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Special advisers are temporary civil servants, of party political alignment,
appointed on a basis of individual ministerial patronage. Particularly since 1997,
there has been much interest in their activities. This work sets out to provide a
historical perspective on the subject, which is currently lacking. The long-tenn
background to the instigation of the special adviser and the circumstances in
which this innovation took place will be discussed. The central focus of this work
is upon the period 1964-70, during which, it will be argued, special advisers, as
they are now conceived, were first used. Full consideration is given to the
subjects of who special advisers were, what they did and why, as well as how they
functioned. Their official positions, in terms of matters such as job titles, pay,
access to information and rules governing their conduct, will be investigated.
Also of importance will be an understanding of their relations with each other,
career civil servants and ministers. All of these themes will be	 extrapolated
beyond the period in which special advisers were first used, through to the present
day. Most importantly, an explanation of the collective significance of special
advisers will be attempted. A core thesis, that they are best understood in terms of
their relations with their employing ministers, will be proposed, along with a
number of possible alternative interpretations. Primary material, including
memoirs, diaries, personal and institutional papers, Public Record Office files and
interviews, will form the most important basis for this work. Much of this will be
examined for the first time in the context of the special adviser. Secondary
2
sources will also be drawn upon. It is concluded that special advisers were a
complex phenomenon and no single interpretation fits them entirely.
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Special advisers are temporary civil servants, of overt party political
alignment, drawn from beyond the career Civil Service, whose appointments
are subject to the patronage of individual ministers. They may be in
possession of specialist skills or particular experience, drawn from areas such
as academia or business. Variously, they provide services including political
counsel, expert guidance, contact with the media, and personal assistance.
Changes in the party of government are accompanied by wholesale clear-outs
of special advisers. If their minister is sacked or shifted to a new portfolio,
they may serve the successor, follow their employer to a different office of
government, or be forced to leave Whitehall.'
Since the 1997 advent of a Labour administration under the premiership of
Tony Blair, the role of the special adviser inside British government has
received a high level of public attention, often of a critical nature. 2 There has,
however, been no specific attempt to investigate the historical origins and
development of this phenomenon, an omission which this work sets out to
repair. It is intended that the following tasks will be performed. The long-
term background will be explained and precedents for the use of aides of this
For descriptions of the special adviser see: Harold Wilson, The Governance of Britain
(London: Sphere, 1977), pp239-247, Simon James, British Cabinet Government (London:
Routledge, 1999), pp22 1-7 and Reinforcing Standards: Review of the First Report of the
Committee on Standards in Public L/è, Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public
Life, Cmnd. 4557-1 (London: HMSO, 2000), pp68-71.
2 See, for example: Nicholas Jones, The Control Freaks (London: Politico's, 2001).
type sought. The circumstances in which the special adviser was instigated,
and the motives lying behind this, must be described. A study of the
experiment which followed, during the 1964-70 Labour administrations of
Harold Wilson, will be conducted. This period has been selected since, as will
be shown, it was the crucial, formative, one for the special adviser.
Furthermore, a rich archive of primary evidence, including Public Record
Office (PRO) files, is now available. This will enable, for the first time, a
careful reconstruction of events and the perceptions of those who participated
in them.
In this context, full consideration will be given to the subjects of who these
counsellors were, what they did and why, as well as how they functioned.
Their official positions, in terms of matters such as job titles, pay, access to
information and rules governing conduct, will be investigated. Also of
importance will be an understanding of their relations with each other, career
civil servants and ministers. All of these themes will be
	 extrapolated
beyond the period in which special advisers were first used, through to the
present day. Most importantly, an explanation of the collective significance of
special advisers will be attempted.
A core thesis will be proposed, along with a number of possible alternative
interpretations of the subject. Because of the lack of secondary material
dealing expressly with special advisers, these will largely be inferred from the
various sources used. They will be considered throughout, with a final
judgement in the conclusion. Primary material, including memoirs, diaries,
personal and institutional papers, Public Record Office (PRO) files and
interviews, will form the most important basis for this work. Much of this will
be examined for the first time in the context of the special adviser. Some of it
has only very recently become available to historians, or is exclusive to this
study. Secondary sources will also be drawn upon. Existing interpretations, in
so far as there are any, will be tested. As previously stated, the focus will be
upon the 1964-70 Wilson administrations, during which, it will be argued,
special advisers, as they are now conceived, were first used. In Chapters II
and III reference will be made to earlier periods and in Chapter VIII, the
conclusion, the main themes will be examined in the context of selected post-
1970 examples.
The central thesis under examination is that special advisers are best
understood in terms of their relationships with their appointing ministers. A
description of this interpretation follows. As already stated, aides depended
upon the patronage of individual politicians for their employment. Special
advisers' first loyalties, therefore, were owed to the particular ministers they
served. 3 The political interests of both were synonymous. The furtherance of
the minister's career, even at the expense of others, was likely to be desirable
to the counsellor. 4 Employing politicians could become reliant upon their
For an expression of this view by one of the most important advocates of the use of special
advisers, see: Fabian Society Collection (LSE, London), K 66.1, 'Civil Service', 1963. 'Civil
Service Group, draft sections of memoranda', 'Advising the Ministers', by Thomas Balogh,
undated, probably from 1963.
This was regarded by many observers as being the case with John Harris, special adviser to
Roy Jenkins, a Cabinet member from 1966-70. See, for example Richard Crossman, The
Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House
of Commons 1966-68 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1976), p.368, diaiy
entry for 7 June 1967.
aides. 5 Special advisers and their ministers sometimes belonged to the same
party faction and shared similar ideological outlooks. 6 They frequently
worked together on key policy objectives. 7 In some cases, ministers and aides
were long-standing associates. 8 Often, they moved in the same social circles
and were friends. 9 In this sense, special advisers were members of the
informal groups which sometimes congealed around politicians.' 0 The
members of such bodies, which could be characterised by internal rivalries,"
achieved influence through their relationship with the person upon whom they
centred.' 2 Even if there was not a pre-existing close personal connection
between aide and politician, it could develop in office.' 3 Bonds of the type
described here could override other commitments, including those to party and
the government as a whole. At times, for example, special advisers acted
against their employers' rivals within the Cabinet.'4
Wilson was regarded by some as, at times, dependent upon Balogh. Richard Crossman, The
Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, Secretary of State for Social Services 1968-70 (London,
Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1977), p.201, diary entry for 26 September 1968.
6 This applied to Jenkins and Harris. Lord Harris of Greenwich in conversation with Andrew
Blick, 3 April 2001.
This was the case with the taxation policies of James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and his aide, Nicholas Kaldor. Robert Neild in conversation with Andrew Blick,
16 July 2001.
8 Brian Abel-Smith was recruited by Richard Crossman at the Department of Health and
Social Security (DHSS) in 1968. The two had first worked together more than a decade
previously. For the fruits of their earliest collaboration, see: National Superannuation
(London: Labour Party, 1957).
For example, Wilson and his senior aide, Thomas Balogh. Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson
(London: HarperCollins, 1992), p.116.
'°An example of this being the informal group which surrounded Wilson, known as the
'Kitchen Cabinet'. For a description of this, see: Philip Ziegler, Wilson (London:
HarperCollins, 1995), p.183.
For the tension between Balogh and another member of Wilson's inner circle, George Wigg,
see: Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, Minister of Housing, 1964-
1966 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), p.92, diary entry for 9 December
1964.
12 For Balogh's regular informal meetings with Wilson, see: Marcia Williams, Inside Number
10 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972) pp81-2.
13 This was the case with President of the Board of Trade, Tony Crosland and his aide Wilfred
Beckerman. Wilfred Beckerman in conversation with Andrew Buck, 15 June 2001.
14 This was the view held by some of Roy Jenkins's special adviser, John Harris. Lord Shore
of Stepney in conversation with Andrew Blick, 13 December 2000.
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Special advisers can also be assessed in terms of their partisanship, which
during 1964-70 meant commitment to Labour. By 1964, the party had been in
opposition for 13 years and the recruitment of sympathetic aides was partly
intended as a means of ensuring the implementation of its radical programme
by an otherwise neutral Civil Service.' 5 All special advisers were supporters
of the Labour government. Their employment resulted from Labour's
electoral success and was dependent upon the continuation of the party in
office. Most were active in party circles for a number of years prior to their
appointment as aides. From 1964, some participated in the implementation of
policies they had helped develop in opposition.' 6 Special advisers often
concerned themselves with the ideological content of policy.' 7 They also took
a particular interest in the party political implications of decisions, for example
their potential impact upon the labour movement or the popularity of the
government.' 8 Special advisers were also associated with attempts to bring
about favourable public presentation of the government and its policies. Of
those recruited during 1964-70, one in particular came from a journalistic
background and devoted much attention to the cultivation of relations with the
press.' 9 Others, too, although drawn from academia rather than the media,
15 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
16 For the role of the economist Nicholas Kaldor as a long-term Party activist who had already
made a considerable contribution to policy prior to 1964, see: Richard Whiting, 'The Labour
Party and Taxation Party Identity and Political Purpose in Twentieth Century Britain,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp 130-172.
For Kaldor's concerns of this nature regarding the 1968 Budget, see: Alec Caimcross, The
Wilson Years: A Treasury Diary, 1964-9 (London: Historians' Press, 1997), p.276, diary entry
for 21 February 1968.
18 For Kaldor's discussion of the latter, in relation to the possibility of floating sterling, see:
Kaldor Papers (King's College, Cambridge), NK 10/2, 'Fixed or Flexible Rates', Kaldor to
Armstrong, 22 July 1965.
' Namely, Harris. For Jenkins's description of Hams's role, see: Roy Jenkins, A L(fe at the
Centre (London and Basingstoke: Papermac, 1994), pp181-2.
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became involved in such activities as speech-writing and media rebuttal.2°
Aides could perform the function of maintaining links between ministers who,
while working closely together in opposition, were now spread out across
various offices of government.21
The recruitment of special advisers could be portrayed as a response to
perceived national decline. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, a sense of
malaise emerged in British political circles, prompted by such factors as a
rapid deterioration in international status 22 and relatively low economic growth
rates. 23 Wilson's 1964 policy objectives were influenced by this vogue. 24
 He
engaged in a number of bureaucratic and policy innovations aimed at
rectifying various supposed British deficiencies. 25 The recruitment of
temporary civil servants can be viewed as an element in this approach.
Moreover, some aides went on to develop major policies aimed, in various
ways, at the reversal of national fortunes.26
20 For Balogh's activities in the latter area, see: Wigg Collection (LSE, London), 4/14, Balogh
to Wigg, undated.
21 Tony Benn, a minister from 1964 onwards, saw John Allen, a prime ministerial special
adviser, as potentially performing this role. Tony Benn, Out of the Wilderness. Diaries 1963-
1967 (London: Arrow, 1988) p.172, diary entry for 25 October 1964.
22 For example, Thomas Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante' in Hugh Thomas (ed.) The
Establishment - A Symposium (London: Anthony Blond, 1959), p.99.
23 Thomas Balogh, Planning for Progress, A Strategy for Labour (London: Fabian Society,
1963), p.3.
24 For the association of certain future special advisers with the development of Wilson's
modemisation agenda, see: Keith Middlemas, Power Competition and the State, Vol. 2,
Threats to the Postwar Settlement: Britain, 1961-74 (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.99.
25 Not least, the establishment of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). Ziegler,
Wilson, ppl7O-l.
26 See: Kaldor's proposal for what became known the Selective Employment Tax (SET) in:
Public Record Office (PRO) PRO T 320/649, 'Introduction of a selective employment tax
1966; working papers', 1962-66, 'The Case for a Payroll Tax and for a New Incentive for
Exports', Kaldor to Callaghan, 6 April 1966.
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It is possible to argue that the special adviser was not a genuine innovation at
all. At various stages in British history, administrations have utilised
temporary bureaucrats, some of whom bore similarities to the 1964-70 batch.
There have been, for example, individual personal aides27 and teams of prime
ministerial advisers. 28 Approaches of this type have sometimes been
motivated by perceived national decline, 29 which, as has been discussed, was a
concern in 1964. Such interpretations of Wilson's 1964 experiment could lead
to the conclusion that rather than signif'ing the emergence of something new,
special advisers were simply the latest in a long line of outsiders to be
introduced to Whitehall. 3° Moreover, the instigation of the special adviser was
in part the continuation of an administrative reform process which had begun
under the Conservatives during the late 1950s. 31 However, as will be indicated
below, views of this type will not be espoused here. Nevertheless, an
investigation of earlier experiments with the use of outside aides and the
changes already underway in 1964 will be conducted.
The instigation of the special adviser can also be explained in terms of a desire
to incorporate greater expertise into the administration. The idea of appointing
policy specialists as bureaucrats was in keeping with a technocratic strand
27	 example, John Rowland, the private secretary of David Lloyd George. Peter Hennessy,
Whitehall (London: Pimlico, 2001), p.59.
28 For an account of the body that served Winston Churchill during the Second World War,
see: G. D. A. MacDougall, 'The Prime Minister's Statistical Section' in D.N. Chester (ed.),
Lessons of the British War Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951).
29 A broad group of anti-decline campaigners from the early twentieth century whose
objectives included the introduction of outsiders into the Civil Service are the subject of: G. R.
Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency (London: Ashfield, 1990).
the 1964 Fabian Society pamphlet The Administrators which proposes the introduction
of temporary bureaucrats, puts it, '[t]hese changes are not startling. Strong ministers do, in
fact, get in the people they want in one way or another now; some personal or "political"
appointments do take place.' The Administrators (London: Fabian Society, 1964), p.40.
'For example, the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), established in 1961,
was staffed by outside economists. Donald MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, Memoirs of an
Economist (London: John Murray, 1987), p.138.
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detectable within Labour, associated in particular with its intellectual wing, the
Fabian Society. 32 Wilson's ideological approach followed in this tradition.33
From the late 1 950s onwards, a number of observers called for the correction
of a perceived weakness in the Civil Service, which, it was argued, over-
valued abstract intelligence at the expense of particular skills and knowledge.
Special advisers, most of whom, during 1964-70, were economists, were
intended to provide ministers with the expert advice that would otherwise be
lacking.34 Their skills were brought to bear in the development of a number of
policy packages. 35 It is also possible, for analytical purposes, to divide aides
into two groups, namely those who were specialists and those who were not.36
Special advisers can be regarded as political actors in their own rights. Some
of them were already substantial figures, for example in the intellectual field,
and carried that weight with them into the bureaucracy. 37 Aides possessed
skills and contributed ideas which might otherwise have been absent from the
administration. During 1964-70 they were motivating forces behind a number
of policy initiatives bearing their distinctive personal imprints. 38 There were
32 Kevin Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall (London and New York: Routledge,
1992), p.7.
B For example, Wilson made much of the idea of technological revolution. Pimlott, Harold
Wilson, p.304.
M This was one of the arguments in favour of the temporary bureaucrat put forward by
advocates such as the economist Thomas Balogh, who was also one of the first wave of special
advisers. See: Thomas Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', in Hugh Thomas (ed.),
The Establishment—A Symposium, esp. p.123.
B For example, Brian Abel-Smith's contribution to the 1969 National Superannuation White
Paper. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.235, diary ently for 23 October
1968. For successive drafts of the National Superannuation from 1968, see PRO PIN 35/334,
'Planning the National Superannuation and Social Insurance scheme: white paper', 1968-9.
36 Abel-Smith, for example, fell into the former group, Harris the latter.
Kaldor was a particularly substantial intellectual figure, as his biography attests. Anthony P.
Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor (Brighton: Wheathsheaf, 1987).
38 For Kaldor's explanation of one of his pet projects, SET, see: Nicholas Kaldor, 'Causes of
the Slow Rate of Growth in the UK' in F. Targetti and A.P. Thiriwall (eds) The Essential
Kaldor (London: Duckworth, 1989).
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also attempts to bring about the implementation not only of particular schemes,
but to influence the overall direction of government policy, in accordance with
special advisers' own preferences. 39 When functioning as individual actors,
the personalities of ministerial counsellors, which were in some cases
characterised by pronounced eccentricities, became important. 4° Special
advisers could become embroiled in political intrigue.41
The subject must also be examined from the perspective of the governmental
centre. It will be shown that, during 1964-70, more special advisers were
attached to the Prime Minister's Office than anywhere else. 42 Such a tendency
could be interpreted as the product of a desire on the part of Wilson to exert
greater control over his administrations. 43 Aides were involved in activities
such as the scrutiny of policy and implementation chasing on behalf of the
Prime Minister.44 It could also be argued that the appearance of special
advisers attached to the premier signified a stage in the emergence of a prime
ministerial department, albeit on an informal basis. 45 During 1964-70, some of
Wilson's allies encouraged him to initiate expansions at the centre, in which
Balogh's attempt to encourage the formation of a Commonwealth economic bloc, see:
PRO PREM 13/182, 'Aid to and Development of Trade with Commonwealth Countries',
1964-5, 'Commonwealth Trade and Aid', Memorandum by Dr.Balogh, 11 March 1965.
4° Kaldor, for example, possessed certain irritating habits. MacDougall, Don and Mandarin,
p.152.
41 For a reference to Balogh's struggles with the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, see:
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.304, diary entry for 6 April 1967.
42 Details of these are contained in: PRO T 199/1063, 'Cabinet Office. Appointment of
Special Advisors to the Prime Minister on Economic Affairs.' 1964-8.
Hence the description of Balogh, in some quarters, as Wilson's 'spy.' Cairncross, The
Wilson Years, p.!, fh.
See: Berm, Out of the Wilderness, p.198, diary entry for 30 December 1964.
This has certainly been an interpretation of the growth in numbers of aides at Number 10
during the 1970s and 1980s, so could be applied to the l960s. See: Lord Hunt of Tamworth,
'The United Kingdom' in William Plowden (ed.), Advising the Rulers, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), p.69.
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special advisers were intended to play a prominent role. 46 The attachment of a
staff directly to the Prime Minister could be taken as associated with the
growth of a leadership cult in British politics.47
There is potential for comparison between foreign arrangements and the use of
special advisers in British government. The French bureaucratic model, as
will be shown, was a direct influence upon the instigation of the special
adviser in 1964,48 as was the 'spoils system' of the United States (US).49
Whether they were the product of a conscious desire to imitate such methods
or otherwise, a comparison can be made between certain advisory structures
which emerged during 1964-70 and those in place abroad. Certain ministers
acquired teams of aides arguably similar in nature to French cabinets.50
Similarities could also be identified with bureaucratic appointments carried out
in the US.51
Special advisers can also be understood in terms of the political approach of
Wilson, the Prime Minister who first utilised them. Wilson's early career
included economic training and service as a temporary bureaucrat during the
Second World War. 52 One aspect of Wilson's premiership during 1964-70
See, for example: PRO PREM 13/360, 'Economic planning in government: views of Doctor
Balogh', 1965, 'Note on the experiences with the Government machine', Balogh to Wilson, 25
February 1965.
' For a full exposition of the theory, see: Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
For evidence of how the French model was taken as a guide, see: A.P. Thiriwall (ed.),
Keynes as a Policy Adviser (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), p.175.
See, for example, Wilson's references to Kennedy's appointments. Whitehall and Beyond
(London: BBC, 1964), p.19.
50 Jenkins's autobiography contains numerous references to his use of a small inner team, that
included his special adviser, Harris, see: Jenkins, A Life at the Centre.
51 For example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.7, diary entry for 19 October 1964 and flu.
52 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister (London: Penguin, 2001), p.287.
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was his association with an informal group of loyalists, known as the Kitchen
Cabinet, which included at least two temporary bureaucrats, Balogh and John
Allen, in its number. 53 He has frequently been portrayed as a shallow
politician, engaging in tactical manoeuvre and presentational novelty at the
expense of long-term strategy. 54 His use of aides may be seen as a product of
such tendencies. 55 However, it could be argued that, in the form of the special
adviser, he bequeathed a lasting constitutional innovation. 56 The personal
counsellors of some Cabinet members figured in various threats to Wilson's
position as premier, which emerged, in particular, from late 1967 onwards.57
Another perspective from which to view special advisers is that of their
contribution to policy. During 1964-70, they were associated with the
implementation of numerous significant proposals, across a variety of areas. A
number of these might not have appeared at all were it not for their input,
which could include detailed formulation, preparing the ground inside the
government and public presentation. 58 Many of the conflicts in which special
advisers became embroiled related to policy objectives. 59 A particular area of
failure attributed to Wilson's first two administrations related to sterling,
Pimlot, Harold Wilson, p.339.
For an example of an unflattering view of Wilson, see: Denis Healey, The Time of My Lfe
çHarmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), pp330-1.
Christopher Booker, The Neophiliacs (London: Pimlico, 1992), p.254.
56 See: Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.338.
For Wilson's suspicions regarding Harris, see, for example: Jenkins, A Life at the Centre,
p.197.
Christopher Foster, for example, was closely involved in technical and political aspects of
the 1968 Transport Act. Sir Christopher Foster in conversation with Andrew Buck, 3 April
2001.
For evidence of Balogh becoming involved in conflicts over North Sea Gas policy, see:
PRO CAB 147/18, 'Natural gas pricing arrangements', 1966-7.
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which, after much resistance, was devalued in November 1967.60 Aides took a
strong interest in this, attempting to influence the outcome.6'
Finally, since the subjects of this work were employed as civil servants, albeit
on a temporary basis, they should be analysed in terms of their relationship
with the career bureaucracy. The appointment of special advisers challenged
certain entrenched Whitehall customs, many of which could be traced to the
mid-nineteenth century. 62 Traditionally, senior civil servants were party
political neutrals, recruited on a basis of open competitive examination, rather
than personal patronage. Their tenure was not dependent upon the fortunes of
individual ministers or election results. Normally, shortly after graduation
from University, they commenced lifelong employment. Movement in and out
of the Civil Service during the course of a single career was abnormal. So,
too, was the recruitment of outsiders into Whitehall. The philosophy of
generalism, which valued abstract intelligence over specialist knowledge,
prevailed. Typically, senior bureaucrats were educated in subjects such as
Classics or Mathematics at Oxford or Cambridge. The most influential office
of government within Whitehall, in terms of both personnel decisions and
policy formation, was the Treasury.63
60 For a critical account of this, see: MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.152.
61 For Kaldor's views on this, see: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/2, 'Fixed or Flexible Rates', Kaldor
to Armstrong, 22 July 1965.
62 For an important source of these tendencies, see: The Northcote-Trevelyan Report,
reproduced in Appendix B, The Civil Service, Vol. 1, Report of the Committee 1966-68,
Cmnd. 3638 (London: HMSO, 1968).
63 For an advocacy of this, see: Sir Edward Bridges, Portrait of a Profession, The Civil Service
Tradition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950). A critical view can be found in
The Administrators.
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The instigation of the special adviser followed a period of public questioning
of many of these traditions, to which it was partially intended as a corrective.
Balogh, one of the most vehement critics of the career bureaucracy, was also
amongst the first wave of aides in 1964. He was particularly opposed to
Treasury dominance of the Civil Service, which he sought to challenge by
various means, including the appointment of special advisers.M One motive
for the use of aides was the desire to ensure that Labour's policy programme
was not obstructed by permanent civil servants. 65 During Wilson's first two
administrations, there was a degree of antagonism between career officials and
special advisers, centring on issues such as status, propriety 66 and access to
ministers, committees and official papers. 67 There were also problems in
obtaining Civil Service security clearance for aides.68
Chapter II will provide the long-term historical background. As already stated,
the 1964-70 experiment took place in the context of a senior Civil Service
characterised by party-political neutrality, permanent employment and
generalism. The emergence of these values, criticism of which rose to a
crescendo in the late 1 950s and early 1 960s, requires explanation. The
perception of national decline, another important theme, prompted
reassessment of bureaucratic arrangements on occasions prior to 1964. The
See: Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante.'
65 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
For the concerns of the senior civil servants' union, the First Division Association, regarding
the initial appointment of special advisers, see: PRO T 199/89 1 'Discussions with and
information supplied to the First Division Assocation (Treasury Branch) concerning
appointments to economic posts in the Civil Service' 1964-5.
6 For Balogh's difficulties in some of these areas, see, for example: PRO CAB 2 1/5248,
'Access to reproduction, circulation and custody of committee minutes, memoranda and
economic papers by Thomas Balogh.', 1960-5.
68 See, for example: PRO 1 199/1164, 'Government Economic Service: employment of
economic adviser Professor N Kaldor and supporting staff', 1964-70, 'Note for the Record',
30 November 1967.
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historian G. R. Searle has observed similarities between the Edwardian
'National Efficiency' movement and the modemisation campaign of the late
1950s and early 1960s, which immediately preceded Wilson's narrow election
success in 1964.69 Foreruimers of the special adviser in earlier periods can be
recognised. For example, during the early twentieth century, politicians such
as David Lloyd George made use of personally appointed aides. The historian
Peter Hennessy has described John Rowland, Lloyd George's private
secretary, as a 'special adviser in today's terminology.' 70 As Prime Minister
during the First World War, Lloyd George established the Prime Minister's
Secretariat. John Turner has traced a line from this through to Harold
Wilson's use of 'independent policy advisers.' 7 ' The large-scale use of
temporary civil servants during the Second World War must also be examined.
Many of those involved in the 1964-70 special adviser experiment were
influenced by the 1939-45 experience.72
As previously stated, the central focus of this work will be upon the 1964-70
period, during which Wilson's first two Labour administrations conducted the
inaugural experiment in the use of special advisers. It will be shown that, prior
to 1964, the patronage-based recruitment of outsiders into the Civil Service as
senior aides did sometimes take place, and the term 'special adviser' was
applied inside bureaucratic circles, although not with its latterly assumed
meaning. However, what marked out the Labour governments of 1964-70 was
69 Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, p.xiii.
° Hennessy, Whitehall, p.59.
' John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
p.4.
2 See, for example: Richard Crossman, 'Scientists in Whitehall', in Richard Crossman,
Planning for Freedom (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965).
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the concerted use of such appointments from the outset, to whom the 'special
adviser' title was applied, as an element within a specific administrative and
ideological programme. Moreover, this approach took root. As Wilson's
biographer, Ben Pimlott, puts it, '[p]revious prime ministers had sometimes
employed non-civil service staff.. . [b]ut Wilson was the first to do so. . .on a
substantial scale, and as a matter of principle. The innovation stuck: what was
pioneering and risque in 1964 became an established practice, copied and
institutionalized by later administrations.'73
Chapter III will examine the circumstances in which the first special advisers
were appointed and the reasons for this development, particularly from the
point of view of the Labour Party. The bureaucratic developments already
underway in 1964 will be assessed, along with Wilson's political style.
Chapters IV, V and VI will cover the period 1964-7. In Chapter IV, the initial
wave of aides recruited in 1964 will be portrayed. Attention will be devoted to
their relations with the permanent machine, ministers and each other, the issue
of access to official papers and membership of committees, as well as
propriety questions. Possible theoretical interpretations of the special adviser
will be explored and the media reaction to Wilson's innovation depicted.
Short biographical studies of three aides, namely John Allen, Thomas Balogh
and Nicholas Kaldor will be provided in Chapter V. Chapter VI will consist of
case-studies of the performance of special advisers in relation to three specific
policy areas. The first is that of sterling, which was devalued in late 1967.
The second is the 1966 introduction of Selective Employment Tax (SET).
1 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.338.
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Finally, Balogh's opposition to EEC membership will be considered, along
with the dissenting views of his team member, Stuart Holland, who saw
European integration as an opportunity for more effective economic planning.
Developments during 1967-70 will be covered by Chapters VII and VIII.
Under examination in Chapter VII will be the shifting balance of power inside
the Wilson administration which followed the devaluation of the pound. This
had implications for a number of special advisers. Consideration will also be
given to the behaviour of the Security Service (the internal agency, commonly
known as MI5) towards certain temporary bureaucrats. In Chapter VIII, the
role of Brian Abel-Smith, aide to the Secretary of State for Social Services,
Richard Crossman, will be considered. Attempts at broad bureaucratic reform
during the first two Wilson administrations reached a crescendo in 1968 with
the appearance of the Fulton report, 74
 which contained a number of proposals
relevant to the special adviser. A description of Christopher Foster's activities
at the Ministry of Transport and Jenkins's use of a small group of aides will
assist an examination of the question of the use of teams including patronage-
based appointments. The electioneering activities of special advisers in the
run-up to the 1970 poll will then be considered.
Chapter IX will evaluate all the possible interpretations of the special adviser
outlined above, drawing conclusions on a basis of the evidence which has been
examined. Further investigations of the themes already discussed will then be
engaged in, with reference to selected developments between 1970 and 2002.
' The Civil Service, Report of the Committee 1966-68, Cmnd. 3638.
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As discussed, there is no previous historical study of the special adviser.
Secondary sources which have been drawn on for all chapters include Peter
Hennessy's Whitehall,75 the only comprehensive history of the Civil Service.
Hennessy emphasises the importance of the declinist school which emerged in
the late 1 950s in influencing subsequent bureaucratic reforms, including the
use of special advisers. Henry Roseveare's The Treasury traces the emergence
of this institution as the central office of government and the philosophies
associated with it. 76 The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, 77 by Deimis
Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, contains valuable analysis of organisation and
staff at Number 10 and their staff, including special advisers. The argument
presented by Kavanagh and Seldon is that, while the number of aides attached
to Prime Ministers has increased, there has been no absolute increase in the
power of the premier.
Kevin Theakston's Leadership in Whitehall78 consists of a series of profiles of
senior civil servants, covering a period from the nineteenth through to the late
twentieth century. This group-biographical approach is followed in Chapter V.
Also by Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall79 offers a clear thesis
regarding Labour's approach to the administrative machine. Here, a
technocratic, Fabian tradition within Labour is identified, as well as a tendency
to doubt whether the existing official machine was willing or able to
Hennessy, Whitehall.
76 Henry Roseveare, The Treasury, The Evolution of a British Institution (London: Allen Lane,
1969).
' Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister (London:
HarperCollins, 1999).
Kevin Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall.
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implement socialism. Much of this will be agreed with. Most importantly,
from the perspective of this study, Theakston casts doubt on the notion that
Labour failed to implement its programme during 1964-70 as a result of
subterfuge on the part of permanent civil servants. 80 As he puts it, 'Labour's
problems, frustrations and "failures" in office are political in origin rather than
due to civil service sabotage and obstruction.' 81 Theakston's argument will be
engaged with in this work. It will not be suggested that career Whitehall was
responsible for all the problems experienced during Wilson's first premiership.
However, it will be shown that permanent officials did offer resistance to the
special adviser experiment. Furthermore, in order to pursue their own policy
agendas, career bureaucrats sometimes deliberately excluded aides from the
policy formation process.
Theoretical texts used include Advising the Rulers, a collection edited by
William Plowden. 82 This provides accounts of various international forms of
counsel, drawn on for the comparative aspects of this work. Of particular use
are its descriptions of the continental cabinet and the US 'spoils system.'
Michael Foley's The Rise of the British Presidency 83 argues that the cult of the
personality prevalent in US politics has come to the fore in Britain in recent
decades. Special advisers, attached to individual politicians rather than
institutions, could be regarded as symptomatic of this trend. It will be argued
in this study that some of the tendencies Foley identifies apply to senior
ministers other than the premier, which Foley concentrates on. Martin J.
80 Ibid, pp32-7.
81 Ibid, ix.
82 Plowden (ed.) Advising the Rulers.
83 Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency.
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Smith's The Core Executive in Britain 84 summarises a fairly recent
development in political science, core executive theory. This is founded on a
view of government as an arena in which multiple actors trade resources such
as information and authority in order to achieve particular objectives. Special
advisers could be viewed as participants in such a process.
For Chapter II, particularly good in its coverage of the emergence of the
permanent Civil Service is Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway's The
Dynamics ofAdministrative Reform. 85 This analyses the circumstances, at
various points in British history, in which bureaucratic change has come about.
John Turner's Lloyd George 's Secretariat86 details experiments with prime
ministerial aides during the Great War, which can be compared with similar
subsequent endeavours. Studies of significant outsiders recruited into the Civil
Service prior to 1964 include Robert Skidelsky's three-volume biography of
the economist John Maynard Keynes. 87 José Harris's William Beveridge, A
Biography is a portrayal of an individualistic academic in the pre-1964 period,
who was able to achieve great influence inside government.88
Paul Addison's The Road to 1945 is an historical study of the broad swing to
the left which took place in British politics during the Second World War, to
Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
85 Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics ofAdministrative Reform
(London: Croom Helm, 1980).
86 Turner, Lloyd George 's Secretariat.
87 Robert Skideisky, John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 1, Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920, (London and
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983); John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 2, The Economist as
Saviour, 1920-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1992); and John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 3, Fighting
for Britain, 193 7-1946 (London: Macmillan, 2000).
88 José Harris, William Beveridge, A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
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which temporary bureaucrats were particularly significant. 89 Addison's is an
account of the emergence of what is described as the post-war political
consensus. This supposedly entailed a high level of agreement over policy
between leading politicians, also taking in senior civil servants. The
implications of the use of special advisers, who were partisan bureaucrats, for
consensus theory, must be considered. The 1939-45 conflict also prompted the
establishment of the Economic Section, a specialist advisory unit initially
attached to the War Cabinet, of which former staff members, Alec Cairncross
and Nita Watts, have produced an history, covering the years 1939-61.° This
could be viewed as part-way between a primary and secondary text.
The relatively recent availability of relevant Public Record Office (PRO) files
explains their absence from many secondary studies of the 1964-70 period.
Nevertheless, there are a number of valuable works. These include two
biographies of Wilson, Ben Pimlott's Harold Wilson91 and Philip Ziegler's
Wilson. 92 As discussed, the former portrays its subject's recruitment of
temporary bureaucrats as a significant constitutional breakthrough. Pimlott's
book also contains a detailed examination of the sometimes real, sometimes
imagined attempts by various rivals and elite social groups to undermine or
remove Wilson. Hermessy's The Prime Minister93 has a chapter dedicated to
Wilson's first two administrations, relating them to the characteristics and
89 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (London: Piinlico, 1994).
° Alec Cairncross and Nita Watts, The Economic Section 1939-1961 (London and New York:
Routledge, 1989).
' Pimlott, Harold Wilson.
92 Ziegler, Wilson.
Hennessy, The Prime Minister.
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development of the office he held. The Chancellors,94 written by former
Labour politician and academic Edmund Dell, good for the entire post-1945
period, provides a searching analysis of economic policy during Wilson's first
two administrations. Dell argues that Wilson's programme, with which special
advisers were closely involved, was misconceived.
The Wilson Governments, a collection edited by Richard Coopey, Steven
Fielding and Nick Tiratsoo, is also drawn upon here. 95 The value of this is its
analysis of its subject from a variety of different standpoints, including the
activities of the Security Service, members of which may have been attempting
to undermine the Prime Minister. Anthony P. Thirlwall's Nicholas Kaldor, 96 a
portrait of the economist who served as a Treasury aide, is the only biography
of a special adviser from the 1964-70 period. This conveys how Kaldor's
considerable intellectual abilities were applied inside the administration, as
well as the great influence he achieved.
Andrew Graham was a member of Balogh's team from 1966 and took over as
Wilson's senior economic adviser in 1968, serving until 1969. His article,
entitled 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985)' portrays its subject as an intuitive, if
flawed, genius, as well as emphasising the closeness of his relationship with
Wilson. It also argues that, during his time as a special adviser, Balogh
reduced his own effectiveness through a tendency to try and achieve too
' Edmund Dell, The Chancellors, a History of the Chancellors of the Exchequer 1945-90
(London: HarperColims, 1996).
R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo, The Wilson Governments, 1964-19 70 (London and
New York: Pinter, 1993).
Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor.
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much.97 June Morris, who assisted Balogh in the preparation of an
autobiography halted by his death, follows a similar line to Graham in her
article, 'Thomas Balogh and the Fight for North Sea Revenue', which also
details his performance in relation to the question of North Sea Gas in the late
1960s. 98 In his chapter from Richard Rose's Policy Making in Britain, called
'The Irregulars' Samuel Brittan provides an overview of the extensive use of
economists made by Wilson's first two administrations. He emphasises the
fact that, while this was presented as a means of brining about a reversal in
economic fortunes, none was forthcoming. The practical difficulties
experienced by outsiders within Whitehall are also discussed.
Susan Crosland, a journalist, has written a biography of her husband, the
Labour intellectual and minister Anthony Crosland)°° This portrays the futile
struggle, engaged in by, amongst others, certain special advisers, to persuade
Wilson to devalue sterling, as well as the role of John Harris in the build up of
resentment between Crosland and his friend and colleague, Roy Jenkins. It
also describes the relationship between Crosland and his special adviser,
Wilfred Beckerman. Giles Radice's Frends and Rivals' 0 ' is a triple biography,
written by a Labour politician and intellectual, of three senior figures on the
Labour right, Jenkins, Crosland and Denis Healey, all of whom made use of
special advisers at various points. Richard Whiting's The Labour Party and
97 Andrew Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985)', Contemporary Record, Vol. 6, No. 1
(Summer 1992), pp194-207.
98 June Morris, 'Thomas Balogh and the Fight for North Sea Revenue', Contemporary British
History, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp105-29.
Samuel Brittan, 'The Irregulars', in Richard Rose (ed.), Policy-Making in Britain, A Reader
in Government (London: Macmillan, 1969).
100 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland (Sevenoaks: Coronet, 1983).
101 Giles Radice, Friends and Rivals (London: Little, Brown, 2002).
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Taxation'°2 includes a particularly detailed analysis of Kaldor's role in the
formation and implementation of Labour policy. It argues that one major
proposal he helped drive through, Selective Employment Tax, was far more a
product of his individual effort than the labour movement as a whole.
Howard Glennerster' s British Social Policy since 1945103 is drawn on here,
particularly for its coverage of pensions. This traces Brian Abel-Smith's
development of the National Superannuation scheme in opposition through to
his efforts at its implementation in office. Michael Stewart, who was a special
adviser from 1964-7, is the author of Politics and Economic Policy since
1964.'° This is useful, in part, for its description of the political contingencies
which led to the adoption of SET. The Mitrokhin Archive, by Vasili Mitrokhin
and Christopher Andrew, which details Soviet intelligence activities in the
West, is relevant in that it contains no references to any special advisers, since
some aides had problems in obtaining security clearance.' 05 The journalist
Christopher Booker's The Neophiliacs analyses the 1960s as supposed era of
cultural	 Booker portrays the appointment of special advisers as
motivated by Wilson's tendency towards gimmickry.
There are a number of valuable primary sources in the form of published texts.
Periodicals, including newspapers such as The Times, The Sunday Times,
102 Whiting, 'The Labour Party and Taxation Party Identity and Political Purpose in
Twentieth Century Britain.
103 Howard Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
'° Michael Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, The Jekyll and Hyde Years
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1978).
105 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, The KGB in Europe and
the West (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000).
' °6 Booker, The Neophiliacs.
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Financial Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mirror, Daily Express and Daily
Mail, have been consulted, along with journals such as The Economist and
New Statesman. These demonstrate the high level of media attention special
advisers and the policies they were associated with received during 1964-70.
Party manifestos have been drawn upon.'° 7 Used for Chapter II, D.N.
Chester's Lessons of the British War Economy'° 8 is a collection detailing
bureaucratic mobilisation for the Second World War, written by protagonists.
Donald MacDougall's Don and Mandarin gives an account of his experiences
as a temporary economist serving in Whitehall during this period, as well as
his numerous returns to bureaucratic employment in subsequent decades.'° 9 In
Change and Fortune, 11 ° Douglas Jay, later a Labour minister, recalls his spell
as an aide to the Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Edward Bridges, a
leading mid-twentieth century civil servant, acted as a public spokesman on
behalf of the permanent bureaucracy and a number of his speeches and written
works are available. He was an exponent of the principles of generalism, party
political neutrality and Treasury control, which special advisers, in various
ways, challenged.111
The period immediately preceding the instigation of the special adviser is rich
in primary material. The 1957 Labour Party publication, National
Superannuation , U2 provides an indication of the intentions lying behind later
pensions policy. Brian Abel-Smith supplied some of the content for this. A
107 Found in: F.W.S. Craig (ed.) British General Election Manfestos 1900-19 74 (London and
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1975).
108 Chester (ed.), Lessons of the British War Economy.
109 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin.
° Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, A Political Record (London: Hutchinson, 1980).




Chance' 2° is the memoir of James Callaghan, whom, amongst many senior
posts, was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1964-7. One interesting aspect
to this is his description of the contingencies which prompted the adoption of
SET. The Time of My LJ,' 2 ' the autobiography of Denis Healey, the
Secretary of State for Defence from 1964-70, contains a particularly scathing
portrayal of Wilson as dabbler and opportunist.
Marcia Williams, Wilson's Personal and Political Secretary, provides insight
into the workings of her employer's inner circle with her Inside Number 10,122
as does another close Wilson ally, George Wigg, Paymaster General from
1964-7, in his autobiography.' 23 Wilson's own record of his first two
administrations contains no indexed reference to any special adviser, but is
good as a general reference work.' 24 As well as 'The Apotheosis of the
Dilettante', important Balogh texts include Unequal Partners,' 25 which
provides insight into his intellectual development, and Planning for Progress,
which, published in 1963, was an account of the views and proposals he took
with him into office. 126 The Essential Kaldor, 127 a collection of Kaldor's
economic writing, contains an exposition of SET, his most dramatic policy
achievement.
120 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987).
121 Healey, The Time ofMy L/è.
122 Williams, Inside Number 10.
123 Lord Wigg, George Wigg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972).
124 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70, A Personal Record (Harrnondsworth:
Penguin, 1974).
125 Thomas Balogh, Unequal Partners (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963).
126 Balogh, Planning for Progress.
127 Targetti and Thirlwall (eds), The Essential Kaldor.
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As will become apparent, the activities of special advisers were often informal
and their relations with ministers markedly personal. For this reason, private
papers and diaries provide a vivid image of the subject under examination.
While not always supplying reliable technical detail, these sources offer
insight into the impressions and perceptions of practitioners. A number of
collections of personal papers have been studied. These include those of two
special advisers, Brian Abel-Smith 128 and Nicholas Kaldor.' 29 For the 1950s
and 60s, the journals kept by Labour politicians Hugh Dalton,' 3° Richard
Crossman' 3 ' and Tony Benn' 32 help demonstrate the long term involvement of
future aides with particular factions and individuals within Labour, which, as
will be shown, continued into office.
The 1964-70 Wilson administrations were particularly well served by diarists.
These include the Labour ministers and Wilson allies Benn, 133 Barbara
Castle' 34 and Crossman.' 35 All three were in close contact with Wilson and
various temporary civil servants. Crossman's record in particular contains a
wealth of references to special advisers, especially Balogh and Abel-Smith.
Crossman displays a tendency to overemphasise the role of personality in the
political process. Nevertheless, this provides a counter-balance to the
128 Abel-Smith Collection, (LSE, London).
129 Kaldor Papers.
130 Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40, 1 945-60 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1986).
131 Janet Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman (London: Hamish
Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1981).
132 Tony Benn, Years of Hope, Diaries 1940-1962, (London: Hutchmson, 1994).
133 Benn, Out of the Wilderness; and Tony Benn, OffIce without Power, Diaries 1968-72
(London: Arrow, 1989).
'' Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1984).
135 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. I; Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet
Minister, Vol. 2; and Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3.
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sometimes misleadingly uncontroversial official files. Alec Cairncross, Head
of the Government Economic Service from 1964-8, also kept a regular
record.' 36 Caimcross sat on the Economic Advisers committee, along with
numerous special advisers, and provided detailed accounts of both personality
and policy. The introduction he wrote to this volume, which, although written
three decades after the fact, is useful, particularly in its description of his
uneasiness at the appointment of special advisers in 1964. Political Diaries'37
details some of the activities of Patrick Gordon Walker, a leading figure on the
Labour right. His account of a plot to oust Wilson implicates Roy Jenkins's
aide, John Harris.
There are a large number of relevant and revealing PRO files, drawn on
particularly for Chapters III-VIII.' 38 There is numerous evidence of the
internal discussion of the appointment of special advisers, as well as the
experiences of these aides. Policy formation participated in by various aides
during 1964-70 is also apparent, along with sensitive information relating to
security issues. Also of interest is the FU ('Forever Unmentionable') Treasury
committee, responsible for sterling devaluation contingency planning, from
which two senior special advisers, Kaldor and Balogh, were excluded.'39
136 Cairncross, The Wilson Years.
137 Patrick Gordon Walker, Political Diaries, 1932-19 71 (The Historians' Press, London,
1991).
138 Most useful here are the PRO Cab [Cabinet], PREM [Prime Minister's Office] and I
çTreasurYl classes.
FU files can be found in: PRO T 312 'Treasury: Finance Overseas and Co-ordination
Division and Finance (International Monetary) Division: Registered Files (2F and 2F (IM)
Series).
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However, there are gaps. So far, the only file devoted to the policy papers of a
particular aide to have come to light is that of Balogh.' 4° For this reason,
traces of the others are often scattered and in some cases not apparent at all.
Discussion relating to the status of sterling, a particular concern of a number of
temporary bureaucrats, was suppressed.' 4 ' Furthermore, as will be shown,
special advisers inhabited a world somewhere between party politics and
bureaucracy. This meant that their activities did not necessarily leave an
official imprint. It is also possible that, perhaps because of the fleeting status
of special advisers within Whitehall, some of their records were poorly
maintained, or have been inadvertently concealed. Moreover, as Balogh once
said, '[o]fficial files do not give away those nuances of intonation, the details
of private horse-trading.' 142 Nevertheless, there is enough PRO material
available, used in conjunction with other sources, to provide a clear picture of
the first special adviser experiment. Owing to the thirty year rule, records
from beyond 1971 were not available. As will be discussed in subsequent
chapters, the Labour party has not historically devoted much time to the
consideration of bureaucratic matters. This explains the absence of relevant
material from its files.' 43 However, the Labour-affiliated Fabian Society did
take a particular interest in the Civil Service and its records have been drawn
on here.'44
'°	 CAB 147, 'Cabinet Office: Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister: Records.'
141 For example, Sir Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to Wilson from 1964-6, was
charged with, and it seems carried out, the destruction of all copies of a 1964 paper
recommending devaluation, produced by three senior special advisers, Thomas Balogh,
Nicholas Kaldor and Robert Neild. Sir Derek Mitchell in conversation with Andrew Buck, 19
A?ril 2001.14 A.P. Thirlwall (ed.), Keynes and International Monetary Relations (London and
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976), p.79.
Labour Party Archive (National Museum of Labour History, Manchester).
144 Fabian Society Collection (LSE, London).
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Official publications examined in the following pages include the 1854
product of Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan's investigation
into the Civil Service. This, it will be shown, influenced the development of
such Whitehall traditions as generalism and career long employment, which
the instigation of special advisers confronted. 145 The 1968 result of the Fulton
enquiry into Whitehall deals with many of the themes under discussion here,
for example the idea of introducing the cabinet to British government.146
Abel-Smith was responsible for much of the drafting of the 1969 National
Superannuation and Social Insurance White Paper.' 47 Extensive use has been
made of The British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List,' 48 an earlier
incarnation of the Civil Service yearbook. This provides details such as job
titles and salaries, the determination of which for special advisers took on great
significance. Hansard, the Parliamentary record, also contains relevant
material, for example in the form of discussions of policies to which aides
contributed, as well as questions relating to their appointments.
Finally, twenty interviews have been conducted. There are pitfalls associated
with the use of oral testimony in historical research, relating to such factors as
the fallibility of memory and the tendency towards individual self-
justification.' 49 Nevertheless, owing to the sometimes uncertain position of
special advisers inside the official machine and their particularly personal role,
conversations with practitioners have proved invaluable. Wherever possible,
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report is reproduced in Appendix B, Vol. 1, Cmnd. 3638.
' Cmnd. 3638.
National Superannuation and Social Insurance, Cmnd. 3883 (London: HMSO, 1969)
In particular: The British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List 1965 (London: HMSO,
1965)
' For a discussion of this, see: Anthony Seldon and Joanna Pappworth, By Word Of Mouth,
'Elite' oral history (London and New York: Methuen, 1983).
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information obtained by this means has been cross-referenced against other
sources. Sir Donald MacDougall served as a temporary bureaucrat on
numerous occasions during the twentieth centuly, for example during the
Second World War, as well as 1964-70. A conversation with him provided a
long-term perspective, as did one with the long serving observer of economic
policy, and brief participant in the first Wilson administration, the journalist
and economist, Sir Samuel Brittan.
All those special advisers from 1964-70 willing and able to participate were
questioned, including Robert Neild, one of the first, 1964, batch, Stuart
Holland, who worked beneath Balogh during 1966-7 and the late Lord Harris
of Greenwich (formerly John Harris), political aide to various Labour
ministers, including Roy Jenkins, during 1964-70. Conversations with Lord
Marsh and the late Lord Shore of Stepney, both of whom served as Cabinet
members during the first two Wilson administrations, supplied a ministerial
view. Similarly, senior civil servants including Sir Derek Mitchell, Principal
Private Secretary to Wilson from 1964-6 and Lord Croham, Permanent
Secretary to the Treasury from 1968-73, helped illuminate the attitudes and
experiences of the permanent machine. Discussions were also held with
Kaldor's biographer, Anthony Thirlwall and June Morris, who is currently
writing a profile of Balogh, both of whom were personally acquainted with




The Permanent Bureaucracy and Outsiders
The significance of special advisers, and the extent to which they represented a
genuine administrative innovation, can only be fully appreciated in the longer-
term context of the development of the Civil Service. The Northcote-
Trevelyan report of 1854 was a touchstone for career officials. 1 Moreover,
demands for the use of temporary aides, which intensified from the late 1950s,
were often founded in a particular view of the historical origins of career
Whitehall. It was argued that the existing bureaucracy, inspired by Victorian
ideals, was no longer equipped to cope with post-Second World War
requirements. Reform campaigners drew attention to the value of previous
experiments with the use of outsiders. The fact that these were not put on a
permanent footing was lamented. 2 It is necessary to describe the emergence,
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of a politically neutral,
generalist, career bureaucracy, dominated by the Treasury. Various attempts
to incorporate outsiders into this institution, prior to the instigation of the
special adviser, will also be considered.
'Sir Edward Bridges, Portrait of a Profession, p.6.
2 The Administrators, pp2-5.
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Victorian reform of the Civil Service
From the mid-eighteenth century, a body of permanent officials, without seats
in Parliament, performing executive functions, began to emerge in Britain.3
The appearance of the single bureaucrat as head of a Government department,
later known as the Permanent Secretary, can be traced to the early nineteenth
century. 4 Nearly all appointments to this embryonic institution were made on
a basis of personal patronage. This mode of recruitment had both advantages
and drawbacks. In some cases, it meant that the right man was chosen for the
right post. However, nepotism and jobbery were rife. 5 By the mid-nineteenth
century, the Civil Service, as Hennessy puts it, 'sagged under the weight of
family, patronage and obligation.' 6 Charles Edward Trevelyan was appointed
to the most senior Treasury post of Assistant Secretary, at the very early age of
32, in 1840. He was a fierce campaigner for drastic re-organisation of the
Civil Service. 7 The Treasury, as the office responsible for overseeing
spending, lay at the centre of government. This role had partly been placed
upon it by Parliament, in its quest for accountable administration. 8 Primarily,
Theakston argues, Trevelyan wanted to strengthen the Treasury, installing it as
the chief office of government.9
Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy, The Development of British Central
Administration Since the Eighteenth Century (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp42-
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ability, and perhaps of questionable character, to situations of considerable
emolument', the report stated. The idea of personally selected ministerial
aides, was, therefore, opposed.
Northcote-Trevelyan proposed that recent graduates should be competitively
recruited through a written test. In the 1854 report, it was suggested that
young entrants were more suitable to a life in public service than older and
more experienced recruits from the outside world. The former could be more
easily infused with the appropriate corporate spirit. The blueprint was for a
Civil Service closed to the outside world; by implication the employment of
'outsiders' was stigmatised. Regardless of changes in the political mastery of
departments, ajob in the Civil Service was permanent; a career. The
recruitment process, the report recommended, ought to be carried out for the
whole service by a central board. This was an attempt to rectify the perceived
problem of a '[fjragmentary' service, where '[e]ach man's experience,
interests, hopes and fears are limited to the special branch of services in which
he himself is engaged.' The Northcote-Trevelyan report, then, put the case for
a centralised service with an intellectual elite comprised of permanent
officials. The members of this group were to be recruited directly from
university on a basis of academic ability rather than personal qualities or
experience. Here can be detected the philosophy of generalism; the belief that
the faculty for abstract thought can be applied to any practical duty.' 2 In the
12 For an exposition of generalism, see: Bridges, Portrait of a Profession.
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Civil Service which developed in the post-Northcote-Trevelyan era, 'technical
expertise tended to be frowned upon."3
The call for the introduction of examinations was a manifestation of the
intention on the part of reformers that the senior Civil Service would become
an exclusive haven for Cambridge and Oxford graduates. 14
 This had specific
social implications. In 1854, in order to qualif' for classification as a
gentleman, an individual not of unquestionably noble birth or established in
one of the professions, had to have attended a university.' 5
 Gladstone sought
to preserve the position and values of the traditional ruling social elite through
limited reform measures. He feared plutocracy; a state overrun by the vulgar
monied classes.' 6
 A possible means of avoiding this was the selection, through
competitive entry, of administrative personnel representing the elite of
respectable, gentlemanly society, rather than the dregs, as was believed to be
the case under the patronage system. As will be shown, a little over a century
later, one advocate of the special adviser regarded the permanent Civil Service
as an element within a social establishment he sought to overturn.'7
Another factor important to an understanding of the Trevelyan programme was
the nature of the Victorian state. Government did, and was expected to do, far
less than would be the case in the following century; laissez-faire principles
0. K. Fry, Statesmen in Disguise (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.36.
Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics ofAdministrative Reform, pp3 8-41.
15 Noel Annan, Leslie Stephen, The Godless Victorian (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1984), p.3.
16 H. C. G. Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.210.
Thomas Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', pp1 17-8.
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ministries to competitive entrance. 24 Trevelyan's objectives in another area
were gradually realised during the second half of the nineteenth century, with
the tightening of the Treasury's grip on government. It obtained greater
powers of scrutiny and control over departmental expenditure, nominally as a
response to political demands for retrenchment. 25 As will be discussed further
in later chapters, one factor leading to the use of special advisers was an
unfavourable perception of the extent of the influence of the Treasury.26
During this period, a distinctive Civil Service ethos of party-political neutrality
began to take shape. From 1870, the practice of appointing experts to
administrative posts declined. Generalist career bureaucrats were less readily
associated with particular policies than the outsiders they replaced. This fact
was associated with the rise of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.
Political heads of department were accountable to the legislature, while
bureaucrats, in theory, were accountable to ministers and required to carry out
instructions once political decisions had been reached. These principles,
combined with the waning of patronage-based recruitment, meant that reform
had guided the developing Civil Service away from the arena of party
politics. 27 By 1964, the lack of politically committed advice available to
ministers came to be seen, by some, as a shortcoming. 28 Moreover, in the view
of one very senior twentieth century career official, the personal commitment
24 Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics ofAdministrative Reform, pp48-9.
25 Maurice Wright, Treasury Control of the Civil Service, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), pp329-
40.
26 See, for example: The Administrators, p.9.
27 Fry, Statesmen in Disguise, pp33-6.
28 See, for example: The Adminsitrators, p.40.
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of bureaucrats to the particular minister they served declined, to be gradually
replaced by loyalty to the Civil Service itself.29
Whitehall outsiders in the early Twentieth Century
In 1901, the Fabian social reformer, Sidney Webb, stated that '[t]he country is
ripe.. .for a policy of National Efficiency.' 3° During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, there emerged in Britain a fairly heterogeneous
modernisation movement. At the time, participants, including Sidney Webb,
referred to a 'National Efficiency' campaign. Another general term,
subsequently attached to the tendency by academics, was 'Social-Imperialism.'
Ideas from left and right were synthesised into a brand of welfarism which, it
was intended, would be founded upon a revitalised Empire. The varied
members of this cross-party movement, who included in their number the
Unionist politician, Joseph Chamberlain, believed in reform designed to
appease the potentially revolutionary working classes. 31 As well as assistance
for the lower orders, the Social-Imperialist programme was intended to
facilitate the more efficient deployment of national resources. Leading figures
within the tendency, such as the journalist J. L. Garvin, feared that, relative in
particular to the United States and Germany, Britain was a declining power.32
Japan was also regarded as an increasingly formidable rival. 33
 One of the
29 Bridges, Portrait of a Profession, p.13.
30 Sidney Webb, Twentieth Century Politics: A Policy of National Efficiency (London: Fabian
Society, 1901), p.7.
' Robert J. Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition, The Politics of Social-
Imperialism, 1900-1918, (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp3-28.
32 G. R. Searle, Country Before Party: Coalition and the idea of 'National Government' in
Modern Britain, 1885-1987 (London and New York: Longman, 1995), p.53.
See, for example: The Earl of Rosebery, 'Foreword' to Alfred Stead, Great Japan, a Study
of National Efficiency (London: John Lane, 1906).
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Social Imperialists' many demands was for the greater utilisation of expertise
within government. For example, the Co-efficients were a turn-of-the-century,
cross-party discussion group, the members of which included Sidney Webb,
the philosopher Bertrand Russell and the writer H. G. Wells. One question
debated by the Co-efficients during 1902 was '[b]y what methods is it possible
to increase the thinking element in the administrative departments?'34
The Liberal Party took power late in 1905 and the following year won a
crushing election victory over the Conservatives. 35 The return of the Liberals
to office occurred in a political context which Social Imperialism had helped
generate. The administrations of the Liberal Prime Ministers, Henry
Campbell-Bannerman and Herbert Asquith, 36 embarked upon an ambitious
public welfare programme. Measures included the introduction of old age
pensions and unemployment insurance, influenced by schemes developed in
Germany during the 1880s.37 Such innovations 'placed new demands on the
state that were beyond the scope of the existing machine and its minders to
meet.' 38 This called for the recruitment of outsiders. For example, in 1908,
Winston Churchill, the President of the Board of Trade, established the first
Labour Exchanges. In order to do so, he had to import experts into Whitehall,
for example the academic, William Beveridge.39
Co-efficients Collection (LSE, London), 'Subjects of Discussion, 1902.'
" Roy Douglas, The History of the Liberal Party, 1895-1970 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson,
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36 Asquith was associated with the social imperialist movement earlier in his career. See, for





The Liberal politician David Lloyd George held high government office from
1906 to 1922.° His political technique involved surrounding himself with
customised institutions and personal allies. 4 ' Lloyd George's tendency to
make personal appointments was interpreted by some contemporaries as a
'predilection for surrounding himself with a bunch of second-rate cronies.'42
However, Balogh referred approvingly to his use of 'men of great ability and
expertise advising him directly - a method. . . of bypassing bureaucratic
obstacles.' 43 Some of Lloyd George's selections were political aides, others
were primarily policy experts. The former included John Rowland, one of
many of Lloyd George's allies who shared the politician's Welsh origins.
Rowland worked in Lloyd George's private office alongside permanent civil
servants. He helped bring about such achievements as the introduction of
National Insurance, which passed into law late in 1911 . Sir George Paish,
who falls into the latter category, was Lloyd George's economics expert in the
early stages of the First World War. 45 During this conflict, Lloyd George
oversaw the introduction of a number of outsiders into Whitehall, for example
the businessmen who were recruited to the Ministry of Munitions, which he
established in 1915.46
Another of Lloyd George's innovations, from his time as premier, was the
Prime Minister's Secretariat, established during the First World War, in early
1917. Comprised of temporary, prime ministerial, personal appointments, it
40Ibid,p.56.
' Ibid. pp56-7.
42 Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, (London: Bame and Jenkins, 1975), p.377.
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was labelled the 'Garden Suburb' because it was housed in huts on the lawn
behind Downing Street. As well as dealing with specific contingencies as they
arose, the Garden Suburb was responsible for inter-departmental co-ordination.
For most of its existence, the Prime Minister's Secretariat had a staff of five,
each of whom were each allotted specific policy areas. Their tasks included
chasing the implementation of decisions, speech writing and research work.47
The historian, John Turner, describes the Garden Suburb as arising from a
'presidential concept of war-leadership.' 48 He argues that, rather than
providing policy guidance to the wartime Coalition government as a whole, the
Prime Minister's Secretariat primarily served the individual, short-term
political interests of the Prime Minister.49
Inter-war Treasury dominance
It has already been shown that, during the course of the nineteenth century, the
Treasury emerged increasingly as the dominant office of government. By the
early twentieth century, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury was often the
first prime ministerial port of call for advice, receiving a higher salary than
other departmental chiefs, but was not the official head of the Service, no such
post existing at that stage. 5° This was to change. On 15 September 1919, a
Treasury Minute announcing Treasury control over the Civil Service was
distributed around Whitehall. This declared that the Permanent Secretary to
the Treasury was now also the Permanent Head of the Civil Service and
John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat, pp I-26; and Frances Lloyd George, The Years that
are Past, (London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp100-101.
48 Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat, p.191.
Ibid, p.192.
50 Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall, pp57-8.
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adviser to the First Lord of the Treasury, (a post almost always held by the
Prime Minister), on Civil Service appointments and patronage. 5 ' Another
Circular, of 12 March 1920, effectively strengthened the Permanent Secretary
to the Treasury further. It stipulated that prime ministerial approval was
needed for all senior Civil Service appointments. As the premier's pre-
eminent consultant in such matters, the Permanent Head of the Civil Service
would naturally have great influence here. 52 An Order in Council of July 1920
gave the Treasury complete control of personnel and staffing matters.53
Lloyd George chose Warren Fisher, who was aged just	 to head the Civil
Service in 1919. He stayed in the top job for twenty years. 55 Early on in his
tenure, Fisher saw to it that elite civil servants were convened as a single
group, throughout almost all departments. Collectively, they were termed the
Administrative Class. 56 Freely admitting that he had little knowledge of
economics, Fisher was a conscious opponent of the notion of the rule of the
specialist in Whitehall. He advocated the movement of administrators through
a number of different offices of government during the course of their
careers. 57 Operating in tandem with the internal ebbing and flowing of staff
was the exclusion of outsiders.58
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To Fisher, the belief that the Civil Service should exist as an entity in and for
itself was vital. 59 Unification of the Home Civil Service was later seen by one
special adviser as having contributed to the creation an independent power-
base, collectively seeking to maximise its influence. 60 Administrators tended
to take more interest in glamorous policy-formation matters than their other
functions, which included internal management. 6 ' During the 1920s, the
senior officials' grip on government tightened when Ramsay MacDonald was
installed as the first Labour Prime Minister in January 1924. For the first time
there was no clearout of Downing Street private secretaries upon a change of
resident. The principle that the employment of Private Office staff in Number
10 was not dependent upon the premier can be traced to this event. 62 One
development during this period led to the existence of institutions from which
partisan, temporary bureaucrats could be drawn. This was the emergence of
party research bodies, such as the Conservative Research Department (CRD),
which was formed in the late 1920s.63
A rare interwar attempt to introduce greater expertise into the bureaucracy
took place when, in January 1930, MacDonald, returned to office the previous
year, created the Economic Advisory Council (EAC). The EAC was intended
to help tackle the problem of unemployment, which had become chronic. It
was comprised of economists, industrialists, trades unionists and others.M The
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EAC's cast was certainly A-list, including the union leader Ernest Bevin and
the economist John Maynard Keynes. However, this collection of specialist
opinion was not properly integrated with the govermnent machinery, and its
role was poorly defined. 65 As one EAC member, the future Labour Prime
Minister Clement Attlee, put it '[t]here were interesting discussions but
nothing constructive ever emerged.' 66
 As will be shown, special advisers, by
contrast with the EAC, were deliberately located within the Whitehall loop.
Outsiders and Total War
During the Second World War, in its bid to direct an effective struggle against
the Axis Powers, the British government engaged in domestic economic and
social intervention on an unprecedented scale. 67 The advent of total national
mobilisation held certain implications for the bureaucracy. Large numbers of
additional staff were needed, many of whom had to be in possession of
particular skills. Accordingly, a specifically established Central Register
supplied the various Whitehall departments with thousands of temporary civil
servants who went on to perform a wide variety of functions. 68
 In quantitative
terms, outsiders were required the most by new departments, including the
ministries of Information, Economic Warfare and Food.69
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In May 1940, following the German surge through the Low Countries into
France, Churchill supplanted Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister.70 The
new premier instigated major changes in the way government was advised,
entailing the use of many expert outsiders, for example in the area of economic
policy formation, as will be shown. Churchill was hostile towards the
Treasury. Its permanent secretary, Sir Horace Wilson, was associated with
Chamberlain's policy for the appeasement of Nazism. 7 ' In place of Treasury
control, economic co-ordination was carried out by the Lord President of the
Council and his Committee. 72 This ministerial Cabinet committee was advised
by the temporary civil servants who comprised the Economic Section of the
War Cabinet. 73 The first Director of the Economic Section was Professor John
Jewkes, an economist from a research department attached to Manchester
University.74
While, theoretically, the Economic Section served the whole War Cabinet,
effectively, particularly from early 1942, it was attached to the Lord
President's Committee. 75 The Economic Section supplied briefs and papers
for the Committee and provided secretaries and members for a range of its
sub-committees.76 The number of staff never exceeded twelve, and was
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normally ten. 77 A variety of statisticians and economists of academic origin
were recruited to the Economic Section. These included one James Harold
Wilson, previously an Oxford don, who was transferred from the Anglo-
French Co-ordinating Committee. 78 Wilson's account of his service in the
Economic Section shows that, as well as utilising specialist skills, members
engaged in 'more general duties.' 79 One aspiring politician who found
employment inside the Economic Section was Evan Durbin, an economist,
associated with Labour. He was said to have 'adopted a role more like that of
a junior minister than a civil servant.. .[he] was in touch with Labour ministers,
and concentrated on large, general issues, particularly those involving social
reform.' 8° Durbin could be seen as a precursor of the special adviser, in so far
as he was a partisan, temporary civil servant.
Another organisation, the Prime Minister's Statistical Section, attached
specifically to Churchill, was required to offer counsel. 81 According to one of
its staff, Donald MacDougall, it 'was essentially personal to the Prime
Minister; it worked continuously for him; it had some idea of what was in his
mind; it knew the sort of thing he wanted to know and how he liked to have it
presented; its loyalty was to him and no one else.' 82 Another member of the
Statistical Section stated that it was created because 'Churchill wished. . .to
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT', 'Official Committee on the Machinery of Government',
Memorandum by Professor Lionel Robbins, 25 January 1943.
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have around him a band of critics, who, precisely because they were not fully
merged into the general machinery of government, would give him an
independent judgement on how things were going forward.' 83 It was led by
Professor Frederick Alexander Lindemann, a physicist nicknamed 'the Prof',84
whom Churchill described as 'my friend and confidant of so many years.'85
'The Prof was soon given the ministerial post of Paymaster General and
raised to the Peerage as Lord Cherwell. 86 The Statistical Section staff of
roughly six economists were mostly temporaries. 87 Their central task was to
keep the Prime Minister informed of matters relating to the allocation of
resources in the context of the conduct of the war.88
Outsiders were also introduced into longer established areas of government. In
the summer of 1940, Keynes was recalled to the Treasury, where he had
previously served during and immediately after the First World War,
subsequently becoming a leading critic of its laissez-faire tendencies. By then
in his late fifties, he remained there until his death in 1946. He had no formal
position and was unpaid. 89 From 1940 onwards, the govermnent began to
assume responsibility for the whole economy, rather than merely setting out to
balance its own books. 9° Budgets had previously been little more than annual
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public sector statements of account. From April 1941, they became tools
designed to maintain equilibrium between demand and supply. 9 ' Henceforth,
such statements included estimates of the total national income and
expenditure. 92
 Keynes's input was crucial to this development. 93 He was also
entrusted with obtaining foreign loans, in particular from the United States
government. 94
 Keynes was the key British figure in the negotiation of the
Bretton Woods monetary agreement for fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates.95
Experts, Keynes believed, had a part to play in post-war government. In 1943
he suggested the 'grouping of the principal economic departments under a
single super-Minister', to whom a staff of economists could be attached.96
Balogh, however, believed that Keynes went native whilst inside the Treasury,
losing his radical edge. 97
 A degree of compromise on Keynes's part was
probably an inevitable product of his involvement in the decision-making
process. In this sense, Balogh's judgement was unfair. As will be shown,
from 1964, Balogh, possibly to his own detriment, was determined not to
succumb to orthodoxy as, he felt, Keynes had.
In 1940, once war had begun in earnest, normal methods of administration
went into abeyance, as has been shown. This fact presented an opportunity to
those members of the intelligensia who sought a radicalisation in the functions
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of government, for example the novelist, playwright and broadcaster J. B.
Priestley. Priestley made the case for an egalitarian society as a war aim.98
Groups such as the 1941 Committee, which met in the home of the Picture
Post proprietor, Edward Hulton and included amongst its members a young
Thomas Balogh, campaigned to this end. 99 Their efforts did not go
unrewarded. Considerable official time and attention was devoted to planning
the society that would be created after hostilities had ceased.'°°
Many of those who forced the pace of the reconstruction project were
temporary civil servants. One such significant outsider was the social scientist
William Beveridge, whose earlier involvement with welfare policies has been
mentioned. Beveridge had long sought to implement his ideas through
association with politicians, for example Lloyd George. 10 ' During the late
1930s, while working at Oxford, Beveridge became increasingly convinced of
the need for economic planning combined with an ambitious social welfare
programme, both during the coming war and beyond.'° 2 Like Keynes, he had
worked in the Civil Service during the First World 	 03 reaching the level
of permanent secretary at the Ministry of Food. 104 From autunm 1939,
Keynes, Beveridge and other such 'Old Dogs' held regular meetings at 46
Gordon Square, Keynes's Bloomsbury residence.'° 5 All awaited the call to
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duty, which one by one they received.'° 6 Beveridge certainly possessed the
difficult personality often associated with individualistic outside policy
specialists. Harold Wilson, who served Beveridge as a research assistant
before the war, described him as 'inspiring and constructive in research,
impossible in personal relations.' 107 Presumably partly as a result of these
tendencies, Beveridge was one of the last advisers to be admitted from
academia into Whitehall during the Second World War. Even then, his
insufferable traits led to his being shunted around the government.108
In June 1941 a committee on 'Social Insurance and Allied Services' was
established under Beveridge.'°9 He took the initiative, conducting
investigations which extended far beyond his apparent initial brief, which was
to investigate workmen's	 The White Paper subsequently
published in November 1942 laid out the blueprint for the welfare state,
advocating universal state benefits, healthcare and education, as well as
maintained high employment levels.' 1 ' Wilson wrote that Beveridge 'certainly
was not guilty of underselling his achievement." 2 Taking on a life of their
own in the public imagination," 3 partly as a result of Beveridge's calculated
priming of the press, the recommendations of the so-called 'Beveridge Report'
were effectively forced upon a reluctant, but distracted Churchill." 4 During
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1943, Beveridge conducted his own unofficial enquiry into methods of
maintaining full employment. His assistants in this endeavour included a
young Hungarian economist, Nicholas Kaldor."5
Interaction between temporary and permanent officials during the Second
World War generated certain tensions. 116 Durbin experienced numerous
difficulties relating to his status and pay." 7 Experts such as Keynes were often
confronted with the problem of 'the inability or unwillingness of some senior
officials to understand the issues under discussion.' 118 The Economic Section
engendered a certain amount of resentment amongst the Departments, when
policy proposals produced by the latter were subjected to criticism or
amendment by the former.' 19 Obstruction was encountered by Churchill's
Statistical Section when attempting to obtain information from Whitehall
officials. 12° As might be expected, certain policy proposals made by
temporaries did not find favour amongst permanent bureaucrats. For example,
established elements within the Treasury offered considerable resistance to the
more radical approaches offered by the Economic Section to the possible
problem of post-war unemployment.' 21 Nevertheless, most temporaries were
full of praise for the co-operation they received from permanent bureaucrats.'22
Lionel Robbins, who succeeded Jewkes as head of the Economic Section, and
his staff were able to achieve much through their determination to work 'with
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the departments rather than apart from them [Robbins's emphasis]."23
Moreover, some disagreements were between outside experts. Robbins wrote
that he possessed a greater willingness to implement austerity measures than
Cherwell, of the Prime Minister's Statistical Section.'24
Chester stated that outsiders brought a 'fresh outlook' to government, which
would have been valuable even if there had not been a war. At the same time,
he felt that 'by the end of 1945, the temporaries were beginning to lose their
value in this respect; their earlier experiences had become heavily overladen
with their civil service experience and they were in danger of losing their
different outlook.' 125 The effectiveness of wartime temporaries was governed
to a great extent by the nature of the institutions and individuals they were
attached to. The Economic Section, for example, failed to fulfil its potential
until it became more closely associated with a powerful body, the Lord
President's Committee, led by an efficient minister, Sir John Anderson.126
The significance of the party-political alignment of temporaries was reduced
by the fact of a Coalition government.' 27 In a time of greater polarisation,
electoral reverses could lead to en bloc changes in personnel among the
temporaries. The relations of outsiders with permanent Civil Servants might
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also have been more strained.' 28 The attachment of policy-forming bodies
such as the Economic Section to the War Cabinet Office may not have been
tolerated elsewhere in the administration under less extreme circumstances.129
The question of the applicability of temporary bureaucrats to peacetime
conditions was examined within Whitehall during the war. The official
inquiry into the future machinery of government, conducted by Treasury
official Sir Alan Barlow, concluded in November 1943 that 'the expert
economist has an important contribution to make to the future business of
Govermnent' but cautioned against the establishment of a central economic
general staff, on the grounds that this might usurp the power of the permanent
Civil Service.'3°
Re-establishment of bureaucratic normality
Allied victory signalled a return to business as usual in Whitehall. The
Statistical Section was dissolved following Churchill's 1945 election defeat.'3'
The Economic Section remained in existence, but by 1953 it had been
officially absorbed by the Treasury, an acknowledgement of the fact that it had
become largely an advisory body to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 132 The
vast majority of temporaries, including, for example, MacDougall, 133 found
their way back to their previous occupations. One reason for this development
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CAB 87/72, 'ThE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIST IN THE MACHINERY OF
GOVERNMENT', 'REPORT BY ThE COMMITFEE', 15 November 1943.
'' MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.41.
132 Samuel Brittan, The Treasury under the Tories (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p.70.
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was the fact that Civil Service salaries were not sufficiently high.134
Employment as a wartime adviser was often particularly arduous.' 35 It is not
surprising, therefore, that a return to academia or business appeared attractive
to so many. The traditional Whitehall strictures on conduct and free speech
also encouraged this exodus.' 36 A note produced by Keynes in 1943, which
correctly anticipated many of them, demonstrated that such problems were
foreseeable.' 37 However, it seems, little effort was made to overcome these.
The Ministry of Production was abolished after the war, 'when it might
conceivably have been built up into a major co-ordinating department or even
a Ministry of Economic Planning." 38 This opened the way for a comeback by
the career officials of the Treasury. Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer
from 1945 to 1947, was a trained economist. He persuaded Keynes, who was
formerly his teacher at Cambridge, to stay on 'as my personal adviser, outside
the establishment.' Keynes, wrote Dalton, 'became my most trusted
counsellor at the Treasury for the last nine months of his life." 39 However, it
has been suggested that, generally, because of his economics background,
Dalton resisted the appointment of experts to the Treasury, feeling that he did
not need help of this nature.140
134 For evidence of this, see: Edwin Plowden, An Industrialist in the Treasury, The Post-War
Years (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989), p.8.
135 See for example: MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.25 and Wilson, Memoirs, pp6O-l.
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Keynes died in April 1946. While it had lost its sole, irreplaceable expert,141
the Treasury soon regained its pre-war administrative hegemony, 142 which had
temporarily been lost to the Ministry of Labour and the Lord President's
Committee. Sir Stafford Cripps became the Chancellor of the Exchequer in
1947. He took the responsibilities for economic policy co-ordination he had
held as Minister of Economic Affairs with him to the Treasury.' 43 Such
developments constituted a pendulum-swing back towards generalist,
permanent administrators and Treasury control.' Ironically, at the same time
that the principle of non-specialism was being re-asserted, the role of the state
was expanding in ways which suggested a need for more expertise, in greater
quantities, than ever before.'45
In July 1945, the first general election held in ten years produced a shock
result. A Labour government was returned, with 393 seats in the Commons, as
opposed to the Conservative's 2 10.146 This victory represented a capitalisation
on the mood for social change, previously described, which had in part
crystallised around the Beveridge report.' 47 The Labour manifesto had laid out
a radical programme' 48 and the government, led by the Prime Minister,
Clement Attlee, was serious about implementation, as its track record
141 Cairncross and Watts, The Economic Section, p.117.
142 Peter Hemiessy, 'The Attlee Governments, 1945-1951' in Peter Hennessy and Anthony
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shows. 149 Policies included the creation of a universal benefits system, state-
funded health care for all and the nationalisation of a number of major
industries, for example coal-mining. 150 Labour held power until 1951. By this
time, it has been argued, the peacetime functions of government had altered
fundamentally. In the words of Addison, 'the new collectivist state was set in
concrete."51
Government was now involved in a vast array of new activities, which surely
called for a stronger presence of expertise within the bureaucracy. 152 This was
not brought about to any great extent. Attlee was not adverse to administrative
modemisation per Se, as his use of a complex cabinet committee system
demonstrated. 153 Furthermore, importantly from the perspective of this work,
certain personal aides were utilised by the 1945-51 Labour administration.
During 1945 and 1946 Attlee employed Douglas Jay, a rising star within
Labour, in his late 30s, as his personal economic adviser.' 54 Jay was
experienced in this role. From 1943, while he was President of the Board of
Trade, Dalton had employed Jay as 'my Personal Assistant on post-war
problems.' 155 In his capacity as an adviser to Attlee, Jay took an interest in
'economics and the press." 56 After initial opposition from the permanent
bureaucracy, Jay was granted access to Cabinet minutes. He also sat on
See: Hennessy, 'The Attlee Governments, 1945-195 1', pp35-8.
' 50 Addison, The Road to 1945, p.263.
151 Addison, 'The Road from 1945', in Hennessy and Seldon (eds), Ruling Perfonnance, p.7.
' 52 Morgan Labour in Power, p.88.
'"Ibid, pp48-9.
For Jay's description of his time at Nwnber 10, see: Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, A
Political Record, ppl28-56.
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'Cabinet committees on major subjects such as food and coal.' 157 As will be
shown, Jay's role and experiences are comparable to those of special advisers
in later decades. As well as Attlee, certain other Labour government members
appointed temporary aides. For example, Herbert Morrison, as Lord President,
was advised by the generalist Max Nicholson, formerly director of the research
body Political and Economic Planning.158
One attempt at administrative innovation, which involved the employment of
temporary civil servants, was the establishment of the Central Economic
Planning Staff (CEPS) in March 1947, under the industrialist Edwin
Plowden.' 59
 Plowden's team contained a mixture of outsiders and permanent
staff. 16° From September 1974, when he became Minister of Economic
Affairs, the CEPS was attached to Sir Stafford Cripps.' 6 ' The independence of
the CEPS, however, was soon compromised, since it was absorbed into the
Treasury upon Cripps's appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer.162
Moreover, the body never fulfilled its supposed long-term planning role,
instead addressing problems on an ad hoc basis.' 63
 Neither this, nor any of
Attlee's other measures amounted to far-reaching administrative change. The
qualities associated with senior officialdom remained unaltered.'
'' Ibid, p.128.
158 Cairncross, Years of Recovery, p.52.
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Aside from the introduction of greater expertise, Labour might have been
expected to introduce bureaucrats committed to its political objectives.
Whitehall was often portrayed in internal Labour mythology as dominated by
public school-educated enemies of the workers' movement.' 65 On a more
sophisticated level, in 1938, the sociailst theorist Harold Laski argued that the
narrow outlook of civil servants made them incapable of implementing radical
legislation.' 66 Balogh later argued that Attlee should have made patronage-
based appointments to senior posts, since, as he puts it, '[c]ertain key positions
of power need for success to be held by sympathizers.' In Balogh's view,
through his failure to displace the existing elites, particularly those based in
Whitehall, Attlee squandered the advantages he possessed in 1945. This was a
mistake Balogh was determined should not be repeated by a future Labour
admjnjstratjon.' 67
 The views of Laski and Balogh, however, were seemingly
not shared by participants in the Attlee governments, as will be shown.
Civil Service reform in the immediate post-war period was a non-event in need
of an explanation. Attlee, as well as other members of his Cabinet, had served
in Churchill's wartime coalition. As a result, he and his colleagues were far
more comfortable in dealing with the personnel and mechanisms of the Civil
Service than they might have been coming fresh to Whitehall. Furthermore,
those ministers who had already operated within the existing system generally
felt it was effective. In the words of Hennessy, '[t]hey had seen the recent
165 Ibid, p.85.
166 For Laski's critique of the Civil Service, see: Harold J. Laski, Parliamentary Government
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administrative past and it had worked." 68 By 1945, the Civil Service was
practised in the implementation of economic planning and welfare policies,
thanks to the experience of total war. 169 The left academic Ralph Miliband
contended that the Labour leadership never contemplated 'a fundamental
transformation of the social order on the basis of common ownership."7°
From this perspective, it could be argued that the Attlee government had no
need to overturn Trevelyan's regulatory Civil Service. Theakston draws
attention to the fact that Labour has never worked out a proper theory of the
state. 171
However, for the first few years of Attlee's premiership, there was pressure for
administrative modernisation to match Labour's social and economic
programme. During the war, left intellectuals had called for a major
bureaucratic overhaul. The journalist and future Labour MP, J. P. Mallalieu,
for example, had called for the establishment of a highly trained elite,
responsible for total economic planning, on the Soviet model. 172 In February
1946, the Labour back-bench MP, Geoffrey Cooper, wrote to the Prime
Minister suggesting the need for reform of the Civil Service in order to ensure
the effective implementation of socialist policies. 173 Cooper was influenced by
the approach taken by the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
of the United Sates from 1933 to 1945. In order to put his 'New Deal' welfare
168 Hennessy, Whitehall, p.1 37.
169 Kevin Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p.26-7.
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programme into place, Roosevelt had ensured that the executive machinery
was suitably adjusted.' 74 Cooper wanted the establishment of a Parliamentary
Select Committee to enquire into the Civil Service. It should, he felt, include
MPs with knowledge of business efficiency methods.'75
Sir Edward Bridges, the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Civil
Service, conceded the possibility that 'the government's legislative
programme. . .will have important consequences on the experience and type of
qualities required in many sections of many depaments.' 176 However, at a
meeting of permanent secretaries in March 1946, it was generally agreed,
unsurprisingly, that Cooper's proposal for parliamentary scrutiny of the
executive machinery was inappropriate. The Civil Service continued to be
self-regulatory.' 77 Evan Durbin, by then a Labour MP, attempted to bring
about publication of a White Paper on Civil Service reform while he was
Dalton's Parliamentary Private Secretary in 1946. As mentioned, Durbin's
interaction with the bureaucratic machine during the war was not happy. His
personal papers indicate an interest in means by which Whitehall might be
modernised, for example alternatives to recruitment by written exam, such as
the instigation of an interview board.' 78 His endeavours were undermined both
by the delaying tactics of Bridges and the appointment of Durbin to a junior
ministerial post at the Ministry of Works. The draft version of the paper,
however, was not radical in its suggestions and was more of a description of
'74Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid, Bridges to Permanent Secretaries, 26 February 1946.
Ibid, 'Orgamsation of the Civil Service', Note of a Meeting, 2 March 1946 and Hennessy,
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existing arrangements than anything else. One reason for this was the fact
that, by this point, the Civil Service Selection Board had been established,
fulfilling one of Durbin's major objectives in the area of staffing policy.'79
Reform of the Civil Service, then, was unfinished business for Labour, to be
tackled by Wilson's administration from 1964.
The Civil Service which re-emerged from the Second World War is
epitomised by Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the Cabinet from 1938 to 1946
and Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and Head of the Civil Service from
1945 to 1956.180 Bridges's power was undeniably great. The academic Peter
Barberis writes that while Bridges 'deliberately soft-pedalled the use of the
term "Head of the Home Civil Service".. .he did not soft-pedal his exercise of
the role." 8 ' He was, however, a virtual unknown to the general public.'82
According to Balogh, a bureaucrat in Bridges's position was able to 'determine
the tone of the whole of the Establishment." 83 Bridges, who consciously took
his cue from Northcote-Trevelyan, 184 was a repository for many of the
characteristics associated with the permanent civil servant described
previously. Sir Derek Mitchell, his private secretary from 1954-6, agrees that
Bridges was the embodiment of the Victorian ideal, who saw his job as a quest
for 'truth which could be expressed in the form of a minute." 85 Though a
product of the past, Bridges's long-term influence was great. Upon becoming
' Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, pp101-3. See: PRO T 273/10 'Civil Service
organisation: setting up of ministerial and official committees and papers concerning draft
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it, 'a Civil Servant.. .is perhaps the least political of all animals.'194
Furthermore, he conceived officials as owing loyalty to the Civil Service as an
institution rather than particular ministers. 195 The introduction of special
advisers, it will be demonstrated, was, in part, a reaction against the kind of
ideas of this distinguished Civil Servant espoused.
Ibid, p.27.




This chapter will examine the circumstances in which Harold Wilson's first
government came to initiate the special adviser, and place this innovation in
the context of certain political trends, Labour ideology and Wilson's particular
qualities. Consideration will be given to the period immediately preceding
Labour's 1964 election victory and the term of office which followed. The
demands for bureaucratic reform which emerged during the late 1 950s,
produced in part by a perception of national decline, must be described, along
with the related changes which had already come about by 1964. There will
be an explanation of the motives lying behind the introduction of special
advisers to government, both in terms of Labour's intellectual traditions and its
desire for effective manifesto implementation. Wilson's political style will
also be assessed in relation to the subject of this work. In particular, there will
be a description of his personal group of allies, which came to be known as the
'Kitchen Cabinet.' The role of special advisers within this informal group will
be investigated. Finally, there will be a discussion of prime ministerial power
in relation to the temporary civil servant.
Decline and administration
The Fabian Society's The Reform of the Higher Civil Service, which appeared
in 1947, described the British Civil Service as 'probably the best.. .in the
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world." The fact that even reform campaigners could be so generous in their
appraisal of the Civil Service was indicative of the high level of complacency
concerning the bureaucracy present in British political circles at the time.2
This was part of a 'general tendency' 3 of contentment that did not survive the
1950s. The Administrators, another Fabian publication, this time from 1964,
was produced by a group of economists, Labour politicians and Whitehall
insiders.4 It stated that '[for many years it has been customary to say that
Britain has the best civil service in the world. The depth of this conviction has
perhaps deflected people from considering what they mean.' 5 While Whitehall
had previously been the subject of relatively gentle criticism, as the 1 960s
approached, the 'mood became nastier, more anguished, more recriminatory.'6
Just as satisfaction with the bureaucracy had been related to a general sense of
national well being, so condemnation of Whitehall was a product of a feeling
of crisis. As will be shown, from late 1956 onwards, members of the
intelligensia urged the declaration of an unofficial countrywide state of
emergency.
The first series of events to encourage this were associated with the
Conservative Prime Minister, Anthony Eden's ill-judged actions during the
Suez crisis. 7 On 26 July 1956, the Egyptian government, led by President
Nasser, announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, in which
l The Reform of the Higher Civil Service (London: Fabian Society, 1947), p.5.
2 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, pp1 70-1.
Kenneth 0. Morgan, The People's Peace, British History since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford
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the British government previously held a controlling interest. 8 Eden's
response, which took the form of military intervention, was opposed by the US
government. 9 Through the refusal to guarantee support for sterling during the
crisis, the US authorities were able to force Eden to abandon his course.'°
Britain's international status was severely damaged, and its ability to conduct
independent foreign policy was called into question. 11 Furthermore, military
efficiency and the probity of leading politicians was also called into doubt.'2
Senior bureaucrats have not been considered leading culprits in the Suez
fiasco. However, the feeling of British decline engendered by Suez led to
intense critical scrutiny of many national institutions, of which the Civil
Service was one.13
The national inferiority complex propagated by intellectuals in response to
Suez was compounded by a number of other developments. Since 1945, the
rate of economic growth in Britain was consistently lower than that of
countries including France, Germany and Japan.' 4 Such a disparity was an
increasing source of concern to many domestic commentators. 15 Britain also
suffered from a confused approach to the developing European unification
project. Numerous invitations to participate were declined. For example, in
1949, the British government rejected the integrationist advances of the French
8 Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), pp38-9.
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Planning Commissioner, Jean Monnet.' 6
 The European Economic Community
(EEC) was formally created on 1 January 1958.17 It included France,
Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations as member states and after a few years
of existence, was generally judged in Britain to be a success. However, Britain
not only declined to involve itself with the EEC at the outset, but established
an organisation initially conceived as a spoiler for the EEC, the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA). The disparate collection of EFTA affiliates, bound
together by the Stockholm Convention of July 1959, included Norway, Austria
and Portugal.'8
EFTA proved to be a non-starter, at least as a viable alternative to the EEC.'9
In 1961, the British Cabinet decided to seek EEC membership, but in 1963, the
resulting application was vetoed by the French. 2° This chain of events was
broadly interpreted as indicative of national weakness. 2 ' By the early 1960s,
then, it was becoming painfully apparent that Britain's global role was
severely compromised, but its European one was yet to be found. The worst
fears of National Efficiency campaigners of six decades previously had
become reality. Britain was now a second-rate power.22
16	 Hennessy, Never Again, pp360-4.
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p.58.
18 Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation Since 1945 (Oxford and Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1992), pp6l-78.
19 Young, Britain and European Unity, p.46.
20 Sean Greenwood, Britain and European integration since the Second World War
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p.1 30 and p.14!.
21 See, for example, Brian Chapman, British Government Observed, p.7.
22 For an expression of this sentiment, see: Chapman, Ibid, p.55.
74
British observers drew dramatic comparisons with the demise of the Spanish
Empire. 23 Domestic scapegoats were sought out and one was found in the
form of the 'Establishment.' The use of the word Establishment as a socially
descriptive term possibly had origins in the early nineteenth century. It was
applied to the Anglican Church, as distinct from Non-Conformism. 24 In 1959,
Hugh Thomas, a former Foreign Office official who left the Civil Service two
years previously, attempted to define the Establishment as a collection of
institutions which between them governed the country. 25 Thomas
characterised the Establishment as possessing an attachment to ideas and
practices associated with the period 1830-70, when Britain was unchallenged
as an international power.26
Conspiracy theorising in various forms was prevalent throughout the Western
world during the late-1950s, for example in the US. 27 Initiated by the
journalist Henry Fairlie, of The Spectator, in 1955,28 Establishment-bashing
took on a particular ferocity in Britain. This fact is in part attributable to the
existence of a rabid desire to identify a group upon which blame could be
allotted for rapid imperial decline. A 1959 book entitled The Establishmen?9
edited by Thomas, investigated aspects of this supposed entity, including the
Public School system, the Armed Forces, the City of London, Parliament and
the BBC. It also included a chapter on the Civil Service, written by Thomas
23 For example, Hugh Thomas, 'The Establishment and Society' in Hugh Thomas (ed.) The
Establishment, p.15.
24 Peter Hennessy, The Great and the Good, An Inquiry into the British Establishment,
(London: Policy Studies Institute, 1986), p.4.
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Balogh, entitled 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante.' Balogh's thesis was an
important one. It will be examined from a variety of different standpoints over
subsequent chapters. Balogh was also a key member of the Fabian group
responsible for The Administrators.30
Those who sought to evaluate bureaucratic arrangements in Britain did not
constitute an homogenous group. For example, Robert Neild, a member of the
Economic Section from 195 1-6 who was involved in the campaign for greater
expertise within the administration, was not motivated primarily by concerns
such as relative national decline. Rather, his complaint was the low status
accorded to economists and other specialists inside Whitehall. 'We were
treated like plumbers' he recalls, 'only called out when things had gone
wrong.' 31 Moreover, Sir Samuel Brittan, whose The Treasury under the
Tories32 was an influential analysis of economic policy-formation methods,
never considered himself to be part of a movement as such. 33 Nevertheless, as
will be demonstrated, certain ideas did recur in reform literature emerging
during the period between Suez and Harold Wilson's 1964 election victory.
A consensus developed amongst many intellectuals regarding the
shortcomings of the Civil Service. Areas of agreement were that Whitehall
suffered from Oxbridge domination34 and was an environment in which
specialist skills were undervalued and 'amateurism' prevailed.35 These
30 Hennessy, Whitehall, p.172.
31 Robert Neild in conversation with Andrew Buck, 16 July 2001.
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criticisms had basis in fact. Between 1937 and 1968, 75% of entrants to the
Administrative Class were Oxbridge graduates. 59% of these had studied
humanities, 29% social sciences and only 7% technical subjects. 36 There was
also said to be excessive secrecy and a lack of movement in and out by staff.37
Furthermore, the power of the Treasury was felt to be too great. 38 More
broadly, observers felt that the Civil Service was a product of the nineteenth
century39 which might benefit if it took a modernising cue from its foreign
counterparts.4° Related to this was the idea that economic policy should move
away from the laissez-faire approach associated with the Treasury and towards
greater interventionism.4'
Balogh was particularly vehement in his criticism, although, in Neild's view,
adding little in the way of original analysis. 42 As an institution, he argued in
'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', the Civil Service, and, in particular the
Treasury, was guilty both of technical incompetence and conspiracy to enforce
its own economically liberal policy agenda upon ministers. The typical senior
career official was characterised by Balogh as a 'smooth, extrovert conformist
with good connexions and no knowledge of modern problems, or of up-to-date
techniques of getting that information.' 43 He was of the view that Treasury
36 Peter Barbens, The Elite of the Elite, fig. 6.2, p.103.
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officials ensured the continued pre-eminence of non-interventionist policy
approaches, undisturbed by election results.
What changes did these reformers propose? There was agreement over the
need for increased specialist knowledge and the recruitment of experts.45
Better training was advocated for civil servants. The model frequently cited as
an example to be followed in this respect was the French one. 46 The French
tradition of technocracy, that is the rule of experts, dates back at least as far as
the foundation, in 1794, of the École Polytechnique ('school of many skills'),
also known as the 'X.' 47 'Les X', as its products were known, often went on to
serve the French state as engineers and technicians. The École Nationale
d'Administration (ENA), created immediately after the Second World War,
turned out students with specialist administrative training, which could be
applied in the field of government. 48 It was argued that mid-career movement,
in both directions, between the service and the outside world, should also be
encouraged.49
Drastic changes were envisaged for the Treasury. In the area of personnel, a
common suggestion was that Establishments (ie: personnel policy) should be
removed from the Treasury to a separate Civil Service Commission. 5° In the
context of the traditional function of the Treasury, that is control of spending,
it is interesting to note that none of the reform texts analysed here called for
Ibid,pp111-2.
Ibid, ppl22-3.
Chapman, British Government Observed, p.12.





retrenchment or a reduction in waste, in fact The Administrators specifically
rules this out. 5 ' Plans for a new approach to economic policy-formation were
at the radical core of the proposals made by Balogh, Brittan, the Fabians and
others. Increasingly, the idea emerged that a new economics ministry should
be created. 52 The proposed role for this department, which would be
responsible for economic planning, clearly representing a challenge to the
Treasury, will be described in greater detail below.
Crucially for this study, a need for temporary bureaucrats, appointed on a
patronage basis, was also frequently identified. 53 Brittan, for example, argued
for the creation of 'a new class of adviser' whose 'job would be both political
and technical. They would be selected in accordance with the personal
preferences of ministers and move freely in or out from the academic world,
industry, the professions, and elsewhere.' 54 Similarly the Fabian society's The
Administrators also proposed 'political appointments.' The Fabians suggested
that there should be two types of temporary adviser, 'experts who are called in
to help implement the particular policies of the government of the day, and
personal aides to provide general help to Ministers in their private office.'55
As will be shown, ideas of this type, when implemented, manifested
themselves in the form of the special adviser. Again, foreign influences were
at play. The US 'spoils system' of patronage-based appointments, was
admired at the time. However, the complete clearouts upon changes of
51 Ibid, p.23.
52 Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories, pp7O-l.
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administration this entailed were seen by some as too extreme. 56 An even
more favoured model, associated in particular with France, was the cabinet,
the handpicked team of ministerial advisers, comprised of both bureaucratic
outsiders and seconded career officials. 57 In July 1962, at the first meeting of
the Fabian Civil Service Group, which produced The Administrators, there was
'some support in the discussion for a modified chef de cabinet system.' 58 This
proposal had great implications for the Civil Service as it was constituted at
the time. As Simon James notes, in countries where the cabinet is used,
typically, the minister's private office as constituted in Britain has no place
and the equivalent to the permanent secretary, if there is one at all, is
responsible for little more than logistical support. Policy formation is in the
hands of the ministerial team. 59 Moreover, the clear distinction between a
career as a party politician and as a bureaucrat associated with Britain cannot
be detected. For example, the French Presidents George Pompidou, Valery
Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac all previously served as cabinet
members.6°
The intention of some reform campaigners was to introduce greater political
control over the bureaucracy. For example, Balogh in particular argued from
this standpoint. This is why he saw the recruitment of 'expert opinion from
outside, sharing the point of view of the Government of the day.. .at senior
Ibid, p.40; Whitehall and Beyond, p.19. For a description of Presidential apppointments in
the US, see: Stephen Wayne, 'The United States' in William Plowden (ed.), Advising the
Rulers, pp7l-91.
57 Hennessy, Whitehall, p.175; and Brittan in conversation with Buck.
Fabian Society Collection, K 65/1, 'Civil Service', 1963. 'Civil Service Group, notices, lists
of members, minutes', Minutes of first meeting, 31 July 1962.
Simon James, British Cabinet Government, p.242.
60 Pierre Gaborit and Jean-Pierre Mounier, 'France' in Plowden (ed.) Advising the Rulers,
p.108.
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levels' as vital. 6 ' There was certainly a distinction between the kind of
explicitly partisan advisers advocated by Balogh and those which, for example,
Brittan envisaged. Brittan's temporaries 'would tend to change with
governments, but this would not be a rigid rule.' 62 As already shown, in the
wake of relative national decline, many intellectuals turned their fire upon
what they described as the Establishment. Balogh's solution to the problem of
the Establishment was to replace it with a new Socialist one, since '[sb long
as Labour hankers after being accepted by the old "Establishment", instead of
creating its own, so long will it be in an awkward position, forced mainly on
the defensive.'63
In Balogh's view, a Labour administration had to be led by the correct
individual and faction. In his 1963 pamphlet Planning for Progress, Balogh
noted that 'Mr Harold Wilson's election to leadership has made a coherent
planning of future Labour strategy easier.M Balogh subjected Wilson's less
dirigiste opponents inside Labour to even greater derision than he did the
Conservatives. 65 Balogh conceived the special adviser as more than mere
technician or indeed partisan, stressing the requirement of personal loyalty to
the employing minister. In a memorandum he drafted for the Fabian Civil
Service Group during 1963, he described how 'each Minister responsible for
an important department should have men at his disposal who are not merely
technically able, who are not merely in sympathy with the political party in
61 Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', p.124.
62 Bjfl The Treasury Under the Tories, p.309.
63 Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', p.126.
Balogh, Planning for Progress, p.7.
65 Thid, p.7 fn.
81
power, but who are personally devoted to the Minister himself.' Such aides
would be expected to enter and leave office with the politician they served.66
Many of the arguments for bureaucratic reform described above rested, to
some extent, on a belief in economic planning. As has been stated, the sign of
British economic weakness considered most significant from the late 1 950s
was that of relatively slow expansion. This led to demands for the introduction
of indicative planning. 67 In Planningfor Progress, Balogh produced a table
detailing annual rates of growth of gross domestic product and output in
various capitalist countries between 1950 and 1960. At the bottom of the pile
was Britain, at 2.7%, compared to Japan, at the top, at 9.5%. France, in the top
half, stood at 4	 68 The perceived post-war success of the French economy
cast a long shadow. 69 In contrast to Britain's Treasury-led laissez-faire
tradition, the French state had long taken a dirigiste approach to the economy.
After 1945, this took the form of indicative planning administered by highly
trained technocrats. 7° Under this influence, by the beginning of the 1960s in
Britain, attempts were being made within government to replace the central,
negative objective of minimum unemployment with the positive one of
maximum growth.7'
Fabian Society Collection, K 66.1, 'Civil Service', 1963. 'Civil Service Group, draft
sections of memoranda', 'Advising the Ministers', Balogh, undated, probably from 1963.
67	 Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, 1951-64,
Thirteen wasted years? (London: Routledge, 1998), pp31-3.
68 Balogh, Planning for Progress, p.3.
69 Donald MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.137.
70 Sampson, The New Europeans, p.330.
71 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, p.20.
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As head of the Planning Commission, Jean Monnet was responsible for
France's first Plan, produced in 1946. His objectives included improvements
in productivity, trade and the standard of living as well as a commitment to full
employment. 72 Production targets and deadlines were set. 73 Rather than the
use of coercion, Monnet's method was one of tripartite negotiations between
state, employers and trades unions in order to arrive at voluntary agreements.74
Monnet utilised expert, often temporary, advisers. 75 He appointed a personally
selected cabinet. 76 Another influence, upon members of Wilson's circle and
those further to the left within Labour, 77 was the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan) of the Soviet Union, instigated in 1921.78 Balogh, demonstrating
the extent of his faith in state intervention, goes as far as to warn that the
command economy of the Soviet Union 'with its vast output of technicians and
ever increasing production' might 'overwhelm us.' 79 According to Balogh, as
a result of their generalist tendencies, permanent civil servants were naturally
prone towards laissez-faire principles. As he put it, '[i]n a planned economy,
the crossword-puzzle mind, reared on mathematics at Cambridge or Greats at
Oxford, has only a limited outlet.' 8° The implication was that outside
bureaucrats would be vital to a successful adoption of planning. On this basis,
politicians from the Labour left had a more obvious motivation for the use of
temporary aides than their less interventionist party colleagues. However, as
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will be shown, during 1964-70, special advisers were employed by ministers
from across the political spectrum.
Prior to Labour's 1964 election success, there had already been significant
government activity related to the concerns described above. The
Conservative governments of 1951 to 1964 utilised outside expertise, even
before the decline vogue began. For example, Churchill, at the beginning of
his second and final 1951-5 spell as Prime Minister, recalled Cherwell (as a
Cabinet member)81
 and MacDougall. Their team was smaller than the wartime
Statistical Section had been, but was housed in 11 Downing Street, allowing
easy access to the Prime Minister. 82
 A very important series of developments
during the long Conservative period of office began in 1957 when the
Parliamentary Select Committee on Estimates established a sub-committee to
investigate the matter of Treasury control of expenditure. 83
 While not all the
subsequent findings were negative, criticism was directed at the Treasury in its
role as lay-critic of policy proposals. 84 In response to this committee, the
Treasury recommended the appointment of another one, this time comprised of
experts. 85
 Under the auspices of Plowden (now Lord Plowden), recalled to
administrative service again, the resulting body of three businessmen and five
anonymous civil servants met and produced reports between 1959 and 1961.86
Roy Harrod, The Prof p.258.
$2 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, pp82-3.
Henry Roseveare, The Treasury, p.287.
House of Commons, Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates, 1957-8, House of
Commons Paper (HC) 254, 1958.
85 Hennessy, Whitehall, p.178.
Roseveare, The Treasury, pp296-7. The Plowden report was published in edited form as
Control of Public Expenditure, Cmnd. 1432 (London: HMSO, 1961).
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The Prime Minister during the Plowden era was the Conservative, Harold
Macmillan, whose term of office covered the years 1957_63.87 He had an
affinity for counsellors drawn from beyond Whitehall, some of whom
performed very personal roles. John Wyndham, for example, served, unpaid,
in the Prime Minister's Office from May 1957.88 As Macmillan put it, '[o]n
and off he [Wyndham] has helped me with his friendship and advice for a
period of over twenty years.' 89 Sir Derek Mitchell, the Prime Minister's
Principal Private Secretary from 1964-6, recalls that Wyndham was able to
work alongside permanent bureaucrats effectively and amicably.9°
Macmillan's outlook was informally influenced by the Cambridge economist
Sir Roy Harrod. Macmillan considered Harrod to be a 'man of considerable
genius. He is often wrong; but then he is often right.'91
Partly spurred by Plowden, Macmillan and the Chancellor he appointed in
1960, Selwyn Lloyd, oversaw a number of significant innovations. 92 In 1961,
the Treasury was given a second representative at Cabinet in the form of the
Chief Secretary, responsible for expenditure, while the Chancellor
concentrated on strategy. 93 On 1 October 1962 a large reorganisation of the
Treasury was implemented, whereby it was divided into two 'Sides.' These
Turner, Macmillan, p.124 and pp264-5.
88 John Ramsden, The Winds of Change, Macmillan to Heath, 195 7-1975 (London and New
York: Longman, 1996), p.19.
Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-59 (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp192-3.
9° Sir Derek Mitchell in conversation with Andrew Buck.
PRO PREM 11/3742, 'Conespondence between Prime Minister and Sir Roy Harrod on
economic matters', 1962, Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 9
December 1962.
92 Sir Richard Clarke, The Development of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC)
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978), p.50.
Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories, p.54. See: PRO PREM 11/3759 'Enquiry into
principles and practice governing control of public expenditure: report of Plowden Committee;
reorganisation of HM Treasury', 1959-1962.
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were 'Pay and Management' and 'Finance and Economic.' 94 Furthermore,
divisions within these Sides were no longer allocated specific departments to
deal with. They now handled particular functions, for example expenditure,
which cut across departments. 95 This approach, described as 'functionalism'
by Bridges, 96 could be seen as a move towards specialisation, but only in terms
of the division of responsibility within the existing bureaucracy.
Two 1961 creations were designed to plan, respectively, spending and growth.
The first was the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC), devised by
Richard 'Otto' Clarke,97 and a product of the Plowden committee of which
Clarke was a key member. 98 Clarke was a permanent Treasury official and, in
this sense, PESC was an 'in house' Treasury operation. The second was the
National Economic Development Council (NEDC). 99 Its tripartite approach
was modelled on that of the French four-year plan. 10° 'Neddy', as it became
known, concerned itself with planning for growth. 101 Not an independent
department as such, the NEDC was headed by the Chancellor and in this sense
did not constitute a direct threat to the 	 02 However, it was staffed by
professional economists drawn from outside Whitehall. 103 The man recruited
to head the NEDC's economic section was Donald MacDougall (by this time
Knighted), who had been back at Oxford since 1953.104 Like Plowden,
Roseveare, The Treasury, p.300. See: PRO PREM 11/3759.
Roseveare, The Treasury, p.300.
Lord Bridges, The Treasury (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), pp141-3.
Peter Barberis, The Elite of the Elite, p.212.
Hermessy, Whitehall, pp 175-80.
1bid,p.180.
'°°MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.137.
101 Roseveare, The Treasury, p.331.
102 Thid, p.131.
103 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.138.
'° Ibid, p.137.
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MacDougall followed a yo-yoing career path, in and out of Whitehall. The
development of the NEDC was certainly influenced by perceived relative
national decline. 105 Wilson later argued that the NEDC provided a precedent
for his use of temporary bureaucrats. Shortly before becoming Prime Minister,
questioned by the academic Norman Hunt regarding his intentions to recruit
from beyond Whitehall, Wilson said '[w]ell, they had to bring in people from
outside to staff Neddy, didn't	 106
The Civil Service itself did show some willingness to change prior to 1964.
Writing shortly after the event, Brittan applauds the Treasury for opening the
Centre for Administrative Studies (CAS), 107 established in 1963, according to
Hennessy, with a view to 'making Whitehall's assistant principals more
numerate and economically literate." 08 However, the CAS did not offer the
level or duration of training available from, for example, the ENA in Paris and
is described by Hennessy as a 'gesture."° 9 Furthermore, during the early
1 960s, as their arrangements came under increasing scrutiny, leading Treasury
spokesmen adopted a contorted posture. The generalist principle was
defended. Yet at the same time the Treasury boasted of an increasing level of
economic knowledge amongst its officials."° There was also a tendency on
the part of the Treasury to exaggerate the proportion of its staff in possession
Ibid, p.136.
106 Whitehall and Beyond, p.14.
107 Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories, p.26.
Hennessy, Whitehall, p.175.
'°9lbid.
"° Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories, pp29-30.
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of genuine training in this field. For example, one such supposed expert
merely 'held a minor post in a bank branch office before the war.'111
Labour and Technocracy
As has been shown, a perceived need for greater expertise within the
bureaucracy existed immediately prior to the creation of the special adviser in
1964. Such concerns, brought to the fore by the post-Suez decline vogue were,
however, by no means entirely novel. The Labour Party has a long
technocratic tradition, associated in particular with its intellectual wing, the
Fabian Society. 112 The Fabians began as an 1884 splinter from a religious
social reform group, established the previous year, the Fellowship of the New
Life. 113
 Significant figures in the development of Fabianism included the
playwright George Bernard Shaw, the novelist H.G. Wells and the social
scientists Beatrice and Sidney Webb. 114 The Webbs were particularly
important to the technocratic aspects of Fabian influence upon Labour. As
Theakston states, their 'socialism had an unmistakable centralist and
bureaucratic flavour. A major role in bringing about and then governing a
socialist society would be played by a selfless, dedicated, unassuming and
public-spirited elite of expert bureaucrats.'115
In their 1920 work A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great
Britain, the Webbs suggested that, following the nationalisation of key
Ibid, p.30.
112 Kevm Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p.7.
113 John Callaghan, Socialism in Britain since 1884 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.30.
114 Ibid, p.30.
115 Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p.7.
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industries, '[i]t will be clearly be necessary to train, for the control
departments, a Civil Service of a new kind; to set these officers to develop a
new administrative technique; and to enable them to study on the spot, the
various devices by which other nations, and other forms of organisation in our
own country, are coping with analogous problems.' 116 Another prominent
Fabian, Harold Laski, was an agitator for bureaucratic change. 117 In 1925, he
suggested that government should 'develop the habit of special appointments
to a small number of technical posts.'118
During 1932, the New Fabian Research Bureau, a branch of the Fabian
Society, investigated the Civil Service. The trades union leader and future
Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his colleague, Cohn G. Clark,
produced a memorandum proposing 'that an administrative Department should
be built up consisting of Civil Servants directly responsible to the Prime
Minister for the purpose of assisting him in his own special tasks', usurping
the authority of the over-mighty Treasury. This innovation, they argued,
should be combined with the establishment of a 'National Economic Plarming
Department.. .staffed by full time experts whose function it would be to
prepare, revise, and advise on the execution of a general plan for the whole
country.' 119 Kingsley B. Smellie, a political scientist, also made proposals. A
critic of the generalism fostered by the competitive examination, he advocated
116 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain
(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1975), pp 175-6.
117 Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p.83.
" Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London: George Allen & Unwm, 1925), p.405.
119 Fabian Society Collection, J 38/2 'New Fabian Research Bureau', 'Memoranda on
Parliament, the Government and electoral reform 1932-35', 'REORGANISATION OF
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS', Ernest Bevm and
Colm G. Clark, 21 January 1932.
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greater post-recruitment training. With a particularly interesting choice of
words he also called for 'a special advisory body within the Treasury' to
provide the administration with technical expertise.' 2° It will be shown that
such notions were central to the Wilson programme which included the
creation of the special adviser.
Fabian proposals for bureaucratic reform were tempered by a genuine respect
for the calibre of existing civil servants 121 and drew back from a full embrace
of the concept of technocracy. In 1931, Laksi authored a Fabian pamphlet
entitled The Limitations of the Expert, stressing the fact that 'it is one thing to
urge the need for expert consultation at every stage in making policy; it is
another thing, and a very different thing, to insist that the expert's judgement
must be final." 22 A similar admiration for permanent civil servants has also
been ascribed to a later would-be reformer, Harold Wilson.' 23 Moreover,
Laski was concerned that the 'special appointments' he called for should not
become 'merely a reservoir of ministerial patronage' and should be subject to
approval by the official machine.'24
As has been shown, Trevelyan's generalist Civil Service was deliberately
conceived as a haven for graduates from Cambridge and Oxford. During the
twentieth century, this bureaucratic duopoly was challenged by a Fabian-
founded, London-based, educational institution. Henry Hunt Hutchinson, a
120 thid, J 38/3, 'Civil Service', 'Memorandum on the Civil Service', Kingsley Smellie, 5
November 1932.
121 Webb and Webb, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, p.67.
122 Harold J.Laski, The Limitations of the Expert (London: Fabian Society, 1931), p.4.
123 See, for example: Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.347.
124 Lash, A Grammar of Politics, p.405.
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wealthy Fabian, committed suicide on 26 July 1894, bequeathing his £20,000
fortune to the Society. 125 Sidney Webb determined that a large portion of this
windfall should be used to establish the London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE).' 26 Foreign influences were important here, with the
examples of educational institutions such as Columbia College, New York and
the Parisian École Libre des Sciences Politiques being followed. 127 The LSE's
formative years coincided with the emergence of the previously described
National Efficiency movement. As the distinguished academic Ralph
Dahrendorf puts it, '[i]n this climate of change, the Webbs and their
friends.. .dreamt of an organized, well-run society.. .[and] of the hegemony of
well-trained benevolent experts." 28 The School placed particular emphasis
upon 'the concrete facts of industrial life and the actual working of economic
and political relations." 29 Over subsequent decades, many individuals
significant to this study were closely associated with the LSE, for example
Beveridge, Laski, 13° Nicholas Kaldor 13 ' and Brian Abel-Smith.132
It is possible to detect the reoccurrence of ideas associated with the Fabians in
the approach adopted by Harold Wilson following his 1963 attainment of the
Raif Dahrendorf, LSE, A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science,
1895-1 995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp3-4.
' 26 Daendo LSE, pp3-5.
' 27 This is indicated in the first LSE prospectus. The London School of Economics and
Political Science (London: LSE, 1895), p.1.
Dahrendorf LSE, p.7.
129 The London School of Economics and Political Science, p.2.
130 Laski, like many others, did not enjoy good relations with Beveridge during their shared
time at the L.S.E. Kenneth 0. Morgan, Labour People, Hardie to Kinnock (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.92.
131 Anthony P. Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, pp 18-32.
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Labour leadership.' 33 In a prophetic novel, The Shape of Things to Come,
written during 1932-3, the former Fabian and Co-efficient, H.G. Wells,
predicted a socialist revolutionary movement founded on an emergent new
class of worker. Wells wrote that 'by the third decade of the twentieth century
two-thirds of the technicians, scientific workers and able business organizers
were talking active revolution... [a] revolution in revolutionary ideas had
occurred. The protean spirit of Revolution had cut its hair, put on blue
overalls, made blue prints for itself, created a New Model, and settled down to
work in a systematic fashion.' Wells labelled this new type of socialist the
'Technical Revolutionary.' 134 Three decades later, Wilson concerned himself
with similar ideas. Famously, at the 1963 Labour Party Conference in
Scarborough, he described how 'we are re-defining and we are re-stating our
Socialism in terms of the scientific revolution' and referred to '[t]he Britain
that is going to be forged in the white heat of this revolution." 35
 The
following year, still in opposition, in a BBC interview, he made it clear that in
order to achieve his modernising agenda, outsiders would be recruited into the
Civil Servjce.'36
Wilson's own background as a 'sparkling temporary civil servant in wartime
Whitehall' 137 was an important influence on his plans to use advisers from
beyond Whitehall. Shortly before becoming Prime Minister, when discussing
133 For an analysis of 'Wilsonism', see: Ilana Favretto, "Wilsonism" reconsidered: Labour
Party Revisionism 1952-64', Contemporary British History, Vol. 14, No.4 (Winter 2000),
pp54-80.
134 H.G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come- The Ultimate Revolution (London: J. M. Dent,
1993), p.257.
Reproduced in Purpose in Politics, Selected Speeches by Rt Hon Harold Wilson (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p.27.
136 Whitehall and Beyond, p.14.
Peter Heimessy, The Prime Minister, p.287.
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his intentions with Hunt, Wilson referred to the time 'when I was a member of
the Cabinet Secretariat." 38 Another important figure in this study, the left-
Labour intellectual Richard Crossman, a close ally of Wilson,' 39 held Cabinet
posts throughout the 1964-70 period. As Leader of the Opposition, Wilson
gave Crossman the science brief.' 40 In an article entitled 'Scientists in
Whitehall', based on a Fabian lecture given in autumn 1963, Crossman
asserted that '[b]etween 1940 and 1945, Britain was probably the best-
governed country in the world' with a successful 'centrally planned
economy.' 14 ' This was made possible through the introduction into Whitehall
of 'an army of outsiders, uninhibited by civil service procedures."42
Therefore, suggested Crossman, '[i]n the technological revolution to which we
are now committed. . .we shall permanently need the marriage of established
civil service and outside expertise that we developed as a temporary expedient
in World War I and perfected in World War 143
Technocratic ideals were, therefore, an element in the development of the
special adviser. However, there were other motivating factors. Continental, in
particular French, influences on this bureaucratic innovation have already been
discussed. Nicholas Kaldor, an economist imported to the Treasury in 1964,
later stated that 'Tommy Balogh and myself. . . were brought in under the
ticket. . .that it would be a good idea to move towards the French system in
Whitehall and Beyond, p.20.
' 39 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.177.
° Ibid, p.274.




which ministers should have a Chef du [sic] Cabinet, or their own advisers.'
The influence of the US spoils system has also been mentioned. To some, the
comparison between the use of special advisers and the US approach, in
particular that of 196 1-3 Democrat President John F. Kennedy, was clear.145
Wilson himself felt this to be the case. 146 Cairncross described Robert Neild's
post as Economic Adviser to the Treasury as similar to that of Walter Heller,
who was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the US from
19614. 147
The fact of Labour's long spell in opposition was important. The task of the
co-ordination of Labour policy fell to Peter Shore (later Lord Shore), head of
the Labour Party Research Department from 1959-64. To Shore, the creation
of the special adviser was attributable to the feeling within Labour that, after
13 years of Conservative government, the Civil Service might have difficulty
adjusting to a change in approach. Special advisers were to be 'guardians of
the manifesto.' It was their task, remembered Shore, to ensure that 'habits of
mind and surmountable obstacles [within Whitehall] should not prevent the
working out' of Labour policy pledges.' 48 Conservatism with a small 'c', then,
was an enemy. Nicholas Kaldor, an aide at the Treasury from 1964, stated that
special advisers were introduced in order to conduct Labour ministers' 'battles
with the Civil Service', a necessity since 'the Civil Service gradually develops
A.P. Thirlwall (ed.), Keynes as a Policy Adviser, p.175.
145	
noted by Crossman. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.36,
diary entry for 29 October 1964.
' Whitehall and Beyond, p.19.
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its own set of views and is an autonomous body, which is on the whole
naturally conservative.'149
Neild emphasises the prevalence of the idea that ministers should have their
own aides of Labour persuasion so as not to be 'run by the Treasury.'
Moreover, members of the Labour government wished to be seen to have
outside advisers 'so as to protect themselves against the accusation of being
too much in the hands of the regulars.' 15° Inside Labour, the view that partisan
aides were required to implement the party's programme had precedence. For
example, following the experience of office in 1924, there was pressure from
within Labour for a large clearout of Foreign Office staff by a future
administration, designed to enable the pursuance of a socialist foreign policy.
However, a wary Ramsay MacDonald saw to it that this did not take place.'51
George Lansbury, who becGvie	 Labour leader in 1931,
argued that 'when a Labour government comes to power it will need as its
leading men in all departments men who accept Labour's policy and are
whole-heartedly determined to make it successful.' 152 For Lansbury, partisan
commitment was more important than expertise, which, he felt, the 'early
Fabians' had overrated.' 53 There was also a long-held belief within Labour
that career officials were not suited to the proactive presentation of policy. At
a Fabian conference in February 1948 held to discuss 'The British
Government's Public Relations Information Services', the view emerged that
149 Thiriwall (ed.), Keynes as a Policy Adviser, p.175.
' 50 Neild in conversation with Buck.
151 Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, pp45-7.
152 George Lansbury, My England (London: Selwyn and Blount, 1934), p.1 45.
153 Ibid. p.147.
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'[t]emporary civil servants who were formerly journalists are much better as
Press Officers than permanent civil servants.'154
Significantly, certain individuals who participated in the development and
presentation of Labour policy in the period leading up to the 1964 election
went on to become special advisers. 155 Owing to the limited financial
resources available to Shore, he was the grateful recipient of intellectual
assistance offered on a voluntary basis. This was one reason why the likes of
Balogh were able to exert considerable influence over Labour's plans prior to
the 1964 election.' 56 Furthermore, Balogh had long been close to Wilson.'57
As Theakston states, 'Balogh's access to the Labour leadership gave his ideas
a special importance." 58 In a 1963 Fabian pamphlet, Balogh advocated a
centrally planned 'increase in the rate of.. . economic growth' in order to
achieve greater social equality at home, and provide assistance to nations
within the developing world.' 59 He suggested that this should be brought
about by a 'central office of control - though not necessarily within the
Treasury.' 16° In May 1963, Balogh produced a document for Wilson, at the
Labour leader's request, which laid out his proposals for this economic
planning ministry.16'
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Upon Labour's 1964 election victory, Wilson established the Department of
Economic Affairs (DEA), deliberately conceived as a rival to the Treasury,
charged with the co-ordination of economic expansion. 162 Should the DEA be
credited to Balogh? Brittan is not convinced of this, pointing out that at the
time of its creation, many were claiming credit for the DEA, but upon its
demise, none were accepting the blame.' 63 Shore, close to Wilson at the time,
would only go as far as to say that Balogh was 'important' to the genesis of the
DEA.' George Brown, Secretary of State at the DEA from 1964-6 suggested
that the department resulted from a broad movement within Labour, rather
than the work of one individual.' 65 Nevertheless, in Brown's account,
Balogh's close intellectual association with the instigation of the DEA is
clear. 166 Even before his appointment as a special adviser, then, Balogh's
influence was great.
Balogh used every means at his disposal to force other aspects of his
bureaucratic reform programme firmly onto the agenda of his party whilst it
was in opposition.' 67 As with the DEA, Balogh's views on the appointment of
temporary civil servants were not unique within Labour, 168 but there is no
doubt he was a forceful advocate. Balogh was a member of the committee,
formed in the summer of 1962, which produced the 1964 Fabian pamphlet The
Administrators. In the chair was Robert Neild, also a special advjser-to-be.'69
162 Philip Ziegler, Wilson, pp 170-i.
163 Brittan in conversation with Buck.
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165 George Brown, In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown
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This body foreshadowed the major committee of inquiry into the Civil Service
which Wilson announced in February 1966, under the chairmanship of Lord
Fulton, of which Neild was again a member.' 7° Fulton's work will be explored
further in Chapter VIII.
The influence of another future special adviser, Kaldor, can be detected in the
1964 Labour manifesto, in the form of its promises of major tax reforms.17'
He had been involved in party policy formation for many years.' 72 Labour's
bid for power in 1964 also required assistance of a non-academic type, for
example speech writing and the formation of campaign strategy. To this end,
two more future special advisers, John Allen and John Harris, proved
extremely useful. 173 It is arguably possible here to discern a distinction
between types of adviser, namely the policy expert, into which category
Balogh and Kaldor fell, and the political aide, a term which could be applied to
Allen and Harris. However, as will be shown later, these categories were not
watertight.
Wilson's embracing of administrative reform was not as wholehearted as some
would have wished. Benn described an animated conversation which took
place between himself and Balogh in May 1963. The topic of discussion was
the politicallscientific take-over of the Civil Service which both men believed
170 Thid, ppl22-3.
171 
'Let's Go with Labour for the new Britain', F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British General Election
Manfestos 1900-1974, pp262-3. For Kaldor's pre-election activities, see, for example:
Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, p.313.
172 See: Kaldor Papers NK 11/1, "Labour Party working party on taxation": Minutes, reports
and memoranda.' 1959-67; NK 11/4 "Labour Party Finance and Economic Policy Sub-
Committee": correspondence, minutes and policy documents.' 1959-82.
Lord Shore in conversation with Blick; and Peter Shore, Leading the Left, p.89.
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would follow a Labour election victory.' 74 As has been shown, later that
month, Wilson solicited a document from Balogh laying out the latter's
conception of a radically restructured Civil Service. 175 Two proposals were
central to Balogh's plan. Firstly, a department for economic planning was to
be instigated and the functions of the Treasury cut back to those of a finance
ministry. Secondly, the role of the Prime Minister's Office would be
enhanced, absorbing the NEDC and assuming responsibility for the resolution
of disputes between the Treasury and the new economic department.' 76 Over
the summer of 1963, Balogh, Shore and Crossman discussed floating various
ideas to Wilson, including Balogh's proposal that Ministers of State
responsible for Home, Foreign and Information policy should be installed at
Number iO.' 77 These, if implemented, would have meant the emergence of
something resembling a Prime Minister's department. As will be shown,
Balogh envisaged special advisers playing an important role within such a
body.
With his speech to the Labour Party Conference in September, Wilson publicly
indicated that while he was in agreement with the first aspect of Balogh's
programme, the second had not found favour with him.' 78 Additionally,
Wilson rejected the notion that the ministerial cabinet should be introduced to
British government. As he told Hunt, 'I'm rather hesitant about this. . . [t]here
is a danger that you get a false division between his [the minister's] political
cabinet. . . and the civil servants. My own experience, having tried as a minister
Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.13, diary entry for 2 May 1963.
' Ibid, p.25, diary entry for 25 May 1963.
176 Ibid.
Ibid, p.33, diary entry for 19 June 1963.
178 Ibid, pp65-6, diary entry for 30 September 1963.
99
to bring in one or two outside experts with the right political approach, was
that I did far better when I relied on loyal civil servants who knew what I
wanted, in my private office, and who saw to it that the rest of the department
knew what I wanted."79
The rejection of the formal cabinet was a crucial decision. The Administrators
had recommended the instigation of 'something akin to the Continental system
of ministerial cabinets.. .a Minister would be able to make a number of
appointments in his private office - up to, say, three or four - as assistants in
his private office." 8° As Samuel Brittan, who served inside the DEA from
1964-6, noted in his diary on 9 November 1964, '[R]eflection. Machine works
through Private Office." 81 The Fabian scheme would have comprised a
greater challenge to the permanent bureaucracy than the one ultimately put
into practice.
Wilson did, however, tell Hunt that he would bring in 'a small number' of
specialists to the 'Cabinet Secretariat." 82 As this statement suggested, Wilson
initially 'considered that perhaps he should concentrate his senior advisers in
the Cabinet office." 83 Had he done so, this would have represented a
considerable bolstering of the prime ministerial centre. Ultimately, however,
as will be shown, the first wave of special advisers was split between Cabinet
Office and Treasury.' 84 Wilson's rejection of certain bureaucratic reform
whitehall and Beyond, pp17-8.
180 The Administrators, p.40.
181 Samuel Brittan Collection (LSE, London), p.6, diary entry for 9 November 1964.
182 Whitehall andBeyond, p.19.
183 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.12, diary entry for 25 October 1964.
' Ibid, p.12, diary entry for 25 October 1964.
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proposals before Labour came to power may have resulted, at least in part,
from a brief consultation the Leader of the Opposition had with the former
Head of the Home Civil Service, Lord Normanbrook (Norman Brook).
Naturally, Normanbrook was opposed to reform.'85
Wilson's plans for administrative change, then, were, in certain respects, fairly
mild. This did not prevent elements on the political right from engaging in
scare mongering. Aims of Industry was a pressure group dedicated to
opposing what its supporters saw as the scourges of organised labour and state
intervention in society. 186 In the run up to the 1964 election, Aims of Industry
published a pamphlet, entitled Advice - And Dissent, Two Men of Influence,
dealing with the subject of Balogh and Kaldor as senior Labour advisers.'87
Advice - And Dissent suggested that Wilson's take-over of Labour had
resulted in its already existing 'enthusiasm for controls' to come to the fore.'88
The pamphlet also drew attention to proposals for the creation of a planning
department and Civil Service reform. 189 It insinuated, incorrectly, that a
Wilson government might embark upon a massive Balogh-inspired
nationalisation programme.'
What were the views of non-Labour politicians? Enoch Powell, the former
Conservative Health Minister, in a 1964 conversation with Hunt, rejected the
185 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.246, diary entry for 13 June 1965
and Ziegler, Wilson, p.18!.
186	 example, an early Aims of Industry pamphlet from August 1944 questioning the
principles lying behind the movement for legally enforceable equal pay for men and women.
Eival Pay, What it is and What it Means (London: Aims of Industry, 1944).





notion of there being a need for the introduction of the ministerial cabinet.'9'
He suggested that the Civil Service did not act as a 'resistant material' towards
ministerial policy initiatives.' 92 Furthermore, on the subject of specialism
versus generalism, Powell, himself a classical scholar, was of the view that
'[t]he minister who has got to take the ultimate layman's decision requires the
administrative lay mind applied to his problems.. . [t]he professional advice
should be in a sense subordinate to the administrative advice." 93 While
Wilson and Powell did not support the formal introduction of the cabinet in
1964, Jo Grimond, the Liberal leader, did. Grimond also advocated greater
specialisation at the summit of the Civil Service, as well as increased
interchange with the outside world and the introduction of business expertise
into the bureaucracy.'94
Hunt's interviews were published in 1964 under the title Whitehall and Beyond
and included a response from Edward Bridges, now in retirement, but still
acting as an unofficial spokesman for career Whitehall. On the subject of the
cabinet, Bridges argued that '[ijt is significant that one wants to use the French
pronunciation here. It is an idea foreign to us, with political overtones. I
dislike the idea a good deal. It implies that a department is unable or unwilling
to serve all ministers loyally and effectively, irrespective of party.' He was
also concerned that Wilson's planned introduction of outsiders into the Cabinet
Office 'could make for difficulties.'	 While not opposed to the use of
191 However, on this occasion, both Hunt and Powell seem to be under the misapprehension






temporary civil servants per se, 196 he did not favour their being 'charged with
executive duties.' 197 The significance of these views will become apparent in
subsequent chapters.
Wilson: style and substance
Labour took office in October 1964 with a parliamentary majority of four.198
Few retrospective judgements, from across the political spectrum or by
academics, of Wilson's subsequent approach to the premiership have been
generous, save for tributes that have been paid to his undeniable tactical skill
and manoeuvrability,' 99 which was directed most effectively towards
significant electoral success200 and the preservation of party unity20 ' for
Labour. The central criticism levelled at Wilson is that he was an opportunist,
lacking in long-term strategy.202 Writing in 1966, Crossman suggested that
Wilson, who set out to create a government driven from 10 Downing Street,
failed as Prime Minister to supply the 'central coherent purpose' that this
required.203 It should be noted that the case against Wilson, which is described








202	 example: Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, pp330-1 and MacDougall in conversation
with Buck.
203 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.51, diary entry for 25
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According to Theakston, under Wilson, Labour, for all its sloganeering, had
little idea how such measures as economic planning were to be implemented.
Subsequent difficulties, Theakston argues, were attributable to this
shortcoming, rather than permanent Civil Service obstruction. 204 It has been
argued that as a result of an absence of readiness, the incoming administration
was forced to rely upon existing Treasury briefs proposing measures to
counteract the existing balance of payments crisis. 205 Wilson, it seems, was
also a poor chairman, allowing discussions to drift aimlessly,206 sometimes
adding rambling monologues of his own. 207 Healey, Secretary of State for
Defence from 1964-70, suggested that Wilson's leadership combined the worst
of both worlds, lacking in direction but coloured by a tendency towards
interference in the business of other departments. 208 The disorganisation said
to have reigned during the first Wilson administration leads Hennessy to
suggest that he was possibly 'the untidiest of all the postwar premiers in
administrative terms.' 209 The Labour politician and academic Edmund Dell
argued that the division of economic policy formation responsibilities between
ministries was a recipe for disharmony.21°
The extent to which the special adviser experiment can be considered tainted
by Wilson's supposed flaws must be considered. According to George Brown,
First Secretary of State and Minister of Economic Affairs, 'there were too
204 Theston The Labour Party and Whitehall, pp64-5.
205 Dell, The Chancellors, p.310.
206 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.289.
207 See, for example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.52, diary entry for 22 May 1965.
208 Healey, The Time of My Life, p.331.
209 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.310.
210 Dell, The Chancellors, pp306-9.
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many of us advising and counter-advising one another.' 211 The accusation of
lack of preparedness is supported by the suggestion that Balogh knew little of
the Whitehall official committee system prior to his appointment to the Civil
Service. 212 Moreover, Kaldor, a taxation specialist, was unaware who Sir Alec
Johnston, Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, was. 213 Balogh,
furthermore, had long displayed a degree of naïvety regarding the ease with
which permanent civil servants could be replaced.214
An aspect of Wilson's weakness in the chair was reflected in his handling of
Balogh at a Number Ten gathering on 1 December 1964. On this occasion,
whenever Balogh and Alec Caimcross, Head of the Government Economic
Service, disagreed with each other over facts relating to a particular subject,
Wilson, in Caimcross's account, simply moved on to another topic. 215 In one
observer's account, at a Cabinet meeting in early 1967, Wilson failed to
support Callaghan sufficiently against a proposal relating to benefit policy,
emanating in part from Kaldor, to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer was
hostile.216 As to the characterisation of Wilson as a dabbler, Balogh arguably
mirrored these tendencies, prompting Hennessy's description of him as
Wilson's 'in-house gadfly.' 217 Wilson's participation in Cabinet discussions
211 Brown, In My Way, p.93.
212 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.616, diary entry for 11 August
1966.
213 PRO T 199/1164, 'Note for the Record', Abbot, 23 October 1964.
214 Alec Caimcross (ed.), The Robert Hall Diaries, 1954-61 (London: Unwm Hyman, 1991),
p.l4'7, diary entry for 10 February 1958.
215 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.20, diary entry for 1 December 1964.
216 Patrick Gordon Walker, Political Diaries, 1932-71, p.309 diary entry for 24 February 1967.
217 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p305.
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suggested that he sometimes failed to pay sufficient attention to his special
advisers' briefings 218
Confusion surrounded the exact nature of the role of the new tier of temporary
appointments, in particular Neild, in relation to the existing Treasury
Economic Section staff. 219 Brown's memoir suggested that he was slightly
surprised that, when appointed to the Civil Service, Balogh was attached not to
the DEA but the Prime Minister. 220 Wilson's active involvement in the DEA's
development of the National Plan was minimal. 22 ' As Wilson's adivser,
Balogh was, therefore, cut off from the department he helped instigate and the
economic plan he had long advocated. Moreover, he did not, in his own
expression, 'click' with Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Secretary to the DEA. On 9
May 1966, Balogh wrote to Roll, complaining that 'you have not answered my
letters of April 20th 26th 29th two letters of May 41h and one letter of May
5thjf you could spare a minute, perhaps you might telephone at least.' 222 As
a result, it is harder to blame Balogh for the excessively optimistic growth
targets set by the DEA.223 In fact, he wrote to Wilson on 3 February 1965
warning that 'I should be very surprised if we got more than 3 to 3 /2 per cent
this year', although he believed that after a slow start, growth would
accelerate.224
218 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.1 74, diary entry for 20 December
1966.
219 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.2..
220 Brown, In My Way, p.93.
221 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.303.
222 PRO CAB 147/14, 1965, Balogh to Roll, 9 May 1966.
223 Projected at 25% over the period 1964-70. MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.157.
224 Wigg Collection, 4/56, Balogh to Wilson, 3 February 1965.
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that, on occasion, Balogh encouraged blind
optimism on the part of Wilson. Balogh's dubious belief that the Sterling Area
could be built into a dynamic economic bloc will be discussed in Chapter VI.
There was also the broad bureaucratic and economic experiment of which
Balogh's appointment was a part. In a 1965 note to the Prime Minister,
Balogh stated, rather prematurely, that 'your decision to bring in outside
experts and to partition the Treasury has proven a brilliant success. The
monolithic supremacy of the Treasury is now balanced inter-departmentally
(as it should be) by an organisation dedicated to expansion.' 225 However, in
May 1966, the Prime Minister's senior special adviser did warn him that 'we
might get into difficulties in the summer.' 226 As will be shown, this was
correct. Moreover, Balogh also attempted to impress upon Wilson the view
that Britain's continued posturing as a global military power could not be
reconciled with economic realities. As he wrote in August 1966, 'the whole
level of [defence] expenditure both in Germany and East of Suez is of an
ostentatious standard not at all in keeping with our present problems.'227
Closely related to Wilson's supposed shortcomings in terms of style were his
administrations' policy failures. Ironically, these were concentrated in the
realm of economics,228 the personal area of expertise both for Wilson229 and, as
will be shown, most special advisers during 1964-70. Arguably, Wilson's
225 PRO PREM 13/360, 'Note on the experiences with the Government machine', Balogh to
Wilson, 25 February 1965.
226 PRO CAB 147/12, 'Domestic economic strategy', 1965-8, 'Economic Strategy and
Tactics', Balogh to Wilson, 12 May 1966.
227 PRO CAB 147/155, 'Foreign currency defence expenditure', 1965-8, Balogh to Wilson, 9
August 1966.
228 Dell, The Chancellors, p.306.
229 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.302.
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greatest mistake was made immediately following Labour's narrow election
victory, on 17 October 1964. The 'economic triumvirate' 230 of Wilson, Brown
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, took the decision, in
the face of a balance of payments crisis, 23 ' not to devalue sterling from its
existing fixed rate of $2.80.232 The economist and future special adviser,
Wilfred Beckerman, was not alone amongst Labour supporters in his dismay at
this. In his view the objective of higher growth was dependent upon increased
exports, for which a correction in what he saw as the overvaluation of sterling
was a prerequisite. 233 It has been argued that the British economy met the
criteria of 'fundamental disequilibrium' required for a 'legal' readjustment
within the Bretton Woods agreement.234
In Wilson, Brown and Callaghan's defence, the precarious parliamentary
position of the Government made the alternative course of action a difficult
one to contemplate. There was also the international context. A decision not
to maintain the parity of the pound may have brought the dollar under extreme
pressure, thereby damaging Anglo-US relations and Britain's international
status. 235 Furthermore, countries with sterling reserves, many of them located
in the developing world, would have suffered an immediate reduction in the
value of their holdings. 236 There was a threat that the potential benefits would
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Labour leadership also wished to avoid maintaining the popular and market
perception of their party as historically associated with the abandonment of
parity.238
In the words of Hennessy, '[t]hereafter, until the rate finally went three years
and one month later, the Wilson governments were locked in a titanic and near
continuous struggle to reconcile the three incompatible aims of economic
growth, a balance of payments surplus and a currency worth $2.80 to the
pound.' 239 MacDougall, who was appointed Director General of the DEA in
1964240 later argued that '[t]he first great mistake of the new Government was
not to devalue at once. In my view this dominated - and distorted - economic
policy for the next four years.' 241 In July 1966, crucially, the desperate
defence of sterling entailed the introduction of deflationary measures which
killed off the notion of planned growth.242
Richard Pryke, a special adviser recruited in May 1966 and working under
Balogh, resigned from the government in protest over the failure to abandon
the parity at this point.243 MacDougall subsequently suggested that the
adjustment in the exchange rate which finally took place on 18 November
1967 came 'at least three years too late.' 244 A successful devaluation,
238 MacDougall in conversation with Buck.
239 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.289.
240 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.149.
241 Ibid, p.152.
242 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.288.
243 See: Samuel Brittan, 'The hregulars', pp334-5. Brittan writes that Pryke was employed
from 1965, but other sources, as will be shown, suggest May 1966. For Piyke's subsequent
critique of economic policy during the first Wilson administrations, see: Richard Pryke,
Though Cowards Finch, An Alternative Economic Policy (London, Reading and Fakenham:
MacGibbon and Kee, 1967).
244 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.173.
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however, was never an easy option, since it necessitated accompanying
deflationary measures. 245 To combine this with the growth Labour had
promised would have been, as Lord Croham, the Treasury Permanent
Secretary during 1968-74, gently puts it, 'tricky.' 246 Nevertheless, the futility
of the course pursued by the Wilson administration suggests that the
appointment of special advisers certainly did not result in better policy
formation in this key area. However, it will be shown that, throughout, they
had mostly advised in favour of devaluation. The exact role of special advisers
in relation to sterling will be considered later.
The central thesis under examination in this work is that special advisers are
best understood in terms of their attachment to a particular minister. In this
context, it will be shown that certain Wilson aides were members of the
entourage which was associated with him. In September 1965, writing of the
group surrounding Wilson, Benn employed the phrase 'the court of King
Harold.' 247 Wilson was far too skilful a politician to rely on one single
counsellor. Rather he had a 'most extraordinary unconventional collection of
personal advisers.' 248 They were all kept, again in the words of Benn, 'at
arm's length' 249 and could be played off against one another. 25° An individual
and collective examination of those involved, with particular attention to the
special adviser, follows.
245 Dell, The Chancellors, pp3l 1-2.
246	 Croham in conversation with Andrew Buck, 5 July 2001.
247 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.319, diary entry for 13 September 1965.
248 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.1 60, diary entry for 11 December
1966.
249 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.41, diary entry for 15 July 1963.
250 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.1 60, diary entry for 11 December
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In a diary entry from September 1965, Benn referred to Balogh as being one of
Wilson's 'three favourites', the other two being George Wigg and Marcia
Williams.25 ' Wigg was given the post of Paymaster General following
Wilson's 1964 election success and was responsible for security and
intelligence matters, as well performing the role of all-round aide. 252 He was
initially allocated a room in Number 10 in 1964.253 Williams was Wilson's
Private and Political Secretary, also with an office in Downing Street
proper. 254 As personal allies, both Wigg and Williams were closer to the
Prime Minister than Balogh, at least in Crossman's account. In early 1965,
Crossman noted that while Balogh's influence was in doubt, Wigg 'really sees
Harold four or five times a day and is virtually living with him.' 255 Similarly,
later that year, the same prolific diarist observed that 'Marcia. . . is still the most
influential person in Harold's life, far more influential I should say than
Tommy Balogh.' 256 Balogh was not housed in Number 10 proper until after
the 1966 election, having to settle for a room in the Cabinet Office building in
70 Whitehall.257
It seems that relations between Balogh and Wigg were strained from the outset
of Wilson's first premiership. 258 Wigg took it upon himself to act as Wilson's
personal filter, on occasions attempting to distance the Prime Minister from
251 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.319, diary entry for 13 September 1965.
252 Pioft Harold Wilson, pp339-40 and Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.308.
253 Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.317.
254 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.339.
255 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, pp11 8-9, diary entry for 3 January
1965.
256 Ibid, p.363, diary entry for 26 October 1965.
257 Marcia Williams, Inside Number 10, pp140-1 and 320-1 and Mitchell in conversation with
Buck.
258 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.92, diary entry for 9 December
1964 and Mitchell in conversation with Buck.
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some of his own allies, Balogh included. 259 Mutual jealousy was compounded
by disagreements over policy, particularly in relation to the possible
devaluation of sterling, which Balogh soon came to support26° and Wigg
opposed. 261 Wigg's influence, however, declined from early 1967.262 Balogh
appears to have enjoyed better, although perhaps not entirely smooth, relations
with Williams than with Wigg.263 Wigg and Williams seemingly shared
mutual animosity.2M
Another figure, this time drawn from the permanent Civil Service, should not
be overlooked as a key Wilson adviser, namely Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of
the Cabinet.265 Trend's importance to this study is derived from the fact that
he represented the career bureaucracy rather than the Prime Minister's
personal entourage. Over the course of 1964-7 and beyond, Trend's influence
increased266 as Wilson lost touch with what Crossman called the 'vague
leftism which he [Wilson] brought with him to the job.' 267 In October 1965,
Crossman referred to the 'battle for the attention of the Prime Minister which
the Civil Service has been winning', spearheaded by Trend. 268 Kavanagh and
Seldon argue that '[t]he Civil Service took increasing control over Wilson's
time from 1966 and the political staff gradually retreated into a defensive
259 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.463, diary entry for 2 August 1966.
260 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.305, diary entry
for 5 August 1965.
261 Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.309.
262 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.295, diary entry for 27 March 1967.
263 Mitchell in conversation with Buck. For Williams's tactful tribute to Balogh as a special
adviser, see: Williams, Inside Number 10, pp320-1.
264 Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.312 and pp315-6.
265 Ziegler, Wilson, pp1 84-5.
266 Poft Harold Wilson, p.347.
267 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.296, diary entry for 27 March 1967.
268 Crossman, Diaiy of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.363, diary entry for 26 October, 1965.
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circle around him.' 269 In spring 1967, Trend and Balogh engaged in a 'terrible
struggle for.. .the ear of the P.M.', 27° which will be discussed later.
Balogh, therefore, provided an example of a special adviser who, as an
individual, possessed close personal proximity to the Prime Minister.
Temporary bureaucrats were also members of the informal group of political
allies which surrounded Wilson, popularly known as the 'Kitchen Cabinet.'27'
In the words of Pimlott, '[s]uch a body never existed, but there was certainly a
group of advisers who were closer to Wilson, much of the time, than many of
his officials or Cabinet ministers.' 272 A nebulous entity, the Kitchen Cabinet
was frequently referred to by Crossman as the 'little group' 273 or the 'old
gang.' 274 Its key members included Shore, Balogh, Crossman, Berm, future
Paymaster General Judith Hart, Barbara Castle, who was made Minister for
Overseas Development in 1964, Gerald Kaufman, who became Wilson's
political press officer in 1965 and, at the centre, Williams.275
The Kitchen Cabinet's ancestry lay in the early 1 950s and the associates of
Aneurin Bevan, then leader of the Labour left. 276 Within this, Crossman and
Wilson came to comprise 'a left-of-centre sub-group, well to the right of the
devotees.' 277 Other Bevanites who went on to become members of the
269 Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, p.69.
270 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.304, diary entry for 6 April 1967.
271 For a description of the Kitchen Cabinet, see, for example: Ziegler, Wilson, p.183.
272 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp338-9.
273 For example, Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.363, diary entry for
26 October 1965.
274 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.718, diary entry for 17 March 1968.
275 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.295.
276 For an account of Wilson and Bevanism, see: Pimlott, Harold Wilson, ppl 54-91.
277 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.12.
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Kitchen Cabinet included Castle and Balogh. 278 Owing to these origins, the
Kitchen Cabinet was, in part, an ideological entity, which served, in theory, to
'keep Harold in contact with his left-wingers' 279 once he became Prime
Minister. The group began to crystallise around Wilson while he was Leader
of the Opposition. 28° Balogh, along with Crossman, Benn and Shore planned
the Labour Leader's approach to the 1964 election, 281 occasionally discussing
matters with Wilson himself. 282 As the poll approached, meetings expanded to
include Wigg, Williams and, significantly, two future special advisers, John
Allen and John Harris, although the latter was from the Labour right and never
a Kitchen Cabinet member.283
Balogh was an important figure within the fully formed Kitchen Cabinet, a fact
underlined by the manner in which he functioned as a two-way channel for
communications between members of the entourage and the Prime Minister.284
Balogh's regular visits to Chequers, the Prime Minister's official country
residence, were envied by at least one fellow Kitchen Cabinet member.285
Another prime ministerial special adviser, John Allen, was a stalwart of the
Kitchen Cabinet during 1964-5, lunching with Wilson on a daily basis. 286 He
attempted to ensure that regular meetings of the group took place.287
278 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.166 and p.177.
279 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.43, diary entry for 19 September
1966.
280 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
281 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.121, diary entry for 19 June 1964.
282 Thid, p.133, diary entry for 21 July 1964.
283 See, for example: Ibid, p.140, diary entry for 13 September 1964.
284 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.275, diary entry
for 17 July 1965 and p.570, diary entry for 17 July 1966.
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Upon his attainment of power, Wilson allotted the highest offices of state to
rivals within Labour, a course he was committed to by the party's balance of
power. 288
 Nevertheless, employment was found for Wilson's allies in a variety
of different Government posts. 289
 In 1967, Wilson appeared to assume
responsibility for the entire economy, 290
 with the assistance of members of his
group. Benn and Shore were placed respectively as heads of the Ministry of
Technology and the DEA, where they were to be advised by Balogh.29 ' In
August 1967, Balogh wrote to Shore, expressing his pleasure at the idea of
closer co-operation with the DEA. 292
 Balogh also influenced Kitchen Cabinet
members in their choice of aides, such as Christopher Foster, an economist and
associate of his from Oxford, whom Castle employed in early 1966 when she
became Minister of Transport.293
As Hennessy suggests, significant collective Kitchen Cabinet influence upon
the major decisions taken during the first two Wilson administrations was
difficult to detect. 294
 This fact serves to minimise the significance of those
special advisers who operated within Wilson's immediate ambit. Kitchen
288 See, for example: Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.308.
289 Pjmio Harold Wilson, pp327-8.
290 See: Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.302 and PRO PREM 13/1538. 'Prime Minister
Assumed Responsibility for Department of Economic Affairs, with Peter Shore as Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs', August 1967.
291 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.465, diary entry for 5 September
1967.
292 PRO CAB 147/75, 'Difficulties faced by Thomas Balogh: attitude of Civil Service', I 964-
8, Balogh to Shore, 30 August 1967.
293 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.89, diary entry for 1 January 1966 and Sir
Christopher Foster in conversation with Andrew Blick, 3 April 2001.
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Cabinet members, including Balogh, did, however, draft the 1966 manifesto.295
Labour officials, based at Transport House, were under the impression that
they were responsible for the authorship of election programmes and for this
reason the Kitchen Cabinet carried out the process in secret. 296
 Shore,
however, downplayed the importance of this, pointing out that he had recently
occupied a senior post at Transport House. 297 A 'strong anti-Common Market
flavour' 298
 could be detected in the Kitchen Cabinet, to which Balogh was an
important contributory element. However, as will be discussed, Wilson
eventually succumbed to European integrationist urges. Crucially, there was
strong support from intellectual Kitchen Cabinet members for the
abandonment of the sterling parity, but elements within the group who shared
this belief failed to persuade Wilson of their case. 299 Often, Wilson's group
was engaged in little more than crisis management. For example, when
devaluation came in late 1967, Kitchen Cabinet members, including Balogh,
drafted Wilson's statement on the retrenchment package which followed.300
In his evocative book The Neophiliacs, the journalist Christopher Booker
attempts to relate radical cultural developments of the 1 960s to such post-war
trends as the growth of affluence and consumerism, the decline of British
295 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.354, diary entry
for 19 October 1965.
296 Ibid, p.324, diary entry for 13 September 1965 and Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.381,
diary entry for 1 February 1966.
297 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
298 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.295.
2	 example, when Cabinet discussed devaluation on 19 July 1966, Benn, Castle and
Crossman all argued in favour, but were outnumbered. James Callaghan, Time and Chance,
p.199.
°° Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.6O'7, diary entry for 17 December
1967.
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status as a world power and the erosion of deference. 30 ' He suggests that, by
the mid-1960s, social, economic and political upheaval during the preceding
decade had engendered a mood of 'frantic euphoria' 302 amongst large sections
of the British populace. Influenced by an hysterical media, the electorate,
Booker argues, was susceptible to the presentational skills possessed by
Wilson. 303 To Booker, the appointment of special advisers was one of a series
of administrative gimmicks which Wilson indulged in upon taking office. 304 It
was the case that, as Prime Minister, Wilson had an eye for public relations
ploys in which special advisers were sometimes enlisted. For example,
according to Caimcross, in March 1965, Kaldor supported Wilson's proposal
for a tax on business entertainment, to be rebated for exports, on the grounds
that 'people must be given something they can approve and understand.'
Caimcross dismissed Wilson's idea as a 'gimmick.'305
Booker and those who share his view of Wilson would no doubt find further
confirmation in a scheme the Prime Minister devised in July 1965. Wilson
intended to flush the perpetrators of the notorious 1963 Great Train Robbery
into the open by removing all pound notes from circulation and issuing ones of
a new design. 306 The robbery and its sequels were great media events in their
own right, a fact which surely encouraged Wilson's interest. 307 He instructed
301 Christopher Booker, The Neophiliacs.
302 Ibid, p.18.
303 ibid, p.252. For aspects of the Wilson and his allies' attitude towards the media, see: Des
Freedman, 'Modernising the BBC: Wilson's Government and Television 1964-66',
Contemporary British History, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp21 -40.
304 Booker, The Neophiliacs, p.254.
305 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.43, diary entry for 8 March 1965.
306 See: PRO PREM 13/284. 'Investment in real estate in non-sterling area by UK residents.
Moves to frustrate train robbers: cost of re-issuing bank notes.' 1965.
307 See: Bruce Reynolds, Nick Reynolds and Alan Parker, The Great Train Robbery (Abstract
Sounds, London, 2000).
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one of his special advisers, the economist Michael Stewart, to contact the
Treasuiy regarding the viability of this proposal. 308 In so doing, Stewart
managed to contravene Whitehall etiquette, prompting the Prime Minister's
Principal Private Secretary, Derek Mitchell to write to him requesting that 'if
any information is sought from a Department "on behalf of the Prime
Minister" we prefer that the Prime Minister's Office should be the channel;
failing that we would at least like to know that the request has been made.'309
By November, Callaghan had become convinced that Wilson's scheme was
impracticable. 31 ° Even Wilson, it seems, was not certain of the viability of his
own plan, since he failed to raise the matter at two meetings with the
Chancellor in early December. The idea appears to have then been dropped.31'
Policy notions of this type are arguably supportive of Booker's assessment of
Wilson as deliberately projecting an often shallow image of himself as the
dynamic leader of a modern administration. However, it will be shown that
the creation of the special adviser was more than a mere novelty, and had
lasting constitutional implications. Moreover, Wilson was not entirely
comfortable with the possibility that he might be perceived as surrounded by a
team of advisers. As Tony Benn, who was, at the time, a close ally of
Wilson,312 noted in his diary during the 1964 election campaign, '[t]he fact is
that Harold doesn't want any people to know that anyone helps him at all. He
wants it all to be his show and Dick [Crossman] and Tommy [Balogh] and I
308 PRO PREM 13/284, Ian Bancroft, Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, to Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 22 July 1965.
Ibid, Mitchell to Stewart, 26 July 1965.
'° Ibid, 'Bank Notes and Train Robbers', Mitchell to Wilson, 26 November 1965.
311 Thid, 'Train Robbers and Bank Notes', Mitchell to Bancroft, 3 December 1965.
312 Ziegler, Wilson, p.155.
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have to pretend we don't exist. Kennedy never minded it being known that he
had speech writers and advisers, but Harold does.' 313 Questioned on the
subject of advisers shortly before becoming Prime Minister, Wilson's response
was suggestive of unease. He was insistent that 'I'm rather against the idea of
bringing in a series of eminences grises or Rasputins or court favourites to
advise a Prime Minister.' Outside advisers, he said, should be 'properly
dovetailed into the administrative machine - on an orgnization chart, not
floating around in an irresponsible way.' 314 As Prime Minister, Wilson was
concerned with the negative media attention directed towards special advisers,
particularly Balogh and Kaldor.315
An important theme of this work is that of prime ministerial power.
Interestingly, during the period under examination, a high-profile academic
debate was taking place as to whether the Prime Minister was becoming
increasingly powerful in relation to the rest of the Cabinet. 316 One participant
in this, who believed that a dominant premier was a reality, was Crossman.317
It has been shown that Wilson resisted the creation of what would have
amounted to a prime ministerial department. Nevertheless, from 1964, as will
be discussed, a small personal team of temporary aides was attached to the
premier. Balogh, as head of this group, persisted in his efforts to persuade
Wilson to bolster the centre. In a 1965 note to Wilson, Balogh proposed the
creation of a 'high-level and very small Cabinet Committee, chaired by the
313 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.146, diary entry for 23 September 1964.
314 Whitehall and Beyond, p.18.
315 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.61, diary entry for 13 June 1965.
316 See: Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp55-7.
317 R. H. S. Crossman, 'Introduction' to Walter Bagheot, The English Constitution (London:
Collins, 1963), pp51-6.
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Prime Minister' in order to 'initiate and carry through decision-making on
questions of intricate economic planning.' 318 In order to make this work,
Balogh argued, 'the Cabinet Secretariat needs further strengthening', possibly
with additions to Balogh's own team. 319 During late 1967, Balogh and
Crossman tried to persuade Wilson of the need to create an inner cabinet to
provide the government with central direction. 32° As will be shown, Wilson
took steps that were probably influenced by this advice, along with similar
recommendations from Castle and others.321
Shortly before his election victory, in his interview with Hunt, Wilson said that
'I am very worried about what I feel is the amateurism of the central direction
of Government.' Bringing in aides 'from outside', Wilson said, was intended
as one means of correcting this problem. 322 The Cabinet Office was to be
expanded, partly through recruitment from beyond Whitehall, in order to
enable it to 'do much more in the way of briefing the Prime Minister, not only
briefing him on the machinery of Government and briefing him on the work of
any cabinet committee, but also providing a briefing agency, so that he is right
up to date and on top of the job in respect of all [the] major departments of
state. My conception of the Prime Minister is that if he's not managing
director, he is at any rate and should be very much a full-time executive
chairman'323
PRO PREM 13/360, 'Note on the experiences with the Government machine', Balogh to
Wilson, 25 February 1965.
Ibid.
320 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, pp569, diary entry for 12 November
1967.
321 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.322.
322 Whitehall and Beyond, p.18.
323 Ibid, p.20.
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For Wilson, then, special advisers were, to some extent, a means of leading
from the centre. They engaged, for example, in activities related to the
implementation of election programmes. Writing in 1965, Crossman
described how Wilson 'is always getting. . .Balogh to try and convince him that
of the seventy-three promises in the manifesto, fifty-two are already being
carried out.' 324 As will be shown, Wilson used John Allen, a special adviser,
to scrutinise departmental proposals from the party political perspective and
follow-up on prime ministerial policy recommendations. Balogh engaged in
redrafting departmental White Papers. 325 He also lobbied for the establishment
of 'a form of possible machinery for chasing up progress on important
decisions made by the Cabinet and Ministerial meetings.'326
Another concept useful to an understanding of the special adviser within the
first Wilson administration is that of 'presidentialisation.' Put forward in its
most sophisticated and eloquent form by the academic Michael Foley, this
thesis suggests that British party leaders have taken on some of the
characteristics adhered to by their US near-counterparts. 327 Foley describes
the presidential-style leader as possessing 'distance, and occasionally
detachment' 328 from government and party, appealing directly to the public.
This development has been fuelled in Britain by, amongst other factors, the
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol 1, p.249, diary entry for 13 June 1965.
See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.2i9, diary entry
for 1 February 1967.
326 Wigg Collection, 4/56, 'Progress Chasing', Balogh to Trend, 29 May 1965.
See: Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency.
328 Ibid, p.264.
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mass media, in particular the rise of television, and the decline of traditional
social hierarchies.329
Significantly, Foley suggests that '[ut was Harold Wilson who really gave rise
to the comparisons between British politics and the American presidency.'33°
Examples of Wilson's presidential tendencies, according to Foley, included his
centralisation of control over the 1964 election campaign and, during the
course of this, his emphasis on the importance of television broadcasts,
inspired by Kennedy's achievements within this medium. 331 There is
substance to Foley's arguments, some of which are similar to Booker's in their
portrayal of changing public perceptions. The attachment of a personal staff to
the Prime Minister, partly comprised of special advisers, arguably at the
expense of the influence of Cabinet members, certainly fits with Foley's
presidential model. Interestingly, in relation to his plans for the use of Civil
Service outsiders, Wilson told Hunt that 'I think one can learn from the
Kennedy experience.. .he [brought] into the White House a number of top
people from universities, one or two top scientists, top administrators.'332
Other ministers began to acquire their own aides, arguably suggestive of their
own potentially presidential tendencies. A great deal of suspicion was
engendered within the Wilson camp by the Home Secretary, and later the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins's employment of John Harris as a
special adviser. 333 Wilson, however, was never entirely comfortable with
certain aspects of the role of presidential-style leader. In September 1965,
329 Thid, p.104 and pp264-8.
330 Ibicl, p.104.
B Ibid, pplO4-7.
332 Whitehall and Beyond, p.19.
Lord Harris of Greenwich in conversation with Andrew Buck, 6 March 2001.
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Balogh encouraged the Prime Minister to increase his tally of special advisers.
Wilson rejected the suggestion, on the grounds that such an act would
constitute the creation of a 'presidential staff.'334





In this chapter, an overview will be given of the first group of special advisers
appointed in 1964. For chapters IV-VI, the end of 1967 has been selected as a
cut-off point, since, in November of that year, the devaluation of sterling,
arguably the defining event of Wilson's first premiership, was carried out. 1 As
well as its consequences for policy, the adjustment in parity was associated
with shifts in the balance of power within the administration. 2 These had
important implications for the subject at hand, which should, along with
subsequent developments, be considered separately. The aides under
examination in this Chapter will be John Allen, Thomas Balogh, Nicholas
Kaldor, Robert Neild and Michael Stewart. The case of John Harris, who was
also recruited in 1964, initially counselling the Foreign Secretary, Patrick
Gordon-Walker, 3 will be examined in Chapter VI, since his prominence grew
in the post-devaluation period, as will be shown.
In Chapter III, Wilson's stated intention that special advisers would be
'dovetailed' into the administrative machine was described. In this context,
there will be an examination of considerations relating to the employment of
special advisers, including their job-titles, pay, their physical location, their
access to ministers and papers, and the committees they attended. An
For an account of this, see: Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp3l4-6.
2 Most importantly, Roy Jenkins was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. Ben Pimlott,
Harold Wilson, p.485.
See, for example: Marcia Williams, Inside Number 10, p.31.
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overview will then be provided of their activities as a group, rather than as
individuals, which be the subject of Chapter V. Possible theoretical
interpretations of the initiation of the special adviser will be discussed.
Finally, a high degree of press attention, focused in particular on Balogh and
Kaldor, was attracted by the use of partisan, temporary civil servants. This
will be described, along with an investigation of the two economists' supposed
partnership.
Inside the machine
The international origins of special adviser as a governmental tenn are not
entirely clear, but it certainly gained prominence in the US during the first half
of the twentieth century. A search of the British Library's computerised
catalogue reveals that it was already in use there by 1924. The Library of
Congress Online Catalogue contains references to Presidential special advisers
dating back to the 1930s. 5 The title occurs in British Public Record Office
files pre-dating October 1964, often used to describe aides to foreign
diplomats.6 In May 1957, Harold Macmillan appointed Admiral Sir Matthew
Slattery as a 'special adviser on the transport of Middle East oil.' 7 It will
become apparent that, from 1964, the designation took on a distinctive new
meaning.
' See: Federal Reclamation by Irrigation. Message from the President of the United States
transmitting a report submitted to the Secretary of the Interior by the Committee of Special
Advisers on Reclamation (Washington: Department of the Interior, 1924).
See, for example: Letter to the President on foreign trade from George N. Peek, Special
Adviser to the President on Foreign Trade (Washington: US Government Print Office, 1934).
6 See, for example, discussion within the Colonial Office of the special advisers who will be
accompanying delegates attending a Kenya Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House in
1960. PRO CO 822/2355, 'Special advisers.' 1960.
7 For details of this appointment, see: PRO T 199/706, 'Appointment of special Adviser on
Middle East Oil Supplies (Admiral Sir Matthew Slattery).' 1957-60.
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For the purposes of this chapter, five special advisers, all of whom were
appointed immediately upon Labour's election victory, have been selected.
They were temporary civil servants of party political association, drawn from
beyond the Civil Service but employed within it, subject to the patronage of
individual ministers. For this reason the official 1964 listing of Solly
Zuckerman, already a long serving formal supplier of counsel on defence
matters, 8
 as a special adviser9 must be taken as anomalous. A number of new
ministries were created during the first Wilson administration,' 0 inevitably
resulting in a large influx of outsiders to Whitehall. 1 ' In order to avoid
dilution of the topic, only temporary newcomers employed in already existing
offices of government have been included for examination. 12 Four of the five
individuals selected are listed in the 1965 Imperial Calendar (the name of the
Civil Service Yearbook in a less politically correct past) as special advisers.13
The fifth appointment was labelled differently,' 4 for reasons which will be
explained.
On the first day of the Labour administration, Balogh told Derek Mitchell, the
Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, that he did not have a title yet. In
his account, Mitchell's quick-witted response, not appreciated by Balogh, was
that these were not bestowed until departure from government.' 5 In the 1965
8 PRO CAB 160/1, 'Dr Thomas Balogh', 1964-6, 'Press Notice', 28 October 1964.
The British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List 1965, p.18.
'° For example the DEA and the Ministry of Technology. Ziegler, Wilson, pp 170-2.
For an account of this, see: Hennessy, Whitehall, ppl8l-9.
12 Three special advisers were attached to the Cabinet Office (working for the Prime Minister)
and two to the Treasury.
' Imperial Calendar 1965, p.18 and p.23.
' Robert Neild is described simply as 'Economic Adviser to the Treasury.' Ibid, p.23.
Sir Derek Mitchell in conversation with Andrew Blick.
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Cairncross. 22 In Kaldor's account, a chance series of events led to Callaghan's
acquisition of Neild as an adviser and the development of the
misunderstanding that Cairncross was ready to leave Whitehall and become
the senior Treasury representative in Washington. 23 The problem of placing a
politically appointed bureaucrat in charge of neutral civil servants was
intractable. 24 Brittan recorded Caimcross stating that 'the Labour Party would
have to make up its mind whether to sack him and introduce the spoil
system.'25
A satisfactory resolution, however, first proposed to Callaghan by William
Armstrong, Joint Permanent Secretary of the Secretary, on 23 October 1964,
was eventually reached. Armstrong's suggestion was that '[b]roadly speaking
Mr. Cairncross would be in charge of the economic analysis of forecasting
operations and also the Treasury's man on the recruitment, training and
posting of career economists in the Government service. Mr. Neild will.. .have
a remit which will be somewhat wider and also more personal to you. He will
be particularly useful in keeping in touch with you about how your mind is
working on policy.' 26 Here then, the importance of the link between special
adviser and minister was clear. Eventually, Neild and Caimcross achieved a
mutually harmonious division of responsibilities whereby the former provided
advice while the latter ran the machine. 27 Aside from the threat to his own
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.2.
23 A.P. Thiriwall (ed.), Keynes as a Policy Adviser, p.175.
24 Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.7, diary entry for 19 October 1964 and p.i3, diary entry for
7 November 1964.
25 Samuel Brittan Collection, p.6, diary entry for 9 November 1964.
26 PRO T 199/874 'Organisation and Staffmg of the Economic Section', 1963-5, William
Annstrong to Callaghan, 23 October 1964.
27 Neild in conversation with Blick; and Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.2.
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position, Cairncross was also concerned that he was not being consulted over
temporary appointments and that the exact status of these in relation to the
career bureaucracy was unclear. 28 The decision to appoint special advisers to
the Cabinet Office was also taken without prior consultation with the Treasury
Establishment Officer, Elsie Abbot.29
The question of remuneration was a contentious one. In the Commons, on 10
November 1964, the Conservative MP, Simon Wingfield Digby, asked how
the salaries of incoming advisers, including Balogh, Kaldor and Neild were
worked out. 3° In fact, there was no precise formula. The problem was that
matching special advisers to Civil Service grades was extremely difficult, as
the example of Allen and Stewart, who both worked under Balogh,
demonstrated. Allen (32 years old at the time) requested payment at Principal
scale.31 Stewart (31), who, like Neild, had previously served in the Economic
Section (from 1957 to 1962) suggested that the calculation of his salary should
take into account the fact that he had less job security than during his previous
bureaucratic stint. 32 In relation to attempts to try and determine Stewart's and
Allen's salaries, in October 1964, Andrew Collier, a Treasury Assistant
Secretary, remarked to David Heaton, the Principal Establishment Officer at
the Cabinet Office, that 'I fear we may run into difficulties in the long run if
we try to equate either of these people to any particular point in an existing
28 PRO T 199/875 'Management of Government Economic Service. Setting up of a General
Service Class of Economists', 1964-5, 'Government Economic Service', Cairncross to Sir
Philip Allen, Second Secretary, Treasury, 22 January 1965.
29	 CAB 160/1 Heaton to Elsie Abbot, Establishment Officer, Third Secretary, Treasury,
23 October 1964.
30 House of Commons Debates, 10 November 1964, Col. 812.
PRO CAB 160/1, David Heaton, Principal Establishment Officer, Cabinet Office, to Sir
Burke Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet, 19 October 1965.
32 Ibid.
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scale; it doesn't really fit.' 33 Allen's and Stewart's grades, were, therefore,
officially deemed as ones for which 'no national scale or rate exists.' 34 The
figure arrived at for both was £2,500 per annum.35
Eventually, Stewart's pay level was set at that of the newly-created grade of
Economic Adviser. In early 1967, Balogh attempted to get Stewart promoted
to the level of Senior Economic Adviser. From the point of view of the
official machine, which possessed no appropriate yardstick, determining
whether this elevation was merited was a difficult task. Furthermore, there
were suspicions that Balogh was merely attempting to obtain a pay-rise for
Stewart by other means. 36 Neild was asked to conduct an assessment of
Stewart's role and in his report remarked that '[i]n "irregular" work of this
kind the work depends on the people i.e. on how the Minister, the Chief
Adviser [meaning, in this instance, Balogh] and his right hand man [Stewart]
actually conduct their operations.' 37 As Louis Petch, a Treasury Second
Secretary, put it to Armstrong two days later, 'the job tends to be what the man
makes it.' 38 Stewart was promoted by a formal board in April 1967.
Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, wrote to both the Vice Chancellor at
Oxford and the Master of Balliol College in order to secure unpaid leave-of-
" PRO 1 199/1 063, Andrew Collier, Assistant Secretary, Treasury, to Heaton, 29 October
1964.
34 i Calendar 1965, p.1 8.
35Ibid,p.18.
36 PRO T 199/1063, Collier to Louis Petch, Second Secretary, Treasury, 14 February 1967.
Ibid, Neild to Petch, 7 March 1967.
38 Ibid, Petch to Armstrong, 9 March 1967.
T 199/1063, Heaton to Collier, 17 April 1967.
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absence for Balogh (58).° As with Allen and Stewart, there was officially 'no
national scale or rate' for Balogh's salary. 4 ' Balogh's grade upon joining the
Civil Service on 17 October 1964 was described as 'Special Adviser to the
Prime Minister.' 42
 Balogh told Heaton that he was not 'concerned with money
as such, but with the status a salary implies and confers.' 43 Balogh suggested
'a salary.. . somewhere between Cairncross and Sir Donald MacDougall [ie:
above Cairncross and below MacDougall].' 44 Heaton initially proposed to
Trend that Balogh receive £7,200. Ultimately, Balogh's starting salary was
£6,500,46 compared to Cairncross's £6,75O. This was a curtain-raiser to
much frisson between the two economists, as will be shown. In April 1966,
Balogh requested an increase in his salary, drawing attention to the disparity
between his and Cairncross's respective levels. 48 Wilson was prompted to
issue a 'dictat that Mr. Balogh should be on a salary £100 less than Mr.
Cairncross's.' 49 Balogh regularly lobbied for the salaries of his staff to be
increased. Indeed, this matter was one of many sources of resentment towards
the permanent Civil Service for him. As he wrote to Petch in February 1967,
'I am not at all satisfied with the way in which my staff is being treated from
the point of view of pay.'5°
40 PRO CAB 160/1, Trend to The Master, Balliol College and the Vice Chancellor, Oxford
University, 27 October 1964.
Imperial Calendar 1965, p.18.
42 PRO CAB 160/1, 'Action Sheet - On Joining', 17 October 1964.
Ibid, Heaton to Trend, 19 October 1965.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Imperial Calendar 1965, p.18.
Ibid, p.23.
48 PRO CAB 160/1, Balogh to Heaton, 25 April 1966.
PRO T 199/1164, Abbot to Armstrong, 24 June 1966.
T 199/1063, Balogh to Petch, 13 February 1967.
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were recruited on terms already in place for the temporary employment of
economists.58
Shortly after the appointment of the first group of special advisers, the First
Division Association (FDA), the union representing senior career officials,
approached the Treasury in order to voice concerns regarding this
development. 59 On 2 March 1965, Collier wrote to Abbot summarising FDA
anxieties. These centred on 'the way the Treasury has seemed to acquiesce in
a rush of appointments, at high salaries, of people with political connections.'
This, the union felt, had negative implications for the career prospects of
neutral permanent officials. Such fears were very difficult to placate. 6° The
FDA was also worried that special advisers might be given access to the
papers of previous administrations. The concern was that politically appointed
bureaucrats might not exercise discretion in the public discussion of advice
tendered by FDA members in the past. 6 ' Wilson, following a request for a
ruling from the Cabinet Office, determined that Balogh should not have access
to the papers of previous administrations. The position of Kaldor in this
respect is not clear. Neild, however, was granted this right. In the words of
Collier, Neild 'can more reasonably be regarded as a civil servant, albeit
temporary.' 62 This description of Neild was probably inspired by the fact of
his previous employment in the Economic Section.
Lord Croham in conversation with Andrew Buck.
T 199/891, Ken Couzens, Chainnan, First Division Association, Treasury Branch, to
Collier, 18 November 1964.




On 19 October 1964, in a letter to Trend, Heaton referred to 'general principles
which the Treasury may be formulating for temporary Civil Servants brought
in at the instance of the new Government.' 63 Heaton was possibly alluding
purely to a method of determining pay, rather than a broader set of rules
relating to matters such as propriety. Whichever it was, no clear guidelines of
any type materialised. As far as Croham (Douglas Allen) recalls knowing, no
official code governing the conduct of special advisers existed during 1964-
7064 None was found in the PRO during the course of research for this work.
Although formal regulation was lacking, there was an understanding that
special advisers would not compromise the neutrality of permanent officials or
involve themselves in exclusively party political activities. In June 1965,
Mitchell cautioned Balogh against habitually approaching Peter Jay, a
Principal in the Treasury, when making Treasury-related inquiries. Jay, the
son of Douglas and son-in-law of Callaghan, was particularly concerned that
he should not come to be regarded as partisan. 65 Kaldor's personal papers
show that not only did he devote a substantial quantity of his own time to
activities such as drafting Labour pamphlets, but he also enlisted career
officials in this.66
When the 1966 general election loomed, Wilson, prompted by Trend,
reminded Balogh that 'he is a temporary civil servant and should so comport
himself during the period of the Election.' Cabinet Office staff were warned
63 CAB 160/1, Heaton to Trend, 19 October 1964.
Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
65 PRO PREM 13/518, 'Research assistance for Dr Balogh: use of Peter Jay;
Private Secretary wrote to Prime Minister', 1965, Mitchell to Wilson, 17 June 1965.
See: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/5, 'Treasury Political Papers', 1966-8.
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that '[i]f there is any reason to suppose that he is failing to heed this injunction,
Sir Burke Trend should be informed at once.' 67 In the 1966 poii, Stewart
contested, and lost, East Croydon for Labour. An agreement was arrived at
before the contest that, were he unsuccessful in his bid to enter Parliament, he
would be re-employed as a civil servant. However, in a meeting with Wilson,
Trend emphasised the 'difficulty of so doing.' 68 The decision caused 'quite a
bit of anguish' for career bureaucrats. 69 Furthermore, Balogh, to the disgust of
career Whitehall, suggested that Stewart should come back at a higher salary.
As Collier put it to Abbot at the time, 'if we are to avoid the impression of the
Civil Service providing a convenience for political candidates between
Elections, it is particularly important that the individuals concerned should at
least not benefit financially from their resignation and re-employment.'70
Further propriety questions related to the outside business contacts, additional
occupations and financial activities of special advisers. Upon his recruitment,
Kaldor decided to leave the Investment Advisory Board of his College, since
inside Treasury knowledge would make his position awkward. 7 ' He also had
to relinquish his directorship of four investment trusts, worth £2,000 a year in
total, as well as 'odd jobs with U.N., B.B.C., and journalism.' 72 Balogh,
Crossman and Paul Streeten, an economist who Balogh had helped place at the
Ministry of Overseas Development, were Trustees of family funds for their
67 PRO CAB 160/1, Note, 3 March 1966.
68 PRO T 199/1063, Collier to Abbot, 4 April 1966.
69 Ibid. Collier to Petch, 14 February 1967.
70 Ibid, Collier to Abbot, 4 April 1966.
PRO PREM 13/15, 'Press interest in recruitment of Dr Balogh and Mr Kaldor', 1964,
'Note', 4 November 1964.
72 PRO T 199/1164, 'Note for the Record', Abbot, 23 October 1964.
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various children. 73 Changes in investments were potentially awkward, given
the positions of the Trustees within the government. Balogh wrote to Trend in
April 1965 to enquire whether it would be satisfactory to hand over decision-
making responsibilities to a broker. 74 Trend raised this with Mitchell, who in
turn approached Wilson. Wilson's hand-written response was '[y]es, can't
stop these fellows' tax dodging activities.'75
In November 1964, attempts were made from the Conservative benches in the
Commons to raise security concerns related to Labour's administrative
innovation.76
 Balogh77 and Kaldor78 were both required to sign the Official
Secrets Act, as all special advisers must have been. The two aides were both
subject to positive security vetting, entailing active enquiry into an individual's
past and personal details. 79 A form from Balogh's Cabinet Office personal file
has a tick next to 'M.I.5' (ie: the internal Security Service), although 'Yard'
(presumably meaning the Special Branch of the police) has a line through it.80
Balogh's referees for the personal vetting process were Wigg and MacDougall.
The latter had to be chased to return the relevant form. 'Field investigations'
were also a requirement. 8 ' Employment as a permanent civil servant was
permitted for anyone who was a British subject and had resided in the country
for five of the previous eight years. 82 Balogh and Kaldor, although both born
See: PRO PREM 13/168, 'Doctor Balogh's family trust', April-May 1965.
Ibid. Balogh to Trend, 14 April 1965.
1 Ibid. Trend to Mitchell, 3 May 1965.
76 House of Commons (HC) Debates, 10 November 1964, Cols 811-2.
" PRO CAB 160/1, 'Official Secrets Acts - Declaration', 17 October 1964.
PRO T 199/1164, 'Note for the Record. Abbot, 23 October 1964.
PRO PREM 13/15, 'Nationality Rules: Dr. Balogh and Mr. Kaldor', 3 November 1964.
° PRO CAB 160/1, 'Action Sheet— On Joining', 17 October 1964.
Ibid, Heaton to Trend, 3 November 1964.
82 PRO PREM 13/15, 'Nationality Rules: Dr. Balogh and Mr. Kaldor', 3 November1964.
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in Hungary, fulfilled these requirements. 83 However, the Cabinet Office, but
not the Treasury, normally required its staff to be born in the Commonwealth,
along with both their parents, although ministers could overrule this. Anyway,
these regulations did not apply to temporary staff.
As well as Balogh and Kaldor, John Allen and Michael Stewart received basic,
negative security clearance immediately upon their appointment, followed by
positive vetting85 and it can be assumed that Neild did, too. The first wave of
special advisers received a 'memorandum which sets out the policy of H.M.
Government on membership of the Communist Party', which was given to all
civil servants, permanent or temporary, upon their appointment.86
Channels of communication and physical access to ministers were of great
importance to special advisers. Throughout his time in Whitehall, Balogh sent
Wilson a large amount of written material, discussed below, and saw him
regularly. 87 Mitchell, horrified by Balogh's assumption that he could call on
the Prime Minister in the Cabinet room at any time, saw to it that Balogh was
housed in 70 Whitehall. The Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary also
ensured that Balogh was not given a key to the permanently locked connecting
door. Balogh therefore faced the indignity of having to ring a bell every time
he wished to visit Wilson. 88 A colleague recalls that Balogh was euphoric
83 Ibid.
PRO PREM 13/15, 'Nationality Rules: Dr. Balogh and Mr. Kaldor', 3 November 1964.
85 PRO CAB 160/1, Heaton to Trend, 19 October 1964.
86 Ibid., Heaton to Balogh, 9 November 1964.
87 See, for example: Williams, Inside Number 10, pp8l-2.
88 Mitchell in conversation with Buck.
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upon moving into an office in Number 10 proper following the 1966
election, 89 although, as will be shown, he was ultimately disappointed.
Cairncross suggested that Neild had a direct line of conatct with the
Chancellor, fulfilling the role of personal aide to a greater extent than Kaldor.9°
Following the initial confusion regarding his role, Armstrong found Neild an
office, next to his own, on the second floor on the inner circle of the Treasury
building, Great George Street. 91 Effectively, he could call in on Callaghan or
Armstrong whenever he wanted. However, Neild recollects that, ultimately,
he spent less time with Callaghan than Kaldor did, since the Chancellor of the
Exchequer devoted so much attention to taxation policy.92
Like Balogh, Kaldor was not initially allocated a room in his desired location.
From the outset, Kaldor was, according to Abbot, 'very anxious to have a
room in' the main Treasury building. However, there was supposedly no
space, and he was housed in the Inland Revenue premises at Somerset
House.93 This was not satisfactory to him. 94 In November 1964, he
complained to Armstrong that it was 'very difficult' to provide effective
general advice 'without having a room in the Treasury.' 95 Eventually, in the
autumn of 1965, he moved there, taking up full-time employment at the same
Sir Christopher Foster in conversation with Andrew B lick, 3 April 2001.
9° Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.142, diary entry for 19 June 1966.
' Neild in conversation with Blick. Sir Kenneth Berrill, a Treasury adviser from 1967-9,
draws attention to the importance of being located in this part of the building. Sir Kenneth
Berrill in conversation with Andrew Blick, 21 June 2001.
92 Nejld in conversation with Blick.
PRO T 199/1164, 'Note for the Record', Abbot, 23 October 1964.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.6, diary entry for 19 October 1964.
T 199/1164, 'NOTE FOR THE RECORD', Armstrong, 4 November 1964.
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time.96 According to his biographer, Kaldor had immediate access to William
Armstrong, but not Callaghan. 97 However, as will be shown, he did send
numerous papers directly to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Inside Balogh's
small team, Allen had 'direct access to the Prime Minister', a privilege not
afforded to Stewart. 98 It will be demonstrated that informal contact with
ministers was also important.
It is necessary to examine the extent of special advisers' inclusion on
Whitehall circulation lists and their attendance at official committees. On 22
October 1964, a 'meeting of [Permanent] Secretaries' was held in Trend's
office. At this, it was determined that Balogh should receive all papers and
minutes of Economic Committees, Social Committees, (with the exception of
the Home Affairs Committee) and the Queen's Speech Committee.99
According to Shore, Balogh saw inclusion on key circulation lists as the most
important prerequisite to the effective performance of special advisory duties.
He coveted, but seemingly was never formally granted, access to the Prime
Minister's box, before it was sent to Wilson, in order that he could insert his
own comments on the papers it contained.' 00 Balogh continually struggled to
ensure that he was copied all of Wilson's instructions 'on the economic side'
as well as all of Trend's similar minutes to the Prime Minister.' 0 ' In March
1967, Balogh complained to Wilson that this was not taking place.102
Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.23!.
Ibid, pp23 1-2.
PRO CAB 160/1 Heaton to Abbot, 23 October 1964.
thid, Note by William Mclndoe, Private Secretary, Cabinet Office, 23 October 1964.
100 Lord Shore of Stepney in conversation with Andrew Blick.
'°' PRO PREM 13/3094, Balogh to Wilson, 2 March 1967.
102 ibid.
139
At the October 1964 meeting in Trend's room, the decision was also taken that
Balogh was only to receive Top Secret papers when permission was given by
the relevant permanent secretary. Defence related papers, which he had said
he did not want, anyway, would not be available. Requests for Treasury or
DEA materials were to be made by Balogh himself. It was assumed that Allen
and Stewart would see all the papers received by Balogh, but they would not
automatically be sent their own copies. 103 It seems there was an understanding
that the materials made available to Balogh would tend towards technical
rather than political discussions. In a letter to Halls from February 1967,
Balogh referred to how it was deemed that some 'general political talk is not
fit for my young eyes.' 104 Balogh was never content with arrangements,
suspecting that, as a result of permanent Civil Service conspiracy, he was not
being made privy to all the information he needed.'° 5 Mitchell suggests that
repeated failures to supply Balogh with certain papers may have been as much
a product of the desire of ministers associated with the policy area concerned
to keep Balogh at bay as Whitehall subterfuge.106
In particular, Balogh sought to expand his access rights to include papers
produced within the Treasury ambit. In November 1964, Armstrong resisted
Balogh's demands to be sent materials normally exclusively within the circle
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the grounds that that the Prime Minister
was happy to deal with the matters that these related to orally.'°7 In February
1966, Balogh requested access to materials produced by Treasury Committees
103 PRO CAB 160/1, Note made by Mclndoe, 23 October 1964.
'° PRO PREM 13/3094, Balogh to Halls, 6 February 1967.
105 See, for example: Willliams, Inside Number 10, pp357-8.
106 Mitchell in conversation with Buck.
107 PRO CAB 2 1/5248, Armstrong to Trend, 6 November 1964.
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dealing with 'capital balance.. .export incentives.. .[and] new taxes." 08 The
Treasury response was to deny that these bodies existed. 109 This scenario was
sometimes reversed, with regular Whitehall feeling that it was being kept in
the dark as to the activities of special advisers. Cairncross did not appreciate
Kaldor's habit of initiating discussions on tables and papers which had not
been circulated in advance."0
Balogh sat on a variety of official committees, including, for example, the
Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC), which he was invited to join in
October 1965." When an Official Steering Committee on Prices and Incomes
Policy was established in May 1966, Balogh was placed on the circulation list
and asked to attend." 2 However, Balogh still complained of being excluded
from committees held under Treasury auspices." 3 A document from March
1967 described Balogh as being 'free to roam around Cabinet Office
Economic Committees' as he saw fit, even those he did not formally belong
to." 4 Balogh and his staff, it seems, between them either attended or were
members of 'the whole field of Official Committees dealing with economic
policy." 5 At this point, Kaldor was a member of the 'Statistical Policy
Committee' and, along with Neild, the 'Official Committee on the Economic
Implications of Entering Europe.' Kaldor occasionally appeared at the 'Export
'° PRO PREM 13/1955, 'Attendance of Economic Advisers at meetings of Cabinet
committees: refusal of Chancellor of the Exchequer to allow Doctor Balogh, Prime Minister's
adviser to see some papers', 'Treasury Committees', 1964-8, Balogh to Wilson, 1 February
1966.
109 Thid, 'Treasury Committees', Mitchell to Wilson, 2 February 1966.
110 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.201, diary entry for 10 March 1967.
'' PRO CAB 147/75, Balogh to Sir Richard Clarke, Second Secretary, Treasury, 21 October
1965.
112 Thid, Annstrong to Balogh, 19 May 1966.
" Ibid, Balogh to Armstrong, 31 March 1966.
114 Thid, Stewart to Balogh, 6 March 1967.
115 PRO PREM 13/1 955, 'Note for the Record', 7 March 1967.
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Policy Committee.' Neild attended 'Possible International Economic
Arrangements' meetings. 116 It will be shown in Chapter VI that Balogh and
Kaldor were excluded from one very important, highly secret, Treasury
committee.
The Economic Advisers, according to MacDougall, was an unofficial body,
initially consisting of Balogh, Neild, Kaldor, John Jukes (MacDougall's
Deputy at the DEA), Cairncross and MacDougall, who normally took the
17 A formal status for this entity would have posed a greater challenge
to the influence of the permanent machine, but did not come about. No doubt
with this in mind, in an April 1966 submission to Wilson, Balogh proposed the
establishment of a 'committee. ..under the Chancellor's chairmanship, and
containing the Economic Advisers apart from the Permanent Secretaries.'118
While ministers often consulted the Economic Advisers on important macro-
economic issues such as forecasts and assessments, MacDougall subsequently
wrote that they were sometimes sidelined into 'specific questions like state
pension schemes and even fisheries. . .to keep us too busy to have mischievous
thoughts about things like the exchange rate.' 119 The uncertain nature of this
body is underlined by the fact that Neild does not recall its existence.'20
116 Ibid.
MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.15!.
118 PRO PREM 13/839, 'Doctor Balogh's views on implementation of Radcliffe
Report', 1966, 'Implementation of the Radcliffe Report', April 1966, Balogh to Wilson, 25
Ari1 1966.
MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.15!.
' 20 Nejld in conversation with Buck.
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MacDougall, Balogh, Kaldor and Neild also met, even more informally,
without Cairncross present. 121 Balogh, Kaldor and Neild sometimes
participated in bilateral discussions held between the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and other ministers 122 or officials such as Sir Alexander Johnston,
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue. 123 They also attended, in an ex
officio capacity, informal suppers that Wilson held at Number 10 for senior
ministers and advisers.' 24 In this kind of company, special advisers tended to
be more vocal and assertive than permanent officials.' 25 Temporary
bureaucrats also often dominated discussion at meetings held in conjunction
with regular civil servants, sometimes, at least in Caimcross's account, to the
irritation of the latter.' 26 Of course, this did not necessarily mean they were
more influential than their less outspoken colleagues.
Overview
The commitment possessed by special advisers to the existing administration
was important. Their deliberations often centred on the party political merits
of particular proposals. 127 Aides were concerned particularly with the
ideological content of government policy. In late 1966, for example, Kaldor
and Balogh took interest in the potential effects of wage freeze proposals upon
121 Sir Donald MacDougall in conversation with Andrew Buck.
122 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, Lord President of the
Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966-68, p.221, diary entry for 17 May 1965.
123 Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.46, diary entry for 5 April 1965.
124 Ibid, p.54, diary entry for 22 May 1965.
125 See, for example: Ibid, p.80, diary entry for 14 September 1965.
126 For an example of how Kaldor's loquacity was, for once, subdued, see: Thid, p.21 0, diary
entry for 13 May 1967.
127 For example: Ibid, p.102, diary entry for 12 December 1965.
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productivity agreements and the low paid.' 28 Kaldor, in conjunction with the
LSE-based social scientist Brian Abel-Smith, who later became a special
adviser at the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) in 1968,
developed proposals for increased family benefits to be subsidised through
taxation of the better-off recipients,' 29 known as 'claw-back." 30 When
measures had to be taken to defend sterling in autumn 1966, Kaldor and Abel-
Smith's ideas were championed by those within the Cabinet who wanted to be
able to show that 'our [Labour's] deflation differs from Tory deflation because
it doesn't affect our social-service programme."31
Balogh conceived special advisers as bureaucratic antagonists, challenging
established elements and practices within the Treasury-dominated Civil
Service. As will be shown in the next chapter, once Balogh was employed
within the administration, his theories of Whitehall incompetence and
conspiracy were confirmed, in his own mind at least.' 32 However,frisson
between insiders and outsiders was not inevitable. Caimcross found Neild a
valuable colleague. 133 Neild says that, following the initial difficulties
surrounding his appointment, it was Armstrong who found him a role at the
Treasury. For this reason, he ultimately felt more loyal to his permanent
secretary than to his minister, Callaghan.'34
128 Ibid, pp 170-i, diary entry for 7 November 1966.
129 For example: Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.90, diary
entry for 24 October 1966.
'° Ibid, p.173, diary entry for 20 December 1966.
Ibid, pp99-l00, diary entry for 24 October 1966. See: PRO CAB C(66) 160, 'Family
Endowment - School Meals', Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, Richard
Crossman, 11 November 1966.
132 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, pp 186-7, diary entry for 14 November 1964.
B Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.211, diary entry for 13 May 1967.
' Neild in conversation with Blick.
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As far as policy was concerned, certainly, there were some disputes between
permanent and temporary bureaucrats. It has been argued that the
interventionist programme with which the latter were associated ran 'against
the whole grain of thought' of Whitehall.' 35 Special advisers often favoured
lower levels of unemployment than established elements within the
bureaucracy, particularly the Treasury.' 36 Further divergence between special
advisers and career civil servants, in relation to sterling and Selective
Employment Tax (SET), will be discussed below. However, for Kaldor at
least, the Treasury did not turn out to be quite the Whiggish institution of
repute. In March 1967, he expressed the view to Cairncross that 'he had never
expected to find the Treasury such a hotbed of Keynesians.' 137 Balogh's
problems with Treasury officials and other permanent civil servants were, in
Cairncross's view, derived not exclusively from disagreements related to
policy or organisation, but also from personality clashes.138
During the course of 1964-7, battle-lines were not always clearly drawn
between permanent bureaucracy and party political elements. Firstly, shared
ideological goals did not automatically mean agreement over the means of
achieving them. In early 1966, for example, Kaldor entered into a dispute with
Crossman over how to provide mortgage subsidies for those whose earnings
were too low for them to pay income tax. 139 Secondly, disagreements over
policy between temporary economists and permanent Treasury bureaucrats
135 Andrew Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.204.
136 For example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.104, diary entry for 25 December 1965.
137 Thid, p.20!, diary entry for 10 March 1967.
138 See, for example: Ibid, p.! fn.
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.446, diary entry for 3 February
1966.
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were often related to struggles at Cabinet level. In late 1965, Callaghan asked
his permanent officials to 'arm him with answers to all the things [Balogh and
Stewart].. .had put the P.M. up to saying' on the subject of deflationary cuts in
public expenditure.'4°
Kaldor's family allowance claw-back proposal, referred to above, served to pit
him against his own employer. In late 1966, a tremendous battle was fought
between ministers over this matter. Initially, Callaghan refused to consider
claw-back in conjunction with his proposed cuts on the grounds that the
Budget should be devised in secret and its contents should not be dictated to
him by other ministers. However, Callaghan then began to soften and on 20
December a paper on the subject, which Balogh helped prepare, was discussed
by the Cabinet. 141 This course of events provided evidence for the view that
special advisers were actors in their own rights. Aides were sometimes
entrusted with specific tasks by ministers. 142 For example, in November 1964,
Neild and Balogh were required to produce a paper on exchange controls,
working alongside Cairncross.' 43 However, Cairncross detected reluctance on
the part of some aides to produce merely "diagnostic" papers and these
tended to lapse into discussions of 'what should be done."
A variety of personal difficulties arose from the appointment of special
advisers. Crossman described how on one occasion during July 1965, the fact
14 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.98, diary entry for 1 December 1965.
141 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.173, diary entry for 20 December
1966.
142 See: Donald MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.151.
143 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.16, diary entry for 24 November 1964.
144 thid, p.102, diary entry for 12 December 1965.
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that he and Balogh were privy to mutually exclusive sets of confidential
material produced a 'curious hitch in our relationship... [n]either of us was
informed about each other's sector and neither was sure how much the other
knew. This meant that our conversation was inhibited." 45 MacDougall writes
that, at meetings of the Economic Advisers, Kaldor could 'at times be a
problem', since he 'had a habit of going to sleep while everyone else was
talking, and then waking up to make a long speech, sometimes - even more
maddening - as if he had heard all that had been said." 46 As already
discussed, the appointment of high-ranking special advisers could cause
disquiet amongst career bureaucrats.'47
Observers of British politics have drawn attention to the problem of
'overload', arguing that the enlarged post-war role of the state has imposed an
unbearable burden upon the administrative machine, resulting in a decline in
the quality of government.' 48 Special advisers helped tackle this problem, in a
variety of ways. Their party political commitment and the specialist skills
some of them possessed gave them particular value in this respect. Kaldor's
economic expertise, Crosland and Crossman both agreed, made him
'immensely useful." 49 As Minister of Housing and Local Government,
Crossman sometimes sent papers to a 'brains trust which includes. . .Neild at
' Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.288, diary entry for 25 July 1965.
'MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.152.
See, for example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.7, diary entry for 19 October.
148 Peter Heimessy, Cabinet (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp34-93.
149 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, pp549-5O, diary entry for 2
November 1967.
147
the Treasuiy and Tommy Balogh." 5° The likes of Stewart helped supply party
political and ideological content for speeches.15'
Special advisers also created the possibility of more meaningful participation
in Cabinet discussions. Writing in 1965, Crossman described how '[m]y
successful interventions in Cabinet Committees and at Cabinet are largely
occasioned by a talk beforehand with a few people who have access to all the
Cabinet papers - Nicky Kaldor, Tommy Balogh. . . and who want to have a
certain view put forward. Because most Ministers aren't briefed in this way
our discussions are lifeless." 52 However, some special adviser activity
increased the load on government. Balogh created work for officials through
querying assumptions and practices,' 53 and showered the Prime Minister with
memoranda and correspondence.' 54 He attempted to enlist Wilson in his
struggle for the receipt of official papers.' 55 Balogh's association with
personal tension within the Prime Minister's Office, was, Mitchell recalls, an
unwelcome distraction from more serious concerns. 156 As will be shown,
Balogh's activities also served to exacerbate disagreements over Europe, a
150 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.163, diary entry for 19 February
1965.
151 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.41, diary entry
for 19 September 1966.
152 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, pp280-1, diary entry for 19 July
1965.
153 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.68, diary entry for 13 July 1965. See, also, for example:
PRO PREM 13/3094, 'Group on Methodology', Balogh to Cairncross, 30 March 1967.
154 Evidence of this is contained in PRO CAB 147 'Cabinet Office: Economic Adviser to the
Prime Minister: Records', PREM 13/3094 and assorted other PREM 13 files.
' See, for example: PRO PREM 13/1955, 'Treasury Committees', Balogh to Wilson, 1
February 1966.
156 Mitchell in conversation with Blick.
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policy area which Hennessy describes as 'the great stress creator of late-
twentieth-century Cabinets."57
An important theme in this study is that of special advisers as participants in
the political process on their own accounts. Here, attention should be drawn to
'core executive' theory.' 58 This portrays government as a process of
interaction between officials and ministers, where outcomes are a product of
the exchange of resources, such as information and authority, between these
agents.' 59 The core executive is the body of institutions and practices within
which these activities take 	 It has already been suggested that special
advisers, rather than being mere tools of their employers, were actors in their
own rights. This idea is in keeping with core executive theory, which rejects
the command model of government.' 6 ' It could be argued that, for special
advisers, the exchange of resources described by core executive theorists took
place when, as well as carrying out tasks entrusted to them, they were able to
obtain ministerial support for their own ideas.
The use of aides must also be considered in relation to the idea of political
consensus. From the late 1960s, a number of historians began to argue that, at
some point during the 1 940s or early 195 Os, a 'broad agreement' emerged at
elite political level 'over certain fundamentals of government policy' including
'Britain's world role, the welfare state, the mixed economy, and the goal of
157 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.3 ii.






full employment." 62 The consensus, according to those who believe it existed,
broke down in the 1970s, particularly following the establishment of Margaret
Thatcher's Conservative administration in 1979. Since the late 1980s, the idea
has been portrayed, by some, as a myth.163
The 1960s have been depicted as a decade in which, while agreement over
goals still existed, the consensus was under strain because it was seen to be
failing. This led to a search for new methods which might make it work again.
In particular, as a result of low growth rates, Keynesian demand management
gave way to more hands-on intervention.IM The introduction of special
advisers, then, might be portrayed as one aspect of the broad attempt to save
the consensus through the use of dirigiste economic management. However,
the recruitment of aides of marked party political commitment could be taken
as contradicting the notion of there being a high level of agreement between
senior politicians and civil servants. If there was a consensus, it could be
argued, why was there a need for partisan counsellors? Nevertheless, in this
context, it is interesting to note that, as will be shown in Chapter IX, a rapid
growth in numbers of special advisers took place during the 1 970s, coinciding
with the break-down in the supposed settlement.
162 Paul Addison, British Historians and the Debate over the "Post- War Consensus" (Austin:
The Harry Ransom Humanities Research Centre, 1996), p.5.
163 ibid, pps-8.
See, for example: Robert Skideisky, 'Introduction' to Robert Skideisky (ed.), Thatcherism
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p.3.
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'The Terrible Twins'
There was much contemporary media interest in the special adviser
experiment, focusing in particular on Balogh and Kaldor, whose appointments
were front-page news. 165 This extended beyond the broad-sheets' 66 to include
newspapers not generally associated with the in-depth treatment of
bureaucratic matters. For example, the pro-Conservative Daily Express found
space for the two 'experts from Budapest' alongside its more typical society
profiles and human-interest stories. 167 This high level of attention was felt by
some insiders to be out of all proportion with the actual influence exercised on
ministers by Balogh and Kaldor.' 68 The victims of thinly-veiled racial abuse
in the Press, dwelling on their foreign origins and left-wing views,' 69 Balogh
and Kaldor were frequently referred to by journalists as the 'terrible twins',170
the 'Hungarian Mafia',' 7 ' 'B and K' (after Bulgarian and Kruschev, the Soviet
leaders) 172
 and 'Buda and Pest." 73 Hungarian (and no doubt Jewish) origins
were portrayed by some on as indicative of an intention to implement Soviet-
style communism.' 74 The level of negative press attention they received
165 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.36, 29 October 1964.
166 See, for example: 'Economic Adviser', Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1964.
167 See, for example: 'Callahgan calls in tax expert', Daily Express, 30 October 1964.
168 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.23, diaiy entry for 10 December 1964.
169 Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, pp230-l. See, for example: 'Callahgan calls in tax expert.'
170 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.27, fn.
171 Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, pp230-l.
172 Ibid, p.231.
173 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.568, diary entry for 14 July
1969.
Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.230.
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possibly undermined their positions inside the government.' 75 Journalists from
the Express Group, including Chapman Pincher, pursued a particular vendetta
against the two economists. In November 1964, Pincher suggested that their
appointments breached regulations governing the recruitment of foreigners
into the Civil Service. Even Kaldor's 82-year-old mother was subject to
journalistic harassment.176
The notion of the special adviser as member of an alternative establishment is
important to this study. It is possible to make a strong case for Balogh and
Kaldor as social outsiders drawn into a traditional administrative environment.
During the Second World War, although both naturalised subjects by this
point, as 'aliens', Balogh and Kaldor were not allowed to serve as temporary
civil servants, surely a frustrating outcome for both men. 177 Prejudice against
the two economists went to the highest levels in British society. Keynes,
enraged by their opposition to the Bretton Woods agreement, once expressed
the view, privately, that they, 'like many Jews, are either Nazi or Communist
at heart.' 178 Gaitskell recorded Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Conservative Colonial
Secretary from 1954-9, referring disparagingly to Balogh as 'that Hungarian
Jew.'179
As Prime Minister, in March 1963, provoked by Kaldor's public support for
floating sterling, Macmillan sent his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.568, diary entry for 14 July 1969.
176 Details of this press campaign are contained in: PRO PREM 13/15.
' 77 Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.76 and MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.35 and p.61.
178 Keynes was certainly referring to Balogh here and probably Kaldor as well. Robert
Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 3, p.445.
M. Williams (ed.), The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell, 1945-1956 (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1983), p.&32, diary entry for 1 February 1956.
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Maudling, a minute which stated that 'I am afraid that the Budapest Group -
B. and K. - Balogh and Kaldor are not valuable immigrants." 8° Maudling's
reply was that 'I am afraid B. and K. does not appear to be a happy
combination of initials.' 18 ' In November 1964, Conservative MP Wingfield
Digby asked in the Commons whether it was 'wise.. .to pay outside
economists of foreign extraction to create chaos in Britain?" 82 Shortly after
his appointment as a special adviser, Balogh claimed to have received a letter
from a man he considered a friend, Lord Boothby, recommending that he
'should go back to Hungary "where there was much work to be done."83
Such attitudes were to some extent present inside Labour as well. Recording a
visit to Cambridge in March 1951, Dalton's diary reads '[d]ined in Hall in
King's with Kaldor. Oh, but against that tremendous background of my old
college, physical, spiritual and memorial, he seems an in-comer - a small,
slightly displaced person!" 84 Balogh and Kaldor were often lazily referred to
as an item, even by supposed allies. In August 1965, Wigg, for example,
provoked by their support for devaluation, denounced them as 'Hungarian
traitors.' 185 The aforementioned Aims of Industry pamphlet dwelt upon
superficial similarities between the two 186 as did sections of the press.' 87 The
fact that two Hungarians, born within a street of each other in Budapest, and
PREM 11/4190, 'Articles by Mr N Kaldor and Dr T Balogh: exchange of
correspondence between Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer', 1963, 'Sterling',
Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister to Reginald Maudling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 13
March 1963.
181 ibid, Maudling to Macmillan, 14 March 1963.
182 HC Debates, 10 November 1964, Col. 812.
183 PRO CAB 160/1, Heaton to Mclndoe, 13 November 1964.
1M	 Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, p.508, diary entry for 2-4 March
1951.
185 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.305, diary entry for 5 August 1965.
186 Christopher George and Simon Bewlay, Advice- And Dissent, p.2.
187 See, for example: 'Callahgan calls in tax expert.'
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who had attended the same school (the Minta Gymnasium, founded by
Balogh's great uncle), had simultaneously become senior advisers to a British
government was certainly remarkable.' 88 However, the portrayal of Balogh
and Kaldor as of a piece was facile. They 'were the closest of friends.. .but
equally the greatest of competitors." 89 There were clear personal and
theoretical distinctions between them.' 9° As the Financial Times put it,
'Balogh. . .is often shaky on theory and woolly on statistics: his interests are
essentially worldly and political. . .Kaldor... essentially unworldly.. .is happiest
in the remoter reaches of theoretical abstraction." 91 As this description
suggests, Balogh was a political animal. Indeed, he was often taunted by the
other Economic Advisers, Neild recollects, for his opportunism.' 92 Kaldor was
generally more well-liked than Balogh.'93
Wilfred Beckerman, an economist and colleague of both men in academia and
government, suggests that, as an economist, Kaldor was a great believer in
models, which Balogh mistrusted, preferring to rely on his instincts. In
Beckerman's view, however, Balogh's judgements, although arrived at by
obscure means, were often more sound than Kaldor's theoretical deductions.'94
A task which often fell to Neild was the establishment of agreement between
the senior outside economists when they combined to make joint
recommendations to their ministers, notably about devaluation. This, Neild
recalls, was made particularly difficult by Balogh and Kaldor's tendency to
Graham, 'Thomas Balogh(1905-1985), p.194.
Ibid. p.197.
°	 Beckerman in conversation with Andrew Buck.
' 'Mr Wilson's S.C.R.', Financial Times, 30 October 1964.
'92 Nejld in conversation with Buck.
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'Mr Wilson's S.C.R..'
Beckerman in conversation with Blick.
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break out into personal quarrels.' 95 In policy terms, broadly speaking, Balogh
put his faith in economic controls, while Kaldor believed in the use of fiscal
measures and the floating of sterling, as will be shown.




Theakston has drawn attention to the lack of literature in the area of Civil
Service "group biography" - the mapping of the networks, connections and
career linkages of an elite group." It is one aim of this work to help fill the
gap described by Theakston, as far as special advisers are concerned. As has
been shown, unlike permanent civil servants, special advisers were recruited as
individuals with particular qualities. This heightens the value of personal
studies of them. The three special advisers selected for profiles are Allen,
Balogh and Kaldor. Allen's inclusion results from the fact that he was a non-
expert, political special adviser. Kaldor was a particularly notable academic,
and became an important policy aide. Extended space has been given to
Balogh, for a number of reasons. His importance as an instigator of the special
adviser has been discussed. He was the most high-powered of the first batch
of this new type of temporary adviser, particularly close in his relationship
with Wilson. 2
 Balogh was a significant figure, often portrayed as a difficult
personality. From a more practical point of view, the large quantity of primary
material generated by and referring to him warrants a full-scale investigation.
Nevertheless, throughout this work, consideration has been given to the need
to avoid over-representation of Balogh.
'Kevin Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall, p.3.
2 
selection of letters from Balogh to Wilson can be found in PRO PREM 13/3094,




Allen had been imported into the bureaucracy, he remained a member of
Wilson's inner circle, now known as the Kitchen Cabinet.' 0 He took it upon
himself to ensure that regular meetings of this group took place.11
According to Mitchell, Allen's role was unclear to all concerned, except in so
far as he was supposed to 'help Marcia [Williams]." 2 One of his functions
was to facilitate communication between the party political components of the
administration. For example, following his 1964 appointment as Postmaster
General, Benn felt isolated from Wilson's inner circle. In Allen he saw 'an
excellent channel.. .to the P.M." 3 As he had done before the election, as a
special adviser, Allen contributed to the development of general political
strategy.' 4 Wilson used Allen to scrutinise the party political implications of
policy proposals,' 5 and to follow up prime ministerial suggestions to
departments.' 6 This could be an awkward business for Allen if it involved
dealing with Labour colleagues on a now transformed basis.' 7 As a partisan
element within the bureaucracy, Allen was suspicious of representatives of the
permanent Civil Service. For instance, in Benn's account, he felt that the
women employed in the Number 10 secretary pool 'were deb types and he
wouldn't trust any of them."8
'° Ibid, p.34!.
Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.172, diary entry for 25 October 1964.
12 Sir Derek Mitchell in conversation with Andrew Blick.
Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.172, diary entry for 25 October 1964.
14 Ibid, p.207, diary entry for 21 January 1965.
15 Ibid, p.198, diary entry for 29 December 1964.
16 Ibid, p.198, diary entry for 30 December 1964.
Ibid, p.198, diary entry for 29 December 1964.
IS Ibid, p.173, diary entry for 25 October 1964.
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at King's College. 28 He was a long-term friend of Hugh Gaitskell and, in
appointing Kaldor as a special adviser, Callaghan was honouring the deceased
Labour leader's pledge to employ the economist in a future administration.29
In February 1959 Gaitskell told Robert Hall that he wanted 'to bring N. Kaldor
in to advise on tax questions.' 3° This does not mean that Kaldor should be
regarded as a member of the Gaitskellite faction, rather he was, in the words of
Shore, 'his own man.'31
Caimcross described Kaldor as 'a highly ingenious, fertile and knowledgeable
economist with great faith in the power of taxation to make the economy work
better; entertaining but rarely stopped talking.' 32 His party affiliations were
clear, and his wife, Clarissa, was a Labour councillor in Cambridge. 33
 As an
aide, he devoted considerable attention to drafting Labour pamphlets, briefing
ministers for public debates with Conservative politicians and continued his
participation in party policy committees. 34 According to Thiriwall, Kaldor was
'a professed and committed Socialist' who sought to achieve his ends not
through revolution, but fiscal innovation. 35 Kaldor's particular role was to
advise the Chancellor of the Exchequer on taxation, 36 although, as will be
shown, he expanded his brief far beyond this. During his time as a special
28 Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.76, p.100 and pp1 10-1.
29 ibid, p.228.
30 Alec Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hall Diaries, 1954-61, p.192, diary entry for 27 February
1959.
31 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
32 Alec Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.1, flu.
B Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.212, diary entry for 7 May 1965.
See: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/5.
Anthony P. Thirlwall, 'Kaldor as a policy adviser' in Tony Lawson, J. Gabriel Palma and
John Sender (eds), Kaldor 's Political Economy (Academic Press, London, 1989), p.1 22.
36 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.36, diary entry for 29 October 1964.
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adviser during the 1 960s, Kaldor held the view that fiscal measures could
provide a solution to almost any problem.37
In Brittan's opinion, of all the special advisers appointed during 1964-70,
Kaldor was clearly the intellectual heavyweight.38 However, unlike, for
example, Keynes, whose General Theory is regarded a definitive theoretical
treatise, Kaldor produced no single masterpiece of this type. For this reason,
interpretations of his total body of work are subject to greatly varying
emphases. What is not in doubt, however, is Kaldor's significance as an
economist. 39 While this is not the place for a full analysis of his thought, it is
necessary to investigate the background to the policy approach Kaldor took
from 1964. Sir Douglas Wass, who was Permanent Secretary to the Treasury
during Kaldor's second, 1974-6 spell as a special adviser, was personally and
professionally very close to Kaldor, whom he describes as a fervent
Keynesian, with his own particular slant on the doctrine. For as well as
believing in broad macro-economic demand management, Kaldor held that
certain particular forms of beneficial economic behaviour could be strongly
encouraged by the state, particularly through the use of fiscal innovation.40
Similarly, Neild describes Kaldor as an inventor of 'gadgets' designed to
achieve ends deemed desirable, such as the more equal distribution of wealth,
or accelerated economic growth. Intended to deliver the latter, SET, which
See, for example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.1 96, diary entry for 20 Febmuary, 1967.
Sir Samuel Brittan in conversation with Andrew Buck.
Tony Lawson, J. Gabriel Pahna and John Sender, 'Kaldor's contribution to economics: an
introduction' in Lawson, Palma and Sender (eds), Kaldor 's Political Economy, p.2.
° Sir Douglas Wass in conversation with Andrew Buck, 19 June 2001.
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will be examined in the following chapter, was perhaps the best example of
this kind of endeavour.41
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Kaldor's outlook was orthodox, influenced
by liberals such as Robbins and F. A. Hayek. 42 However, during the mid-
1930s, he was converted to the ideas of Keynes. Douglas Jay refers to how, by
this time, Kaldor had developed an interest in the use of taxation for the social
benefit of lower unemployment. 43 Another early influence was Allyn Young,
who lectured at the LSE in the late 1920s. Young was a great believer in
increasing returns to scale in manufacturing industry. 44 The significance of
this will become apparent in Chapter Vi's study of SET. Kaldor's 195 1-4
participation in the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income
'turned him into one of the world's leading experts on tax theory and policy.'
During this period, in the interests of social equality, Kaldor advocated the
introduction of levies on capital gains as well as the separation of personal and
company taxation. 45 Another significant development in Kaldor's thought was
his support, dating back as least as far as 1952, for a floating rate for sterling,
as a means of obtaining balance of payments equilibrium and export-led
growth. This was, he felt, a better means of adjustment the than use of
devaluation within a fixed-rate system.46
Robert Neild in conversation with Andrew Buck.
42 Lawson, Palnia and Sender (eds), Kaldor 's Political Economy, p.2.
' Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, p.5!.
John Hicks, 'The assumption of constant returns to scale' in Lawson, Palma and Sender
(eds), Kaldor 's Political Economy, p.9.
Thirlwall, 'Kaldor as a policy adviser', pp1 28-9.
Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, pp283-4. Advocated in an unpublished Fabian paper from 1952,
Nicholas Kaldor, 'Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments', reproduced in: Nicholas
Kaldor, Essays on Economic Policy, Vol. 2 (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1964), p.50.
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From 1964, Kaldor's contribution to policy was considerable. 47 For example,
he was closely involved with the taxation aspects of the 1965 Budget, which
Crossman attributed to him. 48 These consisted of two major new measures,
Corporation Tax and Capital Gains Tax. 49 Both were the product of a long
dialogue within the Labour movement dating back to the 1950s. 5° Corporation
Tax,51 described by Callaghan as 'a new landmark in our fiscal history',52
formally separated taxation on individuals from that levied on companies.
Since it was to be imposed on distributed as well as undistributed profits, in
theory, the result would be an increase in the incentive for corporations to
invest rather than pay out dividends. The tax was designed in such a way as to
discourage foreign investment. 53 This latter aspect brought about strong
resistance from the Bank of England. 54 Critics had long argued that such a
measure entailed the introduction of 'double taxation' on company profits.55
Cairncross gives an account of how Kaldor's skilled advocacy guided this
through the official committee phase. 56 Kaldor also briefed Treasury ministers
for the public defence of Corporation Tax.57
The development of Capital Gains Tax involved the formation of an alliance
between Kaldor and Inland Revenue officials, who believed in the taxation of
'' For a list of his papers from this period, see: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/2, '6 Treasury
Memoranda by NK', 1965-7, 'Memoranda by Professor Kaldor.'
48 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.i93, diary entry for 5 April 1965.
Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.239; and Jay, Change and Fortune, p.312.
° See: Richard Whiting, 'The Labour Party and Taxation Party Identity and Political
Purpose in Twentieth Century Britain, ppl3O-l72.
' For evidence of Kaldor's contribution to this, see PRO T 171/806, 'Corporation tax', 1965.
52 HC Debates, 6 April 1965, Cols 254-5.
PRO T 171/806, Sir Alexander Johnston, Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, to
Callaghan, 6 November 1964; and HC Debates, 6 April 1965, Cols 265-9.
' Ibid, Lord Cromer, Governor of the Bank of England, to Callaghan, 7 May 1965.
HC Debates, 6 April 1965, Cols 254-5.
56 See, for example, Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.36, diary entry for 2 February 1965.
" PRO 1 17 1/806, 'Corporation Tax', Brief for the Financial Secretary by Kaldor, 8 April
1965.
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gains from gilt-edged securities, against the Treasury. 58 Its objective was to
achieve greater equality between wage earners and those whose incomes were
based on 'gains realised on assets', which were previously immune from
taxation. By this means, the potential for tax avoidance could be reduced and
greater goodwill obtained from the trades union movement towards the
development of an incomes policy. 59 The Economist was sceptical regarding
both Capital Gains Tax and Corporation Tax, stating that '[t]he best that might
be said of the claimed economic advantages [of both] is that these are
something about which informed opinion might easily disagree.' 6° An area in
which Kaldor failed to achieve a long-term objective was the establishment of
greater fiscal equality between the self-employed, who were able to offset
expenses against income, and employees, who were not. No progress was
made in terms of his ambitious plan for an expenditure tax.6'
Kaldor's powerful presence probably resulted in an overrepresentation of
fiscal innovation in government policy during 1 9647,62 a fact which had
political and cultural resonance. Wigg felt that the 1965 Budget was over-
complicated. 63 The 1966 Conservative manifesto complained of how
'[c]omplicated tax penalties are sapping individual enterprise.' TM The policies
Kaldor helped develop received the ultimate backhanded compliment when, in
58 Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.239. For Kaldor's considerable contribution in this area, see:
PRO T 17 1/805, 'Capital Gains Tax', 1965.
HC Debates, 6 April 1965, Col. 245.
60 
'Is Virtue Enough?', The Economist (10-6 April, 1965).
61 Thiriwall, 'Kaldor as a policy adviser', ppl 32-3. For an outline of this idea, see: Nicholas
Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (London: George Allen &Unwin, 1955).
62 Crossman The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.228, diary entry for 24 May 1965.
63 Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.321.
'Action Not Words: The New Conservative Programme', F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British
General Election Manfestos 1900-19 74, p.283.
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1966, they became the subject of a (critical) song written by George Harrison
of the Beatles.65
Kaldor's relations with his ministerial employer were not always good. A
former Inland Revenue officer, Callaghan may have shared with Kaldor an
interest in fiscal matters,66 but in fact the Chancellor was not very patient with
his special adviser. 67 Indeed, partly because of this friction, during 1965, it
appeared that Kaldor might be moved to the Ministry of Housing and Local
Government. 68 In one account, Cabinet support for Abel-Smith and Kaldor's
previously mentioned claw-back scheme forced a highly sceptical Chancellor
of the Exchequer to consider resignation in early 1967.69 Nevertheless Kaldor
understood the importance of his relationship with his employer. His papers
suggest that he produced 110 memoranda during 1964-8. Of those where a
recipient is indicated, nineteen are marked 'Chancellor.'70
Kaldor's early difficulties in finding a room inside the Treasury have been
discussed. These related to a more general dissatisfaction he initially
experienced. In late 1964, obviously feeling out of the loop, he 'mentioned to
the Chancellor that he feels he would be more useful if he were brought in at a
rather earlier stage in the formation of policy and drafting of memoranda.'7'
65 The only participant in the Wilson administrations named in the George Harrison song,
'Taxman', from the Revolver album, however, is 'Mr Wilson', alongside 'Mr Heath.' See:
Ian MacDonald, Revolution in the Head (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), pp177-8.
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.228, diary entry for 24 May 1965.
67 thid, p.342, diary entry for 5 October 1965.
68 thid, p.342, diary entry for 5 October 1965 and p.345, diary entry for 8 October 1965.
69 Patrick Gordon Walker, Political Diaries, p.308, diary entry for 27 January 1967.
70 ldor Papers, NK 10/2, 'Memoranda by Professor Kaldor.'
PRO T 17 1/805, 'Capital gains tax', 1965, Ian Bancroft, Principal Private Secretary to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Sir Alexander Johnston, Chairman of the Board of Inland
Revenue, 18 December 1964, 18 December 1964.
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Ultimately, however, as suggested, he was able to achieve great influence.
Participation in the Radcliffe Commission afforded Kaldor an insight into the
workings of the Civil Service, assisting him in the conduct of relations with
career bureaucrats from 1964.72 He could, however, be difficult. Kaldor had
certain exasperating tendencies, for example being prone to falling asleep
during meetings, as previously mentioned. He was 'vety inconsistent at
times', for example regarding the matter of how much deflation was required
from the 1965 Budget. 73 A number of colleagues have noted his obstinacy,74
although it seems if he could be shown to his own intellectual satisfaction that
he was wrong over an issue, he reversed his position without fuss.75
The transition from academia to bureaucracy was not entirely smooth. Kaldor
could be 'too theoretical.' 76 He did not, it seemed, enjoy the restrictions on
freedom of speech that employment in the Civil Service entailed, surely a
problem shared with many special advisers. 77 There was a certain stigma
attached to him as being an adviser with a track record for 'getting
governments overthrown.' 78 Critics from the right gleefully drew attention to
the fact that, in 1961, severe rioting had erupted in Ghana following the
introduction of a Budget the taxation aspects of which he had advised on.79
There were supposedly other examples, internationally, of Kaldor provoking
72 Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.232.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.53, diary entry for 22 May 1965.
Including Croham. Lord Croham in conversation with Andrew Buck.
' Wilfred Beckerman in conversation with Buck; and Sir Donald MacDougall in conversation
with Buck.
76 MacDougall in conversation with Buck.
Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.246.
78 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.12!, diary entry for 2 May 1966.
See, for example: Christopher George and Simon Bewlay, Advice- And Dissent, p.5; and
HC Debates, 10 November 1964, Col. 812.
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civil unrest. 80 In April 1965, when Kaldor attempted to suggest to Callaghan
how public opinion might be effected by the forthcoming Budget, Callaghan
replied "[w]ell we haven't had a revolution yet! And if we do, I'll see to it
that you get pushed in front of the crowd."81
Thomas Balogh
Thomas Balogh was born in Budapest in 1905.82 Having studied at Budapest,
Berlin and Harvard, he arrived in Great Britain in 1930 and began lecturing at
Balliol College, Oxford in 1940.83 Prior to 1964, he provided economic advice
to a number of governments including those of India, Malta, Mauritius and
Greece. 84 He was a Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford from 194573.85
Balogh, as previously discussed, made a significant contribution to Labour's
official 1964 policy objectives. While Kaldor was a Keynesian, Balogh
rejected the macro-economic methods advocated by disciples of this school,
favouring dirigiste, hands-on intervention. In February 1965 he wrote that
'[o]ne of the great failures of economic policy in recent years was the belief
that changes in taxes and interest rates could secure economic objectives. We
must deal in a much more direct and physical way with particular variables.'86
Owing to the importance of his role, the origins of Balogh's central principles
80 
'Opinion', Daily Express, 30 October 1964.
81 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.46, diary entry for 5 April 1965.
82 PRO CAB 160/1, 'Mr. T. Balogh - Biographical Note', October 1964.
83 CAB 160/1, 'Mr. T. Balogh - Biographical Note.'
Ibid.
85 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.1, fri.
86 PRO CAB 147/169, 'Budget, 1965-66', 1965, 'Short tenn policy', Balogh, 18 February
1965.
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and the way these manifested themselves during his spell in Whitehall merit
examination.
During the 1920s, Hungary battled against financial, budgetary and balance of
payments difficulties. 87 This may help explain why, as with Kaldor, Balogh's
initial views as an economist, dating from the late 1 920s, were conventional
for their time, conditioned by the belief that the restraint of inflation ought to
be the primary concern of policy-makers. However, the worldwide slump of
the early 1930s prompted a change in his outlook. 88 This was the beginning of
Balogh's conversion to socialism. In the late 1920s, he was awarded a series
of traineeships at central banks, including the US Federal Reserve and the
German Reichsbank. 89 At the Reichsbank, Balogh worked under its President,
Hjalmar Schacht, a man of whom Balogh was already an admirer, who served
as Hitler's Minister of Economic Affairs from 1934-7.°
While, at this stage, neither Balogh nor Schacht subscribed to the
unorthodoxies with which they later became associated, 91 the intellectual
development of the former was influenced by the practical activities of the
latter, as will be shown. Balogh later wrote that, by the mid-1930s, 'it was
obvious to all who did not want to be blind that the economic systems of the
West, based on decentralised decision-making, were confronted with a planned
87	
a contemporary analysis of the Hungarian economy, see: Allyn Abbot Young, 'Hungary
in 1925' in Allyn Abbot Young, Economic Problems New and Old (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1927), pp37-62.
88 Thomas Balogh, Unequal Partners, Vol. 2, pp1-3.
89 Andrew Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.195.
9°Balogh, Unequal Partn ers, Vol. 2, ppl-2; Dems Healey, The Time of My Lfè, p.30.
For Schacht's changes in policy approach, see: John Weitz, Hitler's Banker, Hjalmar
Horace Greeley Schacht, (London: Little, Brown, 1998), p.187.
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giant [Nazi Germany] dedicated to destructive dominance and of increasingly
superior economic and military strength.' 92 Healey noted that, at Oxford in the
late 1930s, Balogh 'warned us not to imagine that the Nazi's economic
policies would fail in their objectives.'93
Residing in Britain from 1930, Balogh was taken under the wing of the leading
radical economist of the time, Keynes. 94 Douglas Jay's memoir describes
how, during 1933, Balogh was 'working in the City as a protégé of Keynes.'95
However, Balogh's relationship with his mentor was to end in acrimony.
During the course of the Second World War, Balogh became a leading
opponent of the emergent post-war settlement between Britain and the US, as
encapsulated in accords such as the Bretton Woods agreement. 96 His motive
was an objection to the US agenda for 'making trade and payments as free as
possible and. . . restoring currency convertibility at an early date' on the
grounds that this did not serve Britain's interests.97
Again, this view related to the perceived successes of Schacht, who built up a
system of bilateral trade with a group of mainly Balkan and Latin American
states during the 1930s. 98 Through this, Germany was able to achieve full
92 Balogh, Unequal Partners, Vol. 2, p.4.
93 Healey, The Time of My Life, p.30.
' Balogh, Unequal Partners, Vol. 2, p.2.
Jay, Change and Fortune, p.5!.
See, for example: Susan Howson and Donald Moggridge (eds), The Collected Papers of
James Meade, Vol. 4, The Cabinet Office Diary, 1944-6, (London: Unwm Hyman, 1990),
p.186, diary entry for 16 December 1945. For Balogh's retrospective view of this, see: Lord
Balogh, 'Keynes and the International Monetary Fund' in Thiriwall (ed.), Keynes and
International Monetary Relations (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976), pp65-86.
Thomas Balogh, Fact and Fancy in International Economic Relations (Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1973), p.28.
98 Balogh, Unequal Partners, Vol. 2, p.285 and Hjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years
(London: Allan and Wingate, 1955), pp328-9.
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partisan aides. The result would be clear-outs in personnel upon changes of
party administration.' 06 It is likely that Balogh's demands for measures which
resulted in the instigation of the special adviser, were influenced by
Henderson's outlook.
Balogh's objectives in the 1960s reflected the long-held ideas described above.
As a socialist he sought '[t]he supremacy of social over private interest.' 107 He
saw the Soviet Union of the 1960s as a threat to the democratic world, of even
greater magnitude than the Nazi one had been, for the same reason, namely the
superiority of centralised organisation.'° 8 The only way to meet this menace,
Balogh argued, was to concentrate more economic power in the centre,
without adopting the brutality which often characterised Communism.'° 9
 This
explains his advocacy of indicative planning, to be carried out by a department
created for that specific purpose, the DEA. By this time, Balogh was a leading
representative of what was known as the structuralist view of British economic
weakness. 11 ° He argued that the attainment of growth without inflation
required the successful implementation of an incomes policy. This was to be
conducted in the broader context of a national economic plan. 111
 Balogh had
been convinced of the need for an 'incomes policy based on social consensus'
at least as far back as 1941.112
'°	 CAB 87/72, Sir Hubert Henderson to Thomas Padmore, 4 February 1943.
'°7 Balogh, Planning for Progress, p.48.
°j Balogh, Unequal Partners, Vol. 2, p.4.
'°9 lbid, p.47.
"°	 Beckerman, The Labour Government's Economic Record, 1964-1970 (London:
Duckworth, 1972), p.15 and fh.
Balogh, Planning for Progress, pp 14-9.
112 Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.201.
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Another important theme for Balogh for much of his career was the problem of
lack of international liquidity, which he felt hampered the pursuance of full-
employment policies. 113 As a prime ministerial aide, he ensured that Wilson
was briefed to raise the matter at meetings with international leaders.'14
Balogh hoped that international monetary reform of this type might also
benefit developing world countries." 5 Related to this, he proposed that
Wilson seek the funding of sterling balances by an international agency such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 116 This would end the status of
sterling as an international reserve currency. Such an outcome was desirable
in Balogh's view since, as he informed Callaghan in December 1964, 'the
passionate attachment of past Governments (and the Bank) to the key-currency
system. . .has prevented us, and still prevents us, from pursuing an independent
domestic policy."7
An important element in the balance of payments problem was, for Balogh, the
long-term British tendency towards 'large investment overseas.' As a special
adviser he regularly sought 'tightening of the existing exchange control
machinery' as well as use of 'the tax system to affect the relative attractiveness
of domestic and foreign investment.' Such measures, for the time being,
would not apply to the Sterling Area," 8 the group of countries, based largely
113 See, for example: Lord Balogh, 'Keynes and the International Monetary Fund', pp75-7.
"4 See, for example: PRO PREM 13/31, 'Radical international monetary reform: Dr Balogh
reported conversation with Arthur Schlesinger', 1964, 'Brief for Washington', Balogh to
Wilson, 4 December 1964.
115 See for example: PRO PREM 13/250, 'UK economic situation: maintenance of
international
liquidity; Doctor Balogh's proposals on funding sterling balances', 1964-5, Balogh to Wilson,
13 November 1964.
116 Ibid, Balogh to Wilson, 1 December 1964.
117 thid, Balogh to Callaghan, 9 December 1964.
118 PRO PREM 13/250, 'Foreign Investment Policy', Balogh, 22 December 1964.
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on the Commonwealth, excluding Canada, which held their reserves in
sterling, in London. 119 He had other plans for this, which are described in
Chapter VI. It will be shown that the 1965 Budget represented a victory for
Balogh on this front. As discussed elsewhere, Balogh was reluctant to regard
the devaluation of sterling as a panacea, but came to the conclusion that it was
a necessity. However, he hoped that, rather than a unilateral devaluation on
the part of Britain, a general international realignment of currencies could be
agreed upon.12°
Balogh was a very wide-ranging adviser, but certain key areas of interest and
involvement can be identified. The press notice announcing Balogh's
appointment stated that he would 'advise on economic affairs, with particular
reference to questions of external economic policy.' 121 This area of his advice
has been considered. In September 1966 he listed the minutes directed to the
Prime Minister he wanted copied to him. The subject areas included
'Monetary affairs. . .Economic planning. . .Employment and income. . .Mergers,
monopolies and prices.. .Balance of trade.. .Foreign expenditure [and] Public
expenditure programmes.' 122 Balogh' s Cabinet Office files suggested
particular interest in matters including the co-ordination of economic policy,
energy, statistics, prices and incomes and trade figures. 123 As this list suggests,
"9 See: 'The Sterling Area', Memorandum submitted by H.M. Treasury to the Radcliffe
Committee, reproduced in A. R. Conan, The Rationale of the Sterling Area (London:
Macmillan, 1961), pp33-47.
120 PRO PREM 13/250, 'Brief for Washington', Balogh to Wilson, 4 December 1964.
121 PRO CAB 160/1, 'Press Notice', 28 October 1964.
122 PRO CAB 147/75, Balogh to Halls, 22 September 1966.
lB	 in PRO CAB 147.
173
for all his criticism of generalism, Balogh himself was wont to wade into a
debate, arguably to then find himself out of his depth.'24
Balogh's modus operandi, referred to in many sources, must be considered.
Firstly there was the relationship with Wilson. He was frequently referred to
as 'Economic Adviser to the Cabinet.' 125 As the Financial Times reported
upon Balogh's October 1964 introduction into Whitehall, the government
emphasised that his appointment did not signify 'an attempt to strengthen the
staff of the Prime Minister but. . .to make certain specialist knowledge
available to all Departments." 26 However, whatever the protestations to the
contrary, Balogh was a prime ministerial aide first and foremost. Prior to
1964, Balogh had long acted as an informal adviser to Wilson. 127 Balogh's
elevation within the hierarchy of Labour advisers was a direct result of the
1963 election of Wilson to the leadership of the party,' 28 which Balogh helped
organise.' 29 In this sense he was very much Wilson's creature, his importance
derived from his relationship the Prime Minister.
In his capacity as an aide to Wilson, Balogh often provided advice which was
very much of a short-term, presentational nature and useful to Wilson
individually, rather than the Government as a whole. Following deflationary
measures to protect sterling, Balogh wrote to Wilson on 28 July 1965
124 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.1 57, diary entry
for 12 February 1965; and Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.28, diary entry for 27 December
1964.
125 See, for example: Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, xvi.
126 
'Dr Balogh to be adviser in Cabinet Office', Financial Times, 29 October 1964.
127 See, for example: Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hal/Diaries, 1954-61, p.61, diary entry for
31 January 1956.
128 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.15, diary entry for 7 May 1963.
129	 Howard and Richard West, The Making of the Prime Minister (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1965), pp 15-6.
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suggesting that 'you should try to put a distance between yourself and these
measures, for which after all the Chancellor is responsible. It is essential that
you should build up your image as one who is determined to safeguard full
employment.' 130 As Balogh put it in a December 1966 letter to Wilson, 'I am
always at your disposal." 3 ' Caimcross recalled Robert Hall describing Balogh
as "the Prime Minister's spy." 32 Wilson's patronage ensured Balogh's
access to papers' 33 and membership of key economic official committees.'34
Balogh saw a prime ministerial intervention as his last resort when attempting
to resolve problems to his 	 When assessing the extent of
Balogh's influence, the constitutional position of the Prime Minister, whom
Balogh advised, should be taken into account. Often, policies were developed
at the peripheries, with Number 10 engaging itself in such activities as co-
ordination and conflict resolution.'36
According to a colleague, 'Balogh had met Wilson as early as 1937 when
Wilson, then only 21 had become a lecturer in economics at New College,
Oxford, and he acted as unofficial adviser throughout Wilson's' tenure as
President of the Board of Trade.' 37 Aside from their professional association,
Balogh was a friend of the Wilson family at least as far back as the 1950s.'38
It has been demonstrated that Balogh was part of the informal group that
130 Wigg Collection, 4/5 6, Balogh to Wilson, 28 July 1965.
'' PRO PREM 13/3094, 'Reforming Industrial Structure', Balogh to Wilson, 7 December
1966.
132 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.!, fn.
' Ibid. p.6, diary entry for 19 October 1964.
'' Ibid, p.13, diary entry for 7 October 1964.
PRO PREM 13/3094, 'Reforming Industrial Structure', Balogh to Wilson, 7 December
1966.
136 For a job description of the post of Prime Minister, see Hennessy, The Prime Minister,
pp53-IOl.
'' Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.196.
138 Pim!ott, Harold Wilson, p.! 16.
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surrounded Wilson, which became known as the Kitchen Cabinet. While
Labour was in opposition, as well as working with Wilson, Balogh
collaborated with other members of the Wilson group, for example Castle,
whom he advised on international development matters.' 39 Balogh was one of
a triumvirate of the Prime Minister's closest party political advisers which also
included Wigg and Williams, but, as shown, according to Crossman, he was
probably the least influential of the three. This may have been as a result of
his initial location in 70 Whitehall and because he was less involved in day-to-
day arrangements than Wigg and Williams. Nevertheless, during his time as a
special adviser, Balogh saw the Prime Minister 'at least three times a week and
often met him informally in my [Williams's] room for a drink' 140 Balogh's
proximity to Wilson often made him privy to highly confidential information,
for example, in July 1966, a strategic decision on the future of sterling which
Wilson had not yet announced to Cabinet.'4'
There is no doubt that Balogh was extremely partisan, for example in February
1965 encouraging Wilson to use organised heckling as a tactic in
Parliamentary debates.' 42 Balogh was concerned with the way in which policy
was presented. 143
 He sought to bring about interdepartmental co-ordination of
governmental policy statements, claiming in November 1964 that this was the
reason he sought access to Treasury papers. '[O]fficial press releases should
Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, xvi.
'° Williams, Inside Number 10, pp81-2.
'i" Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.576, diary entry for 19 July 1966.
142 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.7, diary entry for 2 February 1965.
' See, for example, Ibid, p.15, diary entry for 22 February 1965.
' PRO CAB 2 1/5248, Balogh to Armstrong, 24 November 1964.
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be co-ordinated and directed by a high level committee', he believed.'45
Balogh also engaged in such propaganda activities as the costing of the 1966
Conservative manifesto. 146 He and Wigg sometimes collaborated on press
rebuttal exercises 147 and discussed presentational strategy. 148 Balogh was
involved in the drafting of key Wilson speeches, for example the Prime
Minister's November 1966 Guildhall speech on the EEC.'49
Balogh was shameless when arguing for an expansion of his own role. For
example, in early 1965, he suggested that his team should be extended in order
to service a prime ministerial economic committee, the creation of which he
proposed.' 5° This represented a challenge to the Cabinet Secretary, Trend,
whose staff had previously monopolised such functions. However, Balogh's
personality could get in the way of his ambition. Long regarded as a 'bad
collaborator',' 5 ' he was notoriously troublesome. Wilson rejected a suggestion
from his adviser similar to that of early 1965 in July 1966 on the grounds that
Balogh was "no good at committees." 152 In a 1964 discussion of the use of
temporary economists, the 'Observer' column in the Financial Times noted of
Balogh that 'however many advisers there are he is likely to have the last
145 Wigg Collection, 4/14, Balogh to Wilson, 1 February 1965.
PRO CAB 147/2, 'Costing of Conservative Party proposals on economy', 1965-6, 'Costing
of the Tory Manifesto', Balogh to Wilson, 7 March 1966.
' Wigg Collection, 4/14, Balogh to Wigg, undated.
"s Ibid, Balogh to Wigg, undated.
149 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.125, diary entry for 14
November 1966.
150 PRO PREM 13/360, 'Note on the experiences with the Government machine', Balogh to
Wilson, 25 February 1965.
Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hall Diaries, 1947-53, p.64, diary entry for 11 July 1949.
152 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol 1, p.595, diary entry for 31 July 1966.
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word. As another Oxford don observed: "There are three kinds of
conversation: Dialogue, monologue and Balogh."53
Balogh was often, if not always, outspoken and abrasive, willing to direct
criticism and abuse at both officials and ministers, in their presence or
otherwise. 154 As Andrew Graham, who worked under Balogh from 1966-8,
puts it, 'he said what he thought or what he thought would provoke.' 155 In
January 1965, Wilson instructed Balogh, via Mitchell, to rewrite a strongly
worded paper criticising Treasury perfonnance in relation to the
implementation of exchange control proposals. The guidance offered was that
'you should as far as possible deal with principles and not castigate
Departmental weaknesses or individuals." 56 Nevertheless, Wilson felt he
needed Balogh. Crossman suggested that the Prime Minister employed a
'jarring element' such as Balogh since 'he feels a need to have unconventional
people close to him because he knows his own extremely conventional
nature.' 157
 For permanent bureaucrats, who valued a smooth-running machine,
this was not welcome.'58
Balogh's tendency to rant often served to lessen his impact. For example,
according to Caimcross, at one of a series of Downing Street suppers for
economics ministers and advisers on 27 December 1964, Brown and
'Mr Wilson's S.C.R.'
154 See, for example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.2 ii, diary entry for 13 May 1967 and
Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.317, diary entry for 8 September 1965.
Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985)', p.194.
156	 PREM 13/250, 'Treasuiy Action on the Prime Minister's Suggestions on Exchange
Control', Mitchell to Balogh, 21 January 1965.
157 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.87, diary entry for 22 October 1966.
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Callaghan were left unimpressed by a Balogh 'tirade' on the subject of
uncontrolled capital movements. 159 Caimcross was very critical of Balogh,
arguing that his outspoken style could serve to distort discussions, pushing
important items 'into the background.' 16° Balogh also had what Cairncross
found an irritating habit of turning up late to meetings, only to launch himself
heatedly into debate.' 61 Caimcross nevertheless conceded that Balogh's
judgements were 'often sound." 62 Castle described the best method of
benefiting from Balogh's advice as being to 'take exciting, stimulating
whiffs.. .while being careful not to inhale."63
Balogh's commitment to his work was definitely not in doubt. Heart
problems' TM meant that death during service as a special adviser was a
possibility he took seriously.' 65 This devotion was reflected in the phenomenal
quantities of memos, notes and papers Balogh produced during his time in
Whitehall, which defied 'filing just as much as comprehension.' 166 Balogh's
unrelenting drive was too much for Benn at times. While still in opposition,
Benn records in his diary that Balogh 'just pursues people who are in his
immediate circle and makes life hell for them by 'phoning and insisting they
have lunch and calling round at weekends." 67 Wilson was aware of Balogh's
tendencies, 168 but tolerant of them, up to a point. In May 1966, for example,
Balogh wrote to the Prime Minister suggesting a committee including 'social
159 Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.26, diaty entry for 27 December 1964.
°Ibid, p.56, diary entry for 30 May 1965.
161 Ibid, p.69, diary entry for 17 July 1965.
162 Ibid. The Wilson Years, p.1, flu.
163 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.512, diary entry for 11 September 1968.
See, for example: PRO PREM 13/3094, Balogh to Wilson, 7 December 1967.
165	 CAB 160/1, Balogh to Heaton, 9 February 1966.
'Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.'73, diary entry for 26 July 1965.
'67 Be Out of the Wilderness, p.94, diary entry for 16 February 1964.
' Mitchell in conversation with Buck.
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scientists, economists.. .[and] cost efficiency experts' to investigate defence
policy. Wilson scrawled on the top of the first page that '[a]lthough this is on
predictable lines, there is something in it.' 169 Wilson was uncomfortable with
Balogh's solo visits abroad, particularly to the US, on the grounds that he
might generate controversy.' 70 The Prime Minister, presumably influenced by
career civil servants, also resisted Balogh's attempts to accompany him on
important foreign missions.' 7 ' Haines recollects that, by the early 1970s,
Wilson's patience with Balogh was virtually exhausted.172
At times, Wilson required Balogh to provide impartial accounts of existing
arguments on both sides of a debate,' 73 to analyse a particular paper,' 74 or
report the proceedings of official committees. 175 However, Balogh was
reluctant to engage in mere diagnosis.' 76 In submissions to Wilson his
proposals for action were often prefaced by the phrase 'in my humble
opinion.' 177 On occasion, Balogh also performed the more menial tasks
associated with a political aide, as opposed to a policy expert, for example
locating individuals and passing messages to them on Wilson's behalf.' 78 In
autunm 1965, when Williams 'downed tools and walked out' following a
169	 PREM 13/796, 'Establishment of independent UK organisation for defence and other
related studies: Doctor Balogh wrote to Prime Minister', May-August 1966, 'Committee on
Higher Defence Studies', Balogh to Wilson, 6 May 1966.
170 PRO CAB 160/1, Mitchell to Balogh, 23 December 1964.
171 See, for example: Williams, Inside Number 10, p.92.
t72 Haines in conversation with Buck.
' Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.437, diary entry for 22 July 1967.
examples of this, see: PRO CAB 147/12.
175 PRO PREM 13/836, 'Progress on steering group: Doctor Balogh reported to Prime
Minister; Prime Minister's comments', May 1966, 'Steering Group', Balogh to Wilson, 16
May 1966.
176 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, pp1 10-1, diary entry for 27 January 1966.
CAB 147/7, 'Report on first 100 days of Labour administration, 1964-1965;
machinery of government; withdrawal of passport facilities from Spain; amendment to 50 year
rule on public records following Conservative Party opposition to Labour proposals', 1965-7,
Balogh to Wilson, 5 February 1965.
178 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p. 146, diary entry for 17 July 1966.
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disagreement with Mitchell, Balogh was despatched to persuade her to
return. 179 Balogh provided the Prime Minister with political intelligence,
reporting details of conversations with a wide variety of individuals.' 80 He
also acted as a go-between on Wilson's behalf, for example with ministers
such as Brown, often, it seems, on his own jnitjative.' 8 ' As has been
discussed, the Prime Minister's senior aide also drafted speeches and prepared
briefs for parliamentary debates.' 82 However, Balogh was also prone to
providing unsolicited advice and engaging in freelance activities, as his
campaign over EEC policy, explored in Chapter VI, demonstrated.
While Balogh primarily served Wilson, he was loaned to other ministers. For
example, during 1965, his skills were utilised at the Post Office by Benn,'83
who unfortunately injured some professional pride amongst permanent
officialdom in the process.' 84 Castle described how she found Balogh's advice
to her while she was in office 'invaluable." 85 Balogh also briefed his allies
before important Cabinet meetings. In July 1965, Crossman received this type
of assistance from Balogh in a bid to secure funds for his housing
programme.186
Balogh took a keen interest in personnel matters. He regularly agitated for the
appointment of more outside advisers. In September 1965, Balogh encouraged
179 Edward Short, Whip to Wilson (London and Sydney: Macdonald, 1989), P.173.
180 See, for example: PRO PREM 13/3094, Balogh to Wilson, 17 Januaiy 1967.
181 See, for example: Ibid, Balogh to Wilson, (no day) January 1966.
182 See: PRO CAB 147/5 'Advice and briefs for speeches', 1964-8, and 6, 'Advice and briefs
for speeches', 1968-9.
' Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.224, diary entry for 22 February 1965.
Ibid, p.226, diary entry for 25 February 1965.
185 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, xvi.
186 Crossman, Diary of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.267, 5 July, 1965.
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Wilson to increase his tally of special advisers, the Prime Minister was driven
to reply that 'he couldn't afford to have more than one Thomas since he
wouldn't be able to read the stuff." 87 As well as demanding that posts be
created for aides, Balogh made a habit of personally recommending people for
these new jobs.' 88 Castle recorded how 'with the help of Thomas
Balogh. . .1. . .built up an Economic Planning Department in the Ministiy [for
Overseas Development]' and that Balogh 'inspired' many of her
appointments.' 89 With Balogh's encouragement, an Oxford colleague of his,
Michael Posner, was employed as Director of Economics at the Ministry of
Power in 1966,190 moving across to the Treasury the following year.'9'
Probably in a bid to move him out of the way, in April 1966, Balogh proposed
Cairncross for the post of Deputy Governor of the Bank of England.'92
According to Crossman, in 1964, Balogh went as far as to recommend that
Wilson should displace Helsby as Head of the Home Civil Service.' 93 When
Castle moved to the Ministry of Transport in 1966, Balogh provided moral and
practical support in her failed attempt to remove her permanent secretary, Sir
Thomas Padmore, which met with opposition from, amongst others, Helsby.194
Balogh also sought to involve himself in decisions over ministerial
appointments. During 1966, in Crossman's account, Balogh tried to place
187 Thid, p.333, diaiy entry for 23 September 1965.
188 Stuart Holland in conversation with Andrew Buck, 15 March 2001.
189 Castle, The Castle Diaries, xvi.
'° See: PRO CAB 147/18, 'North Sea Gas', Balogh to Wilson, 18 April 1966.
191 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.151, diary entry for 5 December
1967.
192 PRO CAB 147/4, 'Advice and recommendations for appointments outside Civil Service',
1966-8, 'Bank of England', Balogh to Wilson, 5 April 1966.
Crossnian, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.92, diary entry for 9 December
1964.
See: Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.9!, diary entry for 5 January 1966; and p.117,
diary entry for 21 April 1966; and Kevin Theaskton, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p.54.
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Trend has provided so that he, Thomas, can insert a memorandum giving a
reply to it.' 203 As discussed, Balogh had consciously challenged Trend's
position and the Cabinet Secretary was probably not enamoured with the
special adviser. Nevertheless, there was substance to Trend's complaints.
During 1964-7, Neild instructed his secretary not to leave Balogh on his own
in Neild's office while any documents were visible. 204 On the subject of
Balogh's reading papers not intended for his eyes, Sir Michael Palliser,
Wilson's Foreign Affairs Private Secretary from 1966-9, remarks that 'he used
to do these things surreptitiously, but everyone knew he was doing them.' In
Palliser's account, Balogh sometimes referred to materials he was not
supposed to have seen in his own circulated papers.205
Having received Trend's dossier on Balogh in April 1967, Wilson finally
decided that the problems created by his aide could no longer be tolerated.
The Prime Minister took steps to persuade him that it was time to return to
academia, talking at length to Balogh as well as Balogh's wife, Penny. 206 On 9
May, Balogh told Benn of his intended departure. Balogh claimed that he was
motivated in part by the fact that his university position could not be held open
for longer than three years. 207 It is doubtful whether Balogh fooled himself or
anyone else with this attempt at a brave face. Balogh was being removed from
office against his will and both he and those around him knew it. The process
of departure was extremely protracted and Balogh was reportedly 'miserable'
in July 1968, upon finally giving up his post, despite the fact that he was
203 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.304, diary entry for 6 April 1967.
204 Neild in conversation with Buck.
205 Sir Michael Paliliser in conversation with Andrew Buck, 12 July 2001.
206 Crossman,, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.304, diary entry for 6 April 1967.
207 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.498, diary entry for 9 May 1967.
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entering the Lords and being taken on as Crossman's aide at the Department of
Health and Social Security. 208 Towards the end of 1967, there were signs of a
decline in Balogh's status. For example, in December 1967, the new
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jenkins, drew up proposals for a retrenchment
package in the wake of the devaluation of sterling. Balogh, to his fury, was
left off the circulation list. 209 The story of Balogh as a special adviser was not
over, however, and will be continued in the next chapter.
Balogh's obsession with the alleged skulduggery and incompetence of the
permanent Civil Service must be examined. Unsurprisingly, shortly after his
entry into the bureaucracy, Balogh was complaining of the 'lack of expertise in
the Treasury and the failure of other departments to have skilled people
operating round the Minister.' 210 Graham notes a certain contradiction in the
fact that 'he denounced administrators in general (and the British Civil Service
in particular) with the same passion that he advocated administrative
controls.' 211 From the outset, Balogh also felt he was being spied on by
Treasury minions. 212 He suspected Caimcross of leaking anti-special adviser
stories to the press. 213 Furthermore, it was his view that the initiatives he
attempted to implement, even when backed by the Prime Minister, were being
resisted within Whitehall. 214 Balogh's doubts as to whether he was being
circulated with all the papers he required have already been discussed. As he
208 Tony Benn, Office without Power, p.90, diary entry for 12 July 1968.
209 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, pp6OS-6, diary entry for 16 December
1967.
210 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p.187, diary entry for 14 November 1964.
211 Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.203.
212 See, for example: Benn, Out of the Wilderness, ppi86-7, diary entry for 14 November
1964.
213 Wigg Collection, 4/56, Balogh to Wigg, 27 January 1966.
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stated in a letter to Wilson from March 1967, '[all! this gravely impairs my
usefulness and makes me feel intensely frustrated. Nor do I like to look a fool
to my colleagues in other Departments who are astonished when I do not know
about communications which they receive on matters in my field from Burke
or from downstairs.'215
Cairncross commented on how Balogh 'turns up at a critical meeting and how
forcefully he puts his points.' 216 But how influential, as a special adviser, was
he? Broadly, he was a long-term believer in economic controls. Therefore,
the abandonment of planning was a failure for Balogh. Graham writes that 'he
was far too optimistic about how much could be planned and controlled in a
non-wartime economy. . . [h]e never really allowed for the complexity that
would be involved.' 217 However, as was the case with Wilson, although
influencing its instigation, there was little evidence to suggest that Balogh's
involvement with the DEA, once it had been established, was hands-on.218
Graham suggests that Balogh undermined his own potential for success by
engaging in 'too much activity.' Furthermore, adds Graham, Balogh's
interventionist economic programme 'made the problem with his spread of
activity worse. In his interaction with the Whitehall machine he was, in many
ways, running against the whole grain of thought - "pissing into the wind" as
he would have described it.' 219 Similarly, June Morris, Balogh's biographer,
writes that 'he might have been more effective had he been more selective in
his advice and moderated the extremity of his criticisms and the language in
215 Ibid, Balogh to Wilson, 8 March 1967.
216 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.211, diary entry for 13 May 1967.
217 Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.203.
218 Lord Croham confirms this. Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
219 Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.204.
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which they were couched, but that was never his style.' 22° Although at times
dependent upon him as a trusted ally, there is doubt as to the extent of
Wilson's faith in Balogh, particularly when it came to the latter's proposals for
action. Robert Hall, who knew both Balogh and Wilson, told Cairncross that
Balogh was 'not somebody the PM felt any need to turn to for advice.'221
The controls on foreign investment included in the 1965 Budget222 were, in
Crossman's view, the product of Balogh's lobbying of Wilson 223 and
represented what was arguably the high tide for his economic programme, both
in terms of influence and acclaim. The Economist, for example, found much
favour with these measures.224 The establishment of the Economic Policy
Steering Committee (SEP) an inner economic Cabinet Committee, was
probably partly influenced by Balogh's previously discussed encouragement
that a body of this type be set up. 225 Balogh's role in relation to the
devaluation of sterling will be considered below. Crossman judged Balogh's
campaign on oil and gas to have been a success, resulting eventually in a
revision of the arrangements for exploitation of the North Sea fields.226
Michael Posner, an economist at the Ministry of Power from 1966-7, agrees
with this assessment, 227
 as do Graham228 and Morris. 229 Balogh was concerned
over the balance of payments implications posed by the fact that most of the
220 June Morris, 'Thomas Balogh and the Fight for North Sea Oil', p.'1 0.
221 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.! 24, diary entry for 23 March 1966.
222 See: HC Debates, 6 April 1965, Cols 269-73.
223 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.193, diary entry for 5 April 1965.
224 
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225 For Crossman on SEP, see: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.39,
diary entry for 16 September 1966.
226 Thid, p.150-I, fn.
227 Michael Posner in conversation with Andrew Buck, 2 July 2001.
228 Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), pp205-6.
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profits reaped by the oil companies profits would be remitted outside the
country. He argued that the 'cost of exploration and investment' should be
established, in order that the level of profit obtained could be regulated. The
excess could be acquired by the state, through a means such as taxation.23°
Richard Marsh, the 1966-8 Minister of Power, however, who had previously
been unaware of the existence of the 'two horrible Hungarians' did not
appreciate what he saw as interference in his policy area.231
Following Labour's success at the polls at the end of March 1966, Balogh was
given a room inside the Number 10 building proper, 232 but an increase in his
importance following this development is difficult to detect. As will be
discussed in Chapter VI, in the area of European policy, Balogh failed to
achieve his objectives, with the Government making an application for EEC
membership in 1967.233 Neild makes the point that Balogh was better at
demolishing other people's arguments than producing solid proposals of his
own.234
 In this sense positive influence upon policy was unlikely. It seems
that Balogh was sucked into day-to-day management, a fact of which he was
painfully aware, once commenting to a gathering at the Croslands' that 'I
thought an adviser could influence timing: I realised too late that he can only
influence the next seven days; beyond that it's too complicated.' 235
 In the
long-term, Balogh's opposition to the US international economic liberalisation
programme, which would now be labelled 'anti-globalisation', retains
230 PRO CAB 147/1 8, 1966-7, 'North Sea Gas', draft paper, Balogh, 21 July 1966.
231 Lord Marsh in conversation with Andrew Blick, 3 July 2001.
232 Williams, Inside Number 10, pp140-1.
" Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp3 11-2.
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235 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland, p.135.
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relevance. Indeed, during the 1 970s, Stuart Holland and Richard Pryke, both
former assistants to Balogh during his time as a special adviser, were leading
figures in the development of Labour's 'Alternative Economic Strategy',
which followed in this tradition. 236 Moreover, as the clearest advocate of
special advisers who were not only expert and partisan but also loyal to the
particular appointing minister, Balogh's influence and intuitive judgement was
great.
236 For Labour's attempts to develop alternatives to what became known as 'globalisation' see:
John Callaghan, 'Rise and Fall of the Alternative Economic Strategy: From
Internationalisation of Capital to "Globalisation", Contemporaiy British History, Vol. 14, No.
3 (Autumn 2000), pp105-30. For Balogh's views on developing world debt, see: Balogh,




An overview of the first wave of special advisers and illustrative biographies
have now been provided. In this chapter, there will be detailed examinations
of the performance of certain aides in relation to three specific policy areas
during 1964-7. Firstly, government attempts at the maintenance of the $2.80
sterling parity will be discussed. The question of conflict between the
temporary and permanent bureaucracy will be of importance here, as well as
the extent of the influence of special advisers and the nature of the proposals
they made. Secondly, there will be an examination of the development of
Selective Employment Tax (SET), with which Kaldor was closely associated.
This will serve as a case study of the implementation of a particularly unusual
measure. Thirdly, there will be a description of the attempts made by Balogh
to encourage the establishment of a Commonwealth trading bloc as an
alternative to EEC membership. In this objective, he met with opposition from
a member of his own team, Stuart Holland. Finally, rounding of the period,
the chapter will close with a summary of the additional special adviser
appointments during 1964-7, with brief descriptions of their functions.
Special advisers and sterling
As has been shown, although the political circumstances made it a difficult
option, the decision not to devalue immediately following Labour's 1964
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election victory has been judged by many as the worst mistake made during
the course of the Wilson administrations. Wilson, Brown and Callaghan
selected this path on 17 October 1964 without officials, temporary or
permanent, present.' Balogh, who wrote in 1963 that '[d]evaluation or a
(downward) floating exchange rate do not provide a panacea' 2, convinced
Wilson, according to MacDougall, that socialist planning was the means of
overcoming current difficulties and would render the sterling question
irrelevant. 3
 This was probably one of Balogh's most significant policy
contributions as a special adviser. Kaldor and Neild, on the other hand, had
already made it clear to Callaghan that they favoured an immediate
devaluation. 4
 Kaldor was a veteran of this type of campaign, having engagaed
in attempts to persuade members of the Labour government of the need to
devalue in 1949. Balogh rapidly came to agree with his two fellow special
advisers. 6
 On 9 December 1964, Brittan recorded that 'Dr. B. now believes in
devaluation.' 7
 This change of outlook was probably brought about by a
realisation of the enormity of the balance of payments problems and the
'ferocious.. .reconsideration of policies' which defence of the rate would
therefore entail. 8 He was, however, never as enthusiastic about abandonment
of the parity as, for example, Kaldor.9
'Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.350.
2 Thomas Balogh, Planning for Progress, pp24-5.
' Donald MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.153.
James Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.159.
Alec Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hall Diaries, 1946-1953, p.67, diary entry for 20 July
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6 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland, p.135.
Samuel Brittan Collection, p.23, diary entry for 9 December 1964.
8 PRO PREM 13/852, 'UK economic situation: post-election measures; possible devaluation;
economic strategy; part 11', March-June 1966, 'Economic Strategy', Balogh to Wilson, 6
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A question begged by support for devaluation was whether the introduction of
a floating, or a new, lower, fixed rate ought to follow. Kaldor, who, as
discussed, was a long-term advocate of the former, sent Armstrong a note to
this effect in July 1965.10 Entitled 'Fixed or Flexible Rates', this was a
particularly full expression of an important alternative approach to the one
ultimately taken." To Kaldor, the economic benefits which would accrue
from floating were clear. Britain's share of world trade was too small. In
order to achieve a sufficient increase, a considerable sterling depreciation was
required. If this was enacted in a one-off move, there was the possibility of a
threat to the gold parities of other currencies. There might also be problems in
maintaining the new fixed rate. The economy could not respond to a shock of
this nature, and potential gains would be lost, in the form of inflation.
Preferable to this was 'a gradual downward drift in the rate over a longer
period.'
Kaldor advocated floating 'for a temporary period' in order that the pound
could find a new equilibrium rate, whereupon a new parity would be fixed. He
did not, then, favour floating 'of indefinite or permanent duration.' On the
other hand, he gave no specific deadline for the return to fixed parity, or
indeed any indication of timescale. While there would still be official
intervention in the markets, this would not be according to an openly
publicised strategy. Floating did not necessarily mean the end of the Sterling
Area, since its members could tie their currencies to the newly-flexible pound,
t0 Alec Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.72, diary entry for 25 July 1965.
"Kaldor Papers, NK 10/2, 'Fixed or Flexible Rates', Kaldor to Armstrong, 22 July 1965.
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as they had done following the abandonment of the Gold Standard in 1931.
Indeed this had marked the emergence of the Sterling Area as a distinct entity.
Importantly, Kaldor dismissed the idea that "price-destabilising" speculation'
could lead to a plunge in the value of sterling, a major argument against
floating, as 'a mirage.' He argued that '[s]ooner or later any speculative trend
reverses itself: prices do not fall to zero, or rise to infinity. The important
question is how wide the "destabilising zone" is likely to be.. .it is most
unlikely that this range should exceed 5 per cent in either direction from the
theoretical "equilibrium price." Kaldor cautioned, however, that this was
dependent upon domestic wage and price stability. Showing his party-political
awareness, while acknowledging the view that floating could produce
undesirable results in terms of the popularity of the government, he pointed out
that '[t]he £ remained "floating" from 1931 to 1939...without any noticeable
political repercussions.' Moreover, this could be presented as 'freeing' rather
than 'devaluing', which the government had pledged not to do. The list of
memoranda in Kaldor's personal files shows that he sent two more papers on
this subject to Armstrong, no doubt both making a similar case to the one
already described. The first, dated 19 July 1966 was called 'The Economic
Situation - (Re. Devaluation).' The second bore the title 'A Fixed or Floating
Rate' and was sent on 13 November 1967, days away from the abandonment
of the existing parity.12
12 Kaldor Papers, NK 10/2.
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Cairncross's diary entry for 29 July 1965 described Balogh, Kaldor and Neild
as favouring floating, but Neild 'with qualifications "floating between fixed
and floating".' 13
 In an undated paper from 1966, possibly March, Balogh
wrote that 'I favour a floating exchange', although he was not as optimistic as
Kaldor about its potential benefits.' 4
 Neild says that he was uncertain about
whether floating was the best option at the time, and remains so.' 5 Wilson
subsequently stated that '[o]n the technique of devaluation, I favoured floating,
rather than a cut to a lower fixed parity." 6
 However, this would have
contravened international regulations' 7 and might have proved inflationary.'8
In terms of retrospective judgement, Dell argued that floating was the 'better
option." 9
 Neild, however, doubts whether there were sufficient resources, in
terms of gold and dollar reserves, to pursue Kaldor's managed float.20
In describing the intensive lobbying for devaluation conducted by special
advisers, Cairncross suggested that 'the advice throughout was political, rather
than economic: the advisers thought themselves better politicians than their
masters.' 2 ' By this, he probably meant that aides sought to influence events on
their own initiative, rather than merely supply analysis on request, which was
the case. Perversely, since Callaghan had made it clear that he had staked his
job on the maintenance of parity, the aides were effectively reconimending that
' Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.'74, diary entry for 29 July 1965.
' PRO CAB 147/14, 'Economic Strategy.' It is not clear who, if anyone, this was sent to.
Robert Neild in conversation with Andrew Blick.
16 Harold Wilson, The Labour Governmnet, 1964-70, p.571.
P. Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.283.
18 Sir Alec Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s, A Treasury Perspective
(Basmgstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp92-3.
19 Edmund Dell, The Chancellors, p.315.
20 Neild in conversation with Blick.
21 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.254, diary entry for 25 November 1967.
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he resign. 22
 Numerous attempts were made by Balogh, Kaldor and Neild, to
persuade both the Prime Minister23
 and the Chancellor24
 of their case.
MacDougall says he collaborated with them in this endeavour.25
During the July 1966 sterling crisis, the three economists became participants
in a battle between two senior ministers over this issue. They took the side of
Brown, whose views, MacDougall recalls, had moved towards their own,26
against Callaghan, who advocated pursuance of the traditional approach to
balance of payments difficulties, namely deflation through public expenditure
cuts.27
 However, at the critical point, Wilson attempted to rally his allies
within Cabinet who supported devaluation around his cause, on the grounds of
personal loyalty, using Balogh as an intermediary. 28 In this instance, Balogh's
commitment to Wilson, then, superseded his economic judgement. In October
1967, Balogh and Kaldor made common cause in their objective with the
President of the Board of Trade, Crosland. 29 While Wilson had publicly set
his face against the abandonment of parity, Cairncross argued, 'the fact that it
had been pressed by the government's own special advisers was known to the
markets and did nothing to help sterling.'30
22 Alec Caimcross, 'Economic Advisers in the United Kingdom', Contemporary British
History, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p.237.
23 See, for example: Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, p.330, diary entry for 27 November
1967.
24 See, for example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.1 14, diary entry for 15 February 1966.
25 Sir Donald MacDougall in conversation with Andrew Blick.
26 Ibid.
27 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.572, diary entry for 18 July
1966.
28 See, for example: Ibid, p.570, diary entry for 17 July 1966; and Andrew Graham, 'Thomas
Balogh (1905-1985)', p.205.
29 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, pp538-9, diary entry for 27
October 1967.
30 Cairncross, 'Economic Advisers in the United Kingdom.'
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MacDougall's view, the Treasury promoted, in conjunction with the Bank and
in particular its Governor, Lord Cromer, an anti-devaluation line. 39 On 18 July
1966, when Kaldor told him that he thought the Bank should be instructed to
stop defending the rate, Armstrong claimed that this would result in an en
masse resignation of the Court of the Bank. 40 As late as October 1967, Wilson
asked Cromer 'whether a recommendation to devalue was in his mind. He
said flatly it was not.' 41 Croham, however, disputes the extent to which the
Bank of England was able to influence the Treasury. He also adds that Bank
opposition to floating was not inevitable.42
Perhaps the Treasury outlook was best summed up by Cairncross when he
stated that 'I was myself convinced when I rejoined the civil service in 1961
that the pound would have to be devalued at some stage in the 1960s. But I
saw no point in devaluing in an overheated economy without the support of
stringent deflationary measures which there was no likelihood that the Labour
government would adopt.' 43 Mitchell believes that, during 1964-7, sterling
policy was ultimately attributable to the ministers concerned, rather than civil
servants. Opposition to an adjustment on the part of officials was probably
eroded by the successive crises which took place, particularly during 1966.
Crossman recorded being told by Michael Stewart (the economist) in
November 1966 that 'there isn't really an official in Whitehall today who
doesn't want devaluation and think it inevitable. It's not only Tommy Balogh
39 MacDougall in conversation with Buck.
° Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.152, diary entry for 20 July 1966.
' Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70, p.565.
42 Lord Croham in conversation with Andrew Buck.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.!.
Sir Derek Mitchell in conversation with Andrew Buck.
197
and Nicky Kaldor. The Treasury and DEA are both convinced and only
Harold and James, who are somehow personally committed, are holding it
up.' 45
 This suggests that, ultimately, the most important opposition to
devaluation came not from the permanent Civil Service, but Wilson and
Callaghan. 46
 However, as will be shown, in the arguably more important area
of how the adjustment was carried out, career civil servants determined the
outcome.
Once the decision had been taken to defend the rate, reference to any other
course of action in official circles was banned by Wilson. Caimcross's diary
entry from 25 November 1964 described a paper produced by Balogh, Neild
and MacDougall that pronounced abandonment of the existing parity
inevitable, merely discussing the relative merits of floating and fixed rates.47
Mitchell says he was entrusted with ensuring that all copies of this were
destroyed. 48
 In December 1964, when, as part of a more general prime
ministerial brief, Balogh referred to the need for an adjustment, Wilson noted
that the offending section should 'be extracted & destroyed.'49
During the 1966 election campaign, Balogh, Kaldor, Neild and MacDougall
took the opportunity afforded by the absence of their political employers to
prepare another submission recommending devaluation. Wilson discovered
what they were doing and ordered that the exercise should stop and the papers
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.1 34, diary entry for 21 November
1966.
For a description of this poltical conmiitment, see: Dell, The Chancellors, pp314-5.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, pp I7-8, diary entry for 25 November 1964.
48 Mitchell in conversation with Blick. So far, investigations in the PRO suggest Mitchell was
successful.
PRO PREM 13/250, 'Brief for Washington', Balogh to Wilson, 4 December 1964.
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be destroyed. Neild says that this was the 'last straw', leading to his decision
to leave the Treasury. He did so the following May, to become the first
Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 50 Wilson's
attempted suppression of discussion of the subject did not deter Balogh, who,
on one occasion, according to Cairncross, told a meeting of permanent and
temporary civil servants preparing a report on investment that 'we needn't
mention devaluation since he had 15 other ways of saying it.' 5 ' Balogh was
particularly creative when it came to such euphemisms. In August 1966, for
example, he referred to the need to 'engineer an export-led expansion.' 52
 On
14 March 1967 he suggested that the time was right to 'act in a certain
direction.' 53
 According to a member of Balogh's staff, another code word for
adjustment in parity often used by Balogh in submissions to Wilson was
'dose.'54
Special advisers, therefore, spent three years being ignored over the question
of sterling. They were often key figures in desperate attempts to prop up the
pound, an activity they felt was ultimately futile. 55 Furthermore, all but one of
them was excluded from planning for the possibility of a forced abandonment
of the exchange rate. The Forever Unmentionable (comically abbreviated to
FU56) Committee, probably established early in 1965, met under Armstrong to
50 Neild in conversation with Buck. This paper is referred to in PRO PREM 13/852, Mitchell
to Wilson, 29 March 1966.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.209, diary entry for 13 April 1967.
52	 CAB 147/10, 'Methods and techniques of forming economic policy', 1965-9, 'Options
and Choices', Balogh to Wilson, 8 August 1966.
PRO PREM 13/1421, 'Views of Doctor Balogh on allowing sterling rate to climb through
anty', 1967, 'The Pound', Balogh to Wilson, 14 March 1967.
' Stuart Holland in conversation with Andrew Blick.
" See, for example: Caimcross, The Wilson Years, ppl5l-2, diary entry for 20 July 1966.
56	 humour of this was apparently not lost on those inside the Treasury loop at the time.
Michael Posner in conversation with Andrew Buck.
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review developments and prepare a War Book for the contingency of ministers
deciding to devalue. 57
 Neild recollects that the formation of FU was a
response to his warning to Armstrong that 'devaluation is going to happen one
day and I trust the Treasury has a contingency plan for it.' 58 Many of the FU
papers are missing and some are still classified. 59
 The earliest set still in
existence in the PRO is the sixth batch, dating from March 1965. While Neild,
along with Cairncross and various permanent Treasury officials, was present
on the circulation list, Balogh and Kaldor were not. 60
 Neild says that,
willingly, he never attended FU meetings and did not look at the papers.6'
However, as will be shown, he did produce at least one submission for the
committee.
Matters discussed in FU files include what the new parity should be 62 and the
timetable for devaluation. 63
 Cairncross described how the question of the
required size of the accompanying retrenchment package was also addressed.64
Given Kaldor's absence from FU, the consideration of whether to adopt fixed
or flexible rates is of particular interest, since he firmly favoured the latter. At
an April 1965 meeting of the committee, Armstrong framed the question in
terms of 'whether it was desired to make a significant break with the present
' Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.'73, diary entry for 26 July 1965 and fn.
Neild in conversation with Buck.
FU files are in: PRO T 312 'Treasury: Finance Overseas and Co-ordination Division and
Finance (International Monetary) Division: Registered Files (2F and 2F (IM) Series).
60	 T 312/1398, 'Contingency planning for a sterling devaluation: circulated FU papers',
1965, 'Procedure', 3 August 1965.
61 Neild in conversation with Blick.
62 PRO T 312/1398, 'Choice of a new fixed rate', Note by the Economic Section, 2 April 1965.
63 Ibid, 'Timetables for measures to be taken before Devaluation.'
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.230, diary entry for 22 September 1967.
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international monetary system', while Cairncross suggested that such a move
'was inevitably a gamble which it was hard to contemplate taking.'65
One FU report, undated but certainly from mid-1965, stated that 'we cannot
recommend the adoption of a floating rate, either as a temporary expedient or
as a more permanent arrangement.' 66
 This was certainly the view of the Bank
of England, which, as mentioned, was understandably protective of the value
of sterling, which sent two representatives to FU. The Bank produced a paper
for FU 'recommending that any move should be straight to a new fixed rate.'67
Neild, who was not opposed to floating in principle, accepted in an April 1965
FU paper that this should not be done from 'a position of weakness.' This
meant, Neild conceded, that 'we would not recommend a flexible rate in the
kind of emergency that these [FU] briefs are addressed' to. 68 On 16 June
1965, FU concluded that 'the considerations against flexible rates were felt to
override those in their favour.' 69 At a meeting of FU in September 1966,
Armstrong referred to the 'risk.. .that. . .the rate itself would.. .spiral
downwards out of control, producing very serious dislocation of our overseas
trading activities and within the home economy.' 70 This was probably the
main motive for opposition to a float, one which Kaldor, as has been shown,
argued was founded in fallacy. Interestingly, it was generally conceded by FU
65 PRO T 312/1401, 'Contingency planning for a sterling devaluation: circulated FU minutes
of meetings', 1965, 'Note of a Meeting held in Sir William Armstrong's room', 5 April 1965.
PRO T 312/1398, 'Guarantees and Compensations.'
67 This paper is referred to in: PRO T 312/1636, 'Contingency planning for Sterling
devaluation: circulated FU papers', 1966, 'Devaluation Dossier', 21 February 1966.
68 PRO T 312/1398, 'Fixed or Flexible Rates', note by Neild, 26 April 1965.
69 PRO T 312/1401, 'Note of a Meeting held in Sir William Armstrong's room', 16 June 1965.
70 thid, 'Note of a Meeting held in Sir William Annstrong's room', 13 September 1965.
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members that, in the long term, floating was a desirable option. 7 ' As
discussed, although he was the closest thing to an advocate inside FU, Neild
was not convinced on the question of floating. Kaldor certainly would
certainly have put up a harder fight on this issue. As one FU member puts it,
'we all knew what Nicky thought.'72
Having pronounced on the matter, officials then had to ensure that, when the
moment arrived, ministers would heed their advice. At the time, to those
inside FU, this outcome did not seem inevitable. On 29 July 1965, Armstrong
told FU that Wilson 'was understood to have a firm preference for floating if
the need for devaluation arose and several ministers were known to share this
view. The Chancellor veered towards it though he was certainly not
completely committed.' This was a cause of concern for Maurice Parsons, the
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and an FU member, who wished to
ensure that 'the Governor and the Bank should have ample opportunity to
present their advice to Ministers before precipitate decisions were taken
without full consideration.' 73 Officials, then, had decided to close off floating
as a policy option, although the Cabinet, a significant portion of which
favoured, or was inclined towards, flexible rates, did not know it yet.
For FU, secrecy was paramount. Frequent references were made in FU papers
to those "within the circle".' 74 Members were reminded of the need for
See, for example: ibid, 'Note of a Meeting held in Sir William Armstrong's room', 13 April
1965.
72 Posner in conversation with Blick.
Ibid, 'Note of a Meeting held in Sir William Armstrong's room', 29 July 1965.
See, for example: PRO T 312/1398, 'Procedure', 23 June 1965.
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'complete discretion at all times.' 75 MacDougall does not recall knowing
anything of FU, the existence of which was of great interest to him when
interviewed for this study in 2001.76 Mitchell, too, says he was unaware of
FU, although is not surprised by the level of secrecy which surrounded it.77
When Kaldor got wind of the existence of FU and sought to attend in July
1965 he was not permitted on the grounds that, as Cairncross put it, 'we
couldn't have him without Tommy and all.' 78 He was allowed, however, to
produce a paper for the committee, advocating flexible rates. 79 The objection
to Kaldor, in Neild's view, was not his support for floating in itself, but the
unrelenting way in which he would have driven his point home. 8° Mitchell
suggests that the desire to exclude Balogh was probably motivated by his
difficult personality and a widely held feeling that he was prone to gossip.8'
Ministers were 'not informed of the existence of' FU, although Callaghan was
shown some papers. 82 Rather shockingly, it appears that even Wilson was kept
in the dark about FU, at least initially. In a diary entry for 29 July, Cairncross
recorded Armstrong saying that he would 'put to the Chancellor the need to let
the P.M. (and perhaps T.B. [Balogh]) see some of the papers on devaluation.'83
It is likely that Wilson was informed verbally of the existence of these
contingency plans at some point. However, Wilson probably made no effort to
bring Balogh 'within the circle' and only showed a serious interest in FU
Ibid, 'Procedure', 25 March 1965.
76 MacDougall in conversation with Buck.
Mitchell in conversation with Blick.
78 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.73, diary entry for 26 July 1965.
This is referred to in: PRO T 312/1636, 'Devaluation Dossier', 21 February 1966. It may be
the one he sent to Armstrong, referred to above.
80 Neild in conversation with Buck.
81 Mitchell in conversation with Buck.
82 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.73, diary entry for 26 July 1965 and fn.
83 Ibid, p.75, diary entry for 29 July 1965.
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materials when he needed them, at the time of devaluation. Michael Posner, as
will be discussed below, joined the Treasury in 1967 and became a member of
FU. Confidentially, he informed Balogh, an acquaintance from Oxford, of its
existence. 84
 Balogh did not acknowledge his awareness of FU's existence
until after devaluation had taken place. He had probably seen none of its
papers. 85
 As will be shown in Chapter VI, following devaluation, the
government pursued a policy of deflation which Balogh objected to for its
laissez-faire nature. No doubt had he been a member of FU, he would have
proposed alternatives to this. On 16 November 1967, now aware that
devaluation was imminent, Balogh urged Wilson to 'strengthen the social
content of the aouncement.'86
The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not accept the advice of his politically
appointed aides, but, early in November 1967, when, in the economist's own
account, Cairncross advised him that an immediate devaluation of sterling was
necessary, Callaghan finally snapped. 87 The Prime Minister and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer first discussed the proposal on 4 November
1967.88 Wilson gave instructions to Armstrong that both Balogh and Kaldor
should not be 'brought in' on devaluation, 89 although Kaldor was allowed to
attend talks at a late stage. 9° While shut out of discussions, Balogh was
informed of the decision by the Prime Minister, probably on 15 November
84 Posner in conversation with Buck.
85 See: PRO CAB 147/75, Balogh to Annstrong, 28 November 1967.
86 PRO PREM 13/1447, 'Exchange rate: measures to devalue pound sterling; "Operation
Patriarch", 1967, November 1967, Balogh to Wilson, 16 November 1967.
87 Cairncross, 'Economic Advisers in the United Kingdom', p.237.
88 Indicated in PRO PREM 13/1447, Wilson to Callaghan, 5 November 1967.
89 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.245, diary entry for 14 November 1967.
° Ibid, p.246, diary entry for 15 November 1967.
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1967, producing, at Wilson's request, a technical paper on the likely effects of
the move. 91
 Kaldor helped write Callaghan's immediate post-devaluation
Commons speech, 92
 as well as Wilson's television statement. In both
instances he was forced to attempt to justify a three-year policy he had
opposed.93
FU, as has been shown, ruled out the option of floating, despite the fact that
Wilson and others were believed to favour this. One Cabinet member who
supported flexible rates was Crossman. On 13 November, having been
informed that the abandonment of parity was imminent, he wrote to Wilson,
stating that devaluation would only be worthwhile if it meant the introduction
of 'a floating pound.' 94
 However, three days later, Callaghan, who had by now
no doubt been appraised of the FU and Bank of England line, proposed to
Cabinet that 'sterling should be devalued...to a new fixed parity of $2.40 to the
pound.' Floating, the Chancellor argued, 'would run counter to the basic
philosophy of international exchange rates and would incur the active hostility
of the IMF and the international monetary community...the rate might sink to
an unacceptably low level.. .the damage to the system of international trade and
payments...could be grave indeed.' Probably as a result of Kaldor's briefing,
the idea of a temporary float was raised in discussion, but rejected. 95 The
defence of sterling, then, was resumed at a new rate.
' PRO PREM 13/1447, Balogh to Wilson, 15 November 1967.
92 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, pp249, diary entry for 17 November 1967. This is indicated
in: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/2.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.250, diary entry for 18 November 1967.
PRO PREM 13/1447, Crossman to Wilson, 13 November 1967.
PRO CAB 128/42, Part 3, CC 66 (67), 66th Conclusions, 'Economic Situation, Devaluation
of Sterling', 16 November 1967.
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Selective Employment Tax
Of all the contributions made by special advisers to the 1964-70 Wilson
administrations, Selective Employment Tax (SET) was, Shore argued, the
most significant. 96
 As suggested by Neild's brief on SET, the '[t]he new tax
fits in with the broad objectives of the Government's economic policies. The
main objectives are to deal effectively with the immediate balance of payments
problem and, in the long term, to achieve a higher rate of economic growth.'97
However, SET also bore the stamp of an individual adviser. The fact that
Kaldor believed in the potentially redemptive power of taxation has been
discussed. SET, which, as Stewart states, 'represented an attempt to harness
market forces to a socially useful end', 98 matched this approach. Unlike earlier
innovations with which Kaldor was associated, such as Capital Gains Tax and
Corporation Tax, it was not the product of years of debate within the Labour
movement, springing more from his own mind.99
Theoretical considerations formed the basis for SET. At a lecture given at
Cambridge in November 1966 in which he explained the ideas underpinning
the scheme, Kaldor concerned himself with the problem of relatively slow
British growth rates.'°° Rather than seek out cultural causes of this malaise,
Kaldor attempted to explain the problem in terms of the stage of expansion
Lord Shore of Stepney in conversation with Andrew B lick.
PRO T 320/650 'Introduction of a selective employment tax 1966; working papers', 1966,
'Selected Employment Tax: General Brief', 29 April 1966.
Michael Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.65.
Richard Whiting, 'The Labour Party and Taxation Party Identity and Political Purpose in
Twentieth Century Britain, p.199.
'°°Nicholas Kaldor, 'Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth in the UK' in F. Targetti and A.P.
Thirlwall (eds) The Essential Kaldor (London: Duckworth, 1989), p.282.
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reached by the British economy. 101 On a basis of international comparisons,
he argued, there was a 'highly significant relationship between the rate of
growth of the G.D.P. and the rate of growth of manufacturing production."°2
This empirical association formed the basis of what became known as
'Verdoorn's Law', named after P.J. Verdoorn, whose investigations on this
subject first appeared in print in 1949.'° Cairncross recorded Kaldor engaging
in 'long expositions of his latest theory of growth, Verdoorn's Law' at a
meeting of the Economic Advisers in March 1966.104
For Kaldor, there was a direct correlation between the level of economic
growth and the extent to which the rate of increase in manufacturing output
exceeded that of the non-manufacturing 	 05 This was a result of the
increasing productivity of manufacturing, which he believed was brought
about through the division of labour, resulting from rises in output. Here,
interestingly, Kaldor invoked by name the classical economist Adam Smith,
not known as a hero of the left. 106 This irony did not escape Caimcross.'°7
Britain's problem, Kaldor felt, was the fact that, as a result of economic
maturity (ie: early industrialisation), the reserve army of workers employed in
agriculture who could be transferred to the secondary (manufacturing) sector





'° Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.126, diary entry for 3 April 1966.
105 Kaldor, 'Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth in the UK', pp285-6.
' °6 lbid, p.287.
107 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.134, diary entry for 3 May 1966.
108 Kaldor, 'Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth in the UK', pp299-3O4.
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Through SET, Kaldor aimed to remedy this, thereby releasing the dynamic
potential of the secondary sector. Another important influence on the
development of SET was the fact that, prior to its introduction, consumers paid
a variety of duties on manufactured goods but none on services. 109 SET was
intended to reduce distortions in the tax structure, which currently favoured the
service sector, which did not offer, in Kaldor's view, the increasing returns to
scale of manufacturing.' 10
 Introduced in September 1966, SET was 'a tax on
all labour, but rebatable in the public sector and transport, and rebatable with a
subsidy to labour in manufacturing industries." 11
 Kaldor intended SET to
transfer labour from the tertiary (service) to secondary (manufacturing) sector
of the economy. As well as the benefits which would accrue to the latter
grouping, he felt that the former would gain through the greater efficiency
consequently forced upon it.112
Whatever the value of Kaldor' s theoretical approach, the adoption of his idea
was dependent upon political expediency. In the light of favourable balance of
payments forecasts, Callaghan suggested during the March 1966 election
campaign that his next budget would not contain 'severe' tax increases.113
Following Labour's victory, the trade position rapidly worsened. However,
'[t]o the Chancellor's rescue.. .came Nicholas Kaldor." 4 Callaghan turned to
'° This point was made by Callaghan when announcing SET to the Commons. HC Debates, 3
May 1966, Col. 1453. See also: Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.65; and
W.B. Reddaway, Effects of Selective Employment Tax, Final Report (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), p.170.
"°Anthony Thiriwall in conversation with Andrew Buck, 13 July 2002.
Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.241.
112 Thid, p.243.
Callaghan, Time and Chance, ppl92-3.
114 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, pp64-5.
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a payroll levy idea he and Kaldor had discussed in opposition." 5 For this
reason, Stewart criticises Callaghan's approach as using a measure 'designed
to bring about long-term structural changes in the economy as if it was a
weapon suitable for coping with a short-term crisis.'116
On 6 April 1966, Kaldor sent Callaghan a paper setting out the case for a
payroll tax biased in favour of manufacturing industry and against the service
sector. 117 This included the arguments already discussed relating to the
operation of Verdoom's Law. Kaldor also promised that such a measure
would subsidise exports, favouring, as it did, manufacturing business, without
contravening international agreements, as well as yielding a net revenue of
£160 million a year to the Exchequer. 118 While, therefore, for Kaldor, the
motives behind SET were long-term, its ultimate implementation was owed to
more immediate considerations. There was also an element of fortune. On
theoretical grounds, MacDougall says he was opposed to SET. However,
during its development, he was out of commission, recovering from both
physical illness and what he now believes was a George Brown-inspired
nervous breakdown.'19
Callaghan formally suggested the idea to Wilson and Brown at a Budget
meeting held between the three men on 15 April 1966. The Chancellor of the
Exchequer explained that he would have to find £200 million in new taxation
" Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp 193-4.
116 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, pp67-8.
117	 T 320/649, 'The Case for a Payroll Tax and for a New Incentive for Exports', Kaldor
to Callaghan, 6 April 1966.
118 Ibid.
119 MacDouga11 in conversation with Buck.
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and a possible means of doing this was via a surcharge on employment in the
service sector. 120
 Brittan recalls that few involved in its implementation
understood the theoretical aspects of SET. However, it was a means of
obtaining increased revenue which could be presented as a structural change
rather than a new tax. 121
 Cairncross made a similar suggestion, emphasising
the political requirements of the Chancellor. 122
 As already suggested, another
potential use of SET was as a 'hidden export subsidy." 23
 As Thirlwall notes,
SET was 'an effective substitute for devaluation (albeit a small one.)"24
Certainly Shore, unaware of Verdoom's Law, remembered seeing it in this
light.125
In order that it could be announced as part of Callaghan's 1966 Budget on 3
May, SET had to be prepared in only three weeks, certainly a tall order for the
bureaucracy.' 26
 Stewart suggests that the haste in which the tax was devised
led to anomalies which were later exploited by the Conservatives for
propaganda purposes.' 27
 Cairncross recorded that Armstrong 'hated the
scheme with its vast surges of money to and fro." 28 Writing to Ian Bancroft,
Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 15 April,
Armstrong made it clear that he felt the scheme was not desirable and that
120 PRO T 230/649, 'Note of a Meeting', 15 April 1966.
121 Sir Samuel Brittan in conversation with Andrew Buck.
122 Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.128.
123 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.122, diary entry for 2 May 1966.
124 Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.243.
125 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
126 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.128.
127 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.67.
128 Cairucross, The Wilson Years, p.131, diary entry for 18 April 1966.
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there was insufficient time to prepare it for the budget) 29 SET also kept him
working until past 8 o'clock, which probably did not enamour him with it.'3°
Callaghan's suggestion that the Inland Revenue could 'collect a tax on
services' met with a hostile response from the Chairman of its Board, Sir
Alexander Johnston, on 15 April. According to Caimcross, this nearly
prompted the Chancellor to drop the whole idea. 131 The Board of Trade, when
approached, protested that it was too busy with its own work.' 32 Eventually,
the tax was collected as an addition to National Insurance contributions, with
the Ministry of Labour paying the subsidies to manufacturing.' 33 This
innovative approach was given the go-ahead at a meeting between Wilson,
Brown, Callaghan and senior officials on 19 April 1966.134 The 1969
government proposal that SET be administered in future through the PAYE
(Pay As You Earn) tax machinery was never implemented owing to Labour's
1970 election defeat.'35
Officials within the Treasury envisaged a number of possible problems with
the proposed measure, related to the fact that, as a result of its novelty, its
effects were unpredictable. Its impact might take some time to be felt.' 36 The
129	 T 320/649, William Armstrong to Ian Bancroft, Principal Private Secretary to the
Chancellor of the Exchchequer, 'Surcharge on Employers' Contributions and a Subsidy for
Manufacturers', 15 April 1966.
' 30 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.131, diary entry for 18 April 1966.
' Ibid, ppI3O-1, diary entry for 18 April 1966.
' 32 PR0 T 320/649, William Armstrong to Bancroft, 'Surcharge on Employers' Contributions
and a Subsidy for Manufacturers', 15 April 1966.
B Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, pp24l-2.
1M	 T 320/650, 'Introduction of a selective employment tax 1966; working papers', note
of a meeting, 19 April 1966.
135 Reddaway, Effects of Selective Employment Tax, p.175.
136 PRO T 320/649, William Armstrong to Bancroft, 'Surcharge on Employers' Contributions
and a Subsidy for Manufacturers', 15 April 1966.
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large movements of money involved would produce a surge in demand for
credit.' 37 There was no guarantee that SET would produce the deflation that
ministers hoped it would.' 38
 Furthermore, practical difficulties might arise
from attempts to formally define the nature of some business concerns within
the scheme.' 39 It was also uncertain that the international trade organisations
of which Britain was a member would view the new measure in a favourable
light.140
SET potentially appealed to the tendency, found within Labour, to view
manufacturing as morally superior to service activities. 14 ' However, support
for the new tax amongst the party and labour movement was far from
unanimous. There was 'a lot of uneasiness' regarding SET inside the
Cabinet. 142 The opinion that manufacturing, rather than services, was in fact
the labour hoarder, recorded Caimcross, was held by the Minister of Power,
Richard Marsh. 143
 Construction was classed as part of the tertiary sector for
the purposes of SET. This worried Crossman, who, as Minister for Housing
and Local Government, feared for his building programme. He wrote to
Wilson on 28 April, requesting that the cost to construction be offset in the
form of investment grants.' Another concern was the very short amount of
137 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.128.
138 Ibid, p.131, diary entry for 18 April 1966 and PRO T 320/649, Alec Cairncross, Head of
the Government Economic Service, to Ian Bancroft, 'Disinflation and the Employers
Surcharge', 18 April 1966.
139 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.128.
'°	 1320/649, William Armstrong to Ian Bancroft, 'Surcharge on Employers'
Contributions and a Subsidy for Manufacturers', 15 April 1966.
141 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.67. See also: HC Debates, 4 May
1966, Col. 1648.
142 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.121, diary entry for 2 May 1966.
143 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.135, diary entry for 8 May 1966.
' PRO T 320/650, Crossman to Wilson, 28 April 1966.
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time the Cabinet was given to consider such a complex measure. 145 Also an
issue was the status of trades unions within SET categorisation.' 46 The
Labour-affiliated Co-operative movement, a major part of the business of
which was retail related, protested to Wilson when the tax was introduced.'47
SET, in the words of Castle, made Kaldor 'particularly famous - or
45 As has been shown, Kaldor was closely associated with SET,
which he saw as a vehicle for the application of some of his theories. To what
extent should the measure be accredited to him? Thirlwall describes SET as
'solely attributable to Kaldor', 149 a view also presented by Callaghan.'5°
Kaldor had been exploring ideas related to those which motivated SET as far
back as the 1930s) 51 Callaghan held discussions with Kaldor along these lines
while Labour was in opposition. 152 Nevertheless, Kaldor did not exist in an
intellectual vacuum. Selwyn Lloyd, the Conservative Chancellor of the
Exchequer from 1960-2, planned to 'increase the cost of the employee's
National Insurance stamp and use the revenue from this as an economic
regulator." 53 Accordingly, in 1961, the Treasury was empowered to do this,
up to a maximum of four shillings a week, but the right was never exercised.
Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, pp338-9.
' Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.135, diary entry for 3 May 1966.
' See: PRO PREM 13/2857, 'Bob Edwards, MP, Chairman, Co-operative group of MPs
wrote about effects of Selective Employment Tax on Co-operative movement: records of
meetings', May-September 1966.
' Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.27, fn.
" Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.24!.
150 Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp 193-4.
' Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.243.
152 Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp 193-4.
Ibid, Time and Chance, p.194.
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However, the intention lying behind Selwyn Lloyd's measure was solely the
regulation of demand.154
The development and implementation of SET was a group effort.' 55 Neild
recalls that the idea of a payroll subsidy, which eventually took the form of
SET, initially emerged from official discussions of possible alternatives to
devaluation.' 56 Amongst other activities, Neild performed clarification and
elucidation functions during the development of SET. 157 Together, Kaldor and
Neild fought various dilutions suggested by Brown, Callaghan and Wilson,
including removal of the subsidy element and large numbers of exemptions.'58
Elements within the permanent machine also contributed, in particular the
Ministry of Labour, which took over the task of administration when the
Inland Revenue and Board of Trade refused.'59
It is possible to make a number of theoretical criticisms of SET. Verdoorn's
Law is correct only if rises in production cause increases in productivity and
not the other way around. Moreover, the statistical validity of the supposed
close relationship between the two processes has been queried. 160 MacDougall
did not accept the 'economic reasoning' which underlay SET.' 6 ' Kaldor's
crucial error, MacDougall argues, was in underestimating the potential for
' 54 F. H. Brittenden, A Guide to the Selective Employment Tax (London: Butterworths, 1966),
ppl-2.
15 See, for example: Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.121, diary entry for 2 May 1966.
'56 Nei1d in conversation with Buck.
'"For an example of Neild at work, see: PRO T 320/649, 'Introduction of a selective
employment tax 1966; working papers', Neild to Kaldor, 18 April 1966.
' Cairncross, The Wilson Years, ppi3i-2, diary entry for 19 April 1966 and diary entry for 24
A,ril 1966.
15 Neild in conversation with Blick.
'° Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.45.
161 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.181.
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economies of scale within the tertiary sector. 162 As a result, from its
introduction onwards, Kaldor was forced to battle with MacDougall over the
future of the tax. 163 Wilfred Beckerman, special adviser to Crosland at the
Board of Trade from 1967-9, examined similar subjects to Kaldor during the
l96Os.'' Beckerman's growth model was export-led. hi his view SET
concentrated excessively on supply-side improvements.' 65 Neild, another
Verdoorn's Law sceptic, suggests that the possible balance of payments
benefits associated with SET were negated by Brown's insistence on the
minimisation of the premium to manufacturing. Brown's trades unionist
instincts, Neild recollects, prompted hostility to the notion of subsiding
employers. Consequently, SET became, in Neild's words 'no more than an
administratively clumsy way of widening the tax base."66
On the subject of the supposed benefits for the tertiary sector, Kaldor's
biographer draws attention to the question of whether selective taxes are
absorbed by producers or passed on in prices.' 67 It could also be argued that if
the subsidy of industry entailed by SET did not discourage efficiency, then a
penalty on services could not be expected to have the reverse effect.' 68 Along
similar lines, The Economist argued that SET would simply serve to encourage
162 MacDougall in conversation with Buck.
163 Ibid. See, for example: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/6 'Assorted papers relating to the Selective
Employment Tax.' 1964-70, 1974-8, 'Employment and Productivity in Retail Distribution',
Kaldor to David Dowler, Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 19
March 1969.
See: Wilfred Beckerman, The British Economy in 1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1965), pp21-6.
165 Wilfred Beckerman in conversation with Andrew Blick.
Neild in conversation with Blick.
167 Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.243.
168 This point was made by Conservative leader Edward Heath in the House when responding
to the 1966 Budget. HC Debates, 3 May 1966, Col. 1475. See also: Cairncross, The Wilson
Years, p.134, diary entry for 3 May 1966.
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who thought it out such a brilliant idea, has not worked out. Indeed, it has
gone off at half-cock and done a great deal of damage because it hasn't really
produced a sense of confidence amongst the overseas bankers.' 176 SET's
effectiveness as a short-term deflationary instrument was restricted by the fact
that it did not become operational until September l966.' In this sense, it
marked the beginning of a fatal slide into the July 1966 crisis.'78
In 1973, SET was replaced by the no-less resented or complex Value Added
Tax (VAT).' 79 In the longer run, SET perhaps achieved its core objectives,'80
although its effects were very difficult to disentangle.' 8 ' In his Effects of
Selective Employment Tax, W. B. Reddaway, broadly a supporter of the
measure, argued that SET did induce greater productivity in its areas of
application, with the tax not being passed on entirely to consumers.182
However, the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance, implemented by the
Conservatives in 1964, could have contributed to this trend also.183
Furthermore, a more general rise in productivity may have occurred which
SET had not affected.' 84 The labour released from the tertiary sector did not
necessarily find its way into manufacturing, owing to occupational and
geographical immobility. 185 Moreover, Thirlwall says, the period of deflation
176 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p.53!, diary entry for 26 May 1966.
' Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.67; and Brittenden, A Guide to the
Selective Employment Tax, p.6.
178 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, pp67-8.
Reddaway, Effects of Selective Employment Tax, p.173 flu.
180 Thiriwall, Nicholas Kaldor, p.245. For an assessment of the impact of SET, see:
Reddaway, Effects of Selective Employment Tax.
181 Reddaway, Effects of Selective Employment Tax, pp2-4.
182 Ibid, pp 176-7.
183 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.66; and Reddaway, Effects of Selective
Employment Tax, p.176-7.
' Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.66.
185 thid, p.67.
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which followed devaluation in late 1967 meant that the trend for employment
was down in all sectors. SET's potential for transferring labour could not be
demonstrated properly in such circumstances.'86
As a result of the economic experiences of the three decades following the
creation of SET, the idea of setting out to reduce employment in any sector of
the economy now seems curious.' 87 Observing from the vantage-point of the
early twenty-first century, MacDougall draws attention to the fact that Kaldor
underestimated the potential long-term importance of the service sector within
the British economy in relation to that of manufacturing.' 88
 This was a line of
attack taken by Callaghan' s shadow, lain Macleod, at the time. 189 An example
of the kind of response SET received in some quarters was indicated, upon its
announcement, by the Daily Telegraph front page story, proclaiming that
'[a]mong those on whom the tax will fall most heavily are the independent
schools and the Churches." 9° Predictably, the tax was subject to much public
criticism from sections of the business community, seized upon by the
Conservatives, on the grounds that it represented an assault on the retail
trade.' 9 ' As Conservative leader Edward Heath put it to the House on 3 May
1966, SET 'will put a considerable burden on the distributive industries and
services.' 192
 Other Conservative criticism in the Commons came from
Margaret Thatcher, who described the use of the Standard Industrial
' 86 11wa11 in conversation with Buck.
187 Brittan in conversation with Buck.
t88 MacDougall in conversation with Buck.
189 HC Debates, 4 May 1966, Col. 1648.
° 'Blow to churches', Daily Telegraph, 4 May 1966.
191 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy since 1964, p.67.
192 HC Debates, 3 May 1966, Col. 1474.
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Classification in order to determine the status of firms within the tax as
'absurd.' 193
Thomas Balogh, Stuart Holland and the EEC
The question of Britain's policy towards European integration was 'one of
Tommy's manias.' 194
 According to Williams, Balogh 'never disguised his
personal dislike of the European project." 95
 The EEC was in part the product
of US sponsorship, and fitted with the US multilateral agenda. A customs
union as opposed to free-trade area, EEC member-states could not conduct
individual trade policies. 196
 Balogh, as has been shown, was a long-term
opponent of the 'general drive towards non-discrimination and a unilateral
lowering of preferences' 197
 that this symbolised. Membership would involve
Britain surrendering the right to use economic controls, which were very
important for Balogh.' 98
 Balogh also feared the national humiliation of a
rejected approach to the EEC.' 99
 As usual, he felt that the permanent Civil
Service was excluding him from discussions on the subject.20°
Balogh lobbied Wilson to focus on the expansion of Commonwealth trade, at
the expense of European integration and in resistance to the US drive for
Ibid, 20 July 1966, Col. 724.
' Crossman. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol, 2, p.37, diary entry for 13 September
1966
Marcia Williams, Inside Number 10, p.180.
' John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, p.42.
PREM 13/182, 'Commonwealth Trade and Aid', Memorandum by Dr.Balogh, 11
March 1965.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.186, diary entry for 8 January 1967.
' Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.37, diary entry for 13 September
1966.
CAB 147/10, 'Methods and techniques of fonning economic policy', 1965-9,
'Economic Policy making', Balogh to Trend, 8 February 1966.
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multilateralism. 20 ' He argued that 'the preferences still enjoyed by Britain in
the Commonwealth are of substantial value' and that British industry, 'behind
a protective screen based on a larger trading area, could be re-organised and
made fit to compete.' Moreover, the other members of the Commonwealth
benefited from the preferential system, since it provided them with 'stable
markets and also...with capital and [technical] know how.' 202 Balogh
envisaged that some form of economic planning could be co-ordinated within
the Commonwealth. 203 Here, it could be argued, the influence of Schacht's
New Plan, discussed in Chapter V, was present. Balogh's ideas here can also
be placed in a tradition traceable at least as far back the early twentieth century
National Efficiency movement referred to in Chapter II, led by politicians such
as Joseph Chamberlain. 204 None of those who campaigned to this end, Balogh
included, were successful in reversing Britain's decline as a global force.
Following the July 1966 sterling crisis, as has been discussed, Labour's
economic policy was de-railed. Obviously fearful that the Prime Minister
would now turn to Europe, Balogh wrote to Wilson on 8 August providing an
assessment of the current options. He suggested that EEC entry would result
in an unfavourable impact of3OO-4OO million upon Britain's trade figures
and unless a total improvement of £6OO-7OO million could be achieved in the
balance of payments prior to EEC membership, 'the...deadly threat of a failure
of competitive power within a large free trade area' loomed. He went on:
201 See, for example: Wigg Collection, 4/29 and Brittan Collection, p.2!, diary entry for 15
March 1965.
202	 PREM 13/182, 'Commonwealth Trade and Aid', Memorandum by Dr.Balogh, 11
March 1965.
203 Ibid, Balogh to Wilson, 1 April 1965.
204 For Chamberlain's campaign for imperial preference, see: Richard Jay, Joseph
Chamberlain, A Political Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp248-303.
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'[t]his might well decisively retard our Economic Expansion and smash a
number of our industries. The "readjustment" would then take the form...of
mass emigration from Britain.'205
Despite his efforts, Balogh found himself in the contradictory position of
opposing membership, but having to advise Wilson, who decided to attempt
entry, on how to bring this about. 206
 During 1966-7, Balogh floated the idea of
a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, which would, if realised, incorporate Britain
into the North American economic bloc. 207 He used his membership of the
Possible International Economic Arrangements official committee to this
end.208
 While US policy remained pro-EEC, this was a non-starter, 209 and the
notion that a British initiative in this area was relevant in the face of US
indifference dubious. 21 ° Cairncross argued that Balogh 'didn't really take it
seriously', but nevertheless happily created large amounts of work for DEA
and Treasury staff.21'
Dissent over Balogh's view of the EEC was voiced from within his own team
by Stuart Holland, an Oxford economist who worked in the Cabinet Office
from 1966-7. At this time, the more conventional Labour left attitude towards
the EEC was that it was a laissez-faire institution, therefore incompatible with
205 PRO CAB 147/10, 'Options and Choices', Balogh to Wilson, 8 August 1966.
206 Williams, Inside Number 10, p.180.
207 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, ppi77-8, diary entry for 22 October 1966.
208 For the development of this, see: PRO CAB 147/52, 'North Atlantic Free Trade Area
(NAFTA)', 53, 'North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA): report' and 54, 'North Atlantic
Free Trade Area (NAFFA): report.'
209 See, for example: PRO CAB 147/5 2, 'Alternatives to EEC', Stewart to Crossman, 19 April
1967.
210 Crossn, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.84, diary entry for 22 October 1966.
211 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.189, diary entry for 25 January 1967.
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planning, and to be opposed. 212 However, Holland felt that the EEC was
developing more interventionist tendencies and now presented a possible
means of bringing about economic planning co-ordinated between European
states. Here he was following the lead of Robert Marjolin, a Vice President of
the European Commission from 1958 and formerly Deputy Planning
Commissioner beneath Monnet. 213 Holland was particularly encouraged in his
outlook by the establishment in European Medium-Term Policy Committee
(MTPC), the first report of which was confirmed by the European Council of
Ministers early in 1967.214
Holland's view was that 'the evolution of the [MTPC] reflects acceptance of a
principle to which the French hold Western Europe's copyright: programming
and intervention rather than reliance on market forces.' 215 While granting that
'the [MTPC] report itself does not actually read like a Community counterpart'
of the French Plan, in a paper from March 1967, Holland suggested there was
potential for future development. He emphasised 'how comprehensive the
terms of reference of the Committee are' and the fact that its very existence
represented a concession of the need for structural, social and regional policies
to offset the imbalances promoted by a European free market system. 216 As
well as disagreeing with Balogh's rejection of the EEC, Holland also opposed
212 j0 W. Young, Britain and European Unity, pp75-6.
213 Robert Marjolin, Architect of European Unity, Memoirs 1911-1986 (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1989), p. 308, p.160
214 
'Britain and Europe since 1945', Institute of Contemporary British History Lecture by
Stuart Holland, 26 March 1997, updated version; Stuart Holland in conversation with Andrew
Buck. See: Geoffery Denton, Planning in the EEC (London: Chatham House and PEP, 1967).
215 
'EEC - the Change in the Community since the General Election', Holland, probably from
May 1966, Stuart Holland private papers.
216 
'Observations on EEC Entry after Visits of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to the
Capitals of the Six', Holland, 31 March 1967, Stuart Holland private papers.
222
the Foreign Office approach to membership, arguing that it was characterised
by a laissez-faire outlook.217
In October 1966 Holland produced a paper, which Balogh forwarded to
Wilson, suggesting that secret negotiations directly between the Prime
Minister and the immediate circle of the French President, Charles de Gaulle,
therefore bypassing the Foreign Office, might be the best means of beginning
an approach to the EEC. 218 The following year, Holland was able to put this
idea into practice. During 1967, Holland's views led to his falling out of
favour with Balogh, thereby losing his formal line of communication with the
Prime Minister. However, Holland was already known to Wilson, who, in
April 1967, in Holland's account, 'put his head round my door' to enquire why
he had seen none of his work for three weeks. This led to a meeting between
the two in the flat above Number 10, at which Holland presented his view to
Wilson of how the bid for EEC membership should be conducted. As well
being framed in terms of co-ordination of economic planning between member
states, Holland argued that Britain's application strategy should be supportive
of the inter-governmentalism then advocated by de Gaulle, as opposed to the
supranationalism believed to be favoured by the West Germans. West German
agreement to this approach, Holland suggested, could be obtained through
offering the possibility of associate status for East Germany.219
217 
'Draft White Paper on Arrangements for Trade and Industry in the European
Communities', Holland to Balogh, 7 June 1967, Stuart Holland private papers.
218 
'EEC Entry', Holland to Balogh, 10 October 1966, Stuart Holland private papers.
219 
'Britain and Europe since 1945', Holland; the East Germany associate status idea can be
found in: 'Observations on EEC Entry after Visits of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary




Labour Party through an application to join the EEC, yet on a basis which was
acceptable to the left. This, Holland feels, was the source of its appeal to
Wilson. 228
 However, the idea was never implemented. Again in Holland's
account, Wilson wanted to appoint him as an economist at the Foreign Office
for the EEC entry negotiations. However, the Prime Minister met with strong
objections from senior officials and backed down. At this point, Wilson
decided to move Holland directly into the Number 10 Political Office, as will
be shown in Chapter Vu.229
Additional Appointments
While chapters IV and V and VI have concentrated largely on the 1964-7
activities of five special advisers appointed in 1964, the picture during this
period was not static, with other appointments being made and departures
taking place. Within Balogh's team, John Allen's ignominious exit from
Whitehall in May 1965 has been discussed. 23° He was replaced in June 1965
by an economist from St Hugh's college, Oxford, Theo Cooper. Born in 1934,
Cooper specialised in wages, working conditions and social security. She was
the first female special adviser. She changed from full to part-time service in
September 1966, staying on until late 1968. An addition to the team, rather
than filling a gap left by a departure, Stuart Holland, some of whose activities
have already been referred to, began working for Balogh part-time in January
1966. Born in 1940, he was also writing a thesis on 'Growth and Output.' As
228 Holland in conversation with Buck.
230 Dei1s of appointments to Balogh's team have been obtained from PRO 1 199/1063, cross-
referenced against Graham, 'Thomas Balogh (1905-1985), p.207 fh. Generally, these two
sources agree, although Graham does not refer to John Allen.
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part of a further expansion of his unit, Balogh recruited another staff member,
Richard Pryke, aged 32, from the Cambridge Department of Applied
Economics, in May 1966. Pryke had previously worked for the Labour
Research Department. As has been shown, Pryke's was a brief tenure, ending
in resignation in protest at the direction of government policy, following the
July 1966 deflationary measures.
Pryke's place was filled in October 1966 by the economist from Balliol
College, Oxford, Andrew Graham. He stayed until July 1969. During 1967,
Stewart found employment in the Kenyan Treasury too attractive a proposition
to refuse. Crossman believed that the difficulties then being experienced by
the government were influential upon his decision to leave. 231 Following
Stewart's departure in October 1967, Margaret Joan Anstee was employed as
Senior Economic Adviser. 41 years old at the time, she was a development
expert most recently employed by the United Nations in Ethiopia. Probably
because of delays in obtaining her security clearance, which will be described
in the next chapter, she did not begin work until December 1967. She stayed
for 12 months.
A brief description of the modus operandi of Balogh's small but growing team
during 1964-7 will be of value. It seems that Balogh passed most analytical
work on to subordinate staff, in the first instance, Stewart. 232 Inside Balogh's
unit, Stewart functioned as the deputy head, monitoring 'the whole field of
economic policy' and producing 'memoranda on major issues of economic
231 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.348, diary entry for 9 May 1967.
232 PRO T 199/1063, Neild to Petch, 7 March 1967.
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policy at the request of the Prime Minister or Mr. Balogh, and sometimes of
other Ministers.' He also gave oral advice to ministers 'on economic issues of
particular concern to their own Departments.' Stewart was responsible for
supervising work within Balogh's unit and 'keeping the office running as
smoothly as possible.' 233 The files suggest that Balogh's team members
worked very much according to his requirements, producing largely technical
analysis. 234 Individual departments or policy areas were not systematically
shadowed by particular staff, with work divided on an ac hoc basis. Holland
says that this was not a weakness, however, since team members were
equipped to cope with varied tasks. 235 Palliser, for one, found Balogh's unit to
be stimulating and original colleagues. 236 The importance of the emergence of
bodies comprised, in whole or in part, of special advisers will be assessed in
Chapter VIII.
As has been shown, Neild left, disillusioned by the failure to devalue sterling,
in May 1967. Faced with Neild's imminent departure, finding a replacement
did not prove to be a straightforward task for Callaghan. The Chancellor
began to consider appointing Michael Posner, Economic Director at the
Ministry of Power since 1966. Posner, born in 1931, came from Pembroke
College, Cambridge and was yet another economist in whose appointment to
an official post Balogh had a hand. 237 Both Armstrong and Caimcross
PRO T 199/1063, 'Mr. M. J. Stewart - Outline of duties and responsibilities', Heaton
to Collier, 22 November 1966.
234 For examples of technical work produced by Stewart, Graham and A5Le see: PRO CAB
147/13, 'Domestic economic outlook', 1965-9.
Holland in conversation with Buck.
236 Palliser in conversation with Buck.
237 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.1 51, diary entry for 5 December
1967 andfn.
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opposed the recruitment of Posner to the Treasury, on the grounds that Posner
was 'doing a good job where he is and there is no one to take his place.'238
Richard Marsh, the Minister of Power, also resisted losing Posner,239 whom he
considered to be an effective aide. 24° Marsh valued Posner, both as a 'theorist'
and as someone able to resist the interference of Balogh.24'
Appointed Economic Adviser to the Treasury despite these objections, Posner
went on to engage in important activities such as helping draft Callaghan's
November 1967 statement to the House on sterling devaluation. 242 That he
was not as senior as Neild is suggested by the fact that he saw himself as
subordinate to Cairncross. He was a member of FU. 243 Posner's was intended
to be a fairly personal role, 'guided to some extent by the kind of things on
which the Chancellor seeks his help.' In policy terms, he was initially charged
with contributing in the areas of international liquidity and finance, industrial
problems and demand management. 244 Though from the political left,
Posner's, at least in his own view, was not a partisan appointment, and he
stayed on beyond Labour's 1970 election defeat, until the following year.245
For this reason he does not entirely fit the definition of the special adviser used
here.
238 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.193, diary entry for 9 February 1967.
239 Thid, p.195, diary entry for 9 February 1967.
240 Lord Marsh in conversation with Andrew Buck.
241 Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.200, diary entry for 1 March 1967.
242 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.58i, diary entry for 19 November
1967.
243 Posner in conversation with Blick.
T 199/1029, 'Government Economic Service. Appointment of Economic Advisers -
Mr K. E. Berrill Mr. M. V. Posner' ,'Mr. Posner and Mr. Berrill', 1967, Cairncross to
Armstrong, 7 August 1967.
245 Ibid.
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Kenneth Berrill, an economist from King's College, Cambridge, who held the
post of Special Adviser to the Treasury from 1967-9, was also appointed
following Neild's departure. 246 However, Ben-ill's job title was anomalous
since he was not a party political animal. 247 Ben-ill's main concern was
intended to be public expenditure, in particular specific items rather than the
overall level. 248 Christopher Foster, who, as previously described, was
appointed to the Ministry of Transport in early 1966, fits the special adviser
description more readily. His activities will be examined in Chapter VIII.
Following his appointment as President of the Board of Trade at the end of
August, 1967, Tony Crosland recruited Balliol economist Wilfred Beckerman,
aged 42, as an Economic Adviser. Those recommending Beckerman to
Crosland included MacDougall 249 and Balogh. 25° Neild described Beckerman
as 'an able go-getter, industrious, ambitious, good at organising things, quite
an entrepreneur.' 25 ' A Labour supporter, Beckerman served for two full
academic years.252
Kaldor also recruited assistance. In August 1966, Christopher Allsopp, an
economist from the Ministry of Overseas Development, born in 1941, was
obtained as a Temporary Economic Assistant, although formally being
employed by the Economic Section. One of Allsopp's most substantial pieces
of work inside the Treasury was an internal report on economic growth, based
246 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol 2, p.651 fn.
247 Wass in conversation with Buck and Sir Kenneth Berrill in conversation with Andrew
Buck.
248 T 199/1029, 'Mr. Posner and Mr. Berrill', Cairncross to Armstrong, 7 August 1967.
249 Crosland Collection, 5/4, MacDougall to Crosland, 22 September 1967.
250 Thid, Balogh to Crosland, 26 September 1967.
251 Ibid, Neild to Crosland, 13 September 1967.




'The Age of Frivolity was over'
Chapters VII and VIII are concerned with the period 1967-70, running from
the abandonment of parity in November 1967 to the Labour's June 1970
election defeat. For Britain, the impact of devaluation was immense and
sudden. This took on its most symbolic form in the realm of foreign policy.
While, in 1964, more British troops were stationed East of Suez than in
Germany, 1 a complete abandonment of the former commitment was now
adopted. 2
 Lord (John) Harris, special adviser to Roy Jenkins, regarded the
sterling devaluation of late 1967 as the final collapse of the Wilson
programme. To Harris and others of Gaitskellite origin, policy since 1964 had
primarily consisted of dabbling in poorly conceived economic management
schemes. Now, as Harris put it, 'the age of frivolity was over.'3
As will be shown below, gold and dollar reserves were at a minimum and the
pound was by no means safe at its new level of $2.40. Furthermore, the new
Chancellor, Jenkins, was faced with the task of forcing a severe deflationary
programme through a Labour Cabinet, some members of which may have
mistakenly believed the exchange rate adjustment to be a soft option. 4
 It is
necessary to consider the role of the special adviser in the post-devaluation era.
The implications of the rise of Jenkins, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer,
'Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, p.278.
2 Edmund Dell, The Chancellors, p.354.
Lord Harris of Greenwich in conversation with Andrew Buck.
' Edmund Dell, The Chancellors, p.347.
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are of particular interest. Related to this were attempts to undermine or even
remove Wilson from office, real or imagined, both from inside the Cabinet and
beyond.
Special advisers and dyarchy
The devaluation of November 1967 was swiftly followed by Callahgan's
resignation as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 5 Wilson opted for a direct swap
with Roy Jenkins, who had been Home Secretary since 1966. Callaghan took
over at the Home Office, while Jenkins assumed the vacated Treasury post.6
While there are a variety of possible interpretations of Wilson's motives, 7 it is
certainly the case that through this course of action, he was thereby able to
avoid a complicated reshuffle and maintain the former Chancellor of the
Exchequer in a senior Cabinet position. The latter was an expedient measure
which reflected as much as anything else Callaghan' s party prominence.8
While this solution was fairly satisfactory under the circumstances, Callaghan
and Wilson, following their doomed three-year crusade for the $2.80 sterling
parity, were damaged goods. 9 Furthermore, the influence wielded by Brown,
the final member of the 1964 triumvirate, by this time Foreign Secretary, had
declined, and he left the Cabinet for good in March 1968.10 Undoubtedly, the
rising force was Jenkins. In the words of Dell, 'the new Chancellor would
Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.315.
6	 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp2l5-6.
See: Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp484-9.
8 Posner's understanding at the time was that this was the sole reason for Jenkins's promotion,
the other potential trade, between Treasury and Foreign Office, where Brown was secretary of
state, being unpalatable. Michael Posner in conversation with Andrew Buck.
9 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.485.
'° Philip Ziegler, Wilson, pp291-3.
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have great power. . . [i]ndeed, Wilson might well fear that a new and successful
Chancellor could become the candidate of a coup d 'état against the much
weakened Prime Minister who had appointed him." 1 It is necessary to
investigate the role of special advisers within the emergent power balance,
which could be regarded as an accommodation between Wilson and Jenkins.
As a Gaitskell protégé, 12 Jenkins was personally and ideologically remote from
the Wilson camp. Neild, also a former member of the Gaitskellite circle, says
that the new Chancellor of the Exchequer tried to persuade him to return to the
Treasury but, having recently committed himself to establishing the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, ajob he was very much enjoying, the
more so since he had a very free hand there and suffered none of the
'frustrations of serving the Wilson government', he refused.' 3 Writing in
September 1968, Crossman noted 'the difference between the casual easiness
and rightness of my relations' with colleagues such as Balogh 'and the
stiffhess of my relations with Roy." 4 This had implications for Balogh.
Jenkins had been one of Balogh's first pupils at Balliol College, Oxford, in
1940.15 However, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer's approach to
economic policy was that of the Labour right, far removed from Balogh's
control model.' 6 Frustrated by Jenkins's traditional approach, in May 1969,
"Dell, The Chancellors, p.347.
12 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.486.
' Robert Neild in conversation with Andrew Blick.
14 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.182, diary entry for 8
September 1968.
Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp4l-2.
16 For a description of Jenkins's deflationary approach, see: Barbara Castle, Fighting All the
Way, p.397.
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Balogh told Castle that 'Roy was in the grip of Treasury orthodoxy."7
Furthermore, Jenkins soon found his former teacher a 'very tiresome'18
colleague. During 1967-70, there were few policy discussions between them
and they were not personally close. 19 The rise of Jenkins was a cause of
unease for Balogh, 2° who viewed the Chancellor of the Exchequer as prone to
intrigue.2 ' Crossman suspected that Wilson's fears of an attempt to oust him
from within his cabinet, with Jenkins as the likely successor, were heightened
by the attitude of members of his inner circle, Balogh included. 22
The Jenkins ascendancy was accompanied by Wilson's advancement of Castle,
who was appointed as Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity in
May 1968. As has been discussed, Castle had already made use of expert
advisers at the Overseas Development Ministry and Ministry of Transport. At
Employment and Productivity from 1968-70, she was served by temporary
economists including Senior Economic Adviser Derek Robinson and
Economic Adviser Anthony Thirlwall, in later life Kaldor's biographer.
However, these were non-partisan appointments. 23 In June 1968, underlining
her enhanced status, Balogh informed Castle that 'the talk was now all about a
new troika.' 24
 It can be assumed that Balogh viewed the growing stature of
Castle, a long-term ally of his, as an opportunity to pursue his own agendas.
He encouraged her to be assertive regarding her inclusion in important inner
17 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.653, diary entry for 18 May 1969.
' Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.242.
19 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.627, diary entry
for 5 September 1969.
20 See, for example: Ibid, pp674-5, diary entry for 12 October 1969.
21 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.673, diary entry for 8
February 1968.
22 Ibid, p.588, diary entry for 22 November 1967.
23 Anthony Thirlwall in conversation with Andrew Blick, 12 July 2002.
24 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.455, diary entry for 6 June 1968.
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ministerial groups. 25 Castle recorded being told by Balogh in May 1968 that
'he and Harold can now use me in their battles against the Treasury.' 26 Castle
valued Balogh's practice of arming her with arguments against the deflationary
approach taken by the Treasury and its ministerial head, Jenkins. She sorely
missed the economist on occasions when he was unavailable.27
In her new role, Balogh suggested, it was vital that Castle bring about wage
and price restraint. 28 Incomes control was required to ensure that the
international competitiveness achieved through devaluation was not dispelled
in domestic inflation. 29 Balogh wrote to Wilson on 11 January 1968, insisting
that devaluation had rendered 'the problem of incomes policy more important
and acute.' 3° Four days later, he suggested to Castle the need for '[a] tougher
incomes policy, almost certainly involving statutory power.' 31 During late
1968, Benn recorded Balogh's railing against the trades unions, who he felt
had become excessively powerful and irresponsible. 32 Both Balogh and
Posner were present at Castle's tri-partate conference, held to discuss the
implementation of the Donovan Report on industrial relations, at the
government's residential accommodation at Sunningdale in January l969.
Discussions on this occasion ultimately led to government proposals for the
25 Ibid, p.441, diary entry for 12 May 1968.
26 Ibid, p.44!, diary entry for 12 May 1968.
27 See, for example: Thid, p.'192, diary entry for 22 July 1968.
28 Ibid p.441, diary entry for 12 May 1968.
29 Dell, The Chancellors, p.347.
° PRO CAB 147/29, 'Prices and income policy', 1968, 'Retail Price Index', Balogh to
Wilson, 11 January 1968.
Ibid, Balogh to Castle, 15 January 1968.
32 TOny Benn, Office without Power, p.122, diary entry for 16 November, 1968.
Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, pp593-4, diary entry for 21 January 1969; and
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.521, diary entry for 17 June 1969.
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statutory regulation of industrial relations, published in the In Place of Strife
white paper.34
In Crossman's account, Castle and her senior permanent officials, 'along with
Tommy Balogh. . . evolved the idea of In Place of Strife' at Sunningdale.35
However, on the question of her proposals, Castle notes in January 1969 that
Balogh 'is against me. . .(and has obviously been talking to Dick
[Crossman]).' 36 Balogh argued that Castle's measures would reduce the
possibility for government action on the prices and incomes front, presumably
because there were limits to the co-operation which could be expected from
the trades union movement. 37 Posner recalls that he and Balogh both felt that
Castle was mistakenly focusing on strikes, when her aim should have been to
bring about pay restraint. 38 Castle, Jenkins and Wilson co-operated over the
attempt to introduce the In Place of Strife proposals. 39 When, in June 1969,
the programme was abandoned in the face of resistance from within the
Cabinet, the Parliamentary Labour Party and the labour movement generally,4°
Balogh attempted to exploit the break-down of this Cabinet alliance. He
lobbied ministers to rebel against Jenkins's deflationary approach to economic
management, in favour of the use of controls.41
' Castle, Fighting All the Way, pp4l5-6, In Place of Strife: a Policy for industrial relations,
Cmnd. 3888 (London: HMSO, 1969).
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.52 I, diary entry for 17 June 1969.
36 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.593, diary entry for 20 January 1968.
Ibid.
38 Posner in conversation with Blick.
See, for example: Castle, Fighting All the Way, p.4 19.
4°Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp287-90.
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, ppSi1Ol, diary entry for 30 June 1969.
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Upon his arrival at the Treasury in late 1967, one of Jenkins's immediate
concerns was the production of a deflationary package which would reduce
domestic demand, thereby increasing export capacity. 42 His attempts to do so
have been criticised by Dell, amongst others, on two counts. Firstly, they were
hindered by procrastination. Public expenditure cuts were not implemented
until January 1968 and tax increases were delayed until March. 43 Jenkins later
blamed this on the failure of Treasury officials to provide him with the ready-
made, detailed proposals which they had shown to Callaghan.44 This reflects
largely on the performance of permanent bureaucrats and presumably relates to
the contents of FU. Secondly, the £923 million of tax increases Jenkins
introduced were not sufficient to bring about the required redirection of
resources to exports. 45 Again, FU, from which certain special advisers were
excluded, had been the forum for discussions of the necessary extent of
deflation in the event of a devaluation. 46 Douglas Allen (now Lord Croham),
who took over from Armstrong as Permanent Secretary of the Treasury shortly
afier the March 1968 Budget, agrees that it was insufficient. 47 Posner,
however, suggests that, while Jenkins's March measures did not prove to be
ideal, they were greater in magnitude than those that might have been
implemented by many politicians, whose concerns were never the same as
those of economists.48
42 Dell, The Chancellors, p.347.
Ibid, pp350-5. For internal Treasury discussion of the possibility of an early Budget, see:
PRO T 230/889, 'Economic Situation. Preparation of the Budget 1968.' 1967-8.
Jenkins,A Life At the Centre, p.221.
Dell, The Chancellors, p.357.
See, for example: Alec Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.230, diary entry for 22 September
1967.
Lord Croham in conversation with Andrew Blick.
48 Posner in conversation with Buck. For the apprehensions shared by the Economic Advisers.
For the apprehensions of the economists on this subject, see: Cairncross, The Wilson Years,
p.T76, diary entry for 21 February 1968.
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complained that they were 'overloaded with all the changes Callaghan and
Kaldor heaped upon them' during 1964-7. Deflation, then, was preferably to
be achieved through the use of ready-made measures, rather than further fiscal
innovation. One such already existing scheme was SET, which also possessed
the potential benefits for the balance of trade discussed in Chapter VI.
Armstrong reluctantly informed Jenkins on 1 February that though 'there were
strongly held objections to certain features of SET, notably the "taking and
giving" method by which it was levied, and the discrimination and anomalies
which it involved.. .it was difficult to see an alternative source of revenue of
this order of magnitude.'55
Kaldor believed that 'doubling SET plus some indirect taxation' could offer a
way out. 56 He drew attention to evidence suggesting that '[t]he net yield of a
15s. increase [in SET] is £200 million in a full year.' 57
 Kaldor felt the
experience of SET to have borne out his belief in its potential as a trigger for
increased growth. In a submission to Robert Armstrong, who was briefly
Jenkins's private secretary, Kaldor argued that, on a basis of recently collated
Ministiy of Labour data, 'there can be little doubt that SET has had a very
substantial effect on productivity.' 58 It seems that Caimcross, along with
Economic Section staff including Wynne Godley, while not sharing his rabid
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.667, diary entry for 6 February
1968.
PRO T 171/832, 'Special Charge (Clauses 41-50)', 1968, Vol. III, Part 2, 'Note for the
record', Robert Armstrong, Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2
February 1968.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.265, diary entry for 12 January 1968.
' PRO T 171/832, Vol. III, Part 2, 'S.E.T.', Kaldor to Robert Armstrong, 6 February 1968.
58 Ibid, 'Changes in Employment 1966-1967', Kaldor to Robert Armstrong, 12 February 1968.
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enthusiasm for SET, were willing to suggest that the available evidence
provided Kaldor's arguments with some support.59
However, Jenkins was 'antipathetic to' SET. 60 He wanted to increase only
indirect taxes, rather than income tax or SET. This was opposed by advisers
including Kaldor. Their objection was that such a set of measures would be
'regressive', depriving the worse off of a disproportionately large share of their
income.6 ' This might lead to an erosion of the goodwill that would be required
from the trades union movement in coming months in order to achieve pay
restraint.62 In Cairncross's account, at a meeting between the Chancellor of
the Exchequer and advisers, Kaldor told Jenkins that the Chancellor's
proposals 'would be regarded as a Tory budget.' 63 One of Kaldor's proposals
designed to counteract this effect was called 'Minimum Earned Income
Relief.' This combined a more progressive income tax with a relative shift in
this fiscal burden away from families and towards single men and women.
The scheme was opposed by Inland Revenue representatives. 65 Kaldor also
persisted in advocacy of the pet scheme of his and Abel-Smith's, 'claw-back.'
This involved the introduction of increases in family allowance, funded by the
taxation of recipients. Again there was disagreement with the Inland Revenue,
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p. 273, diary entry for 13 February 1968. See also, for
example, PRO 1 17 1/832, Vol. III, Part 2, 'S.E.T. and Changes in Employment 1966/67', Sir
Alec Caimcross, Head of the Government Economic Service, to Robert Armstrong, 14
February 1968 and PRO 1 171/832, Vol. III, Part 2, 'S.E.T.', Robert Workman, Under-
Secretary, Treasury, to William Armstrong, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 4 March,
1968.
60 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.232.
61 Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.274, diary entry for 14 February 1968.
62 Ibid, p.2'76, diary entry for 21 February 1968.
63 Thid, p.276, diary entry for 21 February 1968.
PRO T 171/831, 'Major Direct Taxation Proposals', 1968, Vol. III, Part 1, 'Minimum
Earned Income Relief', Kaldor to Jenkins, 26 January 1968.
65 Ibid, Vol. III, Part 1, 'Personal Taxation', Sir Alexander Johnston, Chairman of the Board of
Inland Revenue, to Jenkins, 1 February 1968.
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this time over the extent of claw-back. 66 Kaldor was not satisfied with the
outcome. In May 1968, in a submission to Jenkins, Kaldor described existing
measures as a 'halfway house.' 67 Another measure included in the 1968
Budget with which Kaldor was closely involved was a one-off 'Special
Charge', designed to fall on investment income, calculated in part to obtain
goodwill from the trades union movement.68
Kaldor was successful in persuading both (William) Armstrong and the
Economic Section to advise Jenkins unanimously in favour of the use of
SET.69
 Having considered the alternatives put to him by Douglas Wass, a
Treasury Under Secretary, in a paper of 5 March, Jenkins decided in favour of
the adoption of Kaldor's proposal, 7° although not to the full extent envisaged
by the economist. An increase of 30% was agreed, which the Chancellor of
the Exchequer ultimately raised to 50%.71 It is tempting to conclude that had a
more deflationary Budget been sought, an even greater increase in SET,
perhaps at around the 100% Kaldor had in mind, would have been a suitable
means of achieving this.
As mentioned, although the impression is that he sought a higher total than
anyone else inside the Treasury, Kaldor's exact position on the extent of
taxation increases needed from the 1968 Budget is difficult to pin down. A
See, for example: Ibid, Vol. III, Part 1, 'Meeting with Sir Alexander Johnston on 22
February, 1968', Robert Armstrong to Jenkins, 22 February 1968.
67 PRO BN 89/224, 'Paper sent on a personal basis to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on
Family Allowances from Professor Kaldor; "Conditional Option" scheme', 1968, 'Family
Allowances', Kaldor to Jenkins, 30 May 1968.
68 See: PRO T 17 1/832.
69 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.280, diary entry for 4 March 1968.
T 17 1/832, Vol. III, Part 2, Robert Armstrong to Sir David Serpell, Second Permanent
Secretary, Board of Trade, 7 March 1968.
71 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp232-3.
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view which could without doubt be attributed to Kaldor, however, was that,
after the introduction of tough deflationary fiscal measures, sterling should be
floated. According to Posner, Kaldor's mantra during 1968 was 'double SET,
double REP [Regional Employment Premium], float!' 72 In March 1968 he
argued for the immediate blocking of reserves, followed by the cutting loose of
sterling.73 Kaldor advocated a similar course throughout the year. 74 Traces of
discussions of this matter are difficult to locate in the Public Record Office,
presumably because their sensitive nature discouraged their encapsulation in
written form. Kaldor's own list of memoranda refers to a paper entitled 'Gold
and the Dollar: Contingency Planning', dated 30 July 1968, which he sent to
Armstrong's successor as the Treasury Permanent Secretary, Sir Douglas
Allen. 75 This probably proposed flexible rates.
Posner remembers fearing that, once launched, rather than float, sterling would
plunge, threatening a sudden, huge, burst in domestic inflation. 76 The official
Treasury view, expressed in March 1968, was that if cut loose, the pound
could be expected to drop to a value of $1
	
Kaldor, however, whose
views were outlined in Chapter VI, believed that counter-speculation would
prevent this78 arguing, for example, in September 1968, that the exchange rate
would 'not go below [$1 2.20 except briefly.' 79 In the words of Hennessy, a
plunge in the value of sterling, accompanied by a blocking of the balances (ie:
72 Posner in conversation with Buck.
Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.285, diary entry for 15 March 1968.
See, for example: Ibid, p.308, diary entry for 29 June 1968.
Kaldor Papers, NK 10/2.
76 POSner in conversation with Buck.
PRO CAB, 130/497, MISC 205, 1ST Meeting, 17 March 1968.
78 Posner in conversation with Blick.
Caimcross, The Wilson Years, p.322, diary entry for 14 September 1968.
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defaulting on debts) 'would have instantly been the finish of the pound as the
world's second reserve currency after the dollar. The Bretton Woods system,
too, would have been at an end; enormous strain would have fallen upon the
dollar; and the UK would have acquired, at least temporarily, the status of a
pariah state and would have been plunged into a siege economy and domestic
austerity of a kind that would have wrecked the Wilson administration.'80
Facing this prospect, it is understandable that, for the senior Treasury
economists other than Kaldor, the proposal to abandon the fixed rate was too
great a leap of faith. Kaldor's courage, Posner suggests, was that of the devout
theoretician, while the fears of his associates were derived from their
practicality.8'
An examination of whether the views on this matter held by those involved in
the policy fonnation process have subsequently been revised is of interest. As
discussed, Wilson was attracted to flexible rates prior to devaluation, and later
wrote that he was, but was persuaded of the Treasury and Bank of England
line, probably both directly by representatives of these institutions and through
Callaghan. Jenkins stated in his memoirs that that it 'might have been better to
have floated in November 1967', but also noted that as time progressed and the
new rate was successfully defended, such a course of action began to make
less sense. 82
 Posner, Economic Adviser to the Treasury during 1967-70, is
now tempted to concede Kaldor's case. 83 If Kaldor's judgement was sound,
then British economic policy, which, during 1964-7, was consumed by the
° Ibid.
81 Posner in conversation with Buck.
82 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.282.
83 Posner in conversation with Buck.
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defence of one arbitrary exchange rate, was, in the immediate post-devaluation
period, similarly dominated by the misguided aim of preserving the new
parity. As Castle put it, 'we were merely putting ourselves into a different
strait-jacket.'84
The possibility that a second downward adjustment in sterling might be forced,
with uncertain but potentially disastrous domestic and international
consequences, haunted those inside the Treasury loop from late 1967.85
Furthermore, policy on sterling signified an adherence to the Bretton Woods
agreement, an international system on its last legs, with even the dollar
threatened by devaluation against gold. 86 This outcome, however, could not
have been predicted with certainty at the time. Nevertheless, despite their
efforts during 1967-70, Posner concedes that the burst of inflation feared by
himself and others opposed to floating was merely postponed, coming about in
the early 1 970s, on an international scale. He does, however, argue that, had it
occurred in the late 1960s, such a crisis may have been more severe in absolute
terms, and peculiar to Britain. 87 Sterling was floated by the Conservative
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, in 1972, initially as a temporary
measure. 88 Aside from a disastrous 1990-2 interlude, preceded by a
shadowing of the Deutschrnark, it has continued to do so ever since. 89
' Castle, Fighting All the Way, 397.
Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
86 Dell, The Chancellors, pp355-7 and Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.234.
Posner in conversation with Buck.
88 Dell, The Chancellors, pp389-9l.
89 For that interlude, see: ibid, pp544-6.
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Kaldor's defensive advocacy of SET was a source of friction between Jenkins
and himself and there seems to have been something of a personality clash
between adviser and minister. 90 It is also possible that Jenkins, whose dislike
of SET was founded in the fact that he saw it as 'a symbol of Callaghan's
Treasury',9 ' may have harboured similar feelings towards the aide most
closely associated with the tax. Whatever the reasons, Kaldor was now a spent
force at the Treasury, owing to a lack of confidence on the part of his minister.
Allen took over from Armstrong shortly after the 1968 Budget. Jenkins
informed his new permanent secretary that Kaldor was an irritant he could do
without. While Kaldor did not leave the Treasury altogether, Allen saw to it
that he was removed from key policy areas, and out of the way of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 92 It seems Kaldor was sidelined into co-
ordinating a study of the effects of SET, which will be discussed later. Posner,
by contrast, was regarded as an effective adviser, by both Allen93 and Jenkins,
who saw his aide as 'a very effective.. .economist (and personality.)' 94 Posner
participated in such critical activities as negotiation with foreign holders of
sterling balances, 95 a duty to which Kaldor was not allocated.96
As discussed, following Trend's dossier of April 1967, Balogh's position was
undermined. He was also under pressure from his former employers to return
to academia. From 15 October 1967, he resumed University duties and was
9° See, for example: Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.267, diary entry for 23 January 1968.
91 Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.232.
92 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
9° Ibid.
Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.294.
Posner in conversation with Buck.
Lord Croham in conversation with Blick.
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now paid for government work at a daily rate of £35.10. per day.97
Technically, he was now the 'Prime Minister's own consultant' rather than a
special adviser to the Cabinet, 98 but the practical difference between the two,
other than the way in which he was paid, was difficult to discern. Balogh was
seemingly due to leave Number 10 altogether on 15 January 1968, an
arrangement designed possibly to enable him to help devise the post-
devaluation expenditure cuts announced that month. Crossman felt that his
friend and ally had already been at Number 10 too long for his own good.'°°
Yet Balogh was still present after that date. 10 ' Wilson's personal closeness to
his aide, as well as the fact that, more generally, the Kitchen Cabinet included
a number of long standing friends, made the removal of Balogh particularly
uncomfortable. 102 This, to a great extent, explains the protracted nature of the
operation. Unsurprisingly, Balogh's academic employers became aware of his
continued Downing Street presence and came to the conclusion that he was
neglecting his responsibility to them. 103 His work for Wilson was all but full-
time, 104 yet Balogh denied that he was even a part-time employee, attempting
to get his description in official handbooks, such as the Imperial Calendar and
Vachers, changed accordingly.105
PRO CAB 160/2, 'Dr Thomas Balogh', 1966-75, David Heaton, Principal Establishment
Officer, Cabinet Office, to Balogh, 13 June 1967.
98 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.791 fn.
Ibid, p.606, diary entry for 16 December 1967.
'°° Ibid, p.606, diary entry for 16 December 1967.
'o See, for example: Ibid, p.718, diary entry for 17 March 1968.
102 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, pp48-9, diary entry for 6 May 1968.
103 Ibid, p.48, diary entry for 6 May 1968 and PRO CAB 160/2, A.L. Fleet, Secretary for
Administration, Oxford, to Balogh, 26 April 1968.
'° Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.470 fn. See, for example: PRO CAB 160/2, 'Dr
Balogh - January, 1968', note by Brenda Dew, Secretary to Balogh, 12 February, 1968.
105 PRO CAB 160/2, Balogh to Trend, 29 April 1968.
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Matters on which Balogh advised Wilson during 1968 included the
aforementioned devaluation package, which he argued should include
restrictions on Hire Purchase.'° 6 He also helped develop possible responses to
the international currency crisis of March, which were, as a package, labelled
'Operation Brutus."°7 In this instance, sterling came under pressure as a side
effect of the threat that the dollar would devalue against gold (from its fixed
level of $35 an ounce).'° 8 It was during this affair that Balogh particularly
irritated Jenkins, who found him 'critical of everything we had decided, and of
the motives of everyone who had advised the decisions, without propounding
any practical alternative course.' 109 In broader policy terms, devaluation
dented Balogh's hopes that the Sterling ArealCommonwealth could be built
into a dynamic economic bloc. In December 1967 he informed Wilson of his
view that the 'fact that a large number of countries which belonged to the
British Empire and the sterling area have not followed us in our last
devaluation has completely altered the nature of the sterling area.. .the ending
of discrimination in the field of control over capital export in favour of the
sterling area should be considered urgently." 1 ° However, Balogh argued, any
plans to enter the EEC should also be postponed, since the redirection of
resources this required, combined with that already necessitated by the
106 PRO CAB 147/12, 'H.P. and the package', Balogh to Wilson, 12 January 1968.
107 See: Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp3l6-8 and Jon Davis, "Staring Over the Precipice
into the Abyss": An Anatomy and an Analysis of "Operation Brutus", November 1967-July
1968', unpublished MA in Contemporary British History thesis, Queen Mary and Westfield
College, University of London, 1999.
108 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp3 16-7. For various Balogh contributions, see: PREM
13/2052, 'Problem of gold: contingency planning; Operation Brutus; part 2', 1968.
'° Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.242.
110 PREM 13/1422, 'Overseas investment and export of capital: correspondence from Doctor
Balogh', 1967, 'Overseas Financial Policy', Balogh to Wilson, 6 December 1967.
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did not possess the same authority as his predecessor," 6 nor did his behaviour
suggest he was a political actor in the Balogh mould, appearing mainly
concerned with the technical analysis of problems. 117 Wilson regarded
Graham as 'quite first-class', partly for his ability to produce work at short
notice. 118 One particular concern for Graham was that of prices of incomes
policy, the pressing issue of the	 Some of the difficulties previously
experienced by Balogh continued. In October 1968, Graham complained to
Michael Halls that Cabinet papers and minutes on economic matters were no
longer being circulated to his office following the departure of Balogh.'2°
Following Balogh's departure from Number 10, lamenting the loss of someone
she saw as an effective ally, Castle attempted to obtain the services of Graham
on a part time basis. Wilson informed her that his adviser could not be
spared. 12 ' Wilson had recently lost not only Balogh but also Balogh's deputy,
122 Crossman was interested in taking on Balogh's services at the
nascent Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), with a view to
sharing him with Castle at Employment and Productivity. Paul Odgers,
Crossman's Private Secretary, informed his minister that 'I don't think it will
be allowed. I don't think they are going to allow Tommy to have access to
secret papers again." 23 This suggests Trend had effectively excluded Balogh,
on the grounds of unreliability where confidential information was concerned.
116 PRO PREM 13/1955, Michael Halls, Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, to Sir
Douglas Allen, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 8 November 1968.
See, for example, some of his work during 1968-9 in: PREM 13/2766, 'Paper by Andrew
Graham on use of unemployment figures as economic indicator', 1968-9.
PRO PREM 13/1955, Halls to Allen, 8 November 1968.
" See: PRO CAB 147/30 'Prices and income policy', 1968-9.
120 PRO PREM 13/1955, 'Papers', Graham to Halls, 29 October 1968.
121 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.492 fn.
122 Ibid, p.503, diary entry for 27 August 1968.
123 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.96, diary entry for 17 June 1968.
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Trend was, no doubt, keen to be permanently rid of a rival. When Crossman
put it to the Prime Minister that he wanted to employ Balogh, alongside Brian
Abel-Smith, Wilson insisted that Balogh should only be permitted to look at
Abel-Smith's papers rather than receive his own copies.124
The idea of Castle and Crossman being advised by Balogh was, however,
seemingly unacceptable to Jenkins.' 25 Wilson therefore suggested that
Crossman take on Theo Cooper, an economist from St Hugh's College,
Oxford, who served under Balogh and then Andrew Graham from 19659.126
Balogh would be able to view her papers.' 27 This arrangement was the one
eventually arrived at,' 28 with additional help provided by Kaldor, who for the
time being officially remained a Treasury adviser. 129 Balogh advised on
'general economic questions arising out of the specific duties of the Secretary
of State." 3° His responsibilities included preparing Crossman for the Cabinet
Steering Committee for Economic Policy' 3 ' and accompanying him to
meetings with government statisticians. 132 He was paid at the same daily rate
that he had been since October 1967.133 Balogh, however, proved to be
something of a wayward aide, wont to disappear abroad at the critical
124 thid, p.107, diary entry for 25 June 1968.
125 Ibid, p.105, diary entry for 22 June 1968.
126 thid, p.107, diary entry for 25 June 1968 and fn.
127 Ibid, p.lO'7, diary entry for 25 June 1968.
128 Ibid, p.201, diary entry for 26 September 1968 and pp183-4, diary entry for 10 September
1968.
' 29 thid, p.190, diary entry for 16 September 1968 and ppl83-4, diary entry for 10 September
1968.
130 PRO CAB 160/2, Paul Odgers, Assistant Under Secretary of State, D.H.S.S., to Heaton, 12
November 1968.
131 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol.3, p.231, diary entry for 21 October
1968.
132 thid, p.319, diary entry for 14 January 1969.
133 PRO CAB 160/2, Odgers to Heaton, 12 November 1968.
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moment. 134 Balogh's difficulty was in severing what Crossman described as
the 'umbilical cord which keeps him hanging on to No. iO',' which, in
Crossman's view, he did not manage to do until spring 1969.136 Crossman's
diary entry for 25 September 1968, stated that Balogh was not available to
draft a report on pensions since he had 'slipped back into No. lO',' writing
speeches for a Prime Minister who 'simply can't do without him."38
By early 1969, Crossman came to the view that Balogh was surplus to
requirements. The DHSS was a peripheral, policy-forming department,
removed from the governmental core which exercised such fascination for
Balogh. In Crossman's view, what was needed was a special adviser, for
example Kaldor or Abel-Smith, whose métier was the detailed proposal rather
than the broad sweep, which was Balogh's most familiar territory.139
Advocates of cabinet government might, however, find praiseworthy Balogh's
tendency to pressurise ministers to look beyond departmental business and
participate in general policy discussion.' 4° Reluctantly, Crossman gently
talked his old friend round to the fact that he was no longer required at the
DHSS. 141 Needless to say, Balogh remained a mainstay of Kitchen Cabinet
gatherings, combining political and social life, which continued during 1967-
134 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.161, diary entry
for 29 July 1969 and p.327, diary entry for 16 January 1969.
135 thid, p.142 fn.
136 Thid, p.412, diary entry for 13 March 1969.
Ibid, p.200, diary entry for 25 September 1968.
' Ibid, p.201, diary entry for 26 September 1968.
'' Ibid, p.362, diary entry for 10 February 1969.
'° For an example of Balogh performing this function, see: thid, p.142, diary entry for 13
March 1969.
'' Ibid, p.362, diary entry for 10 February 1969.
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Balogh had been from October 1967, on a consultancy basis.' 48 Jenkins was
not making use of Kaldor, but, in Crossman's view, did not want anyone else
to do so and was therefore reluctant to release him. In November 1969, in a
state of frustration, Crossman sent a 'really hot letter to Roy." 49 Jenkins
finally gave way, relinquishing 'all claim on Professor Kaldor's services',150
going as far as to say that Crossman could employ the economist full-time.15'
Crossman's diary entry for 7 December 1969 refers to 'Nicky Kaldor, who is
now, thank God, my official economic adviser." 52 Kaldor was given the job
title of 'Special Adviser.' The Permanent Secretary suggested his salary be
set at '1,000 guineas.' Kaldor was given a room in the DHSS building in
Elephant and Castle. His appointment was not publicised outside the
department, probably out of a desire to avoid a repetition of earlier experiences
with the Press.153
'Roy's evil genius'
Wilson's fears of an attempt to remove him, particularly involving Jenkins and
John Harris, became heightened from 1967, as will be shown. Moreover, the
behaviour displayed by members of certain elite social groups suggested a
148 Thid, p.201, diary entry for 26 September 1968 and PRO T 199/1164, 'Professor Kaldor',
Andrew Collier, Establishment Officer, Under-Secretary, Civil Service Department, to Allen,
19 September 1968.
149 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.717, diary entry for 5 November
1969. For the letter in question, see: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/35, Crossman to Jenkins, 3
November 1969.
150 PRO T 199/1164, 'Research Assistance for Professor Kaldor', Richard Sharp,
Establishment Officer, Under-Secretary, Treasury, to Allen, 17 November 1969.
'' Kaldor Papers, NK 10/35, Jenkins to Crossman, 4 November 1969.
152 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.751, diary entry for 7 December
1969.
' Details of his appointment are contained in Kaldor Papers, NK 10/35. For Kaldor's
activities at the DHSS, see: Kaldor Papers, NK 10/36, 'Memoranda written by Professor
Kaldor when acting as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Social Security.' 1969-
1970.
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desire to oust Wilson by non-constitutional means. 'In the strange atmosphere
of the late 1960s', writes Pimlott, 'a collective revulsion began to take effect,
beyond politicians or even press magnates, directed against the man whom rich
and powerful people decided was the incubus of the nation's ills."54
Within the post-devaluation balance of power, Harris, a non-expert political
aide attached to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, grew in importance. Writing
in July 1969, Crossman refers to 'Roy Jenkins and his boon companion John
Harris, who is a kind of American character, a real "kitchen cabinet" in one.
He steers Roy a great deal and represents him to the press." 55 Born in 1931,
Harris's initial employment was as a journalist. 1956 found him working on
the Glasgow-based Labour paper Forward. In September of that year, the
publication was re-launched and Harris was taken on as one of the two salaried
editorial staff, operating out of an office in Holborn, London. The financially
independent paper survived into the 1960s.156
Forward was orientated towards the Labour right, with Gaitskell and Jay both
closely involved.' 57 It was this wing of the party with which Harris remained
finnly associated. He was appointed as Gaitskell's 'political adviser' for the
1959 election campaign.' 58 His work entailed involvement in presentational,
strategic and tactical decisions 159 and no doubt more menial duties. Although
no specific arrangement was made, Harris believed that, in the event of a
Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.509.
' Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.583, diary entry for 20 July 1969.
156 Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, p.253.
157 Ibid, p.253.
158 Tony Benn Years of Hope, Diaries 1940-1962, p.3 13, diary entry for 22 September 1959.
159 Janet Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, p.782, diary entry for 30
September 1959.
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Labour victory, the new Prime Minister would have employed him as an
aide.' 6° To Harris, on election night, fell the unenviable task of informing a
previously optimistic Gaitskell that defeat was inevitable.' 61 It seems that
Gaitskell rated Harris highly' 62 and he was kept on as 'Hugh's Adviser'163
after the poil.
Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer under Attlee from 1945-7 and
godfather to the Gatistkellites, took an immediate fancy to Harris, the 'nice
looking young man' he first met in October 1959.164 The occasion was the
gathering of Gaitskell's inner circle at Dalton's Frognal residence, on 11
October, the Sunday after Labour's 1959 election defeat, when Douglas Jay
proposed a revamp for Labour which included disassociation from state
socialism and trades unionism as well as a change of name. 165 It should be
noted that, in Dalton's account, Harris 'came late and took no part in talk."66
Reflecting views such as this, Gaitskell's speech, delivered in Blackpool at the
1959 conference, questioned Clause IV of the party constitution. Clause IV
committed the party to common ownership of the means of production,
distribution and exchange, and was therefore sacred to the left.' 67 Harris
helped prepare the ground for Gaitskell's proposal amongst senior Labour
° Lord Hams in conversation with Buck.
161 Ibid.
162 Ben Pimlott (ed.) The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40, 1945-60, p.694, diary entry
for 11 October 1959.
163 Benn, Years of Hope, p.343, diary entry for 30 September 1960.
Pimlott (ed.) The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, p.694, diary entry for 11 October 1959.
165 Ibid, p.695, diary entry for 11 October, 1959 and Patrick Gordon Walker, Political Diaries,
1932-1971, pp257-8, diary entry for 23 October 1959.
166 Pimlott (ed.) The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, p.694, diary entry for 11 October 1959.
167 See: Tudor Jones, "Taking Genesis Out of the Bible": Hugh Gaitskell, Clause IV and the





 However, Harris was 'not equally at home with Michael Stewart
as he had been with Gordon Walker and before that, in opposition, with
Gaitskell." 82
 There is no mention of Harris in Stewart's autobiography.'83
Harris, however, was in demand. In 1965, Jay, who as President of the Board
of Trade was experiencing public relations difficulties, considered inviting
Harris, his 'previous colleague', to 'join us on press work." 84
 Furthermore, in
June of the same year,' 85
 in the face of perceived problems with the press,
'[am abortive attempt' was made to obtain the services of Harris by the Wilson
camp.' 86
 It was hoped that Harris, through 'acting separately, independently
and politically with the Press on Harold's behalf" 87
 would 'close the gap
between the Cabinet and the Party." 88
 Why was the appointment never made?
According to Williams, 'not only were there objections from the civil servants,
but also from the National Executive Committee [NEC] of the Party too.' In
her account, 'one of Mr Gaitskell's closest friends.. .raised the strongest outcry
possible at the thought of installing one of Hugh's closest confidants in
Downing Street working for Harold." 89
 However, while Williams believed
that he was 'keen',' 9° Harris, who shared with other Gaitskellites a low opinion
181 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.636, diary entry for 5 January 1968.
182 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.182.
183 Michael Stewart, Life and Labour, An Autobiography (London: Sidgwick and Jackson,
1980).
184 Jay, Change and Fortune, p.329.
185 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minsiter, Vol. 1, p.243, diary entry for 4 June
1965.
' 86 Marcja Williams, Inside Number 10, p.223.
187 Ibid.
188 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.243, diary entry for 4 June 1965.




In the same year, the possibility emerged that Roy Jenkins, another friend and
ally of Harris's in the Government, might be promoted from the post of
Minister of Aviation to replace Frank Soskice as Home Secretary. Harris
made it clear to Jenkins that, should this transpire, he (Harris) would be
agreeable to the idea of a move to the Home Office. 195 Wilson appointed
Jenkins as Home Secretary in January 1966. Michael Stewart was seemingly
reluctant to lose Harris, and until Stewart left for the DEA, swapping jobs with
Brown in July 1966, Harris divided his time between the Home and Foreign
offices. 196 Harris then became a full-time adviser to Jenkins, who 'took to him
very strongly." 97 When Jenkins replaced Callaghan as Chancellor of the
Exchequer in November 1967, Harris moved with him to the Treasury, where
he remained until Labour's June 1970 election defeat.'98
In 1964 Harris was employed in the News Department of the Foreign Office.
He was given his own room, which he initially suspected might be an intended
means of 'keeping me out of the way.' At the Home Office and then the
Treasury, Harris saw to it that he was housed in Jenkins's Private Office. This
ensured physical immediacy to his employer, as well as access to official
papers. Throughout his time as a special adviser, Harris could see his minister
whenever he wanted.' 99 That he and Jenkins spent a great deal of time in each
other's company is suggested by other sources. 200 Harris recalled actively
avoiding participation in official committees, since 'they never decide
' Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
'Ibid.
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.636, diary entry for 5 January 1968.
198 Lord Harris in conversation with Blick.
'Ibid.
200 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.758, diary entry
for 2 April 1968.
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anything.' 20 ' This dislike of cumbersome meetings was shared with
Jenkins.202
 There is no question of the great extent to which Jenkins trusted
Harris. 203 Harris argued that his strength, and indeed that of any special
adviser, was drawn from the confidence in him openly displayed by his
minister.204
 As well as sharing political allegiance, Jenkins and Harris were
already personally close.205
 Indeed, the 'extremely personal' nature of their
relationship led to a degree of mistrust and bewilderment regarding Harris's
role amongst Jenkins's cabinet colleagues. 206 This lack of comprehension,
tinged with doubt, was shared by officials at the Treasury.207
Jenkins writes that his special adviser was 'concerned primarily but not
exclusively with public relations, which was then his speciality.' 208
 Harris's
role as media liaison, certainly of great importance, will be examined later in
this chapter. Harris, however, says he saw himself more as a 'political adviser'
than press officer. 209
 Williams's description of him as 'Roy's principal
personal adviser' seems fitting. 21 ° Certainly, Jenkins felt that Harris's
'political judgement was admirable.' 21 ' He was not, nor did he claim to be, an
economist. 212
 An important part of his work involved tactical discussions with
his employer, often taking place several times a day. He emphasised that he
was not a 'svengali' and was critical of the supposed tendency of current
201 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
202 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
203 See, for example: Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.22!.
204 Lord Hams in conversation with Buck.
205 See, for example: Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.171.
206 Lord Marsh in conversation with Andrew Buck.
207 Posner in conversation with Blick.
208 Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, ppl8l-2.
209 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
210 Williams, Inside Number 10, p.311.
211 Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.22!.
212 thid; and Lord Harris in conversation with Blick.
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political advisers to wield independent influence. The distinction between
advice which is solicited or otherwise is unclear, Harris suggested, since both
could be provided in the course of a single discussion with a minister. 213 The
fact that his role involved a large amount of informal, verbal activity helps
explain the lack of traces of Harris in official files.
Harris helped write party political speeches for Jenkins, for instance the one
delivered at the 1969 Labour conference.214 The special adviser also
accompanied his minister on official visits, sometimes abroad. 215 Jenkins used
Harris as a conduit for personal messages to and from fellow Cabinet
members216 and the special adviser seems to have been generally regarded as
able to speak for his minister. 217 On occasion, Harris accompanied Jenkins to
party political engagements which it was more awkward for career officials to
attend in a professional capacity. 218 However, there were apparently
difficulties with this, since Harris, too, was 'on the public payroll.' 219 Croham
regards Harris as the first true special adviser, since his contract, Croham
remembers, was the standard one for permanent civil servants, modified with
provisions for temporary status. This was probably drawn up in 1964 by the
Foreign Office. Other aides under examination in this study were recruited on
terms already laid down for the employment of outsiders prior to 1964.220
213 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
214 Jeins A Lfe at the Centre, p.285.
215 Ibid, p.298.
216 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.686, diary entry for 16 February
1968.
217 See, for example: Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.555, diary entry for 22 November
1968.
218 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.219.
219 Ibid, p.770.
220 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
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'With considerable hesitation, but perhaps attracted by 1909-11 thoughts that
an aggressive role towards the Lords was suitable for a Chancellor of the
Exchequer', Jenkins goes on, 'I decided to use it.' 223 As a result, much public
controversy was generated and Wilson was angered in the process.224
In a more long-term and ideological sense, a series of achievements with
which Harris was rightly proud to have been associated are those relating to
social liberalisation, which Jenkins had long advocated and was able to pursue
at the Home Office. 225 Jenkins's 1959 work The Labour Case refers to 'the
need for the State to do less to restrict personal freedom' 226 and, as Home
Secretary he facilitated the implementation of his radical agenda. 227 For
example, in 1967, laws relating to homosexuality and abortion were reformed,
as a result of private members bills, with the co-operation of Jenkins. 228 Harris
stated that he shared Jenkins's commitment in this area and was involved in
devising the tactical approach required for its implementation. This included
planning and conducting a complex and intensive lobbying campaign amongst
Labour j229
Just as Balogh was part of a group descended from the Bevanite left which
crystallised around Wilson, Harris was clearly one of a clique of Gaitskellite
loyalists, who during the course of the 1 960s began to centre on the personality
of Jenkins. Shore suggested that, following Gaitskell's sudden death in 1963,
223 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.257.
224 thid, pp25'1-8.
225 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck. See: Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.487.
226 Roy Jenkins, The Labour Case (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959), p.135.
227 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, ppl8O-l.
228 Kenneth 0. Morgan, The People's Peace, pp259-60.
229 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
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Harris was a 'deeply disappointed man.' 230 There is no doubt about the hurt
caused to Harris by the passing away of the Labour leader, whom he described
as 'the greatest man I ever knew.' 23 ' In Shore's view, Harris sought another
suitable politician to attach himself to in place of Gaitskell and eventually
found one in Jenkins. Shore was certain that it was Harris's intention to
publicly promote Jenkins as a future Prime Minister, at the expense of
Wilson. 232 Harris was ungenerous towards his Kitchen Cabinet counterparts,
Wilson's 'political staff.' While he felt unqualified to comment on their
economic theories, Harris dismissed Balogh (along with Kaldor) as an adviser,
on grounds of unsuitable personality. He was vehement in his dislike of Wigg,
although he praised Williams, suggesting that she effectively curbed Wilson's
excesses.
Wilson often suspected that, amongst others, Jenkins was plotting against him,
with the assistance of Harris. 234 In October 1966, in the hope of clearing the
air between them, Jenkins requested a meeting with the Prime Minister, at
which Wilson complained of the 'intrigues of John Harris.' 235 Kitchen Cabinet
members took concerned note of Harris. Writing in June 1967, referring to
Harris, Crossman expressed the view that personal public relations advisers
should be forbidden to ministers. 236 Benn recorded telling Wilson on 3 April
1968 that 'you have to deal with Roy by building up John Harris.' 237 Later
230 Lord Shore of Stepney in conversation with Andrew Buck.
231 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
232 Lord Shore in conversation with Buck.
233 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
234 See, for example: Benn, Office without Power, p.63, diary entiy for 30 April 1968; and
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, pp43-4, diary entry for 3 May 1968.
235 Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.197.
236 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.368, diary entry for 7 June 1967.
237 Benn, Office without Power, p.55, diary entry for 3 April 1968.
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November 1968 at which there was a 'universal conviction.. .that John Harris
had become Roy's evil genius'245
During 1967-70, suspicion of Harris's use of the press was great, particularly
within the Kitchen Cabinet. Firstly, it was felt that Harris was dedicated to
obtaining newspaper articles calling for the furthest possible advancement of
Jenkins,246
 even to the level of Prime Minister, 247
 and generally building his
image. In January 1968, the Daily Mirror ran a series of stories drawing
attention to Wilson's supposed failures and portraying Jenkins as a renaissance
man and potential national saviour. 248
 Crossman noted his view that these
were inspired by Harris. 249
 Secondly, some believed that Harris deliberately
tried to undermine the position of Wilson25° and others, for Jenkins's benefit.
Benn suggested that Jenkins used 'John Harris, his press adviser, quite
ruthlessly against anyone who stands in his way', for example, during 1968,
Shore, Secretary of State at a rival economic ministry, the DEA. 251
 Jenkins
supposedly regarded Shore as incompetent and wanted him removed from
office. 252
 Castle recorded being told by Wilson in July 1968 that Harris was
responsible for press attacks on her. 253 Thirdly, as well as image
manipulation, Harris was suspected by some of attempting to use the press in
order to force policy decisions upon Cabinet, through informing journalists of
245 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.269, diary entry for Friday 22
November 1968.
246 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.368, diary entry for 7 June 1967.
247 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.1 87, diary entry for 21 November 1966.
248 See, for example: 'Will he be Britain's man of the year?', Daily Mirror, 1 January 1968.
249 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.636, diary entry for 5 January 1968.
250 ibid, p.297, diary entry for 3 April 1967.
251 Benn, Office without Power, pp49-SO, diary entry for 25 March 1968.
252 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.748, diary entry for 29 March 1968.
253 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.487 diary entry for 15 July 1968.
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Jenkins's own views on matters. 254 Similar means were used to suggest which
concessions Jenkins might be willing to make on certain issues.255 Harris's
method of achieving articles slanted in the way he wanted seemingly involved
furnishing journalists with confidential official information, which related to
matters such as his personal attitudes, the opinions of other ministers and
developments inside the administration.256
Was Harris guilty as charged? Shore, one of his supposed victims and a
Kitchen Cabinet member, remained convinced to the end that he was.257
Harris did not deny the use of inside knowledge in order to obtain favourable
press coverage, but argues that such activities were commonplace across the
government. 258 Marsh agrees. 'I don't doubt that he [Harris] was doing it',
Marsh states, 'but so was everyone.' 259 Certainly, ministers such as Crossman
record sharing internal government knowledge with journalists and, while
there were no other special advisers with Harris's role, press officers, for
example Kaufhian at Number 10, performed similar functions. 26° Croham,
who also notes that Harris was far from being the only culprit, states that press
priming 'was a safety valve for collective Cabinet responsibility.' Through
this means, Croham suggests, ministers were able to signal to their party
supporters disagreement with government policies that they were obliged
254 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.269, diary entry for Friday 22
November 1968.
255 Ibid, p.690, diary entry for 21 October 1969.
256 For a description of the way in which such information was supplied to journalists by
Harris and others, see: Ibid, pp582-3, diary entry for 20 July 1969.
257 Lord Shore in conversation with Blick.
258 Lord Hams in conversation with Blick.
259 Lord Marsh in conversation with Buck.
260 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, pp582-3, diary entry for 20 July 1969
and Castle, The Castle Diaries, p.414 diary entry for 28 March 1968.
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time.267 In May 1966, Wilson even considered appointing a full-time leak
chaser.268
When pressed on whether his primary loyalty was to Jenkins or the Labour
administration as a whole, Harris said that one entailed the other. While he
was a supporter of the government, he was not, he stated, a supporter of
Wilson. Making the criticisms of Wilson previously outlined, Harris added the
charge that he was prone to paranoid fantasy. Harris maintained that both he
and Jenkins were exclusively concerned with averting the possibility of Britain
'going down the plug-hole', possibly dragging the world economy with it.
They were, he argued, not interested in such matters as political conspiracy.
While Harris put his case in a compelling fashion, it is difficult to accept that
there is any level of crisis at which politicians, even those who are striving
genuinely and effectively to prevent looming catastrophe, entirely abandon
politics. Jenkins, an historian himself, was surely well aware of this. His
autobiography referred ruefully to its author's lack of success in capitalising
on Wilson's post-1967 weakness in the form of an effective bid for the
premiership. 269 Jenkins does not, however, deny that such a coup was in his
mind. Furthermore, Harris's protestations of innocence do not fully accord
with Gordon Walker's description of a plot against Wilson by the Labour right
that brewed during 1968-9, which Harris conceded he and Jenkins were aware
of, but claimed they did not condone.27°
267 See, for example: Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.41, 2 May 1968.
268 See: PRO PREM 13/1184, 'Appointment of a full-time leak-chaser.'
269 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.260.
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rally the support of moderate Labour MPs to Wilson. 276 The excitable tone of
Gordon Walker's accounts of the putsch-that-never-was may lead the reader to
doubt the seriousness of the participants. Nevertheless, it seems that Harris
and Jenkins were not adverse to benefiting from a successful move against
Wilson, with which they were willing to co-operate up to a point, merely
wishing to avoid association with an attempt that failed. Marsh suggests,
reasonably, that Jenkins's failure to reach the summit of British politics during
1967-70 was a result not of his preoccupation with potential economic disaster,
but of his failure to cultivate the parliamentary lobby.277
Given that there was no effective attempt to oust Wilson by Jenkins or his
followers,278 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister were
mutually dependent for political success. When suggesting to Castle that
Harris was guilty of intrigue in July 1968, Wilson added, '[mjind you, I like
Roy and work well with him. After all, I appointed him and I was right.'279
Indeed, according to Williams, Harris 'was someone we knew very well and
with whom we had had a very good working relationship before and during
1964. This was a hidden asset. It helped to establish an underlying political
understanding.' 28° As discussed, Williams's admiration was reciprocated by
Harris, who saw her as possibly the only sensible influence inside the Wilson
camp.28'
276 Ibid, p.325, diary entry for 13 May 1969.
277 Lord Marsh in conversation with Buck.
278 For possible explanations as to why this was so, see: Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp504-5.
279 Castle, The Castle Diaries, p.487 diary entry for 15 July 1968.
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As well as the half-hearted Labour right plot, there were certain nebulous
extra-parliamentary attempts, in the wake of devaluation, to remove Wilson,
destabilise his government or question the probity of his associates. 282 The
nature and authenticity of these, from the point of view of the special adviser
experiment, will be investigated below. As Posner remarks, certain
reactionary elements in British society have always found reconciliation with
the fact of Labour in power an impossibility. 283 Marsh goes as far as to
suggest that, during 1967-70, influential sections of the British 'establishment',
taking in portions of the military, aristocracy and intelligence community,
seriously countenanced the removal of Wilson through non-constitutional
means. 284 Owing to their attachment both to the party of government and
individual politicians, the role of special advisers in possible elite-level threats
to the Wilson administration is of particular interest.
In May 1968, Cecil King, chairman of the International Publishing
Corporation (IPC) which included the Mirror group of newspapers, attempted
to inspire a coup d 'état against the Labour Prime Minister he had previously
strongly supported. 285 As Minister of Power, Marsh had inadvertently
introduced King to his future chief co-conspirator and fellow disillusioned
Labour supporter, Lord (All) Robens, when he appointed the former to the
Coal Board, as an intended counterweight to the latter, who was its
chairman. 286 As a regular recipient of King's hospitality, Marsh was subjected
to a series of increasingly worrying anti-democratic rants from the press
282 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp505-9.
283 Posner in conversation with Buck.
284 Marsh in conversation with Buck.
285 For a description of this, see: Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp252-55.
286 Richard Marsh, Off the Rails, p.1 12.
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magnate, which he eventually felt compelled to report to the Security Service
(the internal counterintelligence agency, commonly known as M15).287
Marsh, who was in as good a position as any to judge, suggests that King's
attempts to establish an emergency administration were part of a broader trend
of opinion within the highest social stratum at the time.288 In the words of
Pimlott, in addition to King's activities, 'other, secret, and even more
questionable get-togethers took place, involving sinister figures.' 289 Marsh
adds that many Labour Cabinet members were on the King payroll, receiving
money for articles they wrote for his various publications. 290 In his own
account, Jenkins maintained regular contact with King, 29 ' a fact of which
Harris was presumably aware. Jenkins's lunches with King continued after the
latter's removal from the IPC board, 292 prompted by his unbalanced
behaviour. 293 This was despite the 10 May 1968 demand made by King, up to
that point a member of the Court of the Bank of England, in the Daily Mirror,
for the resignation of Wilson, based on a misleading account of the level of
gold reserves.294
287 Ibid, pp 150-5.
288 Lord Marsh in conversation with Buck.
289 Pinilott, Harold Wilson, p.509.
290 Lord Marsh in conversation with Buck.
291 Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.253.
292 See, for example: The Cecil King Diary, 1965-1970, pp208-9, diary entry for 1 September,
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'Enough is enough', Daily Mirror, 10 May 1968. For Wilson's account of this, see: Harold
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England', 1968.
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Benn, amongst others, suspected that Harris was responsible for a series of
Daily Mirror stories of early 1968 which praised Jenkins and criticised
Wilson.295 This does not mean that the direct involvement of Harris or Jenkins
in the King episode should be inferred, although the Chancellor of the
Exchequer was a possible beneficiary of the proposed coup.296 While he
advocated the application of commercial expertise to administration, King did
not approve of the considerable importation of academic specialists into the
bureaucracy since 1964.297 In particular, he was opposed to 'the
Hungarians',298 whose mere presence inside the administration, he claimed to
believe, served to considerably undermine confidence in sterling.299
King's ideas were associated with the increasing emergence, within the
financial and corporate elite, of the view that the perilous economic
circumstances then prevailing necessitated the establishment of a non-party
'businessman's government', 300 or, as Wilson put it, 'a coalition of all the
talents - Great Britain Limited.' 30 ' Writing in 1963, Balgoh had suggested
that economic elites might conspire to 'defeat a democratically elected
government' if its policies were too radical. 302 In the late 1960s, there was
concern within the Kitchen Cabinet that a group associated with the City of
London might attempt to establish a national government under one of
295 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.631, diary entry for 1 January 1968.
For Wilson's concerns regarding King's access to accurate official information, see: PRO
PREM 13/2033, 'Prime Minister enquired about statement made by Mr Cecil King on
government expenditure at home during David Frost Programme', 1967-8.
296 Marsh Off the Rails, an Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), p.153.
297 The Cecil King Diary, 1965-1970, p.3!, diary entry for 15 August, 1965.
298 Ibid, p.68, diary entry for 10 May, 1966.
299 Ibid, p.127, diary entry for 17 May, 1967.
°° G. R. Searle, Country Before Party, pp235-4l.
301 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70, p.625.
302 Thomas Balogh, Planning for Progress, p.38.
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Wilson's rivals within the Cabinet.303 In a conversation with Benn in early
1968, Balogh became quite agitated at the prospect. 304 Wilson, however,
portrayed this as a largely media-led movement in his memoir of the period,305
although his opinion may have changed later.
If a disgruntled former M15 operative, Peter Wright, is to be believed, there
was a degree of co-operation between King and the Security Service, the
former happily placing in his publications any stories about Wilson the latter
supplied him with. 306 However, it should be noted that the domestic
intelligence agency attempted to keep King on a tight leash. Marsh, having
made his initial report, was instructed to continue attending lunches with the
IPC Chairman in order to act as an informant, which he did. 307 Nevertheless, it
seems that a degree of hostility towards Wilson existed within the secret
community stemming from suspicions, long harboured by some on both sides
of the Atlantic, that Wilson had at some point become an asset of the Soviet
security organisation, the KGB (Committee of State Security).308
Concerns of this type regarding Wilson probably originated with his regular
trips behind the iron curtain during the 1940s and 50s, firstly as President of
the Board of Trade in the Attlee administration and then as a consultant to
timber importers Montague L. Meyer Ltd. 309 Visits to Soviet Bloc countries
303 James Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.205.
3°4 Benn, Office without Power, pp32-3, diary entry for 8 February 1968.
305 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70, p.658.
Wright, Spycatcher, The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer
(Richmond: William Hememann, 1987), p.369.
307 Lord Marsh in conversation with Buck.




entailed exposure to attempted entrapment, for example of a sexual nature.310
Doubt was compounded in the eyes of some, both by his 1951 resignation
from the Government in protest over the adoption of a re-armament
programme and his tendency to associate with Eastern European Jews.
Presumably Wilson's association with the Labour left was another mark
against him.31 ' In retirement, Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary during
Wilson's 1974-6 term of office, told Peter Hennessy that 'I don't think that
there was anything to smear him with.' 312 Moreover, the illicitly compiled
archive of Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin, a former KGB officer who defected to
Britain in 1992, containing details of Soviet intelligence operations covering
the period 191884,313 does not support such suspicions. While the KGB
targeted Wilson for recruitment, even allotting him the code-name OLDING in
1956, the operation was unsuccessful.314
There is a degree of acceptance amongst many observers that elements within
the Security Service who regarded Wilson as a risk may have attempted to
destabilise Wilson's governments during his second and final 1974-6 term as
Prime Minister. 315 Supposedly, favoured methods included publicising
damaging information obtained by illicit means, or placing entirely fabricated
items in the press. 316
 These agitators were probably small in number, possibly
310 Robm Ramsay, 'Wilson and the Security Services', in Coopey,. Fielding and Tiratsoo
(eds), The Wilson Governments, 1964-1970, p.154.
311 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp699-702.
312 Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through, Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in
Poslwar Britain (London: Victor Gollancz, 1996), p.265
313 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, The KGB in Europe and
the West, pp 1-29.
314 
nd, 5279
315 Ziegler, Wilson, p.476.
316 See, for example: Paul Foot, Who Framed Cohn Wallace? (London: Macmillan, 1989),
esp. Appendix, Cohn Wallace's File, pp281 -98.
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acting in tandem with US and South African counterparts, as well as like-
minded individuals inside Britain.317 Hunt suggested that 'there were a few
people - and I really do mean probably two or three people - who were in the
Security Service at the time who perhaps shouldn't have been there but who
were malcontents - who were out of sorts with everyone and who were
probably right-wing in their political attitudes and who talked against not just
Harold Wilson but members of the Labour government, and who talked to the
newspapers.'318
Can such subversion be detected under the earlier Wilson administrations?
During 1964-70, the Security Service, it seems, continuously investigated
Wilson and those associated with him. 319 This does not necessarily constitute
an attempt at destabilisation. Interestingly, however, according to Jenkins,
during his 1966-7 spell as Home Secretary, the division of responsibility for
the Security Service between Wigg, Trend and himself, 'greatly strengthened
the independent power of M15.' 32° Wright claimed that, around the time of
King's notorious bid, '[f]eelings had run high inside M15. . .[t]here had been an
effort to try to stir up trouble for Wilson.'321
Both Balogh and Kaldor fitted into the category of Eastern Europeans of
Jewish ancestry and they displayed a radical approach to policy. These facts
prompted unpleasant responses throughout their careers. It is reasonable to
suppose that the presence of the two economists inside Whitehall tested what
317 Ziegler, Wilson, pp475-48O.
318 Hennessy, Muddling Through, p.265
319 Ramsay, 'Wilson and the Security Services', p.154.
320 Jems A Life at the Centre, p.383.
321 Wright, Spycatcher, p.464.
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Pimlott describes as a 'blimpish' 322 tendency present inside the British
intelligence community. Nevertheless, as has been shown, no serious
opposition was offered by the Security Service when Balogh and Kaldor
underwent positive vetting upon their recruitment. However, doubt may have
existed concerning the sexual conduct of at least one of them. 323 This was
well-founded. 324 Balogh was also regarded by some as being somewhat
reckless regarding the acquisition and dissemination of restricted information.
Fears of indiscretion seem to have motivated Cabinet Office Principal
Establishment Officer David Heaton in writing to Balogh in April 1967,
shortly before the special adviser was due to visit Moscow. Heaton cautioned,
'it is prudent to assume that any conversation (in or near a building or in a car),
save in a "safe" room at the Embassy, is liable to be overheard by one
sophisticated technical device or another.'325
322 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.700.
323 Private information.
324 Ibid
325 PRO CAB 160/2, Heaton to Balogh, 14 April 1967.
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There were scares. In March 1966, for example, Trend wrote to Mitchell
regarding an unnamed Hungarian defector whose statement to a US
Congressional Commitee 'refers to a Mr. Balogh who, he alleges, was an
Hungarian émigré, working for the Hungarian Embassy in London.' However,
Trend went on, '[w]e have confirmed that this Mr Balogh is in no way related
to, or connected with, our Economic Adviser.' 326 The presence of committed
Communists inside Whitehall, subject ultimately to the authority of Moscow,
was a fear, founded in some evidence, 327 harboured by the intelligence
agencies in post-war Britain.328
One economist examined in this work initially failed to gain clearance when
attempts were made to recruit him into the administration, on the grounds of
his close association with a known communist. Later in the course of 1964-70
he was accepted into a different office of government. 329 Writing in 1971,
Graham states that, upon his recruitment to Whitehall, he was given a grilling
regarding his political sympathies 'by the security personnel in connection
with this job.' 33° This was probably a fairly standard experience. In
November 1967, Halls wrote to Helsby regarding his reservations over
whether the newly-recruited Margaret Anstee should be allowed to take up
residence in the Cabinet Office before she had received Positive Vetting. In
326 PRO CAB 160/1, Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet, to Mitchell, 18 March 1966.
327 See, for example: Lord Wigg, George Wigg, pp233-9.
328 See, for example: PRO CAB 130/20, 'Report by the Working Party of the Cabinet
Committee on Subversive Activities, GEN 183: The employment of civil servants exposed to
communist influence', 29 May 1947. It is hard to imagine either Balogh or Kaldor as willing
to subject themselves to the rigid Communist Party discipline described here.
329 Private infonnation.
Andrew Graham, 'Impartiality and bias in economics' in Alan Montefiore (ed.), Neutrality
and Impartiality, The University and Political Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge




nothing about you and have nothing against you and then, suddenly, you are in
Number 10 with direct access to the Prime Minister.' Holland says he replied
that if they saw having nothing as a problem then they certainly were in
trouble. The security officer then suggested that 'you might be another Philby,
for all we know'.336
Holland was incredulous at what he was being subjected to. In his view, it was
obvious that the Security Service had nothing against him but was not going to
clear him. Immediately after the session when Philby was mentioned, Holland
recalls seeing Sir Dick White, walking along Downing Street towards St
James' Park. White was Director General of the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS, responsible for external intelligence, commonly known as M16) and a
personal acquaintance. Holland described what he calls the 'crude fabrications
and smears.' White was embarrassed but protested he did not know anything
about this. This was plausible, given that the agency he headed was not
responsible for vetting.337
The successful penetration of the Prime Minister's Office would have been
considered a major achievement inside the KGB. Holland, along with Marcia
Williams and Gerald Kaufman, was one of only three persons in the Downing
Street Political Office with direct access to the Prime Minister. As was shown
in Chapter VI, Holland had also already played a policy role. However, there
is no mention of him in Mitrokhin's files. Echoes of this investigation and
associated activities, involving other special advisers, can be found in the
336 'Special Advisers and Security', Stuart Holland, written statement to author, 16 July 2002.
337thid.
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PRO. In November 1967, Kaldor informed Andrew Collier, a Treasury Under
Secretary, that he wanted to recruit Henry Neuberger, an economist then
serving in the Ministry of Transport, as an assistant. 338 Neuberger's name had
come to Collier's attention shortly before 'in relation to the case of S.K.
Holland.' 339 This was presumably a result of the fact that Neuberger had
recently started sharing a flat with Holland and Christopher Allsopp, already
an adviser to Kaldor. 34° Collier informed Kaldor that he 'was quite confident
that we would not be able to clear Neuberger for PV puroses.' 34 ' The reason
for this, undisclosed to Kaldor, was 'the strong indication that he [Neuberger]
either took drugs himself or gave parties at which drugs were taken - or
both.' 342 The insinuation here seems to be that Holland was also involved in
these activities.
Holland states that 'I did not smoke pot or take any drugs other than tobacco
and alcohol.' 343 Furthermore, although they lived in the same acconimodation,
he and Neuberger were not close friends. Holland plausibly dismisses as
ludicrous the notion that the two were running a narcotics den. 344 The subject
of Neuberger and drugs, he adds, was broached only very briefly, in one of the
interviews. To the question 'what about Neuberger? Does he take drugs?'
Holland, disliking this and sensing he was being used, responded 'not that I
know.' It was then asked 'does he have friends for dinner parties.. .and do
they take drugs?" This prompted Holland to respond 'look, how should I
338 PRO 1 199/1164 'Note for the Record', 30 November 1967.
Ibid.
° Holland in conversation with Buck.
PRO T 199/1164 'Note for the Record', 30 November 1967.
342 Ibid
'Special Advisers and Security.'
Holland in conversation with Buck.
285
know - I'm not Heniy's keeper - he has his own friends and leads his own
life.' Having been shown the PRO file referred to above, Holland believes that
'some construction' may have been put on this exchange, contributing to
Neuberger being denied clearance.345
How is this matter to be interpreted? The only accusation available in the
official papers relates to drugs. If Holland, Neuberger and others genuinely
were associated with the use of controlled substances, there was legitimate
concern regarding the risk of blackmail. It should be noted, however, that
there is no indication to be found of evidence for these, or any other,
allegations. The Security Service, Holland says, did not clear him, but Wilson
ignored this and continued to employ him anyway. Holland remained at
Number 10 for eight months after the investigations, leaving at the time of his
choosing.346
If, as Holland's account suggests, the Security Service's political line of
inquiry drew a blank, the implication of narcotics use could be seen as an
alternative attempt to smear him and thereby remove him from Downing
Street. Holland speculates that rogue elements within the Security Service
chose to represent his refusal to give information about Neuberger as an
attempt to conceal illegal activities. In Holland's view, what he describes as 'a
sustained effort to discredit me' resulted from the fact that 'the mavericks in
M15 were trying to discredit Wilson, playing with the thesis that he was a
Soviet agent.' He argues now that members of the Security Service were
'Special Advisers and Security.'
Holland in conversation with Buck. This is also suggested by Williams. Williams, Inside
Number 10, p.246 and p.248.
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targeting him because he worked so closely with Wilson, and because some of
them thought that Wilson was, or might be, a Soviet agent. However, he
stresses, 'this is hindsight: none of us knew of the M15 mavericks' Wilson- as-
agent fantasies at the time.'347
While much of this account is dependent upon Holland's personal
recollections, the PRO file referred to above provides some corroboration.
Moreover, interestingly, Sir Christopher Foster, under whom Neuberger was
working at the Ministry of Transport when Kaldor made his approach, says
that he was told that there were problems with Neuberger's clearance, but that
these related to left-wing activism as a student. No mention was made of
drugs and Foster insisted on employing Neuberger despite Security Service
reservations.348
It may be that, to some extent, incompetence, rather than conspiracy,
motivated these activities. A senior Downing Street permanent official from
the period of the first two Wilson administrations describes Security Service
officers as tending to behave 'like plodding policemen', 349 not over-endowed
with intelligence or a sense of proportion. Two temporary advisers from 1964-
70 gained similar impressions from their dealings with intelligence
operatives. 350 Holland, however, distinguishes the interview he received from
a 'plodder' when he first joined the Cabinet Office with the 'spymaster'
Holland in conversation with Buck.




grilling he was later subjected to. 351 Castle, who 'had nothing but contempt
for the Security Service' noted that '[w]hat struck me.. .was its
amateurishness. The facts its officers gave were thin and obvious.' 352 Wigg,
on the other hand, stated that '[d]uring my three years with Harold Wilson I
observed the Security Service at close quarters and came to respect the
members of the Service for their high sense of duty, the quality of their
thinking, and the keenness of their desire to act within the directives laid down
by their political masters.'353
351 Holland in conversation with Buck.
352 Castle, Fighting All the Way, p.404.
Lord Wigg, George Wigg, p.323.
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Chapter VIII
Policy, Reform and Defeat
It is important not to view government activity during 1967-70 purely as a
response to the failures of 1964-7. Moreover, the attention of this study must
extend beyond the core of government to the periphery. For this reason, the
example of an expert aide, Brian Abel-Smith, located at the Department of
Health and Social Security (DHSS), will be considered. There will follow an
assessment of the continuing development of the bureaucratic reform
programme during 1967-70, an important aspect of which was the Fulton
report, published in June 1968.1 The advisory unit established by the
economist, Christopher Foster, at the Ministry of Transport will be examined
in relation to the Fulton recommendations. Special advisers took a particular
interest in the approach to be adopted to the election of 1970, which had great
implications for their future. There will also be a commentary on the
aftermath of Labour's 1970 defeat.
Brian Abel-Smith
Brian Abel-Smith was employed as Crossman's Senior Adviser at the
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) from September 1968 until
Labour's election defeat in June 1970.2 The DHSS was formed in 1968.
Rather than an entirely new department, it was an amalgam of already existing
'The Civil Service, Vol. 1, Report of the Committee 1966-8, Cmnd. 3638.
2 For a description of Abel-Smith, see: Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.517 fn.
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ones,3 therefore suitable for investigation here. Towards the end of his time as
Secretary of State for Social Services, Crossman remarked in a diary entry that
Abel-Smith 'has been my closest personal friend and without him I could have
done very little in the past two years.' 4 Castle, who employed him as a special
adviser when she was Secretary of State for Social Services from 1974-6,
writes of Abel-Smith that '[h]is incomparable knowledge of the whole field of
health and social security and his Socialist sympathies made him an invaluable
asset to Labour Ministers.' 5 He was, therefore, a temporary bureaucrat in
possession of technical expertise as well as party political and personal
attachments.
An embodiment of the ideals which had inspired the LSE, Abel-Smith was
associated with this educational establishment for most of his working life. At
its formation, the Webbs, as Chapter III demonstrated, envisaged the School as
an intellectual stable, rearing an elite breed of humane technocrats, of which
Abel-Smith, it will become apparent, was a fine example. With knowing
irony, Abel-Smith compared himself to Beatrice Webb in a letter written in
1955, stating that, like her, he was willing to finance his research out of
personal funds.6 Born in London in 1926, 'said to be thirty-eighth in
succession to the Throne', 7 from a 'military-cum-City' background, Abel-
Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70, p.659.
4 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.921, diary entry for 14 May
1970.
Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.517 fn.
6 Tjuss Collection (LSE, London), 1/38, Abel-Smith to Richard Titmuss, 31 March 1955.
Janet Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, p. 583, diary entry for 1
May 1957.
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Smith attended Haileybury and completed post-war military service before
studying economics at Clare College, Cambridge.8
An association with Labour was clear from early on. While at Cambridge,
Abel-Smith came to the attention of Dalton, who, in March 1951, was on one
of his regular scouting missions to the University. 9 Dalton viewed Abel-Smith
as a 'very promising young man. . . good socialist, intelligent, good presence
and personality." 0 As a research student at Cambridge under the distinguished
left-Keynesian economist Joan Robinson, in the early 1950s, Abel-Smith's
intentions were already radical.' 1 Initially, he contemplated a career as an
elected (Labour) politician,' 2 but this never materialised, for reasons that are
not entirely clear. There were certainly rewarding academic pursuits to
distract him. From 1955, Abel-Smith was employed by the LSE, as a lecturer
under Richard Titmuss, Professor of Social Administration since 1950, and a
dynamic force within the School.' 3 In 1961, Abel-Smith became a Reader and
in 1965, Professor of Social Administration in 1965, following Titmuss's
retirement.14
Although a parliamentary career never developed, the association with Labour
continued. Abel-Smith did not strictly follow the political example of his
patron, Dalton, who, as discussed, was a mainstay of the scene associated with
8 Ben Pimlott (ed.) The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, pp508-9 and fn, diary entry for 2 to 4
March 1951.
Ibid. pp508-9, diary entry for2 to 4 March 1951.
'° Ibid, pp508-9, diary entry for 2 to 4 March 1951.
Ibid, p.575, diary entry for 14 December 1951. For examples of Abel-Smith's early
research in the area of social security, see: Abel-Smith Papers, 3/1 Social Security 1952-4.
' 2 Pimiofl (ed.) The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, pp575-6, diary entry for 14 December
1951.
Raif Dahrendorf, LSE, pp380-2.
14 Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, p.579 flu.
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Frognal, the Hampstead base of the Gaitskellites. Rather, Abel-Smith moved
into the ambit of his future ministerial employer, Crossman.' 5
 From the mid-
1950s, Abel-Smith was an active Fabian.' 6 One Society pamphlet of particular
importance which he co-authored examined the possibilities for reform of the
state pension scheme. 17 Both during 1968-70 and when serving as a special
adviser to Barbara Castle at the DHSS from 1974-6, Abel-Smith combined
simultaneous academic and bureaucratic employment.18
Long before 1968, Abel-Smith's work had become a factor in the policy-
formation process. He and Titmuss supplied data which inspired the findings
of the Committee of Investigation into the Cost of the National Health Service
(NHS), chaired by the Cambridge economist Claude Guillebaud.' 9 The
resulting 1956 report emphasised the value for money provided by the NRS,
stating that '[amy charge that there has been widespread extravagance in the
National Health Service, whether in respect of the spending of money or the
use of manpower, is not borne out by the evidence.' 20
 In turn, the
Conservative government was prompted to embark on an extensive hospital
building programme, not the outcome envisaged by those who had
commissioned Guillebaud.2'
Tony Benn, Years of Hope, p.291, diary entry for 29 October 1958; and Morgan (ed.), The
Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, p.864, diary entry for 4 August 1960.
'6 Be Years of Hope, p.294, diary entry for 17 December 1958.
' 7 Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend, New Pensions for the Old (London: Fabian Society,
1955).
Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, p.579 fh.
' Howard Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945, p.87.
20 RepOPI of the Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service, Cmnd.
9663 (London: HMSO, 1956), p.269.
21 Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945, pp87-8.
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As discussed in chapters III and IV, Abel-Smith's ideas were an element in the
deliberations of the 1964-70 Wilson administration, prior to the his
employment within the bureaucracy. Working in conjunction with Kaldor, he
produced proposals for increased family allowances, which Crossman brought
before senior ministers in autumn 1966 and again in December 1967.22 Abel-
Smith was an influential public figure and, although a Labour supporter, of
intellectual independence. In 1966, he was a key participant in a campaign
against family poverty which was a source of much embarrassment for the
Labour administration. 23 In that same year, he was an important member of
the Ministry of Health sponsored Committee of Enquiry into the Relationship
of the Pharmaceutical Industry with the National Health Service. 24 His
activities attained for him a degree of notoriety. At a dinner party in early
1969, Arnold Weinstock, the Managing Director of General Electric, told
Benn that Abel-Smith was a 'troublemaker.'25
The DHSS was formally established, with Crossman as its ministerial head, on
1 November 1968, following the announcement of its creation the previous
spring.26 In the months leading up to its official instigation, Crossman
consulted with Abel-Smith, initially informally. 27 Crossman decided to
employ Abel-Smith, on a part-time basis, following a discussion with Titmuss
22 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.90, diary entry for 24
October 1966, pp99- 100, diary entry for 31 October 1966, p.1 14, diary entry for 7 November
1966 and p.613, diary entry for 20 December 1967.
See: Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945, pp 116-9; Brian Abel-Smith and Peter
Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1965); and Crossman, The
Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.135, diary entry for 23 November 1966.
24 See: PRO MH 104/69, 'Committee of Enquiry into the Relationship of the Pharmaceutical
Industry', 1966.
25 Tony Berm, Office without Power, p.144, diary entry for 21 January 1969.
26 Wilson The Labour Government, p.72!.
27 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.T74, diary entry for 10 April 1968.
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in April 1968.28 Crossman felt that this appointment would 'be very important
for our organization of the Intelligence side.' 29 In June 1968, Crossman
informed his private secretary, Paul Odgers, of his intentions. 30 Abel-Smith
began work in September 1968. l Given the title of 'Senior Adviser', 32 He
was eventually allocated a room in the departmental building in John Adam
Street and, according to Crossman, was 'very happy there.' 33 Initially 'anxious
whether there would be enough for him to do', Abel-Smith soon discovered
that there was 'plenty on his plate.' 34 It should be noted that there is no trace
of Abel-Smith in the Imperial Calendar.
Abel-Smith and Crossman had frequent contact 35 and their markedly close
relationship was personal as well as professional. In March 1970, Abel-Smith
was the first person in whom Crossman confided his decision to retire from
front-line politics. 36 Their bond was partly gastronomic. Dinners were taken
together, sometimes in the company of other associates, such as Balogh.37
Working breakfasts seem to have been a regular fixture for the two, starting at
8am and lasting two hours, after which Abel-Smith would return to his duties
28 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.35, diary entry for 29 April 1968.
29thid
30 Ibid, p.96, diary entry for 17 June 1968.
' Ibid. p.186, diary entry for 11 September 1968.
32 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.517 flu.
' Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, pp1 83-4, diary entry for 10 September
1968.
Ibid. p.186, diary entry for 11 September 1968.
See, for example: Ibid, p.859, diary entry for 16 March 1970.
36 Ibid, p.866, diary entry for 19 March 1970.
See, for example: thid, p.534, diary entry for 24 June 1969.
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at the LSE. 38 Crossman was endlessly impressed by Abel-Smith's culinary
abilities39 and had been enjoying meals cooked by him since the 1950s.4°
To Crossman, Abel-Smith's professional value was derived in part from his
appetite for such activities as 'inventing devices for improving contributions',
in contrast to Balogh, who was not interested in 'what from his point of view
are endless minor details of social services.' 41 Abel-Smith possessed great
skill and originality in the area of the application of statistics to problems of
social administration. 42 This was put to good use inside the government.43
Abel-Smith's functions included, in conjunction with ministers, assessing the
departmental workload and planning its execution. When taking a holiday in
August 1969, he left a war book behind him, which Crossman referred to as
Abel-Smith's 'last will and testament', 45 perhaps meaning a set of instructions
to be followed in case of death. Abel-Smith held dinners at his house for
DHSS ministers and others in social policy circles, where business could be
discussed and his evidently excellent cooking enjoyed. 46 Crossman's aide
helped devise public speeches for him. 47 Abel-Smith also assisted with the
Ibid. p.235, diary ently for 23 October 1968.
See, for example: thid, p.479, diary entry for 7 May 1969 and p.606, diary entry for 5
August 1969.
4° Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, p.683, diary entry for 10 April
1958.
" Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.362, diary entry for 10 February
1969.
42 Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945, p.116. See also: Abel-Smith and Townsend,
The Poor and the Poorest.
4° Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.456, diary entry for 25 April 1969.
4° See, for example: Thid, p.588, diary entry for 22 July 1969.
See, for example: Ibid, p.607, diary entry for 5 August 1969.
4° See, for example: Ibid, p.479, diary entry for 7 May 1969 and pp606-7, diary entry for 5
August 1969.
4° See, for example: PRO CAB 152/27, 'Secretary of State for Social Services: Herbert
Morrison Memorial Lecture, June 1969.'
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preparation of Crossman's representations to Jenkins on departmental
spending.48 The special adviser supplied Crossman with gossip from within
the DHSS.49 Abel-Smith was assisted by David Piachaud, a lecturer in Social
Administration from the LSE. 5° Aside from Crossman's personal testament,
the available PRO material suggests that Abel-Smith was a significant figure
inside the DHSS, close to a Secretary of State determined to put his aide's
expertise to use. It emerges, for example, that, during 1969-70, when
Crossman sought to restructure the regional hierarchy of the National Health
Service, Abel-Smith played an important part in this process. 5 ' Abel-Smith
produced a White Paper on the subject of better care for the mentally
handicapped during 1970, which was adopted virtually unchanged by the
Conservative administration formed in June of that year.52
Abel-Smith was a driving force behind an extremely significant policy, lost as
a result of Labour's 1970 election defeat. National Superannuation, an
innovative new state pension system, appeared in White Paper form in January
1969, but did not progress beyond this stage, owing to the outcome of the
following year's poll. 53 The first and most substantial section of the White
Paper, dealing with general principles, was 'Brian's part.' 54 In Crossman's
view, the proposal represented the 'apex' of the social policy of the 1964-70
48 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, pp552-3, diary entry for 9 July 1969.
" See, for example: thid, p.833, diary entry for 24 February 1970.
50 Ibid p.943, diary entry for 12 June 1970 and fn.
51 See: PRO MH 166/13, 'N.H.S. Green Paper', 1969-70.
52 See: PRO CAB 152/10, 'Proposed white paper on the mentally handicapped', 1970-1.
Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945, pp1 10-1. See: National Superannuation and
Social Insurance, Cmnd. 3883.
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.235, diary entry for 23 October
1968. For successive drafts of the National Superannuation from 1968, see PRO PIN 35/334,
'Planning the National Superannuation and Social Insurance scheme: white paper', 1968-9.
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important plank in [Labour's] election programmes of 1964 and 1966.62 Even
before his formal employment as a special adviser, Abel-Smith participated in
Crossman's 'Pensions Circus', the group of experts assisting the
implementation of National Superannuation, attending meetings and producing
papers. 63 Given the DHSS brief in 1974, Barbara Castle set about
implementing National Superannuation, with Abel-Smith as her special
adviser.65 In the interim, Abel-Smith had lobbied within Labour to maintain
commitment to the scheme, against the 'flat-raters' within the party.66
Reforming Whitehall
When, in May 1969, Castle asked Balogh what he thought had gone wrong
with economic policy, he 'replied that we had never reorganized the
Government machine.' 67 It has been demonstrated that the introduction of
special advisers in 1964 was an aspect of a broader programme of
administrative change, although, as Castle's diary entry suggested, one which
did not fully satisf' Balogh. During 1967-70, Wilson's Whitehall
reorganisations continued, taking many forms. Rather than create entirely new
departments, as he had done in 1964, he began dividing, combining or
amalgamating existing ones. 68 One of the products of this approach was the
DHSS. The extensive use Crossman, as Secretary of State for Social Services,
62 PRO CAB 129/139, C (68) 106, 'Earnings-Related Pension Scheme', Memorandum by the
Lord President of the Council', Richard Crossman, 14 October 1968.
63 See, for example: PRO CAB 152/83, 'New insurance scheme: Brains trust', 1968-70, 'The
Social Security Contribution', Note by Abel-Smith, May 1968.
Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune, p.251.
65 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.517 fn.
See, for example: Abel-Smith Papers, 5/3 Pensions 1966-74, Tony Lynes to Abel-Smith, 24
November 1973.
67 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.653, diary entry for 18 May 1969.
For Wilson's own account of this, see: Wilson, The Labour Government, pp89 1-5.
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made of special advisers during 1968-70 has been described. October 1969
saw the abolition of the DEA and the reallocation of its functions variously to
Technology, the Treasury, the Cabinet Office and a new Secretary of State for
Local Government and Regional Planning, Crosland. 69 Balogh, however, told
Castle that Wilson's reorganisation left the Treasury "terrif'ingly
strengthened." 7° In 1968, Wilson, presumably in an attempt to give greater
central direction to government, instigated an inner cabinet, labelled the
Parliamentary Committee and later the Management Committee. 71 As
discussed, this measure had long been proposed by members of the Kitchen
Cabinet. Balogh, however, no doubt hoping to undermine the power of Trend,
had envisaged that such a body would be served by a secretariat comprised of
temporaries, presumably under his control. 72 It was not.
Particularly important from the perspective of the special adviser is an
examination of the Fulton committee on the Civil Service, which reported in
June 1968. As discussed, domestic criticism of British bureaucratic
arrangements had become widespread since the late 195 Os. In this context, in
February 1966, responding to a recommendation from the House of Commons
Select Committee on Estimates, Wilson announced that he was appointing his
fellow war-time temporary, Lord Fulton, the Vice-Chancellor of the University
of Sussex, to examine the 'structure, recruitment and management, including
69 Wilson, The Labour Government, pp893-4.
° Castle, The Castle Diaries, p.720, diary entry for 15 October 1969.
Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp3 19-27.
72 See, for example: Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.348, diary entry for 3 January 1968.
Cmnd. 3638.
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training, of the Home Civil Service.' 74 Fulton's 12-strong committee
(counting himself in the chair) was comprised of four bureaucrats (including,
notably, Neild), three academics, two MPs, two industrialists and a trades-
unionist. 75 His brief specifically excluded what Hennesy describes as the
'specifications of the machine and the ground-rules for its operation.' 76 The
restrictions placed on Fulton's terms of reference served to fuel conspiracy
theorists who regarded these as a deliberate attempt on the part of senior
permanent bureaucrats to undermine the credibility of the resulting
recommendations.77
Before examining the Fulton proposals, an investigation of special advisers'
recollections of their dealings with the permanent Civil Service will be of
value. In particular, the extent to which they coincide with the criticisms
voiced most vehemently by Balogh will be determined. Harris, for one, was
dismissive of the 'Central European conspiracy theorists', insisting that he did
not encounter any organised opposition from permanent officials.78
Christopher Foster suggests that while departmental policy agendas did exist,
the resistance he encountered was no worse than might be expected inside any
organisation. The charge of lack of expertise, Foster argues, was less valid by
the mid-1960s than it once had been, owing to the (limited) reforms of the
early 1960s.79
' Geoffrey K. Fry, Reforming the Civil Service (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1993), p.10.
Ibid,p.11.
76 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, p.190.
Ibid. ppl9O-l.
78 Lord Hams of Greenwich in conversation with Andrew Buck.
Sir Christopher Foster in conversation with Andrew Buck.
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Holland agrees entirely with the views expressed by Balogh in 'The
Apotheosis of the Dilettante', suggesting that charges of incompetence and
intrigue applied even more fully to the Foreign Office than to the Treasury.8°
Wilfred Beckerman, 1967-9 special adviser at the Board of Trade, remembers
initially experiencing obstruction from permanent bureaucrats in the form of
an attempt to reduce the salary he had initially been offered by Crosland,
without the President of the Board of Trade's knowledge. However,
Beckerman recalls, once it became clear that he enjoyed Crosland's full
confidence, problems of this nature no longer manifested themselves.
Nevertheless, on the question of levels of expertise amongst career officials
involved specifically in economic matters, Beckerman is scathing. 'They
didn't know a demand curve from a telegraph pole', he says.81
The opinions of senior permanent civil servants, based on their recollections of
the 1960s, of the criticisms made of the career bureaucracy and the activities of
the special advisers introduced into it must also be assessed. Sir Douglas
Wass, lwho was Treasury Permanent Secretary from 1964-83 and Joint Head
of the Home Civil Service from 198 1-3, says of the Balogh thesis, 'I thought
there was some substance to it, although he took it rather too far, as he did with
many things.' 82 Croham was a particularly strong advocate of the selection of
civil servants with relevant qualifications. This may be explained in part by
the fact that, unusually for a senior career official, he was an LSE graduate in
economics and statistics. He describes the French approach to bureaucratic
training as 'absolutely first class.' When he took over at the Treasury,
o Stuart Holland in conversation with Andrew Buck.
SI Wilfred Beckerman in conversation with Andrew Buck.
82 Sir Douglas Wass in conversation with Andrew Buck.
301
however, while he acknowledges the need for representation of different
theoretical approaches, Croham found its four economic advisers, Berrill,
Caimcross, Kaldor and Posner, too many. 83 Similarly, Caimcross, who,
although a professional economist, should be viewed as close to the permanent
bureaucracy, stated that '[w]hat I learned in 1964-9 was that too many senior
economists spoil the broth of economic policy-making.'84
As Wilson's Principal Private Secretary, Mitchell must have witnessed first-
hand some of the problems associated with the activities of, for example,
Balogh and John Allen. However, he does not reject the need for politically
appointed temporaries. 'I'm not anti-special adviser. I'm pro-special adviser',
he insists. 'But they have to fit in.' 85 Sir Michael Palliser was the Prime
Minister's Foreign Affairs Private Secretary from 1966-9. He found Balogh a
stimulating colleague, who provided original views on a wide range of
subjects. 'You get a sort of gadfly effect', Palliser explains, 'which is fine
provided the adviser doesn't have any real power, which Balogh didn't.'86
What were the views of the gadfly himself, resulting from his experience of
Whitehall? On 25 March 1966, Mary Loughnane, a secretary to the
Committee on the Civil Service, wrote to Balogh requesting his attendance, to
give evidence on an informal, non-verbatim basis, as was Fulton's modus
operandi.87 In advance of his appearance, Balogh sent the committee a
83 Lord Croham in conversation with Andrew Buck.
U	 Cairncross, 'Economic Advisers in the United Kingdom.'
85 Sir Derek Mitchell in conversation with Andrew Buck.
U Sir Michael Palliser in conversation with Andrew Buck.
PRO CAB 147/78, 'Evidence to Fulton Commission on the civil service by Thomas
Balogh', 1966, Mary Loughnane, secretary, Fulton Committee, to Balogh, 25 March 1966.
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particularly interesting bureaucratic reform tract, entitled 'Civil Service
Reform', dated 4 April 1966.88 It was also circulated to Wilson and Trend. As
well as the usual criticisms of generalism and Treasury dominance, Balogh
suggested that decision making on vital policy matters should be conducted on
a basis of greater discussion between different departments. In his sights here,
in particular, was the closed shop approach taken by the Treasury, in particular
its jealously guarded control of the Budget. Writing three months before the
effective abandonment of the National Plan, Balogh applauded the division of
economic policy brought about through the creation of the DEA. Furthermore,
he proposed a further separation, involving a division of the Treasury into
ministries respectively responsible for short and long-term policy. He argued
that responsibility for Establishments should also be taken away from the
Treasury and handed over to a newly constituted Civil Service Commission.
Curiously, on the question of recruitment, Balogh did not attach importance to
subject studied for first degree and supported the use of the written exam.
However, he suggested that after twelve to eighteen months of service,
including a stint in the regions in a post entailing contact with members of the
public, Assistant Principals, that is Administrative Class entrants, should
attend an intensive training course at a Civil Service college. This would be
staffed by 'the outstanding experts preferably of conflicting views from the
Universities on the one hand and industry, professions etc on the other.' After
a second written exam, bureaucrats would then be selected for appropriate
ministries, although how these were to be divined is not made clear by Balogh.
88 Conjned in PRO CAB 147/78.
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Defection to the private sector would require financial compensation to the
state. All civil servants would serve 'at least a year in a statistical or economic
unit.' A year's sabbatical academic study should precede promotion to under-
secretary level. It was advisable, Balogh argued, to promote within
departments rather than transfer staff from elsewhere in the bureaucracy.
Much of this was obviously inspired in particular by the French approach, as
described in Chapter III.
In the short-tenn, while changes in training methods were still working
through, it would necessary to recruit experts from outside the Civil Service.
Balogh noted, however, that, '[e]xpertise does not, in social matters, exclude
value judgements.' For this reason, '[u]nless the American spoils system is
introduced and the whole upper echelon of the Service is changed with a
change of Administration, provision of mere expertise will not suffice to make
the decision of the electorate effective in policy-making.' This, then, was a
democratic argument in favour of the special adviser. Balogh argued that,
between them, permanent secretaries and private secretaries across Whitehall
conspired to restrict the information available to ministers. Therefor, in lieu of
a full 'spoils' approach, ministers ought to 'have there own advisers.. .upon
whom they can depend personally [Balogh's emphasis], and who at the same
time share the political orientation of the Minister.' Again, then, Balogh was
emphasising the commitment of the special adviser, not only to party, but
individual minister.
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In his first draft Balogh stated that these appointments would comprise the
minister's own private office, describing them explicitly as 'Cabinet du
Ministre.' However, in the final version of this document submitted to the
Fulton committee, he backed off a little, stating that such aides would not
necessarily be located in the private office. It is possible that Balogh's retreat
was a result of his already discussed opportunist tendencies. He may have
become aware that his more radical demands were not likely to be adopted.
Importantly, however, Balgoh did suggest the appointment ofjoint permanent
secretaries (jresumably career officials) to advise ministers collectively, in
place of one head of department. This was almost certainly intended to reduce
the strength of the career bureaucracy, relative to special advisers and
ministers, by dividing power at the top.
Speaking in 1980, Kaldor suggested that the main difficulty he experienced in
dealing with the Civil Service was its institutional (small 'c') conservatism,
rather than a disposition towards treachery. As he put it, the 'Civil Service are
totally loyal to whichever government is in power. But they believe that it is
in the long-run interest of their minister and the country to preserve continuity
and to oppose innovations.' 89 Kaldor saw the Fulton Committee on 24 May
1966.° His papers contain two hand-written pages which he presumably took
with him to the meeting for his own reference. 91 In these, he noted that the
'[p]osition of outside advisers.. .[d]epends upon [departmental] heads and
support by Ministers.' Initially Kaldor wrote 'confidence' as well as 'support',
89 A.P. Thiriwall, Keynes as a Policy Adviser, p.176.
90 Kaldor Papers, NK 10/26, 'Correspondence, notes and memoranda relating to NK's
evidence to the Committee on the Civil Service (Fulton Committee)', 1966, Loughnane to
Kaldor, 5 April 1966.
' Ibid. hand-written note, untitled, undated.
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but the former is crossed out. His argument in favour of temporary aides as a
'good thing' was that they introduced 'new points of view' and ensured that
ministers did not 'get only Departmental advice.' Further on in his notes, he
supported the use of 'Outside Advisers, changing with each Administration.'
Making a comparison of his impressions of the Board of Trade and the
Treasury, Kaldor was critical of the latter. He suggested that the Treasury
suffered from a 'lack of knowledge of economics or expertise.. .and detailed
information.' New Civil Service recruits, he argued, should undergo extensive
post-recruitment training and examination and an increased emphasis should
be placed upon '[k]nowledge of social sciences (Economics) vs. humanities.'
Kaldor suggested that government departments such as the Ministry of
Agriculture and Ministry of Power were 'too anxious to argue the case of the
interests in their care rather than represent the national interest.' He also
advocated expansion at the governmental core, presumably involving, to some
extent, the use of outsiders. Criticising '[i]nsufficient co-ordination [between]
Departments' he calls for '[m]ore people in the centre concerned with long-
term policy issues, rather than day-to-day' issues.
As mentioned, Fulton's report appeared in June 1968.92 In it, attention is
drawn to the historical development of the Civil Service discussed in Chapter
II. Specific criticism was made of the 'philosophy of the amateur', that is
generalism, the Treasury's role in 'central management' and the sealed-off




from the Treasury and their combination with the Civil Service Commission in
a new department, under the control of the Prime Minister, was
recommended. 94 This was enacted in October 1968, when the Civil Service
Department was established, with William Armstrong as its Permanent
Secretary. Preference for relevant qualifications in the selection of civil
servants, also called for by Fulton, was not implemented, however. 95 A
number of Fulton proposals dealt specifically with the subject of the special
adviser and related matters. More interchange between employment inside
and beyond the bureaucracy was presented as desirable. Moreover, the
establishment of departmental Planning Units was advocated. These, it was
recommended, would often be headed by Senior Policy Advisers, appointed to
'assist the Minister',96 to whom they would enjoy 'direct and unrestricted
access.' 97 Planning Units would be comprised of both outsiders and insiders,98
although Senior Policy Advisers would normally, but not always, be career
officials. 99 In addition, in certain 'big technical departments' a 'chief scientist,
engineer or other specialist' might be appropriate.10°
Specific reference was made to the special adviser experiment in Fulton, which
was welcomed 'as a means of bringing new men and ideas into the service of
the State.' The report suggested that ministers ought to 'be able to employ on
a temporary basis such small numbers of experts' as they saw fit, who should
be 'of standing and experience.' While desiring that the 'practice should be
Ibid, Vol., 1, pp 104-6.
Hennessy, Whitehall, p.204.






put on to a regular and clearly understood basis', Fulton did not attempt to
recommend 'any precise limitation of the numbers of these appointments or
any defined procedures.' The temporary nature of the employment of these
aides, as well as the personal link with the minister, was emphasised. 101 So too
is the need for close association with official committees. 102 No specific
allowance was made for the use of generalist political aides or public relations
advisers.
Fulton, then, endorsed the temporary employment of experts inside the
bureaucracy and even the use of teams of specialists. The report did not,
however, advocate a violent dislodgement of permanent Whitehall, insisting
that 'the great majority of those who come to occupy top jobs will in practice
be career civil servants." 03 Permanent secretaries ought to retain 'overall
responsibility under the Minister for all the affairs of the Department' and the
Senior Policy Adviser and chief specialist, it was emphasised, should not
between them 'constitute a formal board.' 104 Moreover, the replacement of
permanent secretaries by ministers, while being a possibility in extreme
circumstances, ought to be 'exceptional.' Even Senior Policy Advisers were
expected, normally, to enjoy security of 	 However, ministers should,
if they wished, be able to choose private secretaries suited to their way of








the Civil Service.'°6 Combined with the use of special advisers, this
represented support for a limited increase in ministerial patronage.
Finally, there was the question of foreign influence. Members of Fulton's
group made visits to France, Sweden and the US. In Sweden, Fulton noted,
the senior ministerial policy adviser 'is very close to the minister and is
generally a semi-political appointment." 07 Attention was also given to the US
use of 'political appointees." 08 The adoption of a French-style cabinet system
would have been ominous for the future of both the permanent secretary and
the private office. Fulton remarked that '[t]he directeur du cabinet is. . . the
official in a French ministry who exercises some of the functions of a
Permanent Secretary.' While normally a career official, 'that his appointment
is made by the Minister is a very important difference.' 109 Moreover, '[t]he
staff of a cabinet are normally changed when a new minister comes in.' 110 The
authors of Fulton expressed admiration for these foreign methods, which, in
their view, 'could be used to strengthen the Minister's control of the
departmental policy-making process and to increase the sensitiveness with
which the department responds to the needs of Parliament and the public.'
However, they argued that measures such as the introduction of planning units
would ensure that there was 'no need for ministerial cabinets or for political








Fulton received a mixed response upon its appearance. The economist, Roger
Opie, writing in the New Statesman, was a supporter, on the grounds that, if it
was implemented, 'the degree of expertise' could be 'enormously enhanced'
and 'the balance of power drastically shifted, away from the permanent civil
service towards elected ministers.' 112 In the same addition of the New
Statesman, Balogh, now freed from the constraints placed on his free speech
during his time as Wilson's special adviser, also approved. He again drew
attention to the fact that, in his view '[t]he most important requirement for a
planning adviser, beyond technical competence, is that he should be personally
loyal and attached to the minister, and have a high capacity to work with
him.''13
The Economist, however, warned that the proposed planning units might
become 'internal gadflies' and '[t]he senior planning adviser might.. .be in
constant battle with the permanent secretary.' This view was possibly inspired
by Whitehall gossip about Balogh, as was the statement that '[ut is really too
much to expect a minister to take decisions from day to day, when he is
bombarded both with the longer-term advice of his senior policy adviser, and
with. . . the further advice of expert friends whom the minister might wish to
bring into his service while he holds office.'' 4 Many aspects of Fulton,
including the planning unit proposal, were not implemented during the
remaining two years of the second Wilson administration. No doubt, one
reason for this was the fact that the government had numerous, more
politically pressing difficulties to contend with. Theakston argues that 'with
112 Roger Opie, 'Implement at Once!', The New Statesman, 26 June 1966.
" Thomas Balogh, 'The End of the Amateur', The New Statesman, 26 June 1966.
h14 The Economist, 29 June 1968.
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ministers' short-term political horizons and with detailed involvement in civil
service reform (as opposed to the creation of a general modernizing image)
offering only limited political returns, the outcome was virtually inevitable.'115
By July 1969, with the departure of Graham, Wilson had no special advisers.
Although their use was not extended in the wake of Fulton, the multiple
appointment of aides and the creation of units manned in part by outsiders,
addressed by the report, were already significant issues. Upon Kaldor's
recruitment in 1964, Sir Alexander Johnston, Chairman of the Board of Inland
Revenue, attempted to ensure that 'there is no question of his [Kaldor]
endeavouring to build up a staff to help him.' 116 Subsequently, Kaldor decided
to appoint a small number of assistants,' 17 who have been detailed. In April
1966, Wilson informed Balogh that he wanted 'a reinforcement of
[Balogh's]... staff', with a particular view to the examination of European
issues and foreign policy decisions which related to international economic
commitments. 118 The consequent recruitment which took place in this case has
also been outlined previously.
It was suggested in Chapter IV that, had the Economic Advisers been a formal
body, they may have posed a more serious threat to the influence of the
permanent bureaucracy over policy-formation. Even as they were, Cairncross,
writing many years later, complained that '[flour senior economists [Balogh,
Kaldor, MacDougall and Neild] all seeking to take part in the small number of
" Kevin Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p.132.
116	 T 199/1164, Sir Alec Johnston, Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, to Sir
William Armstrong, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 20 October 1964.
117 thid, Abbot to Collier, 17 January 1967.
118 PRO PREM 13/1955, 'Staff and Papers', Balogh to Wilson, 22 April 1966.
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maj or policy issues. . .meant that the civil servants previously responsible for
advice tended to be crowded out.' 119 As already mentioned, Croham recalls
finding the presence of four high-powered economists at the Treasury
excessive. Problems included three advisers railing against one. Cairncross, it
seems, was often the isolated party in such scenarios, since he was the least
Keynesian in inclination. 120 Perhaps then, teams of experts were more
workable under a single head.
At the time of Fulton's publication, possibly the most progress in terms of the
establishment of an expert staff under a single special adviser had been made
at the Ministry of Transport. When Castle arrived there in 1966 her 'first step
was to set up an Economic Planning Unit' as she had done at the Ministry for
Overseas Development. She appointed Christopher Foster, a 35-year-old
economist from Jesus College, Oxford, who specialised in transport policy, as
its head.' 21 Foster's unit, the Directorate-General of Economic Planning,
consisted of around twelve economists, including both seconded permanent
bureaucrats and outsiders. From his university base, Foster had assisted the
previous administration, co-ordinating research projects and allotting work to
academic colleagues. 122 Achievements already to his credit included the
production of statistical information suggesting the economic and social
viability of what became the London Underground Victoria Line. 123 Despite
his prior co-operation with a Conservative government, Foster was Labour in
personal alignment. While not strongly attached to a particular faction, he
119 Cairncross, 'Economic Policy Advisers in the United Kingdom.'
120 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
121 Castle, Fighting All the Way, p.372.
122 Foster in conversation with Buck.
123 Peter Jenkins, 'Mrs Castle brings in the economists', Guardian, 6 January 1966.
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generally regarded himself as belonging to the right of the party. In 1964, he
became a part-time adviser at the DEA.124
The challenge Foster faced at Transport was considerable. Labour had made
the grandiose promise of a 'national plan for transport' in its 1964 manifesto,
and a 'National Transport Plan' in 1966.125 Unfortunately, what, precisely,
this meant was unclear. It was, therefore, the task of Foster and his team to
turn Labour's vague commitment into a concrete package of policies.126
Castle wanted to bring about greater co-ordination of transport policy and
preserve the railway network in the face of competition from road vehicles,
without resorting to a full nationalisation programme. 127 The ultimate result
was the vast and complex 1968 Transport Act, 128 described by Wilson as 'the
biggest and most far-reaching Transport Bill in our history.' 129 Foster and his
unit were closely involved in the development of many aspects of the Act, for
example, the creation of the National Freight Corporation (NFC), intended as a
clearing house directing the most efficient possible transportation of goods.13°
During 1966-9, Foster was also associated with the introduction of the 70
miles per hour speed limit for cars and the use of the breathalyser by traffic
police. 131 Aside from his role as a policy expert, Foster's contribution was
also political. He and Stephen Swingler, a junior Transport minister, held
124 Foster in conversation with Buck.
125 F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British General Election Manfestos, 1900-1974, p.261; and 'Time for
Decision', p.30!.
126 Foster in conversation with Buck.
127 Castle, Fighting All the Way, pp368-72.
128 See: Vincent Powell-Smith, The Transport Act 1968 (London: Butterworths, 1969).
'29 Wjlson The Labour Government, p.320.
130 See: PRO MT 160/8, 'Plan for a National Freight Authority', 1966.
131 Foster in conversation with Buck.
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regular informal consultations with groups of Labour backbenchers in the
House of Commons.132
Castle's appointment of Foster coincided with her attempt to remove the
permanent secretary at Transport, Sir Thomas Padmore, referred to in Chapter
IV. A Guardian front-page story from 6 January 1966 revealed Castle's
intention of replacing Padmore, preferably with 'a younger civil servant ready
for promotion.' 133 The source of this story was Foster, who naïvely spoke too
freely to his journalist friend, Peter Jenkins, thereby incurring Castle's
wrath. 134 While Castle was not successful in her attempt to displace Padmore,
the permanent secretary was left gravely weakened 135 and Foster became, in
his words, 'the defacto permanent secretary.' 136 Castle portrays Foster as an
influential ally.' 37 Like other special advisers, however, Foster was dependent
upon ministerial confidence, which was eroded late in 1967. Castle came to
suspect him of intriguing to have himself appointed as Chairman of British
Rail' 38 skewing some of his advice to this end. 139 Foster was not aware of
Castle's doubts at the time and plausibly claims that he would never have
considered himself a candidate for the post in question. Other matters aside,
he was surely too young to have been in contention. Foster suspects that since
132 Ibid.
Ibid.
' Foster in conversation with Buck.
135 By the time he took over the ministry, Castle's successor at Transport, Richard Marsh,
perceived Padmore as virtually inactive. Lord Marsh in conversation with Andrew Buck.
136 Foster in conversation with Blick.
137 See, for example: Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.276, diary entry for 11 July 1967.
138 Ibid, p.33!, diary entry for 28 November 1967.
139 Ibid, pp334-5, diary entry for 7 December 1967.
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he was then tainted in her eyes, Castle opted not to take him with her when she
became Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity in April 1968.'°
Castle's replacement at Transport, Richard Marsh, not numbered amongst her
admirers, decided to introduce changes at the ministry. Marsh insisted that
Padmore, whose primary interest by this time, as far as the incoming minister
could tell, was playing the violin, be replaced. 14 ' The new permanent
secretary, David Serpell, was not likely to be as docile. Indeed, in the words
of Castle, he possessed 'the reputation of being a bastard." 42 Foster was
removed from office in early 1969, to be replaced by John Jukes, formerly
MacDougall's deputy at the DEA. According to Foster, this resulted from his
minuting Marsh over the head of Serpell, an act which enraged the permanent
secretary.' 43 This development relates to an important theme of this study,
namely the difficulties associated with combining the introduction of greater
expertise into the bureaucracy with patronage-based recruitment.
Nevertheless, as Foster points out, the Directorate-General survived his
departure and, indeed, the advent of a Conservative administration in 1970.'
As shown, while Fulton endorsed the introduction of planning units, it rejected
the cabinet, which the 1964-70 Wilson administrations never formally
adopted. A justification for this was offered by Crossman, who stated in an
April 1970 Godkin Lecture at Harvard University that '[t]hese last six years,
we have not tried to change the system under which one Minister confronts a
140 Foster in conversation with Buck.
141 Lord Marsh in conversation with Buck.
142 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.559, diary entry for 27 November 1968.




Another example of an at least partially formed, informal cabinet existed at the
Treasury during 1967-70. Jenkins began to create this small, personal staff
during his 1964-6 spell as Minister of Aviation. It was here that he first
encountered David Dowler, his Principal Private Secretary, whom he came to
hold in the highest esteem, 147 and insisted on taking to the Home Office in
1966.148 When Harris began working for the Home Secretary that same year,
Jenkins's core team came into being. Together they engaged in such activities
as writing speeches at moments of political difficulty, seemingly to great
effect. 149 Jenkins socialised with Dowler and Harris out of working hours.15°
Dowler died, aged 39, at the end of 1969,151 as Croham recalls, when a fairly
uncomplicated medical procedure triggered a heart defect he was not
previously known to suffer from.' 52 Harris, for one, was convinced that
Dowler had been on course for a highly successful Civil Service career.153
Jenkins later wrote that, upon his appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the desire to import Dowler was 'even more of an affront to the Treasury than
it had been to the Home Office." 54 Nevertheless, Dowler, along with Harris,
was installed in the Chancellor's private office and the team remained intact.'55
There was, however, a delay of six weeks before Dowler's arrival, owing to
official objections to the move, 156 to which Jenkins partly attributed his early
147 Lord Harris in conversation with Buck.
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and dangerous procrastination over deflationary measures. 157 Alongside the
permanent secretary, the group travelled together on foreign visits.158
Jenkins's final deliberations regarding the 1968 Budget were greatly
influenced by his two aides.' 59 As previously shown, Fulton explicitly
supported the maintenance of the single permanent secretary as ultimate
departmental head. This was surely the most powerful obstacle to hegemony
on the part of the personal, ministerial team, appointed on a patronage basis.
However, it was a tribute to the strength of Jenkins's group that, in taking over
as permanent secretary at the Treasury, Allen decided that his first aim was to
ensure that he became its fourth member.'6°
Certain officials at the Treasury harboured resentment at the tendency on the
part of Jenkins to take decisions in a closed 'court.' 161 Neither was Jenkins's
approach entirely popular amongst Cabinet colleagues. Writing in December
1968, Crossman described the Chancellor as 'a creature of John Harris and
Dowler." 62 It is interesting to note that the Chancellor's inner circle did not
include an economist. Again, this seems to have attracted the scorn of
Crossman, who suspected a failure on the part of Jenkins to consult his expert
advisers on certain important matters.' 63 Jenkins disliked meetings, and
arranged with Allen that he would not have to engage in discussions with more
Ibid. p.222.
158 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.233.
160 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
161 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, pp336-'7, diary entry for 3 November 1968.
162 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.278 diary entry for 1 December
1968.
163 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2, p.651, diary entry for 15 January
1968.
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than two economists at a time.IM Had Jenkins been successful in his attempt
to obtain the services of Neild, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's personal
court may have expanded to incorporate a specialist.165
Electioneering
Towards the end of the 1967-70 period, a number of special advisers suggested
measures designed to improve Labour's chances in the forthcoming election,
demonstrating their party political commitment. Labour's opinion poll rating
was poor for most of this period, often trailing the Conservatives by double-
figure percentages. 166 Balogh, however, for one, remained convinced that the
coming election was winnable. On these grounds, he lobbied Castle to oppose
Jenkins's proposal for three-year expenditure cuts, designed to stabilise
sterling. Balogh argued that while unpopularity was inevitable for a year, it
was necessary to engineer an upturn after that.' 67 Kaldor, 'a man who is
always preoccupied by a single idea at a time', had, by 1970, become opposed
to British participation in the existing European integration scheme. In
particular, he felt that 'EEC agricultural policy is hopelessly reactionary and
terribly expensive' and that 'from every point of view.. .the EEC is a hopeless
organization." 68 He sensed that the public adoption of a critical approach to
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would be of electoral benefit to
164 Lord Croham in conversation with Buck.
165 Robert Neild in conversation with Andrew Buck.
' David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971), p.173.
167 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, p.455, diary entry for 6 June 1968.
168 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.890, diary entry for 16 April 1970.
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Labour, endeavouring to persuade a reluctant Crossman to attempt to force this
upon his Cabinet colleagues.'69
By late 1969, factors such as an improvement in the balance of payments
created a degree of optimism, on the part of, for example, Kaldor and
Crossman, that Jenkins would be able to produce a Budget with popular appeal
in the coming spring.' 70 By the beginning of March, speculation regarding
Jenkins's intentions, amongst Kitchen Cabinet members and Kaldor, became
frenetic. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was now regarded as
'OmnipOteflt.' 17 ' The feeling that the Prime Minister had no control over
Jenkins was shared by many inside the Kitchen Cabinet.' 72 With Graham
gone, Wilson no longer had his own economist to brief him. Naturally, Balogh
had strong opinions about the measures which should comprise the 1970
Budget which he sought to impress upon the Prime Minister. In March 1970,
he wrote to Wilson on this subject. Balogh favoured reflation, arguing that
there was a 'slack' in the economy permitting growth in the national income of
5%. Furthermore, he suggested that a net reduction in taxation of up to £200
million, combined with a similarly sized 'give and take', to the benefit of the
'lower income classes', was advisable.'
In February 1970, Kaldor produced a set of proposals. He floated a scheme to
Jenkins whereby large income tax reductions for below average earners could
be subsidised by increases in SET or the employer's contribution to National
169 thid, pp890-i, diary entry for 16 April 1970.
170 Ibid, p.751, diary entry for 7 December 1969.
'' Ibid. p.839, diary entry for 1 March 1970.
172 Ibid, p.824, diary entry for 18 February 1970.
PRO PREM 13/3094, Balogh to Wilson, 4 March 1970.
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Insurance.' 74 Shortly after this, Kaldor lunched with Jenkins's wife Jennifer.
The two discussed whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to
deliver a give-away budget designed to win the forthcoming general election,
or was willing to accept defeat in the hope that he might then supplant Wilson
as Labour leader. 175 Kaldor, 'a tremendously pertinacious lobbyer',
approached Cabinet members including Callaghan regarding his Budget
proposals.' 76 On 8 March 1970, Crossman put the 'Nicky Kaldor budget' to
ministers. This was designed to 'regain the working-class vote' through tax
concessions for the average and lower paid, combined with real increases in
supplementary benefits.' 77 Naturally, Kaldor envisaged that an increase in
SET would play a part in making these measures possible. Jenkins objected to
Kaldor's proposals, partly on the grounds that SET's effect on demand was
only equal to about half the total it was increased by.178
Other Cabinet members also opposed Kaldor. According to Crossman,
Healey, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1974 employed him as a
special adviser, described Kaldor as 'a hopeless man with no political sense at
all.' Kaldor had engendered a degree of distrust amongst senior ministers,
partly through discussing his plans with John Allen, who had reported this to
Wilson. 179 At the Management Committee, on 8 March 1970, Jenkins made it
clear that he was 'not contemplating anything like Dick's "class redistributive
174 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.82!, diary entry for 16 February
1970.
175 Thid, pp821-2, diary entry for 16 February 1970.
176 Ibid, p.831, diary entry for 22 February 1970.
177 Ibid, p.848, diary entry for 8 March 1970.
178 Ibid, p.850, diary entry for 8 March 1970.
179 Ibid, p.850, diary entry for 8 March 1970.
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Budget"." 8° The Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that maintenance of a
strong balance of payments surplus was essential on political as well as
economic grounds. Furthermore, Kaldor's scheme 'raised the marginal rate of
tax just at the point where chaps began to earn
On 25 March, over a drink at Number 11, Jenkins explained to Castle that
Kaldor's scheme involved giving away and taking back and the latter could
prove psychologically damaging to the electorate. In addition, Kaldor's plans
would cost an exorbitant £350 million. Jenkins planned to give away £229
million, mostly in the form of income tax relief. 182 Douglas Allen used Harris
to communicate the Treasury view to Jenkins that there was not room for a
give-away budget. Jenkins felt that an electioneering ploy of this type would
be 'a vulgar piece of economic management below the level of political
sophistication of the British electorate', anyway.' 83 Ultimately, instead of the
£400 million tax remission proposed by Kaldor, Jenkins opted for £200
million, applied to low wage-earners.' 84 £170 million of this was used in
raising the personal allowance for income tax, particularly favouring married
couples.'85
Abel-Smith, too, entered the budgetary fray, meeting with a perverse success.
In February 1970, Crossman wrote to Jenkins, laying out Abel-Smith's
proposal 'for reducing income tax in the most beneficial way for the largest
ISO Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70, p.770, diary entry for 8 March 1970.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid, p.782, diary entry for 25 March 1970.
183 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.291.
's Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.886, diary ently for 13 April 1970.
185 HC Debates, 14 April 1970, Cols 1249-50.
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number of people.' Jenkins politely told Crossman that he was not planning to
adopt the special adviser's proposals, but that he had considered them fully.
He added that this was ninth scheme for the 1970 Budget floated to him so
far.' 86 Following the introduction of the Budget, Crossman was informed by
Jenkins that, before the former's letter had been received, ideas similar to
Abel-Smith's had already been recommended by officials, and adopted as
policy. Abel-Smith was delighted to be informed of this by his Secretary of
State, who remarked 'I hope you think his budget was good enough.'187
Official files relating to deliberation over the 1970 Budget contain scant trace
of the proposals of Abel-Smith, Balogh or Kaldor, all of whom were outside
the Treasury.' 88 The one expert temporary inside the loop was Posner.
Jenkins, who evidently found Posner extremely useful, described how the
economist 'released a number of tensions by returning to the Budget strategy
group after a couple of weeks away and suddenly saying something like:
"Well, of course when one talks about a neutral budget, £100 million or so
between friends is nothing much to worry about." There was a moment of
mandarin consternation followed by a general realisation that a happy phrase
had resolved the dispute between the official Treasury and me. By such
methods of scientific precision are Budget judgements arrived at.'189
In relation to the drive for re-election, Harris's previously discussed
schizophrenic relationship with the Wilson camp continued. Crossman
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.821, 16 February 1970.
187 Ibid, p.890, diary entry for 16 April 1970.
188 See: PRO T 328 'Treasury: Fiscal and Incomes Policy Divions and successors: Registered
Files, (2F1 Series)', 1960-1979 and PRO T171, 'Budget 1970' subseries.
189 Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.294.
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suspected Harris of feeding media speculation regarding the 1970 Budget.'9°
Yet, during the campaign itself, Harris collaborated with the Prime Minister's
team. 191 While Harris was a professional campaigner, the analytical skills of
technical special advisers were perhaps not as suited to the short-term
requirements of an election. In late April 1970, for example, Crossman
endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to extract from Kaldor a definite prediction of
the economic circumstances which would prevail in October 1970.192
Harris nearly performed the ultimate service for Wilson and the Labour
administration as a whole. Labour's defeat, on 18 June, followed a late dip in
the party's aggregated opinion poll standing, which began on 12 June.'93
Harris had lobbied for the election date to be set for 11 June, pushing the issue
so hard that Jenkins arranged an audience for him with Wilson. Harris's
primary motivation was the possibility of violent demonstrations at a
forthcoming Lords Test match against the South African cricket team,
damaging the government's image. Ultimately this was a false fear. However,
Harris also suspected that the trade figures due to be published on 15 June,
might, after a long run of good results, be unfavourable. This turned out to be
correct. As Jenkins later noted, '[hjad he [Harris] carried his point, who can
tell what changes in the pattern of British politics over the years which have
since gone by might not have followed?'194
'9° Crossnian, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.844, diary entry for 6 March 1970.
19I Marcia Williams, Inside Number 10, p.338.
192 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3, p.906, diary entry for 29 April 1970.
See: Butler and Pmto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, p.181.
' Jenkins, A Lfe at the Centre, p.297.
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As has been discussed, the National Superannuation scheme to which Abel-
Smith had contributed greatly was abandoned following Labour's removal
from office. Proposals from special advisers were particularly vulnerable to
electoral fortunes, since they did not benefit from the continuity associated
with policies developed by permanent officials. Owing to their association
with the outgoing party, the continued employment of special advisers under
the new administration was all but impossible. Posner, however, proved to be
an exception here. While of the left, he did not see himself as specifically
partisan in alignment. Indeed, in an echo of Brittan's call for temporary aides
who did not necessarily change with administrations, he had entertained hopes
that he was one of a new breed of 'inners and outers', experts recruited to
Whitehall, supplying specialist advice to governments of differing
complexions. Unfortunately, certain participants in the Conservative
administration, who regarded him as too left wing, did not share this view.195
Posner became marginalised, leaving to become a consultant to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1971 196
Election success, with an attendant Cabinet reshuffle, would also have had
implications for the personal futures of special advisers. In May 1970,
anticipating a Labour poii victory, Abel-Smith discussed his future with
Crossman, who had already confided in his special adviser his intention to
retire from front-line politics whatever the outcome. Crossman suggested that
service under Castle, who he wanted as his successor at the DHSS, would be
195 Michael Posner in conversation with Andrew Buck.
Sir Donald MacDougall in conversation with Andrew Blick.
325

'the more ephemeral papers.' 204 Following the 1970 election, Allen,
suggesting that such a distinction between academic and policy work was 'too
difficult to draw', came to the conclusion that Kaldor should not retain any
materials, but could be allowed to 'refresh his memory' by viewing copies of
them kept on a separate file at the Treasury. 205 Invoking collective Whitehall
memory, Allen demonstrated that the permanent machine had been stung by
the behaviour of outgoing Second World War temporaries. He noted that
'others in a similar position to his [Kaldor's], like Hubert Henderson and
Keynes, did on occasion take away copies of their papers, though without
permission.' 206 However, the presence of numerous official papers in Kaldor'
personal collection indicates that he did this, too.
A number ofjudgements and observations were made in the immediate
aftermath of the first special adviser experiment. In the words of Brittan,
'[t]he case for introducing irregulars had largely been argued in terms of the
economic mistakes of the previous Conservative governments. Yet judged,
not merely by its own promises, but by any fair-minded criterion of efficient
economic management, Labour's performance.. .makes that of its
Conservative predecessors seem dazzling by comparison.' 207 Posner suggests
that, in this field, the best that can be said is that a collapse in the value of
204 PRO T 328/479, 'Security aspects of the retention of papers on taxation and other research
undertaken by Professor N Kaldor on his departure from public service', 1967-70, Douglas
Wass, Under Secretary, Treasury, to Frederick Butler, Principal, Central Economic Division,
Treasury, 5 November 1968.
205 Thid, 'PROFESSOR KALDOR'S PAPERS', Allen to Sir William Armstrong, Head of the
Home Civil Service and Permanent Secretary to the Civil Service Department, 9 September
1970.
206 Ibid.
207 Samuel Brittan, 'The Irregulars', p.329.
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sterling did not take place in the post-devaluation period. 208 The feeling of
futility which afflicted many special advisers was described well by
Beckerman. 'My job as a top-level economic advisor at the Board of Trade
consisted mainly of dashing off brief and succinct comments on the economic
aspects of the various files.. .that arrived in my "In Tray" every day. It was
like sitting one's final examinations in economics every day, the only
difference being that it did not matter so much whether or not one got the
answers right for nobody was going to take much notice of them anyway.'209
In Posner's view, Balogh and Kaldor were ultimately frustrated in their roles
as special advisers because they had no executive power. They would, Posner
suggests, have been more at home with US arrangements, where presidential
appointees could head departments.21°
Another problem which Brittan draws attention to was that of burn-out.
Advisers who were taken on with a change of administration tended to outlive
their usefulness within two or three years. Unfortunately, this was the point at
which ministers, suffering from the same fatigue, came to need them most.211
Moreover, special advisers were handicapped in their competition for
influence with permanent bureaucrats, since the latter had far greater
experience and therefore knowledge of 'what buttons to press' in order to
achieve administrative results.212 Whitehall secrecy, as has been shown, also
served to reduce the potential influence of aides. 213 The experiment was
208 Posner in conversation with Buck.
209 Beckerman, Growth, the Environment and the Distribution of Incomes, xxxi.
210posner in conversation with Buck.
211 Sir Samuel Brittan in conversation with Andrew Buck.
212 Brittan, 'The Irregulars', p.336.
2)3 Ibid, p.338.
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limited in scope. Important areas of government, for example the Foreign
Office, were untouched by the appointment of outsiders 214 (aside from Harris's
tenure there.) On this subject, the research conducted for this study, indicates
that the number of senior special advisers employed during 1964-70
(excluding borderline cases such as Posner) was seven, namely, Abel-Smith,
Balogh, Beckerman, Foster, Harris, Kaldor and Neild. A figure for assistants
who fitted the definition used here is harder to determine. However, the total
who worked for Balogh, during the whole period, was seven (Allen,
Cooper, Graham, Holland, Pryke and Stewart). At any given time, this did not
exceed four (excluding Balogh)
On the subject of special adviser policy achievements during 1964-70, Neild
suggests that the fact that SET was brought about at all was an administrative
feat, but the measure itself was of dubious value. 215 To this day, Foster
regards the Transport Act with which he was associated as a significant
achievement, which, he argues, provided a framework for policy for more than
a decade. 216 Balogh's performance regarding North Sea Gas, assisted by
Kaldor, was regarded as creditable by some, but, as Posner states, rather than a
central objective this was 'something which came up on their watch.' 217 Abel-
Smith's National Superannuation was unfinished business in 1970, the
conclusion of which will be described in the next chapter. The greatest legacy
of the 1964-70 special adviser experiment was a constitutional one. The next
214 Ibid, p.337.
215 Neild in conversation with Buck.
216 Foster in conversation with Buck.
217 PoSner in conversation with Buck.
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chapter will demonstrate that aides of the type used during Wilson's first spell
as Prime Minister eventually became fixtures on the British political scene.
Wilson's allies had their views. An irritable Benn diary entry from three
months after Labour's removal from office stated that, 'neither Kaldor nor
Balogh.. .seem to.. .have anything real to offer. They fight each other all the
time, tell us what to do, and we follow their advice; but I can't say we have
done well out of it.' 218 Balogh, however, was unrepentant, arguing that 'the
economic policy hadn't succeeded because the wrong people were in the
wrong place.' 219 Indeed, the prevailing opinion within the Wilson camp seems
to have been that, given the appropriate fine tuning, there was a future for the
special adviser. In Holland's account, in late 1967, Wilson was beginning to
consider the idea of an expanded Downing Street unit, with Holland as its
head.22° However, he failed to act on this front before losing office in 1970, as
has been discussed.
Williams, writing in 1972 of the difficulties experienced by Balogh in his
dealings with the permanent bureaucracy, asserted that 'the 1 970s require a
self-contained top grade personal advisory unit within No. 10. This is more
necessary for a progressive government than a Conservative government since
the Conservatives can rely on the Civil Service being tuned in to what they
want to do. But the Labour govermnent must have a small core of highly
qualified, highly expert individuals to initiate policy and ideas which can filter
down through the machine. This unit should also assess decisions coming up
218 Benn, Office without Power, p.305, diary entry for 19 September 1970.
219 thid, p.297, diary entry for 23 June, 1970.
220 Holland in conversation with B lick.
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through the machine via the departments for the Prime Minister's approval.
This is what a Labour government for the future must have and it should start
planning such a unit now.' 221 Furthermore, 'Labour should.. .start earmarking
eager, enthusiastic, able young men and women to be trained in the work they
must do when they accompany future Ministers into the departments.'222
Williams's was a blueprint for the future which, to a great extent, came into
being.





In this chapter, there will be an assessment the extent to which the objectives set
out in the introduction have been achieved. The conclusions will be outlined,
followed by a detailed discussion of the various theses proposed in Chapter I.
Developments from 1970, in the context of the main themes of this work, will be
discussed. Finally, the implications of this for the subject at hand will be
examined.
It has been possible to construct a long-term historical background. This provided
an understanding of the Civil Service into which special advisers were introduced
in 1964 and, to an extent, were intended to challenge. It also enabled the
identification of the types of outside aides employed prior to 1964 and the ways in
which they were used. This, in turn, helped supply a framework in which the
subject at hand could be analysed. The conjunction of events leading to the
instigation of the special adviser and the perceptions of those involved have also
been reconstructed. This study has ascertained the individual biographical details
of aides, the activities they engaged in and their motivations. Their ways of
working, official and informal, have also been depicted. Details relating to the
employment of aides have been established. It has been shown that even
superficially mundane particulars, relating to, for example, locations of offices
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and job titles, were significant. The nature of special advisers' interaction with
each other, ministers and permanent officials has been established. Much
evidence for conflict between permanent and temporary civil servants, with
antagonism and subterfuge on both sides, has been uncovered.
Establishing rules governing the conduct of special advisers has proved difficult.
This, however, almost certainly reflects the fact that there was a lack of clarity in
this area during 1964-70. It has sometimes been necessary to rely upon individual
sources, for example the Crossman and Cairncross diaries and the testimony of
Holland, for which complete cross-references have not been found. The exact
attitude of Wilson, has, at times, been difficult to determine. Although the
instigator of the special adviser, his public advocacy of this innovation was often
cautious and he did not follow through on many of the recommendations of
Fulton.
This work has set out to explain the significance of the special adviser. To this
end, possible interpretations of this phenomenon, which were proposed in Chapter
I, have been tested against primary and secondary evidence. However, of the
explanations proposed in the introduction, no single one serves to the exclusion of
all others. Indeed, all of these are useful, to varying extents, and in many cases
complement each other. There follows a description of the conclusions that have
been drawn.
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During 1964-70, special advisers were dependent upon the ministers they served,
both for their positions and in order to achieve influence. Their employers were
also often reliant upon them, for advice and support. This bond often overrode all
others. Partisanship was important, as reflected in the commitment of aides to
manifesto implementation, their consideration of the political implications of
decisions and their efforts at presentation. However, the link to party was indirect.
Perceived national decline acted as a trigger for the creation of the special adviser,
but does not fully explain the course the experiment took. This innovation was
also motivated, in part, by a desire to incorporate greater expertise into the
bureaucracy. However, not all special advisers were specialists. Moreover, an
attempt to divide them into experts and others is not sustainable.
Aides could be actors in their own rights, interacting with elements within the
administration other than their employers. Those special advisers attached to the
Prime Minister may have been intended to help exercise greater central influence
over the administration. This was not always achieved. The appearance of
temporary bureaucrats across the government, attached to individual ministers,
was associated with a growing personality cult in politics. Foreign examples,
particularly the French cabinet, were significant, although not directly influential
at all times. The creation of the special adviser was a genuine, lasting, innovation
to be credited to Harold Wilson's first premiership. Considerable contributions to
policy were made by aides, but they were involved in activities beyond this.
Although comparable to earlier attempts to use outsiders as bureaucrats, special
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advisers were also something new. As such, they presented a challenge to the
existing, permanent Civil Service. The result was varying degrees of antagonism,
although co-operation was a possibility. These conclusions will now be discussed
in greater detail.
Relationships with their employing ministers were important to all special
advisers. Before 1964, outsiders incorporated into the bureaucracy on a
temporary basis were sometimes attached to particular politicians. This was the
case, for example, with various Lloyd George appointments. However, during
1964-70, the personal link was very pronounced. In the post Second World War
period, the decline of social deference and developments in the media have
contributed to a growing cult of the individual in British politics, resulting in what
Michael Foley has described as the emergence of presidential characteristics on
the part of Prime Ministers. It is argued here this tendency also extended to other
Cabinet members. The recruitment of special advisers, who were personally
attached to ministers, was associated with this. As well as Wilson, there was a
certain leadership cult surrounding, in particular, Jenkins, as suggested by the
coverage of him in the Mirror in early 1968 as an alternative to Wilson. During
1974-70, then, certain ministers began using aides as a means of achieving their
objectives without recourse to more traditional institutions, such as the career
Civil Service.
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The most obvious examples from 1964-70 of special advisers whose bonds with
their employers were particularly significant were Balogh and Harris. Their
personal loyalties to, respectively, Wilson and Jenkins, founded in prior
association, ideological stance and party faction, could supersede all other
commitments. Indeed, these attachments could become a factor in destructive,
internal Cabinet power struggles. Both counsellors were members of the informal
groups of allies which centred on the person of their ministers. They were highly
dependent upon their employers' support. Wilson however, did not always
display complete confidence in Balogh, a source of weakness for the aide. Special
advisers' policy influence was exercised to a large extent through the particular
minister being served. Kaldor, for example, was able to secure the adoption of
what became SET once he had won over Callaghan. Politicians, subject to the
intense pressure of what has been termed 'overload' and surrounded by rivals,
were often dependent upon their special advisers. For example, Wilson used
Balogh for political assistance at times of difficulty, while Callaghan was reliant
upon Kaldor in order to implement complex manifesto commitments.
Aides and ministers, however, were not always perfect matches. For example,
Foster was not on the same wing of Labour as Castle, although he worked well
with her. Kaldor, moreover, did not owe his employment to a close relationship
with Callaghan and at times conflicted with him. However, in both cases, the
importance of the attachment to the employing politician was demonstrated in a
negative sense. When new, less sympathetic, ministers took over their respective
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offices of government, Foster and Kaldor were undermined. Close personal
relations between special advisers and ministers did not always develop, as the
example of Neild, who ultimately felt more loyalty to William Armstrong than
Callaghan, demonstrates. However, the friendship which developed between
Beckerman and Crosland, who did not know each other before their association
inside the Board of Trade, was evidence of a tendency in this direction.
Partisanship has been identified as a defining feature of the special adviser. With
earlier experiments in the use of temporary bureaucrats, this characteristic was
less pronounced. For example, during the Second World War, although many
outsiders were recruited into Whitehall, the existence of a coalition government
with an overriding common objective reduced the importance of party political
concerns. However, in 1964, Labour, following a long period in opposition, was
elected on a radical policy platform. The appointment of politically sympathetic
bureaucrats was intended as a means of achieving party objectives in the face of a
potentially resistant Whitehall. In a number of cases, special advisers engaged in
implementing policies they had helped develop prior to Labour's election victory.
For example, Abel-Smith's work on National Superannuation during 1968-70 was
a continuation of a long-term Labour commitment which he had helped initiate
during the 1 950s. Aides also attempted to develop ideological measures, such as
progressive retrenchment packages, whilst in office. However, the Labour origins
of policies developed by special advisers were not always as clear. In particular,
SET was not the result of internal party discussion over a long period of time in
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the way that, for example, Capital Gains Tax was. Nor was the socialist
motivation of Kaldor' s desire to float the pound immediately apparent.
Furthermore, if special advisers were primarily a means of achieving Labour's
policy ends, then they were not a great success, in so far as, during 1964-70, much
of the party programme was not effectively implemented.
There were aspects to partisanship beyond the implementation of policy
commitments. During 1964-5, John Allen concerned himself with liaison between
different ministers in order to maintain Labour's party political coherence while in
power. Presentation was also important for special advisers. This was to be
expected of Harris, whose background was as a journalist and political
propagandist, but economists including Balogh also took an interest in the conduct
of public relations. Cultivation of the media was not always engaged in for the
benefit of the government as a whole, however and could be used to serve the
ends of individual ministers. Aides also sought electoral success for Labour.
Following the 1970 poil defeat, the existing politically committed bureaucrats
were removed from office, along with certain policies they were developing, most
notably Abel-Smith's National Superannuation. However, during 1964-70, party
political commitment was not always the most important characteristic of special
advisers. As has been stated, association with particular factions or personal
loyalties could supercede this. Moreover, special advisers were not employed by,
or directly accountable to, their party. During this period there were divisions
between the government and the Labour machinery, involving aides. For
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example, Balogh participated in the drafting of the 1966 manifesto, which was
conducted secretly, out of reach of Transport House. During his time assisting
Gaitskell, Harris experienced hostility from certain party officials. This was
indicative of the tensions which could result from the use of personal advisers.
It has been shown that in at least one earlier period of British history, as a
response to perceived relative international decline, many traditional social
institutions became subject to criticism. One result of this was a call for the
recruitment of outsiders into the bureaucracy. The instigation of the special
adviser in 1964 was motivated by similar demands and was an element in
Wilson's programme for national revival. It is significant that certain aides
produced proposals aimed at correcting what were regarded as economic
weaknesses. Balogh intended to achieve an improvement in Britain's trade
position through the creation of a Commonwealth/Sterling Area bloc. Kaldor
designed SET in order to bring about higher growth rates. However, many
temporary bureaucrats did not concern themselves with such a broad and
ambitious objective as reversing national decline, concentrating on the narrower
and more obtainable. Moreover, for much of the post-devaluation period the main
emphasis was upon short-term survival, rather than a revival of greatness. While
the decline vogue slowly subsided over subsequent decades, particularly from the
late 1 970s, 1 the use of aides persisted, as will be shown. Nevertheless, concerns
For a cautious assessment of the improvement in Britain's economic status, see: Edmund Dell,
The Chancellors, p.552.
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regarding British failure provided the vital, initial impetus for the instigation of
the special adviser.
There were numerous instances of the introduction of outsiders into Whitehall
prior to 1964, and those who were recruited shared various different
characteristics with their 1964-70 counterparts. The Liberals utilised temporary
bureaucrats in order to implement a party programme in the early twentieth
century. During both world wars, there were personal aides and bodies of experts.
During the post-1945 period, at Number 10, Attlee employed Jay while
Macmillan had John Wyndham. However, the creation of special advisers was
innovatory because it led to the simultaneous combination of a number of
pronounced features. These new aides were the product of a deliberate, stated,
strategy and they were introduced across a number of different offices of
government at once during 1964-70. Their partisanship was important and they
were attached to individual ministers. A particular job title, previously used only
rarely and in a different context in Britain, was attached to them. They were
placed inside, although not absorbed by, the bureaucracy, receiving papers and
attending committees. The difficulties associated with the acceptance of special
advisers into the Civil Service machine served to emphasise the fact that they
signified a genuine development. The emergence of tendencies such as 'overload'
and the decline of the post-war political settlement may have contributed to a
perception that aides of a new type were required.
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There have been frequent attempts to increase the level of expertise within
administration through the recruitment of outsiders into Whitehall, for example by
the Liberal administrations of the early twentieth century. Labour had a long
technocratic tradition, associated in particular with the Fabian Society. The
majority of special advisers during 1964-70 were economists, recruited in order to
provide ministers with expertise that would otherwise be unavailable. The skills
possessed by temporary bureaucrats were put to a wide variety of uses, for
example briefing, analysis and policy development. However, to depict special
advisers purely as experts would be misleading. Firstly, this would be to overlook
Allen and Harris, neither of whom were specialists. Secondly, even those who
were economists were drawn into consideration of political and presentational
matters. This tendency was a product of the constant pressures of government, as
well as the previously described commitments of aides, both to ministers and
party. Technocracy, in its most extreme form, rejects partisan government
altogether and for this reason is difficult to reconcile with the use of politically
committed aides. Moreover, for the reasons outlined above, a clean division of
special advisers between experts and non-specialists is not possible.
Prior to 1964, there were examples of strong-willed, individualistic, temporary
bureaucrats wielding influence in their own rights. Beveridge, for example, was
particularly determined in his drive to establish what became known as the
welfare state. During the first two Wilson administrations, certain aides can be
interpreted as, at times, pursuing personal agendas and acting on their own
341
account, rather than on behalf of other individuals or bodies. This description
certainly fits some of the activities of Balogh, who pursued a wide variety of pet
objectives, and Kaldor, who had distinctive, forceful, views on certain matters.
The press portrayed them as powerful, indeed sinister, figures, to the extent of
exaggerating their true importance. Since both men were already established in
the political and intellectual fields, they felt their views ought to be accorded a
high degree of respect. Their individualism was heightened by personal
eccentricities.
However, such characteristics could also lead to exasperation on the part of others
and therefore prove counter-productive. Ministers such as Marsh did not welcome
Balogh's interest in their briefs and Jenkins decided to sideline Kaldor at the
Treasury. Moreover, as the case of policy towards sterling demonstrated, special
advisers could be frustrated in key objectives. Aides often became involved in
various types of intrigue, for example Balogh's conflict with Trend and Foster's
(probably incorrectly) suspected attempts at self-advancement. There were
special advisers, for example Abel-Smith, whose behaviour did not suggest a
desire to influence the overall direction of the government or wield great personal
power. In some cases, particularly that of Jenkins and Harris, it was difficult to
determine the extent to which aides were acting with ministerial sanction, or
merely doing what they thought was to the benefit of their employers.
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When attempting to exert increased control over their administrations, some Prime
Ministers, for example Lloyd George, have armed themseLves with personal aides.
Wilson set out to lead from the centre. He recruited three special advisers of his
own in 1964, although resisting the exhortations of allies, including Balogh, to
expand his office to a greater extent than this. The number peaked at five during
1966-7. Through these, Wilson was able to monitor and intervene in a wide range
of departmental business. However, during 1964-70, temporary advisers were
located in other areas of the administration. Moreover, despite the special
advisers at his disposal, particularly from late 1967 onwards, Wilson's control
over his administration weakened. Owing to political and economic
circumstances, power was transferred away from Number 10, in particular to the
Treasury, and a Chancellor of the Exchequer whose small inner circle also
included a special adviser.
By the early 1 960s, French and US administrative methods were highly regarded
in Britain, inspiring those who advocated the use of temporary bureaucrats. Just
as he was reluctant to engage in a large expansion of the Prime Minister's Office,
Wilson resisted the formal adoption of the French style cabinet. Nevertheless,
some ministerial private offices began to take on certain features of the cabinet.
Specifically, Wilson and Jenkins personally selected their staff which included
special advisers. The introduction of US style complete clear-outs of bureaucratic
staff to Britain were not seriously advocated, even by those who could see some
merit to this approach. The cultural barriers to this would have been immense.
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Nevertheless, since certain special advisers had served Labour in opposition, their
appointments did signify a limited division of the spoils of victory, as practiced in
a more complete form in the US. Nevertheless, it is important to view the British
Civil Service as an entity in its own right, rather than an empty vessel into which
foreign ideas can be poured.
Often, before 1964, the manner in which outside bureaucrats were utilised was
strongly influenced by the characteristics of the Prime Minister of the time.
During the Second World War, for example, Whitehall bore Churchill's imprint.
An analysis of special advisers from the perspective of Wilson is particularly
valuable. Wilson's background as a wartime temporary civil servant provides a
context in which to understand his 1964-70 experiment. His career path, which
led from bureaucratic employment to ministerial service, is comparable to that of
many continental politicians. Two of the first wave of special advisers, Allen and
Balogh, were members of Wilson's inner circle of allies.
Wilson has frequently been portrayed as preoccupied with the immediate and
presentational at the expense of long-term strategy. The numerous uncertainties
and tensions which surrounded the use of special advisers during 1964-70 were to
some extent the product of this tendency. More thought could have been given to
how these appointments were to be integrated into the machine, possibly avoiding,
for example, the confusion surrounding Cairncross's and Neild's respective roles.
It could also be argued that, having recruited a number of outsiders to bureaucratic
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posts, Wilson's insistence on ignoring their repeated pleas regarding sterling, in
favour of the conventional wisdom of career officials, was perverse. However,
Wilson also proved to be a constitutional and bureaucratic innovator. While some
of the experiments over which he presided, most notably the DEA, did not
survive, special advisers, as will be shown, were a significant and lasting
contribution, offering evidence for Wilson as genuine modemiser. Finally, the
charge of paranoia leveled at Wilson may also be unfair, at least in the light of
some of Harris's activities.
Prior to 1964, temporary bureaucrats were frequently associated with the
emergence of important policy developments. Keynes, for example, helped
instigate the use of national accounting in the 1941 Budget. Similarly, there were
examples from 1964-70 of special advisers playing a part in the emergence of
major measures. The 1968 Transport Act was an example of a very large piece of
legislation, in which Foster and his unit had a close involvement. Certain
proposals, especially SET, would not have come into being at all, were it not for
the theoretical and technical contributions and, indeed, lobbying of aides. Not all
special advisers' efforts came to fruition. Abel-Smith's work on National
Superannuation was undone by the 1970 election. Many of Balogh's ideas were
not put into practice. Indeed, some of these, particularly his trade bloc plan, were
probably not realisable anyway. Balogh, Neild and, in particular, Kaldor did not
manage to get the decisions they wanted taken over sterling.
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As well as producing fully-blown proposals, aides provided briefs for ministers on
a variety of issues. By this means, they exercised influence in a less dramatic, but
nevertheless important fashion. An analysis of special advisers is greatly assisted
by an examination of the policies with which they were associated. However,
they also had other, admittedly related concerns, beyond the immediate realm of
policy development, for example, presentation and political liaison. Furthermore,
Balogh took a pronounced interest in personnel decisions and set out to change the
bureaucracy itself. This, in fact, serves to demonstrate that policy could not be
readily separated from other aspects of government such as administration and
public relations.
From the mid-nineteenth century, a Treasury-dominated official machine,
characterised by generalism, party political neutrality and permanent employment
began to emerge. As a result of more interventionist government policy and
pressures such as overload, this Victorian creation became increasingly
anachronistic. By the late 1 950s, with a decline in deference towards traditional
social institutions taking place, Whitehall began to be subjected to intense
criticism. Prior to 1964, various outsiders were appointed in peacetime, although
on an ad hoc basis. Special advisers, however, represented a concerted, deliberate
challenge to Whitehall traditions. The position of the Treasury as supplier of
economic advice to the Government was questioned by the recruitment of
economists. There was, to some extent, a natural disposition towards suspicion of
career officialdom within Labour. Balogh was a ferocious public assailant of the
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permanent Civil Service, to an extent that meant antagonism between himself and
the machine was inevitable.
There can be no doubt that certain career officials, perceiving them as a threat, did
offer a variety of forms of resistance to temporary recruits and their ideas. For
example, it is difficult to accept that, given the will to do so, a room could not
have been found for Kaldor inside the Treasury building. Furthemore, Balogh and
Kaldor were deliberately shut out of FU. It was Balogh's view that a socialist
government should overturn the existing Civil Service, to be replaced with an
alternative, Labour establishment. The recruitment of aides, some of whom
headed their own newly-created units, certainly presented rivals to the existing
official machine. However, these were limited in number and, importantly, were
not incorporated into the bureaucratic hierarchy. Furthermore, collaboration
between special advisers and permanent bureaucrats did take place. Indeed, many
achievements, such as SET, would not have been possible without this.
There follows a thematic overview of developments post-1970. It has already
been suggested that, in the years following Wilson's initial experiment, special
advisers became a constitutional fixture. In the period from 1970, their use
persisted and numbers proliferated, as will be detailed here. Some observers have
argued that the administrative practices of Edward Heath's 1970-4 Conservative
administration represented, in some respsects, a reaction against those of his
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Labour predecessor. 2 However, Michael Wolff, Heath's 'senior political adviser
and speech writer', 3 was a political import into to the Prime Minister's Office,4
with the job title 'Special Adviser to the Government' 5, as was Brian Reading, an
economic adviser. 6 Heath established the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) in
1971. Formally a non-partisan body attached to the Cabinet, this became
dependent upon the Prime Minister for its effectiveness and included staff who
were Conservative in their loyalties. For example, Reading joined the CPRS in
November 1971. Another member, William Waldegrave, subsequently became
Heath's Political Secretary and, in the 1980s, a Conservative minister.8
During 1972-3, with Heath's approval, Douglas Hurd, the Prime Minister's
Political Secretary, endeavoured to persuade ministers to recruit aides. Hurd
noted that '[s]ome had them already. . . Brendon Sewill was at the Treasury, and
Miles Hudson at the Foreign Office. Others did not see the point. Others saw the
point, but could not find the right person.' 9 Eventually progress was made on this
front, with, for example, Robert Jackson being appointed to serve Maurice
Macmillan at Employment and John Cope joining Peter Walker at Trade and
2 See, for example, Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime
Minister, pp78-9.
Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.343.
Heath, The Course of My Lfe. My Autobiography (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1998), p.311.
Kavanagh and Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, p.98.
6 Tessa Blackstone and William Plowden, Inside the Think Tank, Advising the Cabinet 19 71-83
(London: Mandarin, 1990), p.30.
See: Ibid, pp25-52.
8 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, pp227-8.




 Such aides were party political. Sewill, for example, was previously
the Director of the Conservative Party Research Department." His job title was
'Special Assistant." 2 Towards the end of the Heath administration, Hurd began
convening meetings between these counsellors, 'to share problems and help
impart a common purpose."3
Wilson told Hennessy in 1985 that the failure of his 1964 bureaucratic and
economic programme was due to Treasury 'moles. . .the Treasury were very, very
skilled chaps in more or less stopping you doing y4 However, as
discussed, he did not implement certain aspects of Fulton that might have served
to undermine the power of the permanent bureaucracy. Given the opportunity to
regroup in opposition, he returned to the special adviser with particular vigour. In
1974, upon his reinstallation as premier, Wilson oversaw the appointment of
between one and four aides to a number of departments across the government.'5
Initially, around 30 special advisers were attached to 15 offices of government,
including Number 10.16
Also in 1974, Wilson established the Downing Street Policy Unit, a body attached
to the Prime Minister, which, during the course of its existence, has been largely
comprised of special advisers. From 1974-9, the Policy Unit employed 'seven to
° Ibid, p.38.
Kavanagh and Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, p.80.
12 The British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List (London: HMSO, 1972), p.713.
D Kavanagh and Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, p.80.
' Hennessy, Whitehall, pp1 87-8.
Harold Wilson, Final Term (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Harold Joseph, 1979), p.1 9.
' 6 Reinforcing Standards: Review of the First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life,
Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Vol. I, Cmnd. 4557-1, p.68.
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ten experts.' 17
 Importantly, after initial doubts as to their value on the part of
Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Prime Minister elected in 1979, these
innovations survived the changeover in party administration. Thatcher came to
value the Policy Unit highly.' 8
 Moreover, as Nigel Lawson, Thatcher's
Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1983-9, remarked, while '[s]pecial advisers
were a Labour innovation to which Margaret Thatcher acceded only
slowly.. . eventually every Cabinet Minister ended up with at least one.' 19 At the
end of the Conservative's long period of office, in 1997, under John Major, the
Prime Minister who took over from Thatcher in 1990, the total number of aides
stood at 38. Following Tony Blair's initial twelve months as Labour Prime
Minister, which began in May 1997, this figure had risen to 7320 By this time,
special advisers were, as the Commons Public Administration Select Committee
put it in 2001, 'an established feature of life in Whitehall.'2'
A study of special advisers in the period from 1970 serves to confirm the
importance of their attachments to particular ministers. During 1974-9, Benn and
his aides, Frances Morrell and Francis Cnpps, who had returned to Whitehall
following his previous stint as Kaldor's assistant, came to be regarded as
Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister, the conduct ofpolicy under Harold Wilson and James
Callaghan (London: Cape, 1987), ix.
' Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 1979-90, First Volume of the Memoirs of
Margaret Thatcher (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p.30 fn.
' Nigel Lawson, The View From No. 11 (London: Corgi, 1993), p.25.
20 NichoI Jones, Sultans of Spin, the Media and the New Labour Government (London: Orion,
1999), p.73.
21 Special Advisers: Boon or Bane: The Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of
Session 2000-01, Select Committee on Public Administration, Third Report 200-1, HC 463,
December 2001, p.2.
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comprising a left-wing clique by others within the government. 22
 Another
example of this is provided by the activities of Lawson and his counsellors during
the run-up to the 1987 election. Lawson became increasingly frustrated with the
handling of the Conservative campaign, in particular, its failure 'to highlight the
implications of Labour's tax and spending plans.' 23 For this reason, Lawson and
his special advisers, in particular Andrew Tyrie, conducted a freelance operation,
priming the media with their projections of the cost of a Labour government and
querying how it might be met.24
 An example of a particularly strong bond was
that between Thatcher and the economist, Alan Walters. Following a dispute with
Walters in October 1989, Lawson, in his account, presented Thatcher with the
alternatives of shedding her adviser or losing her Chancellor. By default she
selected the latter, 25
 in the process contributing to her own downfall. 26
 There is
evidence that special advisers have continued to be associated with internal
Cabinet power struggles, for example those between Blair and his Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Gordon Brown.27
Partisanship remained crucial. Special advisers, often of long-standing party
involvement, were appointed to assist with the implementation of particular
programmes. At the DHSS from 1974, Castle recruited Abel-Smith in order to
implement a simplified form of National Superannuation. She perceived this as
22 Lord McNally in conversation with Andrew Buck, 5 July 2002.
23 Lawson, The Viewfrom No.11, p.702.
24 Ibid, pp7O2-3.
25 thid, pp960-5.
26 G. W. Jones, 'The Downfall of Margaret Thatcher', in R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy
(eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp94-5.
27 See, for example: Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People, The Inside Stoiy of New Labour
(London: Penguin, 2001), pp50-1.
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an important element in the 'Social Contract', the package which Labour had put
before the electorate in February 1 974•28 As well as manifesto implementation,
special advisers were often participants in the continued development of
ideological measures while in office. Ferdinand Mount, Head of Thatcher's
Policy Unit from 198 1-4, took a particular interest in social policy, producing, in
the wake of the urban riots of 1981, a paper for the Prime Minister advocating the
renewal of family values. She came to see this as central to her 'Conservative
mission',29 from which many proposals flowed.30 These included taxation
changes for married couples, education vouchers, a more authoritarian approach to
policing and increased discounts for council house purchase.3'
Aside from the development and implementation of ideological and party political
measures, other activities associated with the partisanship of special advisers
included political liaison and the conduct of public relations. The growth of the
political aide, particularly from 1974, will be discussed below. Following the
1997 advent of the Blair administration, much attention was drawn to the
increased use of what were labeled 'spin doctors', especially the Prime Minister's
Chief Press Secretary, Alastair Campbell. 32 However, as there had been during
1964-70, there was sometimes a distance between special advisers and party
machine. For example, Lord McNally, who was an aide to Callaghan at the
28 See: Barbara Castle, Fighting All the Way, p.459-64; and Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries,
1974-6 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p.38, diary ently for 6 March 1974. For
Wilson's description of the social contract, see: Wilson, Final Term, p.5.
29 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p.278.
30 thid, pp278-9.
31 Ibid, p.279.
32 See, for example, Jones, Sultans of Spin; and Rawnsley, Servants of the People.
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Foreign Office during 1974-6 and served as his Political Secretary at Number 10
from 1976-9, recalls that Wilson's expansion of 1974 was partly conceived as a
means of avoiding dependence upon Labour research staff, whose political
orientations were generally to the left of many leading ministers.33
In the period since 1970, expert special advisers continued to be employed. Abel-
Smith returned to the DHSS in 1974 when Castle was appointed Secretary of State
for Social Services. 34 Alan Walters, the economist, was, as has been shown, a
valued prime ministerial aide under Thatcher. In comparison to the 1964-70
period, the distinction between expert and generalist special advisers became
clearer, with the emergence of two discernible tribes. One of Wilson's 1974
innovations was the across the board introduction of political aides. 35 He
described their functions as including 'examining papers as they go to
Ministers.. .chasing up Ministerial wishes.. .liaison with the party.. .contact with
outside interest groups. . . .speech writing.' 36 Michael Heseltine, a Cabinet minister
under Thatcher and Major, offered a useful definition of the two groups.
Specialists, he wrote, 'should be expert in a particular field, concentrate on policy
relevant to that expertise and work with civil servants rather than with the
minister, but with open access to the minister.' The political aide, on the other
hand, 'is based near to the minister's private office and works closely with the
Lord McNally in conversation with Buck.
Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1974-6, p.38, diary entry for 6 March 1974.
Harold Wilson, Final Term, p.19.
36 Harold Wilson, The Governance of Britain, pp245-6.
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party as well as the department.' 37 In his description of post-1974 arrangements,
Simon James observes that the generalists have normally been in the majority.38
As has been shown, during 1964-70, political pressures forced even expert special
advisers to engage in more general activities. These same tendencies no doubt
encouraged the emergence of a class of aide that was specifically devoted to
party-orientated functions.
Post-i 970, an examination of special advisers as actors in their own rights
remained revealing. David Young was appointed special adviser to Keith Joseph,
the Conservative Secretary of State for Industry, in 1980. Young's memoirs
suggest that, throughout his involvement in the Thatcher governments, which
continued over the next decade in various forms, he endeavored to drive forward
the agenda of the government on his own account. For example, he was a pioneer
of the Conservative privatisation progranlme. 39 Hennessy describes Alastair
Campbell as 'arguably the closest and most influential individual within [Blair's]
innermost circle', having a personal impact upon many aspects of government.40
It was sometimes difficult to determine the extent to which aides were acting on
their own initiative or carrying out instructions, as was the case with Walters's
provocation of Lawson.
' Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2000), p.200.
38 Simon James, British Cabinet Government, p.221.
Lord Young, The Enterprise Years, a businessman in the Cabinet (London: Headline, 1990),
p.43 and pp48-9.
° Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.488.
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There was ample evidence of special advisers, post 1970, as elements in prime
ministerial attempts to lead from the centre. The numerical balance of aides
favoured the Prime Minister at the expense of other Cabinet members. In 1974,
while creating a relatively large Downing Street team, Wilson limited most other
secretaries of state to two special advisers each, with appointments subject to
prime ministerial approval. 41 The Policy Unit scrutinised proposals emerging
from the departments. 42 This, as Bernard Donoughue, its first Head, put it,
'increased the Prime Minister's capacity for effective intervention in other
Minister's policy areas.' 43 Following her installation as premier, determined to
drive through proposals which many senior Conservatives disagreed with,
Thatcher used her Policy Unit 'as a kind of special forces little platoon.'
Amongst others, Lord Hunt, who was Cabinet Secretary from 1973-9, argued that
the Policy Unit, as well as other Number 10 special advisers were elements in the
informal emergence of a 'Prime Minister's Department.' 45 Some observers deny
that there has been a corresponding increase in the power of the premier.46
However, there seems little doubt that, at least when political circumstances are
favourable, the potential for the Prime Minister's Office to intervene across
government, through the use of special advisers, became great.
Foreign comparisons remained relevant. David Owen, the 1977-9 Labour Foreign
" Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.359.
42 Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, pp1 19-20.
Donoughue, Prime Minister, p.24.
Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.409.
'The United Kingdom' in William Plowden (ed.), Advising the Rulers, p.69.
Kavanagh and Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, xiv-xvi.
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Secretary, inspired by the example of the cabinet system, informally established 'a
separate policy unit working direct to myself.' The two staff were career officials,
transferred from elsewhere in the Foreign Office, but were often supervised by
Owen's 'Special Economic Adviser', Michael Stewart, a veteran from the 1960s,
and frequently liaised with the Downing Street Policy Unit. 47
 Two decades later,
Hennessy suggests that Gordon Brown, with his team of special advisers at the
Treasury, 'was close to running a cabinet system.' 48
 Hennessy told Sir Nigel
Wicks's Committee on Standards in Public Life in 2002 that Brown's aide, Ed
Balls, had a 'way of working which is more akin to a French politician or an
American one.' 49
 Blair's Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, was particularly
influenced by US approaches, as his job title and role, discussed below,
suggested. 50 The continental-style career path of bureaucratic service preceding a
later period of ministerial office, has also emerged in Britain. For example, John
Redwood, Head of the Policy Unit from l984-5,' and Michael PortiLlo, Lawson's
special adviser, 52
 were both Cabinet members under Major.
The extensive involvement of special advisers in various aspects of policy
continued. Adam Ridely, as a special adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Geoffrey Howe, was closely involved in the development of the 'Medium-Term
David Owen, Face the Future (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981), pp300-2; and David Owen, Time
to Declare (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p.263.
Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.487.
Wicks Committee on Standards in Public Life, Public Hearings, Day Four, Morning
Session, 2 July 2002.
° John Rentoul, Tony Blair, Prime Minister (London: Little, Brown, 2001), p.194; and Michael
Foley, The British Presidency, Tony Blair and the Politics of Public Leadership (Manchester,
Manchester University Press), p.5.
Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.424.
52 Lawson, The View from No.11, p.263.
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Financial Strategy', introduced in the 1980 Budget. This entailed the
proclamation of precise commitments to restrictions on the growth of the money
supply, designed to reduce inflationary expectations. 53 Major's big idea was the
Citizen's Charter, an initiative intended to re-cast recipients of public services as
consumers, with the system of rights this entailed. 54 This was developed and
named in 1991 by senior members of his Policy Unit, in conjunction with Major's
Political Secretary, Jonathan Hill.55
Ed Balls, aide to Gordon Brown, was a major inspiration for a variety of important
measures. Amongst the most important of these was the decision implemented
immediately after Labour came to power in 1997, to remove the power to set
interest rates, which previously resided with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to
the newly formed Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England.56
Anthony Thirlwall, Kaldor's biographer, agrees that, as an outside economic
adviser, Balls's policy influence has been historically immense, possibly coming
behind only that of Kaldor and Keynes. 57 As well as initiating ideas, from 1970,
special advisers enabled their employers to monitor and influence developments.
As has been shown, political aides provided briefings on papers being sent to their
ministers.
" Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.155.
' John Major, The Autobiography, (London: HarperCollins, 2000), pp245-63. See: The Citizen's
Charter, Cmnd. 1599 (London: HMSO, 1991).
Sarah Hogg and Jonathan Hill, Too Close to Call, power and politics - John Major in No. 10
(London: Warner, 1995), pp93-105.
56 Paul Routledge, Gordon Brown, The Biography, (London: Simon and Schustser, 1998), p.290.
Anthony ThirIwall in conversation with Andrew Buck, 12 July 2002.
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It has been suggested that, to some extent, the use of special advisers posed a
threat to the traditions and influence of the permanent bureaucracy. Post-1970,
matters such as obtaining access to ministers continued to be significant. For
example, at the time of its instigation, Donoughue engaged in 'prolonged and
strenuous talks' 58 with the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt, regarding the role of
the Policy Unit within Whitehall. Hunt was greatly concerned that the position of
the Private Office as the formal channel for communication between Number 10
and ministers be maintained. 59 Antagonism between special advisers and
permanent bureaucrats, in which questions of policy, propriety and personality
could become intertwined, continued. Great public controversy surrounded the
activities of J0 Moore, special adviser to Stephen Byers, the Labour Secretary of
State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) during 200 1-2.
Discontented permanent officials leaked details to the press of her alleged
attempts to use events such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US as
opportunities for announcing 'anything [ie: bad news] we want to bury.' In its
report on this affair, the Select Committee on Public Administration judged both
that Moore had improperly assumed management functions and that 'a number of
civil servants abandoned professional standards by leaking information and
misinformation in a way intended to undermine Ms Moore.'6°
58 Donoughue, Prime Minister, p.22.
Ibid. p.22.
60 The Unfortunate Events', Select Committee on Public Adminisfration, Eigth Report 2001-2,
HC 303, July 2002, p.5.
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By the 1980s and 90s, the policy influence of permanent secretaries had declined,
with special advisers gaining influence in this area. 61 Under Blair, the power of
temporary aides also began to expand in other ways. Following his election
victory, 'executive powers over civil servants' were granted to up to three Number
10 aides through an amended 1997 Order in Council. These were taken up by two
special advisers, Alastair Campbell, the Chief Press Secretary, and Jonathan
Powell, the Chief of Staff. 62 In a 1983 BBC Reith Lecture, Sir Douglas Wass, no
doubt speaking for many permanent bureaucrats, stated that he favoured the
existing arrangement of 'special advisers working with permanent officials, but
not directly responsible for the implementation of policy.' 63 This convention was
now overturned. Balogh in particular saw the use special advisers as a means of
establishing an alternative establishment. Since the 1 960s, other politicians have
viewed the Civil Service as a traditional institution to be displaced, especially
Thatcher, who, as has been shown, also made extensive use of temporary
officials. Perversely, in the Blair era, the Treasury, the power of which Balogh in
particular sought to reduce, reached what was arguably its zenith in terms of
detailed policy influence, although it was subject to greater political direction
from Brown's team of aides. Control of personnel, however, (though not of
labour costs) was long since lost.65
61 Peter Barberis, The Elite of the Elite, p.37.
62 Reinforcing Standards, Vol.1, Cmnd. 4557-1, p.70.
63 Douglas Wass, Government and the Governed, BBC Reith Lectures 1983 (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1984), pp55-7.
Kevin Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall, p.232.
65 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p.477 and p.480.
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During 1964-70, there were no clear rules governing the conduct of special
advisers. Given the growth in numbers and power of aides, the lack of formal
regulation became an increasing concern. In 1974, between them, the Head of the
Home Civil Service, Douglas Allen, and Wilson agreed the ground rules for the
large batch which were appointed upon Labour's return to office that year.
According to Allen, Wilson made most of the suggestions. The total possible
number was capped, Allen recalls, at 38. Appointments were subject to prime
ministerial approval. Special advisers would leave with a change of government.
Their contracts, although varying in length, were all short, meaning ministers, if
so inclined, could remove them quickly. Crucially, they had no power over
permanent civil servants. 66 Wilson initially contemplated forbidding special
advisers from serving as local councillors, 67 but eventually a Cabinet decision was
taken to the contrary. 68 By the early twenty-first century, there was a degree of
alarm within political circles that, particularly since 1997, the use of special
advisers had gone too far, too quickly, without being given sufficient
consideration. For example, in 2001, concerned by issues such as the possible
politicisation of the neutral Civil Service, the Public Administration Committee
stated that '[n]ot only should the experiment not be extended but the existing
arrangements should be reviewed.'69
Lord Croham in conversation with Andrew Buck.
67 Castle, The Castle Diaries 1974-76, p.66, diary entry for 4 April 1974.
68 Ibid, p.105, diary entry for 23 May 1974.
69 Special Advisers: Boon or Bane?: Report. Proceedings and Appendices, Public Administration
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Under pressure of this type, in 2001, the government published a 'Code of
Conduct for Special Advisers', as part of a Model Contract for aides. One of its
most important stipulations was that special advisers were limited in their
activities to the 'areas that Govermnent and Party.. .overlap' rather than
exclusively party political territory. 70 Also in 2001, following a degree of
confusion about the numbers that could be appointed, the government changed the
sections of the Ministerial Code (the guidebook for ministers) relating to special
advisers, to realistically reflect existing practice. It was now made clear that there
was no limit on the total which could be appointed to Number 10. Others within
the Cabinet (and those who attended regularly but were not official members)
were restricted to two each, although with prime ministerial approval, could
appoint more.71
This represented limited movement towards formalisation. However, there were
demands, particularly from Lord Neill's Committee on Standards in Public Life in
early 2000, that rules controlling special advisers should be included in a proposed
Civil Service Act. 72 In July 2000, the government committed itself to do this, but
at an unspecified point in the future. 73 In March 2002, prompted by concerns that
have been described, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, by this time
chaired by Sir Nigel Wicks, embarked on an extensive investigation 'into the
° The 1997 edition used similar wording. Model Contract for Special Advisers (London: Cabinet
Office, July 2001), p.12.
' Ministerial Code (London: Cabinet Office, 2001), paragraph 50.
72 Reinforcing Standards, Vol. 1, Cmnd 4557-1, p.83.
The Government's Response to the Sixth Report from the Committee on Standards in Public life,
Cmnd. 4817, (London: HMSO. 2000), response to recommendation 24.
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relationship between Ministers, special advisers and permanent civil servants',
due to report at the end of 2OO2. Hennessy, in his appearance before Wicks, in
support of the Neill objective, said that '[t]he human side of these operations is
going to be always very fluid and not to be codified.. .the reason for codes.. .is that
if it does get out of hand we have all, by and large, signed up for something which
Parliament has passed, about what the relationship should be in the round, so that
we can be clear about what the 'rubbing points' are.' 75 In an unusual move,
nearing retirement, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Richard Wilson, publicly entered
the fray in March 2002, in a lecture to the Centre for Management and Policy
Studies, part of his own Cabinet Office. He, too, favoured codification in law, in
order to provide negative controls on the conduct of aides. As he stated, 'we
should say clearly and firmly what they cannot do.'76
Certain conclusions can be drawn as to the nature of special advisers during all the
periods under examination. There can be no doubt that the introduction of
partisan elements into the neutral bureaucracy took place. They represented a
genuine, lasting innovation. While additional expertise was incorporated into the
Civil Service as a result of the use of special advisers, much of the work of aides
was generalist in nature and specifically political counsellors grew in number.
Sometimes they were actors in their own rights. The proliferation of temporary
' For details of this, see: Defining the Boundaries Within the Executive, Ministers, Special
Advisers and the Permanent Civil Service, Issues and Questions Paper, Committee on Standards in
Public Life.
The Wicks Committee on Standards in Public Life, Public Hearings, Day Four, Morning
Session, 2 July 2002.
76 Po,frait of a Profession Revisited, Speech by Sir Richard Wilson, 26 March 2002.
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bureaucrats made an important contribution to a quantitative growth at the prime
ministerial centre. Foreign influences were an important, although probably not
pre-eminent, factor. Special advisers have been continuously involved with many
important policy-related activities.
The 1964 instigation of the special adviser was partly motivated by a desire to
displace a supposed existing establishment. Whether this objective was ever
achieved is very difficult to determine. However, particularly since 1997, as a
result of the use of temporary aides, the relative power of the permanent
bureaucracy declined significantly. This heightened anxieties regarding propriety
and led to calls for codification of the conduct of temporary bureaucrats. Finally,
in the period from 1964, all senior ministers became equipped with their own
aides, appointed on a basis of personal patronage, who owed their first loyalty to
their employer. At times, the mutual dependence which emerged was a more
important characteristic than any other.
From 1964 onwards, special advisers became an established constitutional fixture.
For the foreseeable future, it is difficult to envisage their being abolished. As the
case of Thatcher demonstrated, even those who regarded these temporary civil
servants with scepticism could find them extremely useful once in office. The
period 1964-70 was a formative one, in which the characteristics attributable to
the special adviser were combined for the first time in a single post. All of the
functions, from the supply of expert counsel to presentation, were there, as were
363
the human and propriety-related difficulties which have attained prominence
recently. While the emphases may have changed in the subsequent decades, an
unbroken tradition can be traced from Wilson's first wave to the present batch.
Special advisers must be understood in this context.
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